Matras Estate, 2016 ABQB 728

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Matras Estate, 2016 ABQB 728 Date: 20161221 Docket: ES03 145958 Registry: Edmonton Court File Number ES03 145958 Court Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta (Surrogate Matter) Judicial Centre Edmonton Estate Name Marjorie Matras Applicants Maxine Elsenheimer Karen Meyer Candace Watson Respondents Rene Matras Eileen Gullion _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Mr. Justice W.N. Renke _______________________________________________________ [ 1 ] The Applicants brought an application for advice and directions respecting the

interpretation of the Will of Marjorie Matras in Civil Chambers on October 4, 2016. Counsel for Rene Matras, the personal representative named in the Will, was in attendance. Eileen Gullion was not named as a party to the proceedings and no one appeared on her behalf in Chambers. [ 2 ] The issue was whether Ms. Gullion is one of the testatrix’s “children” and therefore a residuary beneficiary under paragraph 4(

b) of the Will. I was of the view that the issue could not be resolved in Chambers but that I would accept written submissions from the parties. I also directed that Ms. Gullion, who would be clearly affected by the

interpretation of the term “children,” would have an opportunity to respond to the application. I indicated that I would provide a written decision based on my review of the submissions (unless it turned out that a hearing to resolve disputed facts would be necessary). The parties, including Ms. Gullion, have provided written submissions. Having reviewed those submissions, I find that resolving the issue on the basis of those submissions is a fair, just, cost-effective, and proportional procedure as contemplated by rule 1.2 and Hryniak v Mauldin , 2014 SCC 7 , Karakatsanis J at para 49.

[ 3 ] I find that Ms. Guillion is included within the scope of the term “children” in paragraph 4(

b) of the Will. My reasons follow. BACKGROUND [ 4 ] Marjorie Matras died on February 8, 2016, leaving a Will dated November 9, 2009. [ 5 ] The Respondent Rene Matras was named in the Will as the testatrix’s personal representative. [ 6 ] Mr. Matras is a legally adopted child of the testatrix. [ 7 ] The Applicants are the biological daughters of the testatrix. [ 8 ] Ms. Gullion was the testatrix’s foster child. She commenced living with the testatrix in about 1959, when Ms. Gullion was between 4 and 8 months old. She was, however, never adopted by the testatrix. [ 9 ] Mr.

Matras filed an application for probate in April, 2016. Ms. Gullion was named as one of the testatrix’s “children” and listed as a residuary beneficiary. [ 10 ] The Applicants filed a caveat in the probate proceedings on the basis that Ms. Guillon was not one of the “children” of the testatrix as contemplated in the Will. [ 11 ] The Applicants filed this application in September 1, 2016, seeking a judicial

interpretation of paragraph 4(

b) of the Will and an Order directing Mr. Matras, as personal representative, to administer the estate of the testatrix in accordance with the terms of the Will or as the Court directs. In the relief sought, the Applicants applied for certain consequential relief should Mr. Matras fail to administer the Will in accordance with its terms, including an application to remove Mr. Matras as personal representative. [ 12 ] The Grant of Probate has not yet been issued. THE ISSUE: WILL PROVISIONS REQUIRING

INTERPRETATION [ 13 ] Paragraph 4(

b) of the Will provides as follows: (

b) To transfer the rest and residue of my estate, including all articles of personal, domestic and household use or ornament belonging to my estate at my death for the benefit of my children and to divide the residue of my estate then remaining into as many equal shares as the number of my children .... [emphasis added] [ 14 ] Paragraph 4(

c) of the Will provides as follows: For the purposes of this Will, a child or children of a person named in this Will shall mean the biological and legally adopted children of such person. [ 15 ] The Applicants are biological children of the testatrix. Mr. Matras is a legally-adopted child of the testatrix. They, without dispute, are “children” within the meaning of paragraph 4(b). Ms. Guillon is neither a biological child nor an adopted child of the testatrix. The issue is whether she falls within the scope of the term “children” in paragraph 4(b). REASONS 1.

What statutory provisions apply? [ 16 ] The testatrix died after February 1, 2012. Hence, under s. 8(2) of the Wills and Succession Act , ss. 26 and 37 – 40 apply to her Will. Subsection 8(2) provides as follows:

(2) Despite subsection (1), sections 26 and 37 to 40 apply to a will or other writing, a marking or an obliteration regardless of when the will, writing, marking or obliteration was made, if the testator died on or after February 1, 2012. [ 17 ] Notably, s. 28 of the Wills and Succession Act does not apply to the Will since the Will was made prior to February 1,

Section 28 concerns the

interpretation of “child” and “children” in a will. The applicable statutory provision respecting children is s. 36, as it stood before the 2010 amendments to the Wills Act : 36 In the construction of a will, except when a contrary intention appears by the will, an illegitimate child shall be treated as if that child were the legitimate child of that child’s mother. That provision does not advance the argument. Counsel for the Applicants referred to a version of s. 36 that did not apply given the date of the Will.

Part 1 of the Family Law Act has no application to the determination of the issue before me (see s. 36(2) as amended by SA 2010, c. 16, s.1(53) ). [ 18 ] Even if the current s. 28 applied, it would not be decisive. It provides, generally, that a will must be interpreted to include

biological children as children. The provision expands the scope of a reference to children in a will. The provision is subject to a “contrary intention” manifest in a will, and, in any event, does not speak to the inclusion or exclusion of non-biological children of a testator. The purpose of the current s. 28 and the earlier versions of s. 36 of the Wills Act was to combat discrimination against children born outside marriage. These provisions were not drafted with non-biological children in mind.

I read these provisions as including individuals that would otherwise have been excluded from the scope of the term children, but not as excluding other individuals who may be included based on a contextual reading of a will.

See Alberta Law Reform Institute, Wills and the Legal Effects of Changed Circumstances , Final Report (August 2010), chap. 9 , https://www.alri.ualberta.ca/docs/fr098.pdf. [ 19 ] Of more significant bearing on the present issue is s. 26, which does apply, and which provides as follows: 26 A will must be interpreted in a manner that gives effect to the intent of the testator, and in determining the testator’s intent the Court may admit the following evidence: (

a) evidence as to the meaning, in either an ordinary or a specialized sense, of the words or phrases used in the will, (

b) evidence as to the meaning of the provisions of the will in the context of the testator’s circumstances at the time of the making of the will, and (

c) evidence of the testator’s intent with regard to the matters referred to in the will. I will return to this provision below. 2. Does paragraph 4(

c) determine the

interpretation of “children”? [ 20 ] Paragraph 4(

c) of the Will may appear to be decisive. Again, it provides as follows: For the purposes of this Will, a child or children of a person named in this Will shall mean the biological and legally adopted children of such person. It does not refer to non-biological, non-legally adopted children, which might seem conclusively to exclude Ms. Gullion as a “child.” I find, however, that paragraph 4(

c) does not have this effect, for three reasons. [ 21 ] First, it refers to “a child or children of a person named in this Will.” None of the “children” of the testatrix was “named” in the Will in paragraph 4(b). Only Mr. Matras and Candace Watson are named in the Will, in paragraph 2(a), the “Appointment of Executors and Trustees”

section in

Part 1 of the Will. Paragraphs 4(

b) and (

c) are found in

Part 2 of the Will. Arguably, the

Part 1 naming is irrelevant to

Part 2. In paragraph 4(

b) only the description “children” appears. Paragraph 4(c), then, might be found not to have been engaged given the language of the Will. [ 22 ] Second, if that approach is too literal and pedantic, the crucial question is whether “a person named in this Will” includes the testatrix. The difficulty is that this element of paragraph 4(

c) is in the passive voice. It might concern anyone whose name occurs in the Will or it might mean any person the testator has named in the Will. If the former

interpretation were adopted, 4(

c) would apply to the testatrix’s children and would exclude Ms. Gullion. I find, though, that the latter

interpretation is correct. It is the testatrix testator’s Will. She would do the “naming”, even if that were by description – i.e., by referring to her “children.” The testatrix, then, is not included as a “person named in this Will.” She is the person doing the naming in this Will. She is not named in the Will. It is her Will. Hence, as counsel for Mr. Matras pointed out, the testatrix refers to herself in the first person throughout the Will. [ 23 ] Third, if the purpose of paragraph 4(

c) were to define “child” or “children” for all purposes under the Will, the words “of a person named in this Will” would not have been necessary. These words should not be regarded as mere surplusage. They were added for a reason. That reason (as indicated in the previous paragraph) was to distinguish the testatrix’s children from her children’s children. [ 24 ] This approach does not strip paragraph 4(

c) of use. Paragraph 4(

c) applies to the children of the testatrix’s children. It provides some certainty, consistent with statutory non-discrimination provisions, that the biological children of the testatrix’s children would be entitled to benefit under the Will in the circumstances contemplated by the Will. [ 25 ] Thus, paragraph 4(

c) does not determine whether Ms. Gullion does or does not fall within the scope of the term “children” in paragraph 4(b). The testatrix’s intention must be determined. 3. What did the testatrix intend to convey by the term “children,” in light of the evidence? [ 26 ] Paragraph 26(

b) requires a Court to consider, in particular, “the meaning of the provisions of the will in the context of the testator’s circumstances at the time of the making of the will:” 26 A will must be interpreted in a manner that gives effect to the intent of the testator, and in determining the testator’s intent the Court may admit the following evidence: (

b) evidence as to the meaning of the provisions of the will in the context of the testator’s circumstances at the time of the making of the will ....

According to Justice Goss in Re Warren Estate , 2015 ABQB 420 at para 60 , [60] Anyone with an interest can ask the court to determine the testator’s intent, and in that event the court must consider extrinsic evidence without the need to first establish ambiguity: Ryrie v Ryrie , 2013 ABQB 370 at para 41-47 , 564 AR 312. See also Re Lubberts Estate , 2014 ABCA 216 , Wakeling JA at paras 59-61. “Anyone with an interest” includes Mr. Matras and Ms.

Gullion. [ 27 ] Justice Goss’s comments at para 62 of Re Warren Estate respecting a testator’s intent must be borne in mind: [62] The Court noted [in Lubberts Estate ] that ascertaining the testator’s will is a subjective exercise, unlike interpreting contracts and legislation. A will incorporates a series of unilateral choices in contrast to legal instruments which are the product of multiple factors. Subject to public policy concerns, a testator’s last will and testament should be interpreted in a manner completely faithful to her wishes.

A court must assume that the testator intended to give the words which appear in her will their ordinary meaning unless the will and the context rebuts this assumption.

The factual backdrop against which the will was created may explain the meaning the testator attached to words in her ordinary speech, and reveal the persons she most likely regarded as persons whom she would like to assist: Lubberts Estate , paras 10, 52, 57. [ 28 ] The Alberta Law Reform Institute provided the following recommendation and comments about extrinsic evidence and testator’s intent at paras 228 and 230 of Wills and the Legal Effects of Changed Circumstances – and the current Wills and Succession Act was based on ALRI recommendations ( Ryrie at para 24 ): [228] The recommendation of ALRI is that a court should be able to consider all the extrinsic evidence in every case, including evidence of the testator’s intention.

With implementation of this recommendation, the law would be simple and clear. The admission of evidence would not depend on the individual judge’s view of the current law. All litigants would have the same opportunity to have all the available evidence considered. A court would have the best opportunity to ensure that a testator’s intentions were carried out. [230] .... [Safeguards against increased litigation are in place.] Firstly, the will still acts as the guiding star. Extrinsic evidence is only an aid to

interpretation. The court cannot write the will for the testator. Secondly, the Alberta Evidence Act requires that evidence in actions against deceased persons be corroborated. To ensure that this requirement applies to all proceedings interpreting wills, ALRI recommends that a similar provision be placed in the Wills Act . Thirdly, it has always been the job of the court to determine the relevancy and weight of evidence and immaterial or irrelevant evidence would be excluded [footnotes omitted].

As Justice Sisson noted in Ryrie at paras 18 and 19 , [18] Section 3(3) of the Wills and Succession Act , deals with a requirement for corroborative evidence in an application such as this one. It says: “For greater certainty,

section 11 of the Alberta Evidence Act applies in respect of evidence offered or taken in an application to the Court under this Act.” [19]

Section 11 of the Alberta Evidence Act says: In an action by or against the heirs, next of kin, executors, administrators or assigns of a deceased person, an opposed or interested party shall not obtain a verdict, judgment or decision on that party's own evidence in respect of any matter occurring before the death of the deceased person, unless the evidence is corroborated by other material evidence. [ 29 ] The requirement for evidence respecting the testatrix’s intentions fully answers a concern raised by counsel for the Applicants. The testatrix and her husband had more than one foster child.

Counsel asserted that a “Pandora’s box of potential new claims” would be opened should Ms. Gullion be found to be a child of the testatrix. Ms. Gullion is found to be a child of the testatrix based on the evidence, not simply because she was a foster child of the testatrix. There was no evidence that any other former foster child was considered by the testatrix at the time of making the Will to be one of her children.

Were there such evidence, that former foster child would be as entitled to be classified as a residuary beneficiary as the testatrix’s natural children. [ 30 ] The Will was drafted by Thomas Cooke Q.C., now deceased. No part of his file was disclosed in the application. No illumination of the testatrix’s intentions may be drawn from that quarter. I shall not speculate about communications between the testatrix and Mr. Cooke. [ 31 ] Nonetheless, evidence of the testatrix’s intention respecting the term “children” at the time of making the Will was corroborated and utterly convincing.

On the same date as the Will was signed, the testatrix granted an Enduring Power of Attorney naming Ms. Gullion as an attorney and made a Personal Directive naming Ms. Gullion as an agent. In both cases, Ms. Gullion was described as “my daughter.” The other attorney and other agent was her natural daughter, who was also described as “my daughter.” The testatrix’s evidence is hearsay. Necessity is established because she is deceased. Reliability is established because the description of Ms.

Gullion as her daughter (an abbreviated factual proposition) is found in a signed, witnessed, and reviewed-with-counsel document. [ 32 ] Counsel for the Applicants pointed out that entrusting an individual with authority under an Enduring Power of Attorney or a Personal Directive is different than identifying the individual as a beneficiary in a will and different than classifying that individual as a “child” under a will. While the distinction is acknowledged, it misses the point. The point is that on the same day as the Will was signed, the testatrix referred in other estate planning documents to Ms.

Gullion as her “daughter” and used the term “children” to identify beneficiaries in her Will. A daughter is a child. That is common sense. The estate planning documents provide solid evidence of how, at the time the Will was executed, the testatrix regarded Ms. Gullion. She was her daughter and she therefore was one of her children for the purposes of the Will. [ 33 ] Counsel for the Applicants suggested that the testatrix was “mistaken” in referring to Ms. Gullion as her daughter in the other estate planning documents. That is a potential inference. It is the wrong inference. The testatrix referred to Ms.

Gullion as her daughter because that is how she thought of Ms. Gullion. The evidence of her subjective appreciation of Ms. Gullion’s family status should inform

the

interpretation of the Will. [34] The evidence of the other estate planning documents is sufficient to establish the testatrix’s subjective understanding of thefamily status of Ms. Gullion and to resolve the issue of the

interpretation of the Will. Other evidence was referred to in submissions,though, which warrants comment. [35] In her submissions in reply to Ms. Gullion’s submissions, counsel for the Applicants included the former will of the testatrixdated September 16, 1996. Paragraph 3(

c) of that will provided as follows: I direct my Trustee to pay or transfer the residue of my Estate among my five children, MAXINE ROSEMARY ELSENHEIMER,KAREN RUTH MEYER, CANDACE ELAINE WATSON, EILEEN GULLION, and RENE STANLEY MATRAS in equal shares perstirpes. Counsel went on to claim that “In 2009, [the testatrix] drafted a new will specifically excluding Ms. Gullion.” I draw a differentconclusion. First, the old will expressly referred to Ms. Gullion as one of the testatrix’s children (the old will language supports Ms.Gullion’s argument). Second, paragraph 4(

b) of the Will does not name any of the testatrix’s children. If it excludes Ms. Gullion, itexcludes the rest of the children. If it does not exclude the rest of the children, it does not exclude Ms. Gullion. Third, the differencebetween the old will language and the current Will language is that the testatrix’s children are not named. The effect of the twoprovisions is similar. Hence, just as Ms. Gullion was treated as one of her beneficiary children under the old will, so Ms. Gullion wastreated as one of her beneficiary children under the Will. [36] Mr.

Matras also filed an affidavit sworn June 3, 2016, included with counsel’s submissions, that contained evidence pre-datingthe Will. These were birthday cards provided to Ms. Gullion in 1990, 1991, and 1992 from “Mom” and “Dad”, and in 1998 from “Mom”.These descriptors would permit the inference that the recipient was a child of the persons who sent the cards. Ms. Gullion’s 1993Wedding Program was included, which referred to the testatrix and her husband as her “parents,” the Applicants as her “sisters,” and Mr.Matras as her “brother.” Ms.

Gullion attached her wedding announcement as an exhibit to her affidavit of November 2, 2016.Consistently with the Wedding Program, the announcement describes Ms. Gullion as the daughter of the testatrix and her husband. [37] This evidence was not contemporaneous with the execution of the Will. It may be understood as before-the-fact circumstantialevidence relating to the testatrix’s views relating to Ms. Gullion’s family status. Its probative value, though, is not strong given that thedocuments originated (for the most part) over a decade before the execution of the Will.

It was not clear who prepared the weddingdocuments. One might surmise that had the descriptions in these documents have been inaccurate, there would have been a correctiveresponse, but none was in evidence on the record. The pre-Will documentation, at least, did not undermine the inferences drawn from theestate planning documents. [38] Mr. Matras’s affidavit included post-Will execution evidence, in the form of a residency agreement for the Copper Sky Lodge(a supportive living facility) where the testatrix took up residence in 2013. Ms.

Gullion, who had been assisting the testatrix when herhealth took a turn for the worst, was named as a “daughter.” It was not clear who was responsible for so describing Ms. Gullion orwhether the testatrix had endorsed that description. This evidence has little probative value, but again at least did not undermine theinferences drawn from the estate planning documents. [39] Ms. Gullion was placed in the foster care of the testatrix and her husband when she was between 4 and 8 months old. Shelived in the Matras home for her young life, including the period of her University studies.

She left home when 21, but later moved backat intervals. She moved to Calgary in 1988, and, as indicated, married a few years later. This evidence of the long relationship of thetestatrix and Ms. Gullion aids in understanding why the testatrix would have thought of Ms. Gullion as her daughter. [40] Ms. Guillon and Mr. Matras included some social services records concerning Ms. Gullion and the Matras family. Therecords, generally, set out the opinions and impressions of third party social services workers.

The records were hearsay but admissible.Necessity is made out by the impracticality of calling individual workers to testify respecting impressions of a child and her family in the1960s and 1970s. The records are reliable, in that they were prepared by persons with a duty to prepare such records and the records wereprepared with the expectation that they would be relied on by other workers, to ensure that the best interests of the child were served.Workers had an obligation to be accurate.

The records were made by individuals with personal knowledge of what was recorded,although (being typed) the records could not have been made contemporaneously with the information gathered by the authors. I find therecords admissible under Ares v Venner, (SCC), [1970] S.C.R. 608 and R v Khan, (SCC), [1990] 2S.C.R. 531. [41] For the most part, the social services records confirm Ms. Gullion’s and Mr. Matras’s contentions respecting Ms. Gullion’srole as a true member of the testatrix’s family. We read entries such as the following (references are to exhibit C of Ms.

Gullion’saffidavit): [The testatrix] is obviously very fond of Eileen ... and would fight any plans to move [her] (February 8, 1968, p. 23). Eileen ... [works] out very well in this home and there appears to be very strong bonds and relationships between family members (April9, 1974, p. 14). [Eileen is] fully excepted (sic) by [her] foster parents (October 8, 1973, p. 11). Eileen is definitely and completely a family member (July 2, 1975, p. 9).

RELATIONSHIP WITH FOSTER FAMILY: Seems excellent. [The testatrix] is obviously very proud of all [of Eileen’s] accomplishments and when financing of her university wasdiscussed she was advised that they were prepared to assist her. Two other daughters were home at the time of this visit and theirrelationship to Eileen was one of mutual respect and affection (May 30, 1977, p. 5)

[ 42 ] However, as counsel for the Applicants pointed out, there are some discordant elements in the records. In an April 4, 1963 entry (p. 33), we read that the testatrix had Eileen “call her ‘auntie’ and her husband ‘uncle.’” Not, one might observe, mom and dad. An August 18, 1966 entry stated that The foster family is very attached to [Eileen]. [The testatrix] feels she will probably never be in a financial position to adopt but wants [Eileen] to remain with her. The testatrix and her husband did adopt Mr. Matras, who came into their lives after Ms. Gullion.

Finally, a December 8, 1977 (p. 2) entry reads as follows: Eileen has been somewhat disappointed in the last couple of months in what she interprets as a change in the foster parents[’] attitude towards her. She has believed all of her life that she was a complete member of this family, and in the past couple of months [the testatrix] has been saying such things as Eileen will have to pay room and board after the termination of her wardship at the end of January and the other reason for this is that Eileen is not her natural daughter ....

Further, It was news to [Eileen] that the foster parents were expected to provide her clothing and also to give her a monthly spending allowance. Apparently she hasn’t received this in years. Ms. Guillon did not want either of these matters discussed with her foster parents. [ 43 ] Do these entries undermine the conclusion that the testatrix, at the time of making her Will, regarded Ms. Gullion as one of her children? They do not. The entries long pre-date the making of the Will and the other estate planning documents. The 1963 record makes sense.

At this time, the testatrix and her husband could not predict that Ms. Gullion would spend her life to young adulthood with them. It was prudent to try to keep some emotional distance, hard as that might have been (the entry went on to add that when Eileen became excited about something, she always called the testatrix “mummy” (p.33)). The 1966 entry speaks to a tension that manifested later. On the one hand, a strong relationship existed. On the other hand, Eileen was a source of income. I cannot speculate about why Mr. Matras was adopted but Ms. Gullion was not.

I can only observe that the adoption simply confirmed the mixed nature of the testatrix’s family, with natural, adopted, and foster children. [ 44 ] The 1977 entries are disturbing. It is true that many families have older children pay room and board. That by itself has little probative value, one way or another. The requirement to pay, though, was apparently linked to Ms. Gullion’s foster status. As illuminated by the second 1977 entry, what may be disclosed was an excessive focus on money over relationship. I do not judge this.

Whatever may have been the testatrix’s perspective in 1977, the testatrix – like all other individuals – was entitled to develop as a person and to embrace or re-embrace Ms. Gullion as a daughter. The testatrix had done so as her years advanced, and, as I have found, by the time she made the Will. CONCLUSION [ 45 ] Ms. Gullion was one of the testatrix’s children. She falls within the scope of the term “children” in paragraph 4(

b) of the Will. That is what the testatrix intended. That is the only reasonable and moral

interpretation. [ 46 ] I hereby direct that the testatrix’s personal representative divide the residue among the five children of the testatrix – Maxine Elsenheimer, Karen Meyer, Candace Watson, Rene Matras, and Eileen Gullion. [ 47 ] There is no need to resort to “rectification” of the Will under s. 39 of the Wills and Succession Act since what the testatrix testator meant by the term “children” in paragraph 4(

b) is clear without the need for any linguistic modification. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST [ 48 ] Counsel for Ms. Gullion made passing mention of a constructive trust argument that related to a settlement agreement concerning the testatrix’s husband’s estate. I make no findings respecting any constructive trust. Constructive trust issues are beyond the scope of the application before me and are distinct and separable from the

interpretation of the Will. APPLICATION TO REMOVE MR. MATRAS AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE [ 49 ] An application to remove Mr. Matras as personal representative is premature. To this point, he has sought the proper

interpretation of the Will and has not demonstrated unwillingness to administer the estate according to the correct

interpretation of the Will. Insofar as the Applicants have applied for the removal of Mr. Matras as the testatrix’s personal representative, that application is dismissed.

COSTS [ 50 ] I have considered rule 10.33. Ms. Gullion was fully successful. The Applicants failed to name her as a party to their application, which had put Ms. Gullion at risk of loss without the ability to answer. Ms. Gullion had been a member of the testatrix’s family for over 50 years. I regret to find that I could discern no good reason for the Applicants’ attempt to exclude Ms. Gullion as a member of their family and to subvert their mother’s intentions. Ms. Gullion shall have her costs of this application on a solicitor and own client full-indemnity basis, payable from the testatrix’s estate.

Heard on the 4 th day of October, 2016. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 21 st day of December, 2016. W.N. Renke J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Agota Taborosi Sinclair Law for the Applicants Malkit Atwal Field LLP for the Respondent Rene Matras Gordon VanderLeek VanderLeek Law for the Respondent Eileen Gullion