Annett v Annett, 2017 ABQB 216

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Annett v Annett, 2017 ABQB 216 Date: 20170328 Docket: 4810 024622 Registry: Red Deer Between: Marsha Gail Annett Plaintiff/Applicant - and - Teddy Cecil Annett Defendant/Respondent _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Madam Justice J.B. Veit _______________________________________________________

Summary [ 1 ] In this morning chambers application, Ms. Annett asks the court to implement child and spousal support order variations as agreed between the parties in February 2016 and to confirm the parenting arrangement made in that agreement. She acknowledges that the agreement was never finalized, but alleges that the inability to finalize the agreement is due to Mr. Annett’s failure to make specific required disclosure. [ 2 ] Mr. Annett responds that the agreement should not be declared valid because Ms.

Annett has shown her intention to disregard the agreement; in legal terms, he pleads anticipatory repudiation. [ 3 ] Ms. Annett’s request is allowed, in part: the parties did enter into a settlement agreement on February 29, 2016. That contract dealt with parenting, child and spousal support, and the division of matrimonial property. The contract does not need to be documented in order to be recognized as valid and binding.

[4] After the contract was concluded, the parties agreed with one another to change the term of the contract dealing withparenting of the older child. In other words, the part of the contract dealing with the parenting of the older child was repudiated by bothparties; therefore, no part of the original contract dealing with the parenting of that child can now be enforced by the mother.

All otherterms of the contract remain in force. [5] Subsequent failures by one party or the other, even if proved, do not establish a repudiation of the contract: “anticipatoryrepudiation should be considered a particularly exceptional remedy in the context of settlement agreements”. That policy applies on thefacts here: none of Mr.

Annett’s allegations, even if true, go to the core of the settlement agreement. [6] Court costs of an application dealing with children’s passports and travel plans can legitimately be characterized as relatingto s. 7 expenses and therefore added to the support obligations enforced by the Maintenance Enforcement Program. However, in thecircumstances here, because no explanation was provided for the late filing of the order dealing with the passport issues, the courtcannot order MEP to enforce the $500.00 costs award made in April 2015. Cases and authority cited [7] By Ms.

Annett: Dobbin v Dobbin 2012 ABQB 711. [8] By the court: Coco Homes Inc. v Caleron Properties Ltd. 2017 ABQB 15; Remedy Drug Store Co. v Farnham 2015ONCA 576; Fieguth v Acklands Limited (1989), (BC CA), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 114 (B.C.C.A.). Appendix A: February 29, 2016, Oral agreement between the parties 1. Background [9] The parties, who have been engaged in active litigation since these proceedings commenced in 2015, met with theirrespective lawyers on February 29, 2016, and, in the presence of a court reporter/examiner, recorded the terms of an agreement whichhad been reached amongst them: see Appendix A. [10] Ms.

Annett’s acknowledges that, “shortly after” the February 29, 2016 meeting the parties’ older child asked for a sharedparenting regime; that his request was granted by both parties, and that the shared parenting agreement lasted until the end of April,2016. She states that, currently, that child “does not have contact with me”. [11] Ms. Annett swears that Mr.

Annett has breached the agreement: - “since we agreed to the terms set out in the Minutes of Settlement, I have yet to receive the information on the Quebec propertythat would enable us to sign the agreement”; - by failing to pay the debt on the Dodge vehicle and the VISA account. [12] In addition, Ms. Annett indicates that the agreement was made by her without knowing certain material information: “I havebecome aware that [Mr. Annett] has another bank account that he failed to disclose in his initial disclosure . . . our agreement was madewith his income in mind”. [13] Also, Ms.

Annett states that, after the agreement was reached, Mr. Annett did not pay the ongoing rental fees for the Sea-cans. [14] Finally, Ms. Annett lists a series of observations and inferences she has made of Mr. Annett’s financial circumstances, therebysuggesting that his real income has been misrepresented to her. [15] Mr. Annett attaches to his reply affidavit a statutory declaration from the parties’ 15 year old son to which is attached atranscript of a conversation between Ms. Annett and that son in November 2015 in which she involves the son in the conflict between herhusband and herself. Mr.

Annett also swears that Ms. Annett has “promptly and consistently refused to honour” part of the February 29,2016 agreement relating to parenting of the parties’ younger child. Mr. Annett notes that Ms. Annett’s own materials appear to show thatthe debt owing on the Dodge vehicle has been paid off. He says that Ms. Annett thwarted his access to the Sea-cans and, as a result, hisbankruptcy will be extended. 2. General principles relating to settlement agreements: do they need to be documented; post-contractual behaviour shouldnot easily be characterized as anticipatory repudiation [16] Ms. Annett relies on Dobbin.

Although there are some similarities between the agreement reproduced in Appendix A and theagreement in that case, including for example the fact that both sets of litigants were fully represented, there are also importantdifferences. In Dobbin, there is an actual written agreement. Here, no physical, written, agreement was signed by both parties. AlthoughAppendix A does not mention a written agreement, Ms.

Annett’s materials suggest that a written agreement was contemplated by theparties. [17] Where a written agreement is contemplated but not signed, the law is addressed in cases such as Coco Homes: 27 A settlement agreement is a form of contract. Its existence depends, as with other contracts, on showing a mutual intention to createa legally-binding relationship and agreement on all essential terms: Newell Post Developments Ltd v 1402801 Alberta Ltd, 2010 ABQB

660, 503 A.R. 334, para 32, citing authority. 28 Whether a contract was made, in this sense, requires consideration of the parties' words and conduct from an objective perspective:Newell Post, para 33. 29 Determining existence of a contract is different from whether it was completed or documented: Fieguth v Acklands Ltd (1989), (BC CA), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 114 (B.C.C.A.), quoted with approval in Newall Post, para 39. In many cases parties makea simple contract but later disagree on how it should be documented, what it means or how it should be performed.

In those cases, theterms of the contract must be determined by the court based on the conduct and words by which the contract was made and, where thecourt concludes that everything agreed by the parties is not contained in the written documents or oral statements of the parties, byimplied terms: Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada, 6th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2011), 463. 30 Where the essential terms of the contract are clear, it is not proper to inquire into the subjective intentions or state of minds of theparties: Lakemount Sportsworld Inc v Cicchi, 2012 ONSC 544, para 26. [Emphasis added] [18] Dobbin is similar to this case in that repudiation of the agreement is raised in both situations.

A recent appeal level decisionwhich articulates not only the law on contract repudiation, but also the special status of repudiation of settlement agreements, can befound in Remedy Drug Store: The Applicable Legal Principles 41 The authorities establish the following principles relevant to this issue. i. A Focus on Intention 42 Repudiation occurs by the words or conduct of one party to a contract that show an intention not to be bound by the contract:Guarantee Co. of North America v. Gordon Capital Corp., (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 423, at para. 40.

Anticipatoryrepudiation is essentially the same as repudiation simpliciter -- the only difference is timing.

In her treatise, Canadian Contract Law, 3ded. (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2012), at p. 618, Angela Swan begins her discussion of anticipatory repudiation by helpfullyoutlining the circumstances in which this issue typically arises: The phrases "anticipatory breach" or "anticipatory repudiation" refer to the situation created when, before the time of performance hasarrived, one party to a contract tells the other, either explicitly or as an inference from something said or done by the party, that, despitehaving no justification for its position, it is no longer prepared to perform its obligations under the contract.

The statement may be madein a letter by one party's solicitor to the other, by an oral statement by a party himself or herself to the other, or in any form ofcommunication. [Emphasis added. Citations omitted.] See also John McCamus: The Law of Contracts, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2012), at p. 689. 43 Recently, in Potter v. New Brunswick (Legal Aid Services Commission), 2015 SCC 10, 381 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at para. 149, CromwellJ. (concurring) wrote this about anticipatory repudiation: "The focus in such cases is on what the party's words and/or conduct say aboutfuture performance of the contract.

For example, there will be an anticipatory repudiation if the words and conduct evince an intention tobreach a term of the contract which, if actually breached, would constitute repudiation of the contract." 44 Accordingly, the same principles guide both anticipatory repudiation and repudiation. Courts often use the terms interchangeablybecause alleged repudiations frequently occur "before the time of performance has arrived" (to borrow Swan's phrasing). ii. The Test is Objective and the Surrounding Circumstances Should be Considered 45 The test for anticipatory repudiation is an objective one: S.M.

Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 6th ed. (Toronto: Canada LawBook, 2010), at para. 620. As Gillese J.A. wrote for this court in Spirent Communications of Ottawa Ltd. v. Quake Technologies(Canada) Inc., 2008 ONCA 92, 88 O.R. (3d) 721, at para. 37: "To assess whether the party in breach has evinced such an intention [torepudiate the contract], the court is to ask whether a reasonable person would conclude that the breaching party no longer intends to bebound by it." 46 In objectively construing the purported breaching party's intention, the surrounding circumstances must be considered. In White v.E.B.F.

Manufacturing Ltd., 2005 NSCA 167, 239 N.S.R. (2d) 270, Saunders J.A. wrote, at para. 89: "Proof of such an intention requiresan investigation into the nature of the contract, the attendant circumstances, and the motives which prompted the breach." Earlier thisyear, Cromwell J., in his concurring opinion in Potter, confirmed the importance of considering the surrounding circumstances. At para.164, Cromwell J. wrote: "As Lord Scarman put it in Woodar Investment Development Ltd. v.

Wimpey Construction UK Ltd., [1980] 1All E.R. 571 (H.L.), at p. 590, the trial judge and the Court of Appeal in this case were 'concentrating too much attention on one actisolated from its surrounding circumstances and failing to pay proper regard to the impact of the party's conduct on the other party'." iii. Subjective Intention Not to Repudiate is Not Determinative 47 A party can repudiate a contract without subjectively intending to do so. As the Supreme Court wrote in Guarantee Company, atpara. 40: Repudiation, by contrast, occurs "by words or conduct evincing an intention not to be bound by the contract.

It was held by the PrivyCouncil in Clausen v. Canada Timber & Lands, Ltd. [ (UK JCPC), [1923] 4 D.L.R. 751], that such an intention may beevinced by a refusal to perform, even though the party mistakenly thinks that he is exercising a contractual right" (S.M. Waddams, TheLaw of Contracts (4th ed. 1999), at para. 620).42 [Emphasis added.]

48 Swan confirms this approach at p. 618 of her treatise: "The person (or his or her solicitor) may believe when the statement is madethat he or she has an excuse for non-performance and that it is the other party who is in breach of the contract. The characterization ofthe statement as an "anticipatory breach" [or "repudiation"] will then be made when the dispute goes to trial." 49 However, the subjective intentions of the breaching party are of some moment. They may assist in determining what the objectiveintention was.

Justice Cromwell made this point at para. 171 of Potter: "while the breaching party's motives as such are irrelevant, theymay throw light on the way the alleged repudiatory conduct would be viewed by a reasonable person." Thus, the driving factor behindanticipatory repudiation remains the objective intention of the party purportedly about to breach the contract. iv. The Seriousness of the Conduct 50 A finding of anticipatory repudiation is reserved for cases in which the conduct at issue can be said to be serious.

Before ananticipated breach of contract can be characterized as an anticipatory repudiation, the breach must deprive the innocent party ofsubstantially the whole benefit of the contract: see Swan, at p. 618; Waddams, at ss. 590, 595; McCamus, at pp. 693-694; and Fridman,The Law of Contracts in Canada, 6th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2011), at p. 585. 51 In Spirent, Gillese J.A. confirmed an approach that focuses on the importance of the disputed term, saying, at para. 37, "Whenconsidering Spirent's conduct, it was important to keep in mind that what was involved was an anticipatory breach of contract... [I]ndetermining whether the party in breach had repudiated or shown an intention not to be bound by the contract before performance is due,the court asks whether the breach deprives the innocent party of substantially the whole benefit of the contract." See also Place ConcordeEast Limited Partnership v.

Shelter Corporation of Canada (2006), (ON CA), 270 D.L.R. (4th) 181 (Ont. C.A.), atpara. 51, where this court wrote, "A breach that allows the non-repudiating party to elect to put an end to all unperformed obligations ofthe parties is an exceptional remedy that is available only in circumstances where the entire foundation of the contract has beenundermined, that is, where the very thing bargained for has not been provided"; and Potter, per Cromwell J., at para. 164. 52 The authorities are therefore clear.

The conduct in this case -- insistence on a new contractual term -- can amount to an anticipatoryrepudiation, but only if the term is of such importance that the party seeking to rely on the term can be said to have exhibited an intentionnot to be bound by the contract. v. Anticipatory Repudiation in the Context of a Settlement Agreement 53 I agree with the opinion of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Fieguth v.

Acklands Limited (1989), (BCCA), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 114 (B.C.C.A.), at pp. 122-123, that anticipatory repudiation should be considered a particularly exceptionalremedy in the context of settlement agreements. The Court explained the rationale for this approach as follows: It should not be thought that every disagreement over documentation consequent upon a settlement, even if insisted upon, amounts to arepudiation of a settlement. Many such settlements are very complicated, such as structured settlements, and the deal is usually struckbefore the documentation can be completed.

In such cases the settlement will be binding if there is agreement on the essential terms.When disputes arise in this connection the question will seldom be one of repudiation as the test cited above is a strict one, but ratherwhether a final agreement has been reached which the parties intend to record in formal documentation, or whether the parties have onlyreached a tentative agreement which will not be binding upon them until the documentation is complete.

Generally speaking, litigation issettled on the former rather than on the latter basis and parties who reach a settlement should usually be held to their bargains.Subsequent disputes should be resolved by application to the court or by common sense within the framework of the settlement to whichthe parties have agreed and in accordance with the common practices which prevail amongst members of the bar.

It will be rare forconduct subsequent to a settlement agreement to amount to repudiation. [Emphasis added.] This passage from Fieguth has been cited with approval by at least three Ontario courts, including this one: see Bogue v. Bogue (1999), (ON CA), 46 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.); Cellular Rental Systems Inc. v. Bell Mobility Cellular Inc., [1995] O.J. No. 721(S.C.), aff'd [1995] O.J. No. 3773 (C.A.); and Whitehall Homes & Construction Ltd. v. Hanson, 2012 ONSC 3307, 23 C.L.R. (4th) 272,at para. 31. 54 Courts are motivated to enforce settlements for good reason.

As Swan puts it at p. 52 of her treatise, "There are strong policyreasons for the court's attitude to settlements: it is in everyone's interest that litigation be concluded by the parties' agreement". 36 If the nature or consequence of the defaulting party's breach is so serious or fundamental as to go to the root of the contract andsubstantially deprives the innocent party of what he or she bargained for, or where the defaulting party's words or conduct unjustifiablyexhibits a clear and unmistakable intention to no longer be bound by his or her contractual undertaking, amounting to a serious breach ofsuch undertaking, then the defaulting party will be considered to have repudiated the contract: Bayer AG v.

Apotex Inc (1998), (ON CA), 113 OAC 1 at para 34, leave to appeal to SCC refused, [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 563, 239 NR 200; BurntwoodHoldings Ltd v.

Salt, (1988), (AB KB), 93 AR 161 (QB) at para 37. 37 The court should consider five factors when determining whether there has been a breach of a serious or fundamental nature: (1)the ratio of the party's obligations not performed to that party's obligations as a whole; (2) the seriousness of the breach to the innocentparty; (3) the likelihood of repetition of the breach; (4) the seriousness of the consequences of the breach; and (5) the relationship of thepart of the obligation not performed to the whole obligation: Canadian Western Bank v. 702348 Alberta Ltd., 2010 ABCA 227, 487 AR340 at para 17. 38 Timing can be one concern in the performance of the contract.

The rule of equity presumes that time was not of the essence unlessthe parties had expressly made it of the essence or the nature of the property or circumstances allow for such a presumption: SailLabrador Ltd v. Navimar Corp, (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 265 at para 53; Judicature Act, RSA 2000, c J-2, s 21. [Emphasis added]

3. These parties intended to agree and did reach a settlement agreement [ 19 ] As McEachern C.J.B.C. put it in Fieguth : With respect, I have difficulty agreeing with the reasoning in these judgments. If there was an agreement of settlement, as both courts found, then the consequences of subsequent conduct relating to the exchange of funds and documents would not discharge either party unless it could be said that the party alleged to have repudiated the contract exhibited an unwillingness to carry out its terms.

Odeco may have erred in the way it sought to complete the settlement, but it cannot be said it repudiated the agreement, and if a settlement agreement had been reached then there is no room for a counter-offer. In these matters it is necessary to separate the question of formation of contract from its completion. The first question is whether the parties have reached an agreement on all essential terms. There is not usually any difficulty in connection with the settlement of a claim or action for cash.

That is what happened here and as a settlement implies a promise to furnish a release and, if there is an action, a consent dismissal unless there is a contractual agreement to the contrary, there was agreement on all essential terms. The next stage is the completion of the agreement. If there are no specific terms in this connection either party is entitled to submit whatever releases or other documentation he thinks appropriate.

Ordinary business and professional practice cannot be equated to a game of checkers where a player is conclusively presumed to have made his move the moment he removes his hand from the piece. One can tender whatever documents he thinks appropriate without rescinding the settlement agreement. If such documents are accepted and executed and returned then the contract, which has been executory, becomes executed.

If the documents are not accepted then there must be further discussion but neither party is released or discharged unless the other party has demonstrated an unwillingness to be bound by the agreement by insisting upon terms or conditions which have not been agreed upon or are not reasonably implied in these circumstances. [Emphasis added] [ 20 ] The evidence here establishes that the parties did, knowingly, enter into a settlement agreement.

Each had the assistance of a lawyer and all 4 individuals agreed to record the agreement by spelling the agreement out – and correcting it as they went – in front of a court reporter/recorder who was tasked with the very responsibility of recording the agreement. The intention of the parties to enter into a settlement agreement could not be more clear; it was not necessary for the parties to set their agreement down in a document and to sign the document. As of February 29, 2016, these parties had a settlement agreement. 4.

There was no repudiation of the parties’ agreement except in relation to parenting of the older child [ 21 ] Shortly after the settlement agreement was concluded, both parties agreed to repudiate that part of the agreement dealing with the parenting of their older child; their joint action in that regard had the effect of nullifying any agreement between them with respect to the parenting of that child.

If the situation has changed again, the mother cannot, unilaterally, return to the terms of the settlement agreement; that term was struck out. [ 22 ] The situation here is somewhat odd in that the mother states, on the one hand, that she wants the settlement agreement to be enforced with respect to the support and other provisions, but, on the other, that she might have been misled into making the agreement in the first place because her husband did not make full financial disclosure. The way to resolve this problem is to declare that the parties did reach a settlement agreement.

Thereafter, unless there has been a repudiation of the settlement agreement, the declaration that the parties did conclude a settlement agreement allows the parties to enforce the agreement as they see fit. [ 23 ] For the following four reasons, Mr. Annett’s argument that, after the parties reached a settlement agreement, Ms. Annett showed by her actions that she was repudiating the agreement, cannot be sustained. - Mr. Annett has always maintained that he did not involve the parties’ children in the parties’ dispute.

The solemn declaration by his son about his telephone call with his mother actually establishes that Mr. Annett does involve the children in his dispute; it also deals with a conversation that took place prior to February 29, 2016. Therefore, this evidence was known, or could have been known, to Mr. Annett prior to reaching the settlement agreement. The issue of the parties improper behaviour relative to involving their children in the adults’ dispute was, in fact, one of the issue that was dealt with in an order of this court dated April 5, 2015.

The November, 2015 conversation between the mother and her son therefore has no effect on the February 29, 2016 agreement; Mr. Annett knew about that conversation or at least knew about the dispute concerning conversations with the children, and still entered into the settlement agreement; - even if it were true that Ms. Annett has consistently refused to honour the agreement about weeknight access with the parties’ daughter – and it is odd that in this highly charged atmosphere, that Mr.

Annett has produced no confirmation of his allegation by recording of a text or voice message – that repudiation would be limited to one, relatively small, temporal aspect of the parenting of that child; this is not a repudiation of the father’s parenting regime of the younger child. Also, the agreement itself indicates that the daughter is to have some say in the matter of the weeknight access; therefore, it is difficult to accept that the mother would have needed to have inserted herself into that parenting area. - the evidence on this application with respect to the Dodge is unclear and somewhat contradictory.

In any event, that is only one aspect of the property portion of the agreement and not such an important part even of the property portion, much less of the whole of the agreement. The agreement between the parties in relation to the Dodge is clear; it will now be up to them to decide if they will take further action in relation to that agreement; - the settlement agreement merely stated that Mr. Annett would be responsible for any debt related to the Sea-cans; it does not speak of access to the Sea-cans or of any other practical matters in relation to them. In any event, whatever debt Mr.

Annett may have incurred relative to the Sea-cans, ex. “C” to his affidavit establishes that that debt is not the basis on which Canada Revenue Agency is

opposing Mr. Annett’s discharge from bankruptcy. Indeed, it is to be noted that the Notice of Objection to Discharge is dated March 15, 2016, i.e. a mere two weeks after making the settlement agreement. It is not clear to me when Mr. Annett went into bankruptcy; once he went into bankruptcy, Mr. Annett no longer had any interest in any property he owned – that property would all have become the property of his trustee. However, support obligations are not affected by bankruptcy.

The bankruptcy issue makes it all the more important to confirm the existence of the settlement agreement because that agreement will have to be taken into account in relation to the bankruptcy. 5. Previous costs to be enforceable by the Maintenance Enforcement Program [ 24 ] Ms. Annett states that the costs ordered by this court as part of its April 8, 2015 order, filed on April 21, 2016, have not been paid by Mr. Annett; he appears to agree. Ms. Annett asks that those costs be made enforceable under the Maintenance Enforcement Program; Mr. Annett states that he cannot afford to pay the $500.00 in costs.

The ability to pay costs must be distinguished from the obligation to pay them; in any event, that order has already been made. The only issue is whether that order should be enforced by Maintenance Enforcement.

While I acknowledge that passport issues and travel with the children can legitimately come within the general rubric of an extraordinary expense that should be considered as a s.7 type expense, and therefore enforceable by MEP, in this case, no explanation was given to me about why the April 8, 2015 order was allowed to be filed more than one year after it was obtained, i.e. in contravention of the Rules of Court. I assume that an explanation was given in April 2016, but that explanation has not been provided to me. I therefore deny this part of Ms. Annett’s application. 6. Conclusion [ 25 ] In the result, Ms.

Annett’s application is allowed in part: the existence of the settlement agreement is confirmed. However, because the mutual repudiation of the settlement agreement in relation to the parties’ older child struck out that term of the settlement agreement, Ms. Annett’s request to go back to the terms of the settlement agreement with respect to the parenting of the older child must be denied. Ms. Annett’s request to have a 2015 costs order collected by Maintenance Enforcement is denied. 7. Costs of this hearing [ 26 ] Ms. Annett has been successful on this application; therefore, Mr.

Annett will pay her tariff costs, i.e. $500.00 for this application. An important part of this application deals with support for the parties’ children; therefore, the $500.00 costs debt can be collected by the Maintenance Enforcement Program for Ms. Annett’s benefit. Heard on the 24 th day of February, 2017. Dated at the City of Red Deer, Alberta this 27 th day of March, 2017. J.B. Veit J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Matthew T. Mowbrey, Warren Sinclair LLP for the Applicant, Ms. Annett Mr. Annett, on his own behalf

APPENDIX A Recording of Minutes of Settlement COURT FILE NUMBER: 4810 024622 COURT: COURT OF QUEEN’S BENCH OF ALBERTA JUDICIAL CENTRE: RED DEER PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT: MARSHA GAIL ANNETT DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: TEDDY CECIL ANNETT -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MINUTES OF SETTLEMENT, TAKEN BEFORE TRUDY SKJONSBERG, EXAMINER, AT THE LAW OFFICES OF GERIG HAMILTON NEELAND LLP, IN THE CITY OF RED DEER, IN THE PROVINCE OF ALBERTA, ON THE 19 DAY OF FEBRUARY, A.D. 2016. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- T.K.

Lorenz, Ms. For the Plaintiff/ (Gerig Hamilton Neeland LLP) Applicant P.A. Crossley, Esq. For the Defendant/ (Crossley Law Office) Respondent Trudy Skjonsberg Court Reporter/Examiner

CENTRAL ALBERTA REPORTING RED DEER, ALBERTA 403-340-3414 (PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED AT 2 : 37 P.M.) MS. LORENZ: So the parties are agreed to the joint custody arrangement and a split custody arrangement. The mother will have primary care of the child Kenedy and the father will have primary care of the child Dailen. Sorry, are we continuing with the same specified access for Kenedy? MR. CROSSLEY: Plus an extra hour on the Wednesday. TEDDY ANNETT: Well, she was saying now she doesn't want to do the extra hour on Wednesday. MR . CROSSLEY: Okay. So no?

TEDDY ANNETT: So, fine, if she wants to go home, I'll bring her home, if not - - MARSHA ANNETT: Yeah, if she wants to come home, you can bring her home, if not - - TEDDY ANNETT: Okay. So 8 o'clock then if she's . .. MS . LORENZ: All right. So access arrangements with Kenedy and her father will remain the same. Access with Dailen and his mother will be reasonable and generous? MARSHA ANNETT : I'm hoping the same weekends I have Kenedy. TEDDY ANNETT: Okay. MARSHA ANNETT: And days where he would like

CENTRAL ALBERTA REPORTING RED DEER, ALBERTA 403-340-3414 to come and spend the night during school. TEDDY ANNETT: He's more than welcome to go anytime he wants. MS. LORENZ: And then we were talking about child support and spousal support. We've agreed that spousal support will be paid in the amount of $1,600 per month. That will commence March 2016 and continue for a period of 24 months. MR. CROSSLEY: March 1st, and then the 1st of each month thereafter. MS . LORENZ: Yes, the lst of each month. And then child support we actually -- I don't think we specified an amount there. MR.

CROSSLEY: But it will be payable in the amount based on Ted's income of 115,000 a year, plus he will pay whatever it is up to the date, 1,400 a month all in, which includes all

Section 7 expenses. So the spousal support 1,600 a month and the child support is 1,400 a month, and that includes the current

Section 7 expenses and all of Ted's contribution. TEDDY ANNETT: But after the 24 months it goes to the standard -- not 1,400 a month, whatever the standard rate is; correct? MS. LORENZ: Yes. MR. CROSSLEY: Correct. And spousal support terminates in the event of Marsha's remarriage or -- CENTRAL ALBBRTA REPORTING RED DEER, ALBERTA 403-340-3414

MS. LORENZ: Hold on, we didn't actually officially agree on that. Can we go off the record for a minute. (DISCUSSION OFF RECORD) MR. CROSSLEY: So spousal support is for two years, but it will end earlier if Marsha remarries or becomes an adult independent partner as per the legislation even if it's amended in the future to shorten the time. MS. LORENZ: Okay. MR. CROSSLEY: And child support at the end of spousal support will revert to whatever the Federal Guidelines for child support requirements are in terms of

Section 3 and

Section 7. So it all gets revisited based on Ted's income, which child is where with the

Section 7 expenses. MARSHA ANNETT: Okay. And so then if the child support is shorted, like if I get cut down on child support, he's going to start paying for Dailen’s dental? TEDDY ANNETT: How many more years is Dailen’s dental? MARSHA ANNETT: Two more years. MR. CROSSLEY: And then it falls under whatever the going rate would be for

section 7 expenses. MARSHA ANNETT: Okay. CENTRAL ALBERTA REPORTING RED DEER, ALBERTA 403-340-3414 MR. CROSSLEY : Okay? MARSHA ANNETT: But regardless, after the two

years he's getting clear braces. MR. CROSSLEY: Off the record for a second. (DISCUSSION OFF RECORD) MS. LORENZ: So the current

Section 7 expenses that are being covered within the named child support include the ballet for Kenedy, those are at $700 a year, the gymnastics for Kenedy which are $95 per month from September to June, and $300 a month for Dailen’ s braces. Any additional

Section 7 expenses are to be discussed and agreed upon between the parties prior to incurring those expenses, you know, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld. TEDDY ANNETT: Yes. MS. LORENZ: And is that it for the access and support provisions? MR. CROSSLEY: I believe so, yes. MS. LORENZ: So with respect to the property, the 2012 Dodge Charger, which is currently in Marsha's name, as well as the debt with respect to that will be the responsibility of Ted Annett, and he's agreed to continue the monthly payments until it is fully paid. TEDDY ANNETT: Yes. MS.

LORENZ: And Marsha has agreed that she will cooperate in allowing him to get insurance CENTRAL ALBERTA REPORTING RED DEER, ALBERTA 403-340-3414 into his name. MR. CROSSLEY: And Ted will use best efforts to refinance it at the earliest opportunity. TEDDY ANNETT: Yes. MR. CROSSLEY: Best efforts. And in regard to the TD card which is the name of Mr. Kunkel, being Marsha's father, Ted will make the

payments on that in the minimum amount of $200 a month and he will likewise -- TEDDY ANNETT: Starting the lst of March. MR. CROSSLEY: -- starting March 1st, and likewise use best efforts to have that debt either paid off or refinanced to save harm to Mr. Kunkel. Marsha will receive the family home free and clear and the Pontiac. Ted will receive all of his tools and other bric-a-brac that's currently stored at Marsha's place, and he will be responsible for any expenses associated with the Sea-cans. TEDDY ANNETT: Yes. MS. LORENZ: I believe that's all of the property that was on it. MR.

CROSSLEY: I believe that's all. MS. LORENZ: And everything else that’s in your named debt will be your responsibility. Any property in your name will be your responsibility as well. CENTRAL ALBERTA REPORTING RED DEER, ALBERTA 403-340-3414 MR. CROSSLEY: And officially incurred at any time, not since the date of separation, so anything that you own or any debt you owe. And all of this is subject to confirmation that the sale of Quebec house happened during the time the parties were living together. MS. LORENZ: Yes. Is there anything that we're missing? MARSHA ANNETT: I don't think so. MR.

CROSSLEY: And officially you agree to

this? Yes? TEDDY ANNETT: Yes. MARSHA ANNETT: Yes. MS .

LORENZ: Thank you. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 2:48 P.M. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CENTRAL ALBERTA REPORTING RED DEER, ALBERTA 403-340-3414 Certificate of Transcript I, the undersigned, hereby certify that the foregoing pages 2 to 7 are a complete and accurate transcript of the proceedings taken down by me in shorthand and transcribed by means of a computer-aided transcription system to the best of my skill and ability.

Dated at the City of Red Deer, Province of Alberta, this 20th day of February, A.D. 2016.

CENTRAL ALBERTA REPORTING RED DEER, ALBERTA 403-340-3414