R v Abzakh, 2016 ABQB 694

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v Abzakh, 2016 ABQB 694 Date: 20161208 Docket: 111460168Q1 Registry: Edmonton Between: Her Majesty the Queen - and - Yanal Abzakh _______________________________________________________ Judgment of the of the Honourable Mr. Justice J.J. Gill _______________________________________________________ Introduction [ 1 ] Mr. Yanal Abzakh (the Accused) applies for a judicial stay pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter ) on the ground that his s. 11(

b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time has been violated. Background [ 2 ] The Accused is charged with three offences: 1) Possession of a loaded firearm contrary to s 95(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code (“CCC”);

2) Possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking, contrary to s 5.2 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (“CDSA”); and 3) Possession without lawful excuse of a firearm, knowing that the serial number has been removed contrary to s 108(1)(

b) of the CCC. [ 3 ] The charges arise from the police search of the Accused’s house. During the search the police located cocaine in powder form and in a hard format in the Accused’s basement. The drugs were found adjacent to a bathroom sink in a locked bathroom and above a ceiling tile in a storage room adjacent to the bathroom. A loaded handgun was found under the mattress in the master bedroom ( R v Abzakh, 2014 ABQB 372 ). [ 4 ] The Accused was first charged with the offences on September 29th, 2011.

The delay between that day and the anticipated end of trial on November 29th, 2016 is 1888 days (62.9 months). [ 5 ] The Defence concedes that 411 days of this period arises from Defence adjournments leaving a net delay of 1497 days (49.9 months).The Crown attributes 1030 days to Defence delay resulting in a net delay of 858 days (28.6 months) which is below the presumptive ceiling of 30 months set out in R v Jordan 2016 SCC 27 . [ 6 ] The Crown and the Accused jointly rely upon the attached

summary of the Court appearances taken from the date of the Applicant’s arrest to November 29 th , 2016. Issues: 1) How much of the delay is attributable to Defence delay? 2) Does the delay exceed or fall below the presumptive ceiling? 3) Is the delay unreasonable? Law [ 7 ]

Section 11(

b) of the Charter provides: 11. Any person charged with an offence has the right (

b) to be tried within a reasonable time. The Jordon Framework [ 8 ] In R v Jordan 2016 SCC 27 the Supreme Court provided a new framework for s. 11(

b) analysis. At paragraph 105: [105] The new framework for s. 11 (

b) can be summarized as follows: • There is a ceiling beyond which delay becomes presumptively unreasonable. The presumptive ceiling is 18 months for cases tried in the provincial court, and 30 months for cases in the superior court (or cases tried in the provincial court after a preliminary inquiry). Defence delay does not count towards the presumptive ceiling. • Once the presumptive ceiling is exceeded , the burden shifts to the Crown to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness on the basis of exceptional circumstances.

Exceptional circumstances lie outside the Crown’s control in that (1) they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and (2) they cannot reasonably be remedied. If the exceptional circumstance relates to a discrete event, the delay reasonably attributable to that event is subtracted. If the exceptional circumstance arises from the case’s complexity, the delay is reasonable. • Below the presumptive ceiling , in clear cases, the Defence may show that the delay is unreasonable.

To do so, the Defence must establish two things: (1) it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings; and (2) the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have. • For cases currently in the system , the framework must be applied flexibly and contextually, with due sensitivity to the parties’ reliance on the previous state of the law. Defence Delay [ 9 ] The principal issue in this case is Defence delay. Defence delay does not count towards the presumptive ceiling. Defence delay is discussed in Jordon in paragraphs 60 -65:

[60] Application of this framework, as under the Morin framework, begins with calculating the total delay from the charge to theactual or anticipated end of trial. Once that is determined, delay attributable to the Defence must be subtracted. The Defence should notbe allowed to benefit from its own delay-causing conduct. As Sopinka J. wrote in Morin: “The purpose of s. 11(

b) is to expeditetrials and minimize prejudice and not to avoid trials on the merits” (p. 802). [61] Defence delay has two components. The first is delay waived by the Defence (Askov, at pp. 1228-29; Morin, at pp. 790-91).Waiver can be explicit or implicit, but in either case, it must be clear and unequivocal. The Accused must have full knowledge of his orher rights, as well as the effect waiver will have on those rights.

However, as in the past, “[i]n considering the issue of ‘waiver’ in thecontext of s. 11(b), it must be remembered that it is not the right itself which is being waived, but merely the inclusion of specific periodsin the overall assessment of reasonableness” (R v Conway, (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659, perL’Heureux-Dubé J., at p.1686) [63] The second component of Defence delay is delay caused solely by the conduct of the Defence.

This kind of Defence delaycomprises “those situations where the Accused’s acts either directly caused the delay . . . or the acts of the Accused are shown to be adeliberate and calculated tactic employed to delay the trial” (Askov, at pp. 1227-28). Deliberate and calculated Defence tactics aimed atcausing delay, which include frivolous applications and requests, are the most straightforward examples of Defence delay.

Trial judgesshould generally dismiss such applications and requests the moment it becomes apparent they are frivolous. [64] As another example, the Defence will have directly caused the delay if the court and the Crown are ready to proceed, but theDefence is not. The period of delay resulting from that unavailability will be attributed to the Defence. However, periods of time duringwhich the court and the Crown are unavailable will not constitute Defence delay, even if Defence counsel is also unavailable. Thisshould discourage unnecessary inquiries into Defence counsel availability at each appearance.

Beyond Defence unavailability, it will ofcourse be open to trial judges to find that other Defence actions or conduct have caused delay (see, e.g., R v Elliott (2003), (ON CA), 114 C.R.R. (2d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 175-82). [65] To be clear, Defence actions legitimately taken to respond to the charges fall outside the ambit of Defence delay. Forexample, the Defence must be allowed preparation time, even where the court and the Crown are ready to proceed. In addition,Defence applications and requests that are not frivolous will also generally not count against the Defence.

We have alreadyaccounted for procedural requirements in setting the ceiling. And such a deduction would run contrary to the Accused’s right to makefull answer and Defence. While this is by no means an exact science, first instance judges are uniquely positioned to gauge thelegitimacy of Defence actions. [66] To summarize, as a first step, total delay must be calculated, and Defence delay must be deducted. Defence delaycomprises delays waived by the Defence, and delays caused solely or directly by the Defence’s conduct.

Defence actionslegitimately taken to respond to the charges do not constitute Defence delay. (emphasis added) Analysis 1.) How much of the delay is attributable to Defence delay? [10] There are three types of Defence conduct which the Crown submits should be deducted as Defence delay. These are: (

a) Delay caused by a late change of counsel by the Accused; (

b) Delay caused by the Defence/Accused changing his stated position on key issues after the Crown has closed their case; (

c) Delay caused by the Defence filing an inadequate Charter notice.

a) Delay caused by a late change of counsel by the Accused [11] The date of the charges is Thursday, September 29, 2011. The first court appearance was on Monday, October 3, 2011.Several appearances for election and plea took place on November 30, 2011 and December 22, 2011. On January 18, 2012, preliminaryhearing dates were set for October 22-24th, 2012.Complete disclosure was provided by November 15, 2011. [12] On September 14, 2012, the matter was brought forward at the request of Defence to vacate the October 22-24, 2012preliminary hearing dates and set a half day for

summary disposition. That date was adjourned again the request of the Defence to October 5th, 2012. On October 5th, 2012 the matter was set to January 9, 2013 for a half day preliminary hearing. Later that day theCrown received a letter indicating that new Defence counsel was being retained. [13] The matter was then brought forward at the request of the Defence to October 18, 2012 to speak to new preliminary hearingdates as new counsel was not available for the October, 2012 preliminary hearing dates. New preliminary hearing dates were set forApril 10 and 11, 2013.

The Crown submits that this delay of 171 days from the original to the new preliminary hearing dates (October22, 2012 – April 11, 2013) is Defence delay. [14] The Defence submits that this delay should not be attributable to the Defence as the delay was occasioned by the applicant’sonly change of Counsel. The Defence submits that under the Jordan framework the accused should be able to retain and instruct newcounsel without penalty. Upon being retained current Defence counsel forthwith scheduled a new and shorter preliminary hearing which

proceeded as scheduled. The change of counsel took place at a relatively early stage in the proceedings and there is no proof that the change of counsel was a delaying tactic by the Accused. [ 15 ] I find that this delay was due to the Accused changing counsel a short period before the preliminary hearing was scheduled to begin on October 22 nd , 2012. The delay from October 22, 2012 – April 11, 2013 (171 days) was caused directly and solely by the conduct of the Defence. It is Defence delay and should be deducted.

b) Delay caused by the Defence/Accused changing his position on key issues after the Crown has closed their case; [ 16 ] The Crown submits the entire period from April 23 rd , 2015 to October 19 th , 2016 (545 days) is Defence delay. The Defence agrees that the period from May 24 th , 2016 to October 19 th , 2016 (148 days) is Defence delay (medical emergency). [ 17 ] This leaves a period of 397 days from April 23 rd , 2015 to May 24 th , 2016, which the Crown submits is Defence delay arising from the Defence/Accused changing his position on key issues, after the Crown has closed their case.

The Crown submits it was required to respond to these changes of position by calling rebuttal evidence and/or making additional submissions. The Crown submits this delay was avoidable if the Defence/Accused had disclosed his intention to change his positions before the Crown closed its case on November 5 th , 2014. [ 18 ] The Crown points to two main changes of position by the Defence/Accused. The first relating to the Accused’s statement to the police. In his evidence the Accused denied significant elements of his police statement.

This was contrary to an earlier agreement between the Crown and the Defence. [ 19 ] The second change of position concerns the Accused alleging a breach of his

section 10(

b) Charter right after previously admitting that he was given his 10(

b) rights. The Police Statement: [ 20 ] Dealing firstly with the police statement. A voir dire was concluded on May 12 th , 2014. The matter was adjourned to June 9 th , 2014 for argument. It was then adjourned to June 17 th , 2014 for a decision on the voir dire . This Court determined that the evidence in the voir dire was admissible at trial. Continuation of the trial was scheduled to commence November 5 th , 2014. [ 21 ] On November 5th, 2014 the Crown closed its case. The Defence then advised that it had a new witness (Natasha) that counsel had met for the first time minutes before coming into court.

Defence counsel was not ready to proceed as he needed time to decide if the witness would testify and, if so, to prepare. The matter was adjourned and rescheduled for continuation on April 23 - 24 th , 2015. [ 22 ] At the continuation on April 23 rd , 2015, the Defence advised the Crown that he intended to call the Accused and that the Accused would be disputing possession of the handgun and the drugs. [ 23 ] The Crown submits that this news was a surprise for two reasons.

Firstly because counsel for the Defence had stated on the record on November 5 th , 2014 when the last adjournment (for Natasha) was granted that it would provide notice to the Crown of any other evidence that might be called. The following is an excerpt from the transcript of November 5 th , 2014 beginning at page 4, line 18: MR. HLADUN: . And the Crown’s closed its case. In terms of defence, there’s a witness that, for the first time this morning, minutes before coming into court, I had an opportunity to meet, and I had some discussion with her.

She’s present in the courtroom, and I’ve shared with my friend what her evidence, generally, would be. I’ve not had an opportunity to interview her properly or at length or to do what I should be doing in a – in a complete, full manner.

My friend and I had discussions, as well, that if perhaps this matter could go over to a date and put that date into next year, where, in discussions with my friend, I will share with him whether or not this witness will testify, and of course the Crown – if I propose to call this witness, I’m sure there will be some due diligence the Crown’s going to undertake, so I’m aware of that. Secondly, I would propose that I would come with notice to the Crown if there’s any other evidence I propose to call . If not, close case, argue, and make use of that time.

And in that regard, we may want to take a full day, I would expect. (emphasis added) [ 24 ] Secondly there was an agreement between the Crown and the Defence that the Accused would not dispute that he was in possession of the firearm and drugs and that the Crown would not call evidence of the police statement made by the Accused. This agreement was explained in more detail by the Crown on August 27 th , 2015. The following is an excerpt from the transcript of the proceedings on August 27 th , 2015 beginning at line 6: Submissions by Mr. Brown MR. BROWN:

Thank you, Sir. Sir, frankly with respect to the law my friend has put before the Court, I don’t have any dispute with any position or the argument he’s put forward in terms of the normal course of events this would clearly be the Crown splitting its case. The Crown cannot say that we were not aware of the statement that was given by Mr. Abzakh and taken by Corporal Ross on September 29 th of 2011. It’s been in our hands essentially from the outset of this case. So there’s no surprise from that perspective, and it is otherwise a matter that you would anticipate the Crown would enter into its case proper.

There are, however, two factual elements that make this case different from what I would submit is the norm. Firstly, my friend and I, as I think you know, have had a number of discussions about this case, and we’ve tried to be cooperative throughout the process of this case. So in April of 2013, I believe it was, I’m sorry, April 2014 rather, he and I had a discussion, and as a result of that discussion, I sent him a letter dated April 30 th , 2014.

Now, normally of course I wouldn’t disclose any communication between Counsel but this was not on a non-prejudice basis, and it’s frankly necessary for me to read a very brief portion of the letter I sent to Mr. Hladun confirming our discussion. So I’ll read that to you briefly, Sir, if I might. This is on the second page of my April 30, 2014 letter. It says: The defence is prepared to admit that Mr. Abzakh was in possession of the firearm and the cocaine, the crack cocaine at the relevant times; therefore, the Crown will not call any evidence of any statement given by Mr. Abzakh .

No evidence will be called with respect to the contents of the seized electronics. The Crown will call evidence with respect to the stun gun for the sole purpose of establishing the basis for the controlled delivery and the general warrant.

The submission the Crown makes, and I don’t intend for the Crown to necessarily take notice of any of those facts specifically, the only element of that paragraph that the Crown wishes to rely on for the purpose of this argument is that there was an agreement between defence and Crown that the statement would not be called as part of the Crown’s case and that’s why it wasn’t called as part of the Crown’s case. (emphasis added) [ 25 ] The Crown confirmed for the record that this agreement concerning the police statement was not intended to be an admission of guilt by the Accused, nor could it be used as evidence of the offences.

I will not use the agreement for those purposes. However, the agreement is relevant to the issue of whether some or all of the delay is Defence delay. [ 26 ] In his testimony on April 23 rd , 2015 the Accused denied having any knowledge of the drugs found in the basement and the gun under his mattress. He described the witness Natasha (22) as a kind of step daughter who had lived with his family until she moved out at age 15. She had moved back with her boyfriend in August 2011 and lived in the basement. Natasha moved out right after September 29 th , 2011, the day the Accused was arrested.

The Accused had only met Natasha’s boyfriend a couple of times. He did not know his last name and believes he got busted for drugs and went to jail. The Crown cross examined the Accused but did not use the Accused’s police statement to the police to challenge the Accused. [ 27 ] After hearing the Accused’s evidence on April 23 rd , 2015 the Crown applied to call evidence of the police statement by way of rebuttal. The Defence opposed the Crown application. The Crown’s application to call rebuttal evidence was granted.

An adjournment was required as the Crown needed to call the retired detective who had taken the Accused’s statement. Trial continuation dates were subsequently set for August 27th and 28th, 2015. There was no admission that the statement was voluntary. [ 28 ] The Crown submits that the delay from April 23 rd , 2015 to August 27 th , 2015 was caused by the Defence’s failure to provide the Crown with advance notice that the Accused was going to testify and would dispute possession of the handgun and the drugs.

Had the Crown been aware that the Accused would testify and deny significant contents of his police statement, the Crown would have been prepared to call evidence concerning the police statement during the April, 2015 appearances. [ 29 ] The Defence submits that this is not Defence delay.

The Defence submits that given the tactical burden borne by the Defence, it should not come as surprise to the Crown that after the evidence from the May 2014 voir dire was found to be admissible, the Defence would call the Accused and other witnesses to provide testimony as to his knowledge in possession of items upon by the police in the applicant’s home. I agree that might be correct in other situations. But in this case, the Defence breached an agreement after the Crown had closed its case. The Crown had relied on the agreement. It was caught by surprise and was put at a serious disadvantage.

The Crown needed time to respond. [ 30 ] The Defence further notes that the Crown had the opportunity to cross examine the Accused on the contents of the police statement when the Accused first testified in April, 2015 but failed to do so. I do not find this argument persuasive. Accused had changed his position without notice and the Crown did not have the police witnesses available to present evidence of the police statement. There were no admission that the police statement was voluntary [ 31 ] I find the delay relating to the Crown’s rebuttal evidence was caused solely by the Defence. Alleged

Section 10(

b) breach [ 32 ] On August 28 th , 2015 the Crown called rebuttal evidence. Retired Detective Ross testified in a voir dire concerning the Accused’s statement. The Accused also testified in the voir dire . The Accused’s evidence raised issues concerning voluntariness and a 10(

b) Charter breach. [ 33 ] The 10(

b) Charter breach was a new issue. It was contrary to the position taken on the record by the Defence in May 2014. The following is an excerpt from the May, 2014 transcript beginning at page 220, line 20:

MR. HLADUN: Yeah, no that’s—we are both on the same page and I thank Your Lordship. I guess two things. One, that’s the evidence on the voir dire, so that’s that. And there is an admission by the Defence that in terms of

Section 10(b), you heard evidence that he was given his 10(

b) rights, so the admission is that those rights were in proper form, proper wording, there’s no issue with respect to that. THE COURT: Okay. So we are probably – I am not anticipating anything, but maybe

Section 7,

Section 8 are the main kind of arguments? MR. HLADUN: They are. THE COURT: Okay. MR. HLADUN: The 10(

b) in terms of the implementation of it, there’s no argument there either . So quite properly the argument will be

section 7,

Section 8. (emphasis added) [ 34 ] It is also significant that the Accused did not file a 10(

b) Charter notice. [ 35 ] Additional court time was required for the Crown to respond to the 10(

b) issue. The proceedings continued on May 24th, 2016 but had to be rescheduled to October 19th, 2016 due to a Defence request (medical emergency). [ 36 ] The Crown submits that the

section 10(

b) Charter issue could have been raised by the Defence at either the first voir dire in May 2014, or when the Accused testified in April 2015. The Crown notes that there was ample trial time in April 24, 2015 for the Accused to give evidence. I agree and find any delay relating to the Accused’s change of position on 10(

b) was caused solely by the Defence. [ 37 ] I note also that there is no explanation as to why the Defence did not advice the Crown that the Accused was changing his position concerning either the contents of the police statement or the alleged 10(

b) breach prior to the Crown closing its case on November 5th, 2014. Clearly if the Defence had done so, the Crown would have been able to call the evidence and make submissions on these issues at an earlier point thereby eliminating all or most of the delay. [ 38 ] This appears to be deliberate conduct by the Defence to delay the trial. The following comment from Jordan is applicable: [60] The Defence should not be allowed to benefit from its own delay-causing conduct. As Sopinka J. wrote in Morin: “The urpose of s. 11(

b) is to expedite trials and minimize prejudice and not to avoid trials on the merits” (p. 802). [ 39 ] In

summary I find that all of the delay, after the Crown closed his case on November 5, 2014 to October 19, 2016 (over and above the periods already agreed to as Defence delay) was caused solely and directly by the Defence/Accused changing his position on the police statement and on

section 10(

b) of the Charter . [ 40 ] The Crown also submitted that the time period from the conclusion of the first voir dire up until the date of submissions on that voir dire(i.e.: from May, 12 2014 to June 9 th , 2014 (28 days) should be attributed to Defence delay because the Defence changed its position regarding a s. 8 breach. I find no evidence to support this argument.

c) Delay caused by late and inadequate notice on a Charter application notice. [ 41 ] On October 19th, 2016, the Defence applied for a judicial stay on the ground that his s. 11(

b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time has been violated. The Defence had filed and served the Crown with a Charter notice on October 17th, 2016. [ 42 ] The Crown argued that the Defence should not be permitted to proceed with the s. 11(b). It noted the Charter notice did not provide any facts on which to base a decision regarding the delay nor did the Defence provide supporting case law in a timely manner. After hearing argument this Court decided that it should hear the s. 11(

b) argument but granted the Crown an adjournment to respond due to the inadequate notice and materials provided by the Defence. The matter was rescheduled to November 29 th , 2016 [ 43 ] The Crown submits that the period from October 19th, 2016 to November 29th, 2016 (41 days) should be classified as Defence delay. The first notice of the s. 11(

b) application received was on October 17, 2016, two days before the scheduled October 19 th , 2016 continuation. The Crown notes that the Jordan decision was released on July 8, 2016. The Defence would have been aware of the potential for the s.11 (

b) argument but no steps were taken by the Defence to bring the matter forward or ensure that the matter was presented in a timely manner. In addition, the Charter notice itself was wholly inadequate. It contained no facts other than to state that the matter had continued for five years .The notice contained no delineation of the delay among the Crown, the Court or the Accused.

[ 44 ] I find that this 41 day delay should be attributed to the Defence. It was directly and solely caused by the inadequate Charter notice filed by the Defence. The Jordan decision was released in July, 2016 and the Defence had sufficient time to provide a timely and adequate Charter notice. 2) Does the delay exceed or fall below the presumptive ceiling? [ 45 ] In

summary, I find the following periods totalling 1002 days (33.4 months) should be deducted as Defence delay: October 22, 2012 – April 11, 2013=171 days (Late change of counsel by the Accused) February 18, 2014 – May 5, 2014 = 76 days (Agreed Defence delay) November 5, 2014 – April 23, 2015 = 169 days (Agreed Defence delay) April 23, 2015 – August 28, 2015 = 127 days (Defence/Accused changing position) August 28, 2015 – May 24, 2016 = 270 days (Defence/Accused changing position) May 24, 2016 – October 19, 2016 = 148 days (Agreed Defence delay) October19, 2016 – November 29, 2016 = 41 days (Inadequate Charter notice) Total Defence delay =:1002 days (33.4 months) [ 46 ] There has been a total of 1888 days or 62.9 months of delay in this matter since the Accused was charged.

Deducting the 1002 days of Defence delay leaves a total of 886 days (29.5 months). The delay falls below the presumptive ceiling of 30 months set out in Jordon . 3) Has the delay been unreasonable? [ 47 ] If the delay is below the presumptive ceiling the Defence may show that the delay is unreasonable.

The Accused filed an affidavit describing the negative effects of the delay on his family, work and financial situation. [ 48 ] The Defence has not established that it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have. [ 49 ] I do not find that the delay has been unreasonable. Decision [ 50 ] The s.11(

b) application is dismissed. Heard on the 29 rd day of November, 2016. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 8th day of December, 2016. J.J. Gill J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Mr. Kent Brown and Ms. Jane Conly,

Public Prosecution Service of Canada for the Crown Mr. R.W. Hladun, Q. C. for Mr.Yanal Abzakh Abzakh Court Appearances Date Appearances Provincial Court September 29, 2011 Date of Arrest October 3, 2011 First Appearances November 30, 2011 Election & Plea December 22, 2011 Election & Plea First Appearance for 111460168P1 (s. 104 & 95 CC; s. 159 CUA & s. 5(2) CDSA) January 18, 2011 Election & Plea Prelim Dates are set for October 22-24, 2012 First Appearance for 120016399P1 (s. 108 CC) March 13, 2012 PTC September 14, 2012 To Speak To – to Vacate Prelim dates and se new

Summary Disposition Date October 5, 2012 To Speak To – ½ day set for January 9 Prelim October 18, 2012 To Speak To – change of Defence Counsel New Prelim dates set for April 10-11, 2013 October 22-24, 2012 (Original Prelim Dates) CANCELLED – Prelim These were cancelled at the September 14, 2012 appearance January 9, 2013 CANCELLED – Prelim These were cancelled at the October 18, 2012 appearance January 11, 2013 CANCELLED – PTC Adjourned to March 15 March 15, 2013 PTC April 10, 2013 Prelim Court of Queen’s Bench May 24, 2013 Arraignment – QBAC November 5, 2013 PTC & February 2014 Trial dates were pre-booked so this appearance was cancelled

June 21, 2013 Arraignment – QBAC February 2014 Trial dates were cancelled at Defence’s request and May 2014 trial dates are set November 5, 2013 CANCELLED – PTC PTC was cancelled at Defence’s request and rescheduled for March 5, 2014 February 18-21 & 24-27, 2014 Original Trial dates CANCELLED – Trial These dates were cancelled at Defence’s request at the June 21, 2013 appearance March 5, 2014 PTC May 5-11, 2014 Trial June 9, 2014 Voir Dire Decision June 17, 2014 Charter Decision July 4, 2014 Arraignment – QBAC November 5, 2014 Trial continuation was pre- booked so this appearance was cancelled November 5, 2014 Trial Continuation November 21, 2014 Arraignment – QBAC Adjourned to December 5, 2014 as Justice Gill’s

schedule for 2015 wasn’t available December 5, 2014 Arraignment – QBAC April 23 & 24, 2015 Trial Continuation was set April 23 & 24, 2015 Trial Continuation May 8, 2015 Arraignment – QBAC August 27 & 28, 2015 Trial Continuation was set August 27 & 28, 2015 Trial Continuation September 18, 2016 Arraignment – QBAC May 24, 2016 Trial Continuation is set May 24, 2016 Trial Continuation June 3, 2016 Arraignment – QBAC October 19 Trial continuation was pre-booked so this appearance was cancelled October 19, 2016 Trial Continuation November 29, 2016 Decision