Summit Solar Drywall Contractors Inc v Alberta (Human Rights Commission), 2017 ABQB 215

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Summit Solar Drywall Contractors Inc v Alberta (Human Rights Commission), 2017 ABQB 215 Date: 20170327 Docket: 1601 03137 Registry: Calgary Between: Summit Solar Drywall Contractors Inc Applicant - and - Alberta Human Rights Commission (Director), Joanne Goossen and Hans Goossen Respondents _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Mr. Justice R.A. Neufeld _______________________________________________________ I.

Introduction [ 1 ] In this proceeding, Summit Solar Drywall Contractors Inc. (“Summit) appeals a decision by an Alberta Human Rights Commission Tribunal (the “Tribunal”). In it, Summit was held to have unlawfully discriminated against the respondents Joanne and Hans Goossen, a husband and wife drywall taping crew. As the Tribunal’s participation in this appeal was limited, I will the term “Respondents” will be used in this decision to collectively refer to Ms. And Mr. Goossen only. [ 2 ] The Tribunal found that Summit discriminated against Ms.

Goossen based on physical disability by terminating her contract following an on-site injury. It found that Summit discriminated against Mr. Goossen based on his marital status by terminating his contract during the month following Ms. Goossen’s injury in order to avoid having to incur costs and to deal with Workers

Compensation Board issues pertaining to that injury. [3] Summit argues that the Tribunal breached its duty of procedural fairness in reaching its decision by considering a safetyjournal that had been provided to the Tribunal during the hearing but that was not entered as an Exhibit, and using information in thatjournal to make adverse findings concerning the credibility of Summit witnesses. It also argues that the Tribunal’s findings ofdiscrimination were unreasonable and unsupported on the evidence, and that the damages awarded ($20,000 to Ms. Goossen; $20,000plus lost wages to Mr. Goossen) were unreasonable.

II. Issues [4] On appeal, three basic questions were argued: 1. Did the Tribunal err in law by failing to discharge its duty of procedural fairness? 2. Did the Tribunal err in law in finding that Summit had unlawfully discriminated against Ms. Goossen on the basis of physicaldisability? 3. Was the Tribunal’s determination of unlawful discrimination against Mr. Goossen unreasonable? 4. Did the Tribunal err in law in determining the quantum of damages to be awarded? III. Issue No. 1 Did the Tribunal err in law by failing to discharge its duty ofprocedural fairness? A.

Standard of Review [5] Procedural fairness is not subject to assessment under the correctness versus reasonableness dichotomy discussed inDunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 S.C.R. 190. Instead, the issue is whether the conduct of the Tribunal having regard to all of thecircumstances, conformed to the standard of fairness expected. In Thomas v Alberta (Transportation and Safety Board, 2003 ABCA256 (Thomas) Paperny JA discussed the flexible nature of that standard, as follows: 61.

The content of the duty of fairness is flexible and variable depending upon the context of the particular statute involved and therights, privileges or interests affected. “[T]he purpose of the participatory rights contained within the duty is to ensure that administrativedecisions are made using a fair and open procedure, appropriate to the decision being made and its statutory, institutional and socialcontext, with an opportunity for those affected to put forward their views and evidence fully and have them considered by the decision-maker.” Baker v Canada (minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at para 22. 62.

The several criteria to determine what procedural rights the duty of fairness requires in the circumstances of the operation of this civillaw program, as set out in Baker at paras. 23-28, include: (1) the nature of the decision being made and process followed in making it;(2) the nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of the statute pursuant to which the body operates; (3) the importance of the decisionto the individual or individuals affected; (4) the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision; (5) the choices ofprocedure made by the agency itself. The list is not exhaustive. B.

Assessment [6] In this case, the Appellant complains that the Tribunal ought not to have reviewed a safety journal provided to it during thehearing. Excerpts from the journal had been provided earlier, and were part of the documents marked as Exhibits. They were apparentlydifficult to read and follow, and Summit’s counsel offered the original complete journal. He was initially advised that the journal wouldbe returned, but that did not occur. Instead, the Tribunal kept the journal.

During closing argument, the Chair seemed to indicate that shemight well be reviewing all of its pages, and drawing inferences from it: THE CHAIR: So with what you are looking at, do you refer to your documents in there? No, I don’t expect you to do that but,you know, if you want me to look much beyond -- I mean because it has been submitted and is an agreed statement of exhibits orcollection of exhibits, it’s completely open to me to review it all without having heard evidence on it. I am not much inclined to do that.Just as an example -- and, again am just giving you guys the benefit of what I need to do.

The safety book; we did not look at every singlepage, but I might take a look at all of those pages for other reasons and draw some inferences, but I might not too. So I just want to makesure that you both have an opportunity to let me know, these are the documents we really want you to paw over. So – sorry.

My answerwas, no, I do not expect you to do that right as we go. (Vol 4 of 11 of Transcript of Tribunal Proceedings, pg. 775-776) [7] Following receipt of oral argument and prior to the conclusion of the hearing the subject arose again, when counsel forSummit requested return of the safety journal, and was refused. MR.KUGELMASS: I won’t. And Frank Ayer has reminded me about the book. THE CHAIR: Yes, and I am not going to give it back to you today. MR.KUGELMASS: Okay. THE CHAIR: I will give it back to you in the fullness of time. I will take good care of it.

MR.KUGELMASS: Okay. THE CHAIR: I am fairly certain he doesn’t need a safety book from 2008/2009. MR.KUGELMASS: Okay. Well, I’m going to - - if I have a problem with Frank, I’ll tell him not to call you on it because you’re the judge. (Vol 4 of 11 of Tribunal Proceedings filed Pursuant to Section 37(3) of Alberta Human Rights Act - Transcript pg. 777-778) [ 8 ] In argument before me, Summit contended that it was unfair for the Chair retain the entire safety journal, and to “sneak a peek” at it in assessing Summit’s evidence.

It also contended that the adverse findings on credibility by the Tribunal “tainted” all of its substantive findings on the issue of discrimination. [ 9 ] The Respondents replied that there were many reasons for the Tribunal to find that the Summit witnesses were not credible, and not reliable, including a variety of inconsistencies between those witnesses’ versions of events, and within their evidence.

They also noted that there were different opportunities available to Summit to insist on return of the journal, or an opportunity to explain its contents, none of which were taken. [ 10 ] Having reviewed the submissions of the parties, and the transcripts of the hearing, I cannot agree with Summit that the Tribunal breached its duty to procedural fairness in retaining, and using the safety journal in question. There is no question that the journal contained relevant and material evidence.

Among other things it included information regarding the number of workers on site- a point of contention given the disagreement as to whether Mr. Goossen was terminated due to lack of work (as alleged by Summit). It seems to me, therefore, that the unfairness complaint is one that reduces to an allegation that the Tribunal erred by considering a document that all parties knew it had but which was not assigned an Exhibit number.

In my view, given the circumstances leading to the hearing, the procedures adopted by the Tribunal, and the reasonable expectations of the parties, there was no need to assign an Exhibit number to the journal as a prerequisite for using it in the decision-making process. [ 11 ] It might have been preferable to mark the document as an Exhibit, but the Tribunal’s intention to retain it was made clear to the parties, and Summit acquiesced to that being done. [ 12 ] I would add that even if the subject of the return of the journal had not been raised, and discussed prior to closure of the hearing, I would still not consider the Tribunal’s process to be procedurally unfair.

In offering the full journal to the Tribunal earlier in the hearing, Summit knew, or should have known, that it might be used to assess the oral evidence of Summit’s witnesses on the matters in dispute. Whether assigned an Exhibit number or not, Mr. Ayer’s journal was in play and to the extent that it contradicted Summit’s viva voce evidence, the risk of an adverse finding on credibility was created.

This situation cannot be compared to cases in which a tribunal has taken into consideration reports that were not before the tribunal in the hearing [ Kane v University of British Columbia (1980) 1 S.C.R. 11 05; Pfizer Co. Ltd v Deputy Minister of National Revenue

(1987) SCR 456] or issues that had not been addressed in evidence or argument. [ I.W.A. Local 2-69 v Consolidated Bathurst Packaging Ltd

(1990) Carswell Ont. 821 , S.C.C.] IV. Issue No.2 – Did the Tribunal err in law in finding that Summit discriminated against Ms. Goossen on the basis of a physical disability? A. The Tribunal finding [ 13 ]

Section 7 of the Alberta Human Rights Act S.A. (the “ AHRA ”) provides as follows: Discrimination re employment practices 7(1) No employer shall (

a) refuse to employ or refuse to continue to employ any person, or (

b) discriminate against any person with regard to employment or any term or condition of employment, because of the race, religious beliefs, colour, gender, gender identity, gender expression, physical disability, mental disability, age, ancestry, place of origin, marital status, source of income, family status or sexual orientation of that person or of any other person. [ 14 ] To maintain a discrimination claim, a complainant must establish that they have a characteristic protected from discrimination, that she has been adversely impacted and that the protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact.

Once prima facie discrimination is shown, the burden shifts to the employer to justify the conduct or practice ( Moore v British Columbia (Education) 2012 SCC 61 CanLII at para 33 ). In the case of Ms. Goossen, this required proof that accommodation of the physical disability would constitute an undue hardship ( Attorney General of Canada v Cruden 2013 FC 520 ; Affirmed on appeal 2014 FCA 131 ; Telecommunications Workers Union v Telus Communications Inc. 2014 ABCA 154 paras 47-49 ). [ 15 ] After considering the evidence, the Tribunal found that a prima facie showing discrimination had been made by Mrs.

Goossen. [ 16 ] It then turned to the issue of justification, finding that Summit had failed to show that it fulfilled its duty to accommodate Ms. Goossen’s disability. I will return to the Tribunal’s reasoning, later in this decision. B. Standard of Review

[ 17 ] In argument before me the parties agreed that the appropriate standard of review regarding the Tribunal’s discrimination finding is reasonableness. It was therefore unnecessary to hear argument from the Respondent AHRC (who had, appropriately, limited its written submissions to the standard of review issue rather than the merits of the decision), or the Respondents on that point. [ 18 ] In Dunsmuir , the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that when properly applied, the reasonableness standard compels the Court to assess whether the decision falls within a reasonable range of acceptable outcomes. It follows that within that range, a tribunal has a right to be wrong, either in the

interpretation of its home statute, its assessment of the facts, or both. C. The Discrimination Claim by Ms. Goossen [ 19 ] The basic issue before the Tribunal regarding Ms. Goossen’s discrimination claim was whether Summit had accommodated her disability to the point of undue hardship. [ 20 ] Summit says that the Tribunal erred in two ways in finding that it had not done so. First, by finding that procedural accommodation was a prerequisite to arguing that substantive accommodation was not possible. Second, by finding that Summit could have accommodated Ms. Goossen when the evidence clearly showed that she was incapable of even sedentary, data entry work.

a) Was the Tribunal’s legal

interpretation of the duty to accommodate a disability unreasonable? [ 21 ] Summit contends that the Tribunal incorrectly held that it owed both a duty of procedural accommodation, and a duty of substantive accommodation. At paragraph 143, it stated: Despite the option presented by Mr. Ayers, Mr. Joe Bruno and/or Mr. Mohamed rejected the above accommodation option without genuinely considering it, contrary to the duty to accommodate. Summit has not presented any compelling reasons for halting the accommodation at the time it was raised by Mr. Ayers and agreed to by Mrs. Goossen. Mrs.

Goossen being “unable to work” since the accident is a reflection of the reality of her not working, but does not supplant the actual facts that occurred or provide a satisfactory defence to an allegation of failure to accommodate. Mr. Ayers considered the option of computer work sufficiently viable that he requested a physician’s note. From this I infer Mr. Ayers believed the work was available to be performed and it was not merely part of preliminary discussions regarding various options. If Summit had permitted follow through of the accommodation Mr.

Ayers offered, and the accommodation efforts were unsuccessful, only then would Summit be able to rely on Mrs. Goossen being “unable to work” as a substantive basis establishing undue hardship. As Mrs. Goossen was willing to attempt the accommodation proposed by Mr. Ayers, and physician approval was provided, I find a reasonable accommodation option was available. [ 22 ] These findings were made in the context of the tribunal’s

interpretation of the law applying to the duty to accommodate: The case of Meiorin , supra , establishes that procedural accommodation is required as part of the overall substantive duty to accommodate. The procedural inquiry looks to the process the employer used to assess accommodation, while the substantive inquiry looks to, among other things, the employer’s reasons for not offering an accommodation. [ 23 ] I agree with Summit that as a matter of law, there was only one duty owed, and that is to substantively to accommodate the physical disability, to the point of undue hardship.

However, in considering whether that duty has been fulfilled, the Tribunal may consider the procedural efforts made by the Employer to find a substantive accommodation. I agree with the comments made by the Federal Court in this regard in Attorney General of Canada v Cruden when it characterized the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach as follows: In my view, Meiorin simply does not reasonably support the proposition that there exists a separate, procedural duty in the accommodation process which can be breached notwithstanding a substantive finding of undue hardship and which would attract remedies on its own.

In paragraph 66 of Meiorin, which is the passage referenced by the Tribunal, the Supreme Court is merely stating that a court or tribunal can look at the procedure employed in the accommodation process as a practical tool for deciding whether an employer has established—on an evidentiary basis—undue hardship. [ 24 ] While Tribunal incorrectly described procedural accommodation as a separate duty when read in their entirety, the reasons do not lead me to conclude that it did not nevertheless consider whether Summit had discharged the onus of proving that substantive accommodation was not possible, without undue hardship. [ 25 ] On the contrary, the Tribunal found that from a substantive perspective accommodation was available in the form of sedentary duties, and that Summit’s owners (Mr.

Mohammed and Mr. Bruno) prevented it from being offered. It follows that Tribunal’s apparent misunderstanding of Meiorin was not determinative of the result. [ 26 ] Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the Tribunal erred in law adjudicating the accommodation issue, whether on a correctness standard or a reasonableness standard.

b) Was the Tribunal’s decision that Summit failed to show that substantive accommodation of Mrs. Goossen was not possible without undue hardship unreasonable? [ 27 ] At the outset it is important to note that the Tribunal properly characterized the accommodation issue as being one in respect of which the employer held the onus of proof. This is particularly important given the Tribunal’s findings regarding the credibility and reliability of the Summit witnesses.

[ 28 ] Summit’s strongest argument in contending that the discrimination finding was unreasonable was that there was evidence before the Tribunal that as of February 3, 2009 Ms. Goossen was incapable of working for Summit as a taper or for that matter in a sedentary position – even if such a position existed. On that date, Mrs. Goossen and her physician both advised the Workers Compensation Board (“WCB”) that she was unable to work as a drywall taper and was unable to undertake modified work either. This contradicted a letter from Mrs.

Goossen’s general physician dated a few days earlier, clearing her for sedentary work. [ 29 ] Four months later, a work site visit arranged by the WCB confirmed that Mrs. Goossen was unable to undertake worksite clean-up duties offered by Summit as a potential alternative. [ 30 ] It is also clear on the evidence that in the years following Mrs.

Goossen’s December 4, 2008 workplace injury she has become unable to secure different employment of any kind. [ 31 ] In Dunsmuir , the Supreme Court of Canada directed that the purpose of a reasonableness assessment is to determine whether the impugned decision fell within the range of reasonable acceptable outcomes. [ 32 ] In this case, there seems to me to have been four possible outcomes in respect of the accommodation issue: 1. That there was no accommodation possible because Ms. Goossen was physically incapable of performing any type of work for Summit. 2.

That there was no accommodation possible because while Ms. Goossen was physically capable of sedentary work, no such work was available at Summit without creating a new position. 3. That accommodation was possible because Ms. Goossen was capable of performing data entry work at home, and that such work was available without creating a new position but was not offered by Summit. 4. That Summit was unable to prove on a balance of probabilities that it had accommodated Mrs. Goossen to the point of undue hardship as it failed to show that Ms.

Goossen was incapable of performing modified work; or that no such work was available without creating a new position. [ 33 ] Having carefully reviewed the transcripts of the hearing and the decision, it is my view that each of the foregoing were within the reasonable range of acceptable outcomes. After having heard all of the witnesses, and submissions of counsel, the Tribunal decided to accept the evidence of Ms. Goossen on her willingness to perform sedentary work for Summit, at home.

It accepted the evidence of Summit’s safety supervisor that he had offered such work, subject to clearing that offer with his superiors. It rejected, as being an “impressionistic and unsupported opinion” the explanation of Summit’s owner Mr. Bruno as to why the safety supervisor’s tentative offer was unacceptable. Based on these findings the Tribunal concluded that Summit had not discharged its onus of proof to show that it had accommodated Mrs.

Goossen to the point of undue hardship. [ 34 ] On judicial review, it is irrelevant whether the Court would have reached the same decision on the evidence if the decision withstands review on the reasonableness standard. Where there is some evidence to support the conclusions drawn, and where the Tribunal’s reasons are sufficient to show how it applied that evidence to the question before it, the reviewing Court cannot and should not substitute its opinion for that of the Tribunal. I will not do so in this case even though on my review of the evidence, the result is not one that I would necessarily have reached.

V. Issue No. 3: Was the Tribunal’s determination of unlawful discrimination against Mr. Goossen unreasonable? [ 35 ] The Tribunal determined that Mr. Goossen was terminated by Summit in order to distance Summit from potential costs associated with a WCB Claim by his wife and that the conduct constituted discrimination by virtue of marital status. In doing so, it rejected Summit’s evidence that Mr. Goossen was terminated due to a shortage of taping work, finding that the evidence showed that there was ample taping work available. The Tribunal noted that Summit continued to have many workers on-site after Mr.

Goossen’s termination, including a taper hired shortly after Mr. Goossen was let go. [ 36 ] Summit argues that there was no evidence before the Tribunal to support a finding of discrimination by Summit against Mr. Goossen. It says that Ms. Goossen’s work status was never mentioned in relation to the termination, and points to efforts made by Summit (through the WCB) to investigate modified work for Ms. Goossen well after Mr. Goossen’s termination. It also says that there was no evidence to support the Tribunal’s conclusion that Mr. Goossen was terminated in order to show the WCB that Ms.

Goossen was a “temporary” employee (and hence to reduce exposure by Summit to increased WCB rates). [ 37 ] As was the case regarding the finding of discrimination against Mrs. Goossen, it is my view that the Tribunal’s findings of discrimination against Mr. Goossen was within the range of reasonable outcomes. While Summit’s witnesses denied any linkage between Mr.

Goossen’s termination and his wife’s injury and WCB claim potential, there was evidence on the record showing reluctance by Summit to engage the WCB; concerns by Summit regarding exposure for WCB costs associated with subcontractors; and concerns of the Respondents regarding retaliation by Summit if a WCB claim was filed. There was also some evidence on the record contradicting Summit’s position that there was a shortage of work at the time of Mr. Goossen’s termination. [ 38 ] Accordingly, it was open to the Tribunal to find that Ms. Goossen’s disability, and Mr. Goossen’s marital status was a factor in Mr.

Goossen’s termination. [ 39 ] While I may not have reached the same conclusion on the evidence, the decision is not mine to make.

VI. Issue No. 4: Did the Tribunal err in its determinationof damages? [40] Summit contends that the Tribunal erred in the determination of damages. [41] Ms. Goossen was awarded $20,000 “for injury to dignity and self-respect” arising out of Summit’s discrimination against her.Her wage loss claim was withdrawn following the hearing. [42] Mr. Goossen was also awarded $20,000 for injury to dignity and self-respect arising from his termination and from havingpreviously been told by his employer that he should be able to provide for his injured wife on his own salary. [43] Mr.

Goossen was also awarded damages for lost wages for a three year period following his termination. This was calculatedby deducting his actual earnings during that time from that which he would have earned by working a 40 hour week at $30.00/hr forSummit. [44] In its decision, the Tribunal appropriately cited the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision in Walsh v Mobil Oil Canada 2013ABCA 238 CanLII, wherein it explained the approach to be taken in setting damages for contravention of human rights. At paragraphs31-32 the Court stated: Human rights legislation must be accorded a broad and purposive

interpretation having regard to its fundamental purpose: to recognizeand affirm that all persons are equal in dignity and rights and to protect against and compensate for discrimination. In addition tocompensating victims of discrimination, the remedial authority under human rights legislation serves another important societal goal: toprevent future discrimination by acting as both a deterrent and an educational tool: Canada (Treasury Board) v Robichaud, (SCC), [1987] 2 SCR 84.

Damage awards that do not provide for appropriate compensation can minimize the serious nature of the discrimination, undermine themandate and principles that are the foundation of human rights legislation, and further marginalize a complainant. Inadequate awards canhave the unintended but very real effect of perpetuating aspects of discriminatory conduct. [45] The Tribunal’s decision in this case regarding damages for injury to self-respect and dignity was discretionary in nature, withthe discretion to be exercised in accordance with the guidance provided in Walsh.

Like its decision on liability, the Tribunal’s decisionon damages is owed deference and is reviewable for reasonableness. This is particularly so in respect of the assessment of generaldamages, which is inherently subjective and imbued with broad policy objectives as articulated in Walsh.

However, where the taskbefore the Tribunal is setting damages for financial losses, or categorizing conduct that warrants an award in the nature of generaldamages, the reasonable range of acceptable outcomes is informed and proscribed by basic principles of the law of damages. [46] It is my view that two aspects of the assessment of damages contained errors that brought the damage awards outside of thereasonable range of acceptable outcomes. The first error made was including Summit’s conduct at the hearing in the consideration ofgeneral damages to be awarded to Ms.

Goossen. [47] In reviewing the decision there can be no doubt that the Tribunal’s award of general damages included consideration of andcompensation for the conduct of Summit at the hearing, as opposed to the time period relevant to the complaint. In paragraph 154, theTribunal described the submissions made by Summit at the hearing regarding Ms. Goossen’s credibility as having been “demeaning andhumiliating”. It proceeded, in paragraph 156, to award damages “for injury to dignity and self-respect” of $20,000.

While it was open tothe Tribunal to consider Summit’s conduct at the hearing in determining costs that was clearly irrelevant to the determination ofdamages. Its award of damages to Ms. Goossen was as a result, unreasonable, particularly in view of the fact that the Tribunal alsoawarded the maximum amount of costs allowed, ($5000.00). [48] The second error made by the Tribunal was to calculate Mr. Goossen’s wage loss on the assumption that but for thediscrimination he would have continuously worked forty hours per week for three years as a sub- contractor to Summit.

While statingthat it was not finding a “fixed term contract” per se, the Tribunal’s use of a three year time period in the calculation of damages hadexactly that effect. This was despite the evidence of Mr. Goossen that he had never received such a guarantee in the industry from otheremployers; and the evidence of Summit that such a guarantee would be unheard of in the industry.

It was also despite the evidence ofSummit (which was not discussed in the decision) describing industry practice of giving work priority to employees over sub-contractors(such as the Goossens), and the difficulties encountered at the FMC job site in ensuring a continuous supply of taping work due tointerruptions in progress by other trades, whose work had to be finished before tapers could start theirs. In short, the Tribunal’s findingthat there was no fixed term contract when coupled with the balance of the evidence before the Tribunal simply cannot reasonablysupport its conclusion that Mr.

Goossen suffered three years of continuous wage losses, as a result of Summit’s actions. In that respect,the decision falls outside the reasonable range of acceptable outcomes in the calculation of wage loss. To assist the Tribunal in itsreconsideration of this issue I note that Exhibit 9 of the hearing record calculated Mr. Goossen’s earning loss at $8,776.36 in respect ofwage loss from the date of termination to resumption of full time work. This seems to me to be clearly recoverable.

Lost wages attributedto the following time period are much more speculative, given the uncertainties inherent in the construction industry and if awarded at allshould be properly discounted to account for such uncertainties. [49] The Tribunal’s award of $20,000 to Mr. Goossen for Mr. Bruno’s suggestion by Summit’s owner that he should be able toprovide for his wife on his income alone seems to me to be somewhat excessive. Nevertheless, it was open on the evidence for theTribunal to conclude that Mr.

Bruno’s suggestion was “humiliating”, or “hurtful” and “inaccurate”, and its assessment of damages in thisregard will not be disturbed. Conclusion

[ 50 ] The decision of the Alberta Human Rights Commission concerning the complaints made by Joanne Goossen and Hans Goossen against Summit Solar Drywall Contractors Inc. is confirmed in respect of the finding of discrimination as being within the range of reasonableness outcomes. [ 51 ] The award of general damages to Ms. Goossen is generally upheld, but must be reduced to rectify the Tribunal’s error in considering Summit’s conduct at the hearing in the setting of general damages, as well as in the award of costs. [ 52 ] The award of general damages to Mr.

Goossen is upheld as being within a reasonable range of acceptable outcomes. The calculation of wage loss incurred by Mr. Goossen based on three years of lost earnings is set aside as being outside of the reasonable range of acceptable outcomes based on the evidence before the Tribunal. [ 53 ] The matter is remitted back to the Tribunal for reconsideration and rectification of the errors discussed above. [ 54 ] In view of the mixed result, no costs will be payable. Heard on the 07 th day of February, 2017. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 27 th day of March, 2017. R.A. Neufeld J.C.Q.B.A.

Appearances: Gerald J. Kugelmass for the Applicant Summit Solar Drywall Contractors Inc. Geoffrey Boddy for the Respondents Joanne Goossen and Hans Goossen Janice Ashcroft for the Respondent Alberta Human Rights Commission