Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v McDougald, 2017 ABQB 124

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v McDougald, 2017 ABQB 124 Date: 20170224 Docket: 1703 00170 Registry: Edmonton Between: Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Applicant/Plaintiff - and - William McDougald, also known as William G. McDougald, also known as Bill McDougald, also known as Bill G. McDougald Respondent/Defendant _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of S.L. Schulz , Master in Chambers _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] On July 7, 1997, the Defendant, William McDougald [“Mr.

McDougald”] entered into a Visa credit card agreement with the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce [“CIBC”, or “the Bank”]. Mr. McDougald then used that credit card until he ceased making payments on June 15, 2016. CIBC terminated the credit card agreement, and on January 3, 2017 sued to collect the outstanding debt. The Bank on January 27, 2017 applied for

summary judgment per Alberta Rules of Court , Alta Reg 124/2010, [the “ Rules ” or individually a “ Rule ”], Rule 7.3 . [ 2 ] That is the routine component of this debt collection action. There is another, less savory aspect. Mr. McDougald has unfortunately adopted several pseudolegal schemes sold by UK scam artists who operate a website with a name that does not exactly inspire much confidence: “Get Out Of Debt Free” (http://www.getoutofdebtfree.org). Mr.

McDougald sent the Bank and its lawyers documents obtained from that website and attempted to “get out of debt free” by what is commonly known as the “Three/Five Letters” scheme, and a spurious promissory note. He has also counterattacked, billing for over $276 million on the basis of “Common Law Copyright” in his name. [ 3 ] None of these strategies has any legal merit or effect. I therefore order judgment in favour of the Bank.

II. The Lawsuit [ 4 ] Counsel for the Bank sued on January 3, 2017 for the outstanding credit card debt, $14,435.42, and interest for the period after September 6, 2016, calculated either according to the credit card contract rate (24.99% per annum) or under the Judgment Interest Act , RSA 2000, c J-1. [ 5 ] Mr. McDougald on January 17, 2017 filed a Statement of Defence which reads in total: Statement of facts relied on: 1. I have sent registered mail to CIBC showing in detail that our Supreme Law clearly indicates in

Article 1 subsection 1 that our signature is our inalienable right to create money. 2. I have sent registered mail to CIBC showing that our Domestic Law in the Financial Administration Act and Bills of Exchange Act .

Article 189 shows that the Government of Canada agrees with the United Nations Covenants that it is our signature that creates money. 3. Any matters that defeat the claim of the plaintiff(s): 4. RBC mortgages say at the top of page 1 that “This is a Promissory Note” and BMO says on their loan documents that “This is a Promissory Note”. Clearly all we do is sign it, not knowing that we just created the money. 5. The Library of Parliament 2015-51-E says that all Promissory Notes go to the Bank of Canada to be exchanged for Bank notes and digits in an account accessed by a computer or at the Branch.

This document tells us that all bank debt instruments are Promissory Notes and our signatures create all of it. The bank has no money available for mortgages, loans, lines of credit or credit cards. 6. Remedy sought: 7. Follow the Rule of Law and close this case. 8. [ 6 ] On January 27, 2017 the Bank applied under Rule 7.3 and sought: 1.

summary judgment per the Statement of Claim, 2. costs on a solicitor / client basis, alternatively on a party / party basis, 3. an order abridging time for service of the January 27, 2017 application materials, and 4. just and reasonable further and / or alternative relief. [ 7 ] Ms. Mary D’Alessio swore a January 27, 2017 Affidavit in support of the Bank’s

summary judgment application, which includes information on the credit card agreement and its terms, and billing records to support the alleged debt. She calculates that on the date of the hearing, February 10, 2017, Mr. McDougald owed CIBC $15,986.58. [ 8 ] The Affidavit also attaches unusual communications received by the Bank and its lawyers from “Sovereign (

c) William of the family McDougald Authorized Agent and Representative for WILLIAM MCDOUGALD TM .” Ms. D’Alessio deposes that she identified in those documents a sham debt elimination scheme that applied Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument [“OPCA”] (from Meads v Meads , 2012 ABQB 571 , 543 AR 215) motifs and concepts, including the “Double/Split Person”, foisted unilateral agreements, and a “money for nothing” promissory note that allegedly creates money out of thin air. The Affidavit attaches the purported “promissory note”, which the CIBC refused to accept as payment. [ 9 ] Ms.

D’Alessio’s Affidavit notes that on September 9, 2016, Mr. McDougald was warned by CIBC’s lawyers that he had advanced legally incorrect OPCA concepts. [ 10 ] Mr. McDougald did not file any response to the Bank’s application. III. The February 10, 2017 Hearing [ 11 ] Counsel for the Bank relied on Ms. D’Alessio’s Affidavit, submitted that Mr. McDougald voluntarily entered into the credit card contract, and he therefore owed the amounts claimed. [ 12 ] At the hearing Mr. McDougald presented documentation which was not in the form of an affidavit. This was therefore not evidence before the Court.

I nevertheless accepted these materials as argument and to better understand Mr. McDougald’s position. [ 13 ] Mr. McDougald indicated he is seeking the administration of justice, and said that I should disregard the Meads v Meads decision. I explained that since Meads v Meads is an unappealed decision of a justice of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench that

judgment is binding on a Master of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta. [ 14 ] Mr. McDougald then made submissions which I believe were intended to explain the relevance of a document titled “PROMISSORY NOTE” that he sent to Kevin Glass, the Chief Financial Officer of the CIBC, along with a letter dated January 11, 2017. Mr. McDougald said Mr. Glass had no objection or protest to the promissory note. The value stated on the note is $14,689.67, the amount for which CIBC sued. Mr. McDougald explained a promissory note is legal tender. Once Mr.

Glass received the promissory note then it would be sold to the Bank of Canada, which in turn would deposit money into the CIBC Visa account. Mr. McDougald noted that had not happened, so he sent a second promissory note on February 2, 2017. Mr. McDougald said he has, in fact, paid twice, however his CIBC Visa account does not reflect that payment. [ 15 ] These submissions also included more general comments on the implications and operation of documents of this kind. Mr.

McDougald provided the Court with excerpts from a number of sources, and stressed these were relevant: • United Nations Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes :

Article 5 defines an “instrument” means “a bill or a note”. • Bills of Exchange Act , RSC 1985, c B-4, s 176: defines a promissory note as: an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another person, signed by the maker, engaging to pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to, or to the order of, a specified person or to bearer.

section 38: Every contract on a bill, whether it is the drawer’s, the acceptor’s or an endorser’s, is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument in order to give effect thereto, but where an acceptance is written on a bill and the drawee gives notice to, or according to the directions of, the person entitled to the bill that he has accepted it, the acceptance then becomes complete and irrevocable. • The June 7, 1930 Geneva Convention Providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes : Articles 45, 75. • A printout of a “Wikipedia”

article titled “Promissory note”. • Financial Administration Act , RSC 1985, c F-11, s 2

definitions: money includes negotiable instruments; (fonds) negotiable instrument includes any cheque, draft, traveller’s cheque, bill of exchange, postal note, money order, postal remittance and any other similar instrument; (effet de commerce) note means promissory note; (billet) • Bank of Canada Act , RSC 1985, c B-2 defines “notes means notes intended for circulation in Canada (billets). • The first two pages of a document apparently published by the Library of Parliament: Penny Becklumb & Mathier Frigon, “ How the Bank of Canada Creates Money for the Federal Government: Operational and Legal Aspects ”, Publication No. 2015-51-E (10 August 2015). [ 16 ] Mr.

McDougald used a Canadian $10 bill to illustrate the seven characteristics of a promissory note. The bill identifies the type of instrument (a “Bank of Canada Note”), has a document ID number, identifies the parties (the Governor and the Deputy Governor), shows the value of the note in numerals (“$10”) and words (“Ten Dollars”), has the authorized creator’s name and signature, and indicates the jurisdiction of the court for the note (the picture of the Parliament Building indicates the jurisdiction is Ottawa). These are the characteristics for a promissory note, per “UCC 3-104”. [ 17 ] Mr.

McDougald explained that combined, these mean all money is a promise to pay. Cash would have no meaning, unless it was a promise by the government to pay. Mr. McDougald’s promissory note is a negotiable instrument, and per Canadian legislation and treaties is an unconditional promise to pay, so that means the Bank could get its funds in that manner. IV. Law [ 18 ] The test for

summary judgment is well established. Rule 7.3 states: 7.3(1) A party may apply to the Court for

summary judgment in respect of all or part of a claim on one or more of the following grounds: (

a) there is no defence to a claim or part of it; (

b) there is no merit to a claim or part of it; (

c) the only real issue is the amount to be awarded.

(2) The application must be supported by an affidavit swearing positively that one or more of the grounds described in subrule (1) have been met or by other evidence to the effect that the grounds have been met.

(3) If the application is successful the Court may, with respect to all or part of a claim, and whether or not the claim is for a single and

undivided debt, do one or more of the following: (

a) dismiss one or more claims in the action or give judgment for or in respect of all or part of the claim or for a lesser amount; (

b) if the only real issue to be tried is the amount of the award, determine the amount or refer the amount for determination by a referee; (

c) if judgment is given for part of a claim, refer the balance of the claim to trial or for determination by a referee, as the circumstances require. [ 19 ]

Summary judgment can be given if a disposition that is fair and just to both parties can be made on the existing record by using that alternative method for adjudication: Hryniak v Mauldin , 2014 SCC 8 , [2014] 1 SCR 87. This is a question of “merit”.

Pyrrha Design Inc. v Plum and Posey Inc. , 2016 ABCA 12 at para 19 provides a useful restatement of the concept: The question is whether there is in fact any issue of 'merit' that genuinely requires a trial, or conversely whether the claim or defence is so compelling that the likelihood it will succeed is very high such that it should be determined summarily. [ 20 ] Only the Bank filed an affidavit in support of it positions. Parties have the obligation to put their “best foot forward”: Pyrrha Design Inc. v Plum and Posey Inc. V. Analysis A. Introduction [ 21 ] Counsel for the Bank argues it has established Mr.

McDougald entered into a credit card contract with the Bank, made purchases with that credit card, and that amounts under that contract remain unpaid. Mr. McDougald in his Statement of Defence appears to only contest the last fact, arguing he has paid the debt with his promissory notes. [ 22 ] Accordingly, the only live issue for this application is: Has Mr. McDougald paid his Visa credit card debt via the promissory note mechanism? B. Mr. McDougald’s OPCA Documents [ 23 ] Mr. McDougald sent the Bank and its lawyers a series of documents in the summer of 2016.

These illustrate two pseudolegal debt elimination schemes. [ 24 ] The first is the Three/Five Letters scam which is reviewed in Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky , 2014 ABQB 771 at paras 55- 73 , 603 AR 261 [“ Rogozinsky ”]. That judgment attaches the documents that Ms. Rogozinsky sent to her bank. She claimed these created “private estoppel” and therefore disproved the alleged debt. Many of the documents employed by Mr. McDougald are exactly the same as those used by Ms. Rogozinsky, including the same style and formatting, which suggests Mr. McDougald purchased OPCA materials from the same source as Ms.

Rogozinsky, the UK Get Out Of Debt Free website. [ 25 ] In brief: • July 15, 2016 - Mr. McDougald sent a ‘conditional acceptance’ that he would pay the outstanding debt provided the Bank provided certain evidence. Failure to do so in 10 days meant the Bank had no valid claim (see Rogozinsky , Appendix “A”). • July 27, 2016 - Mr. McDougald sends a ‘second notice’ (see Rogozinsky , Appendix “B”), which warns that since the Bank did not respond to the demands in the ‘conditional acceptance’ means the Bank admits the debt did not exist or has been paid. • August 31, 2016 - a ‘third notice’ is sent by Mr.

McDougald to the Anderson Sinclair law firm. This document is largely the same as the one reproduced in Rogozinsky at Appendix “C”, except that Mr.

McDougald’s version omits the introductory paragraph, and attaches a “previously agreed upon invoice” that bills the law firm $276.072 million, most of which relates to 276 $1 million “unauthorized Trademark Infringements from June 2013 to July 2016 nunc pro tunc.” • September 6, 2016 - another ‘third notice’, but to the Common Collection Agency, again with an invoice billing $276.072 million. • September 20, 2016 - yet another ‘third notice’, sent to the Kronis, Rotsztain, Margles, Cappel LLP law firm. Mr.

McDougald’s attached invoice now bills that law firm $276.074 million. • September 29, 2016 - a further ‘third notice’ and invoice ($276.189 million) addressed to the Kronis, Rotsztain, Margles, Cappel LLP law firm. • November 4, 2016 - Mr. McDougald completes the Get Out Of Debt Free Three/Five Letters paperwork with a “Notice of Irrevocable Estoppel by Acquiescence” (see Rogozinsky , Appendix “D”). This document purports to permanently prohibit the Bank from any attempt to sue on or recover the credit card debt. Mr.

McDougald’s version of this document is slightly different from the Rogozinsky version, since it includes an additional paragraph: I further demand that you remove any negative remarks made to a credit reference agency and mail it to me. The government Financial Administration Act says in its

definitions that a bill of exchange is money and in the Bills of Exchange Act 189 says that a consumer bill is a bill of exchange when it is signed. Same thing for your alleged debt. I created the money and you deceived me and pretended it was your money. The international covenants both declare in

article one that everyone is to enjoy using his natural wealth which is the fact

that our signature creates the money. Clear your negative remarks and mail it to me immediately. [ 26 ] I adopt Master Schlosser’s analysis and conclusion in Rogozinsky that the Three/Five Letters documents have no legal effect. They illegally attempt to foist various arrangements and obligations on the documents’ recipients. [ 27 ] The July 15, 2016 ‘conditional acceptance’ also attaches a “Common Law Copyright Notice” from the Get Out Of Debt Free website. This is the same document reproduced in Rogozinsky at Appendix “E”. In brief, the “Common Law Copyright Notice” purports to require anyone who uses Mr.

McDougald’s name must pay him $1 million per use. “Common Law Copyright” is also asserted over Mr. McDougald’s bodily characteristics, such as fingerprints, retinal image data, DNA, tissue samples, and even to his “semen, urine, faeces, excrement, other bodily fluids and matter of any kind”. Master Schlosser in Rogozinsky at paras 80-87 rejected this “bizarre, inexplicable claim” as having no legal effect. In Meads v Meads Rooke ACJ at paras 501-504 rejects foisted unilateral copyright claims as having “an overwhelmingly juvenile character” and no effect in law. I agree with these conclusions. [ 28 ] A fee

schedule such as this which purports to foist penalties on other persons is a tool of intimidation and harassment: Meads v Meads at para 527 ; Fearn v Canada Customs , 2014 ABQB 114 at para 199 , 94 Alta LR (5th) 318; Rogozinsky , at para 78 ; Gidda v Hirsch , 2014 BCSC 1286 at para 84 ; R v Sands , 2013 SKQB 115 at para 18 ; R v Boxrud , 2014 SKQB 221 at para 46 , 450 Sask R 147; Re Boisjoli , 2015 ABQB 629 at paras 58-69 , 29 Alta LR (6th) 334; Gauthier v Starr , 2016 ABQB 213 at para 39 , 86 CPC (7th) 348; Allen Boisjoli Holdings v Papadoptu , 2016 FC 1260 ; Pomerleau v Canada Revenue Agency , 2017 ABQB 123 at para 135 . [ 29 ] I do not believe Mr.

McDougald argued in either his Statement of Claim or his in-court submissions that these documents now operate as a defence to the CIBC lawsuit. These materials do, nevertheless, establish a pattern of OPCA debt evasion, and unjustified, illegal retaliatory claims for money. C. The Promissory Note Argument [ 30 ] The last documents sent by Mr. McDougald to the Bank was a January 11, 2017 letter that attaches a “PROMISSORY NOTE”. The text of these documents are generally reproduced following at Appendix “A” and “B”, respectively.

The latter document is ‘fancied up’ with various scrolls, mandalas, coloured bars, and so on. Like the Three/Five Letters and Common Law Copyright Notice, the purported promissory note template is also from the Get Out Of Debt Free website. Mr. McDougald selected the “improved ... design” version which has “incorporated powerful sacred geometry”. [ 31 ] There are a surprising number of promissory note- and bill of exchange-based OPCA schemes in circulation. I can fairly express Mr. McDougald’s variation as follows: 1. International treaties guarantee “self-determination”, which means self-confidence.

Self-confidence requires the free purchase of goods. The method by which this objective is met is by individuals having a right to create their own free money. 2. The mechanism to create free money is via promissory notes. A promissory note is money, and money is a promissory note. 3. Legislation and the Canadian banking apparatus combine so that if an individual creates a promissory note, then gives that to a vendor or bank, that makes a payment equal to the ‘promised amount’. 4.

The direct or indirect recipient of any such promissory note (the “holder” or “holder in due course”) can give the promissory note to the Bank of Canada. The Bank of Canada then deposits the money created by the author of the promissory note via his or her signature into the holder’s bank account. [ 32 ] There are many problems with this scheme. 1. The January 11, 2016 Document is Not a Promissory Note [ 33 ] First, the January 11, 2016 promissory note is not, by definition, a promissory note.

The Bills of Exchange Act , s 176(1) definition of a promissory note indicates it is an unconditional promise to pay: A promissory note is an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another person, signed by the maker, engaging to pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to, or to the order of, a specified person or to bearer. [Emphasis added.] [ 34 ] Mr. McDougald’s promissory note is not unconditional - it does not promise ‘cash up front’ if presented. Instead, it only authorizes $1,000.00 monthly payments.

Further, the promissory note breaks the rule that a document of this kind may be transferred from holder to holder, each of whom has an equal right to demand payment. The promissory note instead states if it is traded “... such trade shall terminate the obligation herein.” Thus, Mr. McDougald’s document is not a promissory note per the Bills of Exchange Act . It is, at most, a kind of non-legally binding “IOU”. 2. No Lender is Required to Accept a Promissory Note [ 35 ] Second, Mr. McDougald’s scheme would only operate if CIBC was obliged in law to receive and accept his promissory note as a payment. It is not.

The Scottish Court of Sessions (Scotland’s highest civil court) in Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission v Wilson , 2014 SLR 46, [2013] CSIH 95 evaluated a promissory note scheme that in many ways parallels the one advanced by Mr. McDougald. Wilson said his promissory note paid a child support debt. It was as good as cash.

Wilson explained that if he did not pay for the note then the Bank of England would, and his promissory note would become part of the national debt. [ 36 ] The Court of Sessions rejected Wilson’s argument, and concluded that a creditor has no obligation to accept a promissory note, unless the option to make payment by promissory note was part of the original lending contract (para 11):

Promissory notes, in modern times at least, are not commonly agreed by creditors to be the way in which their debts will be extinguished. Their role, perhaps, is to be found more in mercantile transactions of a certain class. ... the creditor cannot be obliged to agree to a promissory note being the method of extinguishing a debt due to him, in the absence of any prior agreement to that effect . ...

The position is correctly stated by Gloag and Henderson in the present edition at paragraph 3.28: " A creditor, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary , is entitled to insist on payment in legal tender ." (Emphasis is added.) ...

But the basic point is that creditors are not, absent agreement by them, bound to accept payment by means other than legal tender and, in particular, are not bound to accept satisfaction of their debts by way of promissory notes . ... [Italics in original, underlining for emphasis.] [ 37 ] This principle is binding on me since it was endorsed by a judge of this Court in Re Boisjoli , at paras 30-36 . This is a second basis to reject Mr. McDougald’s defence. CIBC had the right to reject his promissory note and demand legal tender. 3. My Signature Creates Money [ 38 ] A third critical issue is that Mr.

McDougald’s argument his signature creates money is false. First, there are problems with the various authorities he presented. For example, he points to international bill of exchange treaties, but Canada is not a party to the 1930 Convention and has signed but not ratified the UN Convention. [ 39 ] He appears to believe that international treaties are binding authorities on Canadian governments, and trump Canadian law. For example, in his January 11, 2017 letter he says: ...

The International Covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) cannot be infringed upon nor abridged and in each of their first articles describe this creation of money with a signature. ... ... This is the reason Chief Justices tell every judge to follow the International Covenants and strike down all domestic law that contradicts these covenants. ... [ 40 ] In his Statement of Defence invokes “our Supreme Law” “Article 1 subsection 1”.

I think he means the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights , both which have the same

Article 1.1: All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. [ 41 ] As I understand it, he says that means anyone’s “signature is our inalienable right to create money.” [ 42 ] The problem is that international covenants and treaties have no binding effects on Canadian governments and persons in Canada unless those treaties were enacted into Canadian law.

I recently reviewed how OPCA litigants frequently and falsely impute supraconstitutional authority on international agreements: Pomerleau v Canada Revenue Agency , at paras 97-126 . In fact these are nothing more than political agreements between countries. Canada is free to ignore and legislate in defiance of the treaties it signs. [ 43 ] Mr. Pomerleau also points to various

definitions, to sketch out a mechanism where signing a promissory note creates money. This is a commonplace OPCA technique - it does not rely on a clear reading of legislation, but instead what Justice Myers in R v Porisky , 2012 BCSC 67 at para 67 , 2012 DTC 5037, retrial ordered 2014 BCCA 146 , 354 BCAC 86 called “legal numerology”: Mr. Porisky’s analysis picks and chooses snippets from various statutes and cases, and attempts to create logical links where none exist. [ 44 ] The same is true here. I will give one specific example, but this illustrates a larger pattern. Mr.

McDougald provided me a page of the Bank of Canada Act , and highlighted the definition of “notes”: notes means notes intended for circulation in Canada. (billets) [ 45 ] I understand Mr. McDougald is trying to link the term “notes” in the Bank of Canada Act to other legislation (and the irrelevant treaties) which use the word “note”. That, purportedly, would mean cash like the $10 bill he displayed during the hearing is a “promissory note”. [ 46 ] However, the full definition of “notes” includes a very important

preamble: 2 In this Act , ... notes means notes intended for circulation in Canada. (billets) [Emphasis added.] [ 47 ] So the definition of “notes” here is not a definition from another act, or intended to operate in another act. “Notes” in the Bank of Canada Act may mean something different from “notes” in the Bills of Exchange Act . [ 48 ] If Mr. McDougald had read the entire Bank of Canada Act , he would realize he has a problem.

Section 25 of the Act explains what a note is, and what it is not. A note is currency, and then there is subsection 25(6), which says: Notes of the Bank are neither promissory notes nor bills of exchange within the meaning of the Bills of Exchange Act .

[ 49 ] That eliminates the link between those two pieces of legislation. When they use the word “notes” it means very different things. [ 50 ] Mr. McDougald also argues that Canadian currency is a ‘promise to pay’. He is partially correct there. Bank of Canada Act , s 26 indicates some very old currency is a “promise to pay” that can be ‘redeemed’. However, that is no longer the case. [ 51 ] The idea that signatures create money is an old OPCA concept, as is illustrated by Dempsey v Envision Credit Union , 2006 BCSC 750 , 151 ACWS (3d) 204. In that case OPCA guru John Ruiz Dempsey made the same argument as Mr.

McDougald (para 27): ... Mr. Dempsey described the "money for nothing" theory. He stated that the banks do not have money. Rather, they create money out of "thin air". He asks, "where did that money come from", he answers "it came from us". He says the plaintiffs create money by signing promissory notes, and as soon as the promissory note is signed the banks deposit money in their own statement of account.

The banks do not place hard currency in the hands of the debtors. ... [ 52 ] This concept was rejected as “entirely without merit.”: para 39. [ 53 ] These “money out of thin air” concepts misrepresent how the fractional banking system operates, see Crossroads-DMD Mortgage Investment Corporation v Gauthier , 2015 ABQB 703 at paras 68-85 , 28 Alta LR (6th) 104. None of these schemes, including Mr. McDougald’s variation, are correct in law. 4. Illogical Paperwork Payments [ 54 ] A fourth defect with Mr. McDougald’s scheme is that he effectively says he is paying for his debt with a promise to pay for his debt.

After all, a promissory note is a promise to make a payment. Mr. McDougald’s promissory note says he will pay for it (though he falsely claims the Bank of Canada will).

Therefore, the January 11, 2017 document replaces one debt with an IOU for the same debt. [ 55 ] Re Boisjoli at para 35 points out the fundamental illogic of this so-called payment approach. “Wouldn’t this then inevitably lead to a conga line of promissory notes, each purporting to satisfy the debt of the note one step up the cue?” [ 56 ] Beyond that, the idea that one can magically pay for substantial debts with paperwork featuring “powerful sacred geometry” is simply preposterous.

Justice Richard of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in Bossé v Farm Credit Canada , 2014 NBCA 34 , 419 NBR (2d) 1 observed concepts like “A4V”, and promissory notes you sign but someone else pays, are so absurd that schemes like this are automatically suspect. In that case a couple claimed their “Private Registered Setoff Bonds” made the US government pay off over a million dollars of the Bossés’ debts. Justice Richard wrote, and I agree, that just makes no sense: ...

It defies logic that one could print out bonds for any sum of money, let alone significant amounts, and simply say to one’s creditors “here, go away, you have been paid.” I am convinced the Bossés knew this. ... [ 57 ] Mr. McDougald’s January 11, 2017 letter simply underlines how his overall scheme is a flight of fantasy. “Self- determination” comes from “freedom”. “Freedom” needs “confidence”.

You can buy “confidence” if you have “all the money we need to buy everything we want.” We therefore must have a right to “[c]reate your own money with your signature when you need it.” [ 58 ] As Milton Friedman observed “There ain’t no such thing as a free lunch.” An unlimited right to ‘buy what you want’ and ‘create money’ combines into only one thing. Unbridled, uncontrolled inflation. The more money there is, the less it buys. Fortunately, Canada is not Zimbabwe, and while some may argue over our nation’s currency policies, at least we are not carrying around 100 trillion dollar banknotes.

That, however, is the only possible end-point of Mr. McDougald’s ‘money buys you self-determination’ scheme. D. Conclusion [ 59 ] These are all valid bases to reject Mr. McDougald’s defence that he has paid for his outstanding debts (twice) with his so-call promissory notes. In other words, Mr. McDougald owes the debt claimed by the Bank, and I order judgment on that basis. VI. Costs [ 60 ] Since the Bank was entirely successful in this action it presumptively is due costs: Rule 10.29(1). However, in this situation elevated costs are appropriate. Mr. McDougald’s arguments have no merit.

The victimized party in OPCA litigation is should be indemnified, to the degree possible: Meads v Meads , at para 631 . Mr. McDougald’s promissory note defence was futile on multiple bases, and was a part of a larger OPCA scheme to evade and retaliate against collection of a legitimate debt [ 61 ] The situation here resembles the credit card debt recovery action in Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Hartloff , 2016 SKQB 155 , where the OPCA litigant was warned his ideas were invalid, was directed to Meads v Meads , but the debtor continued to persist in a futile, nonsensical defence.

That made solicitor client indemnity costs appropriate: para 35. VII. Conclusion [ 62 ] I order Mr. McDougald pay CIBC the amount claimed as at September 6, 2016, of $14,435.42, interest at 24.99% for 157 days being $1,551.16, plus interest on the principle amount at that rate until the date of this decision, interest in accordance with the Judgment Interest Act thereafter, and solicitor-client indemnity costs to be assessed. [ 63 ] This action has been expensive for Mr. McDougald. He has incurred over $1,500.00 in interest that could have avoided if he

promptly paid his outstanding debt. In addition Mr. McDougald will be paying CIBC’s legal bill, which will likely be another substantial expense. Then there was whatever Mr. McDougald paid for the materials from the Get Out Of Debt Free website. He was “ripped off” even if they were free. [ 64 ] All this could have been avoided. It is easy to get tangled in a web of legal concepts, legislation, and rules, but really, this comes down to a question of common sense. Does it make any sense that a debtor can simply fill in a piece of paper, let alone an IOU, and say “here, go away, you have been paid”? Of course not.

I doubt Mr. McDougald would accept his employer paying him in that manner. If something seems too good to be true, it probably is. [ 65 ] I do not know Mr. McDougald’s personal financial circumstance. He may be having money issues. Many Albertans are. But there are better alternatives than websites that promise free money mantras and magic documents. I hope Mr. McDougald will choose better in the future. Doing otherwise can be very expensive. Heard on the 10 th day of February, 2017. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 24 th day of February, 2017. S.L. Schulz M.C.Q.B.A.

Appearances: Vance Siakaluk Oshry & Company Barristers & Solicitors for the Applicant/Plaintiff William McDougald, representing himself for the Respondent/Defendant Appendix “A” - January 11, 2017 Letter (C)William of the family McDougald Authorized Representative for WILLIAM MCDOUGALD TM and all derivatives thereof c/o 7 Loyola Place St. Albert, Alberta T8N 4M1 Kevin Glass, CFO CIBC

199 Bay Street, Commerce Court Toronto, Ontario MSL 1A2 January 11, 2017 Re: Account Number: 4501 1000 1576 3653 Dear CFO Kevin Glass: I am seeking the administration of justice in other words the Rule of Law. I wish to pay off my CIBC Visa Card account above for $14,689.67. The government Financial Administration Act says in its

definitions that a Promissory Note is money and in the Bills of Exchange Act 176 says that a Promissory Note is a promise to pay when it is signed and a person is then made liable, but a person can only be liable when it is in fact money. My RBC mortgage says on the top of page one that "This is a Promissory Note" but I, having signed become liable for the money specified on the document. The bank then monetizes it and enters the "money" as "keyboard digits" into the proper law firms account where it is dispersed.

The International Covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) cannot be infringed upon nor abridged and in each of their first articles describe this creation of money with a signature.

Article 1.1 states "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political, social and cultural development." Self-determination is what we need to do in order to freely determine our social development which boils down to self-confidence which allows us to do anything we want to do. But "freely" is infringed upon if we cannot do it whenever we want to. It is the lack of money which infringes our rights. It follows then that the Covenants must provide the solution for the need for money.

Article 1.2 states "All people may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources." Our natural wealth is our money, our creativity, our planning, our focusing our thoughts, our love, our compassion. our delight and our laughter. We need money so we can freely develop our self-confidence. Because we have the right of self-determination, we can choose to create the money we need. Now Articles 1.1 through 1.3 reads more clearly. All people have the right to create money and freely dispose of their money. All countries must respect that right through domestic laws.

Our right to freely determine our confidence is our inalienable right and is shown in the language, the use of "have the right", past tense, we were born with this right. All people have the right to develop their confidence. We were born with the right to be confident, all babies are confident initially. All people have the right to be confident. Confidence must be continually developed. In order to freely do what we want we need to overcome the interference of needing money in order to buy what we want. We could develop streams of income sufficient for us to buy what we want.

But doing that takes confidence and lots of it. So, the lack of money stands in the way of developing confidence. The only reasonable way to freely do what we want is to freely create all the money we need to buy what we want. Hence our inalienable right to self-determination and freely so, is our inalienable right to freely create all the money we need to buy everything we want. We were born with the right to self-determination and we were born with the right to create money.

The United Nations International Laws tell us this and the Government of Canada has confirmed this by pulling it into domestic laws, the Financial Administration Act and the Bills of Exchange Act.

Article 1.3 paraphrased "Canada shall promote the realization of the inalienable right to create money and shall respect that right." That is why Canada put it into domestic law. Further, no crime nor war would happen if everyone had everything they needed. This is solved by everyone creating their own money for their own ends. This is why United Nations wrote this up in 1966, after the atrocities of WWII to prevent it from ever happening again by creating the solution to all people's needs. Create your own money with your signature when you need it.

Notice that the United Nations is not creating these rights but merely telling us we have these as inalienable rights. Canada realized my right to create money with the Financial Administration Act and the Bills of Exchange Act . The Financial Administration Act says in its

definitions that money includes negotiable instruments; a negotiable instrument includes a promissory note ; therefore, a promissory note is money and in the Bills of Exchange Act

article 176 it says that it is money and makes us liable when we sign it. Our signature then, creates the money. This is the reason Chief Justices tell every judge to follow the International Covenants and strike down all domestic law that contradicts these covenants. This may well be the best way to maintain the Rule of Law and show to all peoples that Canada is like a beacon of hope for the dignity, worth and value of a human being together with justice and the means to fully develop our self-esteem. our self-confidence to make great individuals and realize peace and enlightenment for all peoples.

Please monetize the Promissory Note I have included with this letter, and pay off my CIBC Visa Card.

Yours sincerely, By: [signature] By: Sovereign (c)William of the family McDougald Authorized Agent and Representative for WILLIAM MCDOUGALD TM Appendix “B” - Get Out Of Debt Free Promissory Note Promnote.pdf 1 24/02/201 13:13:38 $14,689.67 PROMISSORY NOTE $14,689.67 Tender in terms of the Bill of Exchange Act 179 of 1985 and Settlement In terms of Supreme Court Rulings R v. Peel and R v. Wagner NO. WGMPN1002 William George McDougald Amount $14589.67 Amount in words fourteen six hundred and eighty nine dollars and sixty-seven cents. Place: St. Albert, Alberta, Canada Date: 2017,01 11 Account Receipt Number 191471.

Account Registration Number 49-09-020763. This certifies that I, WILLIAM GEORGE MCDOUGALD

(710367558) Hereby promise to pay to the Holder, [CIBC]. The full amount specified on this note, for value received. Terms and Conditions This payment will be made in monthly installments of $1000 (one thousand) per month, on the 7th (seventh) day of every consecutive month until the obligation has been fulfilled. The Payment can be obtained by the Holder at 7 Loyola Place, St. Albert, Alberta T8N 4M1 upon presentation of this original Promissory Note.

I hereby give permission to the HOLDER and/or the HOLDER IN DUE COURSE of this Promissory Note to use this NOTE in any way necessary as a negotiable instrument to be financially traded on: whereas such trade shall terminate the obligation herein. [January 11, 2017] [signature] Date ALL RIGHTS RESERVED | WITHOUT PREJUDICE | WITHOUT RECOURSE | NON ASSUMPSIT Signature