Milbury v Milbury, 2017 ABQB 251

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Milbury v Milbury, 2017 ABQB 251 Date: 20170405 Docket: 4810 025342 Registry: Red Deer Between: Laura Raychelle Milbury Plaintiff - and - Derek Corbin Milbury Defendant _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Madam Justice J.B. Veit _______________________________________________________

Summary [ 1 ] Ms. Milbury asks the court for an order specifying access as a variation of a previous access order, adding some restrictions on the father’s access, specifying a penalty for failure to provide financial information, and finding Mr. Milbury in contempt and ordering that Mr. Milbury be arrested by the RCMP and imprisoned until his contempt has been purged. [ 2 ] Ms. Milbury’s application for variation of the existing access order is allowed, in part. The tone of Mr.

Milbury’s text messages to his wife is indeed unacceptable; in order to minimize conflict between the parents, access exchanges will be facilitated by an agency. During his access weekends, the father will not be required to take the children to any commitments made by the mother. The mother’s request that the father be prevented from removing the children from school and from the province without notice to her is reasonable and is granted. The request for RCMP is denied: Mr. Milbury has not breached any order; involving the police in parenting is a last resort; although Mr.

Milbury has been vulgar, and somewhat difficult to deal with, we are not yet in a last resort situation. [ 3 ] Ms. Milbury’s application for a fine for failure to provide financial disclosure is denied: there is no evidence on this

application of Mr. Milbury’s failure to provide financial disclosure. [4] Ms. Milbury’s application for a declaration of contempt and for imprisonment of Mr. Milbury until he purges his contempt isdenied. Ms. Milbury must personally serve Mr. Milbury with a contempt application which sets out clearly what Mr. Milbury is allegedto have done wrong. If Mr. Milbury is found in contempt for failing to obey an order of the court, a sentencing hearing will be held. [5] Civil contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature: the punishment for civil contempt could be a lengthy period ofimprisonment.

For that reason, special process must be undertaken to cite a person in contempt: Form 27 must be served on therespondent and service must be effected as for a commencement document, i.e. personal service or recorded mail service: Rules 10.52(1)and 11.5. These rules reflect the common law which has consistently held that personal service is required of contempt proceedings:Bhatnager. [6] Here, Mr.

Milbury, who has behaved offensively and unwisely, has nevertheless not been served with a Form 27 applicationfor contempt as a commencement document as required by Rule 10.52. [7] Although it is possible, in special circumstances, to relieve an applicant of the duty to serve a respondent personally withnotice of intention to engage contempt proceedings – Susin – the situation here is not one where the strict rules should be relaxed.

Inorder to establish civil contempt, an applicant must prove three things beyond a reasonable doubt - Carey: the applicant “must stateclearly and unequivocally what should and should not be done”, must establish that the respondent has actual knowledge of the order;and, must establish that the respondent has intentionally failed to do what the order required. Here, because there was no contemptapplication, it is not clear what missing disclosure is required: a requirement that a respondent make “full disclosure” is not sufficientlyprecise to allow Mr. Milbury to know what he must do to purge his contempt.

Also, in the circumstances here, it is not clear that Mr.Milbury has received personal notice of contempt proceedings against him. Finally, the proposed order would not bifurcate the contemptproceedings with a view to having a punishment hearing separate from the proceeding holding Mr. Milbury in contempt. This isparticularly important in civil contempt proceedings which are primarily coercive in nature, i.e. intended to produce compliance with anorder of the court, rather than punitive in nature. [8] Indeed, in a contempt procedure such as this one, where Ms.

Milbury is specifically asking for imprisonment as a sanctionfor contempt, in order to comply with the spirit if not the letter of the Charter, the application should advise Mr. Milbury that he cannotbe compelled to give evidence at the contempt hearing.

In a similar vein, Form 47 of the Rules of Court should perhaps be modified:although “show cause” is the traditional language of contempt, because the respondent is not compellable in contempt proceedingswhere jail or a punitive fine are realistically available sanctions, the language of the form should perhaps be changed to reflect the post-Charter position that, in contempt proceedings, the burden is on the applicant throughout. Cases and authority cited [9] By the court: Carey v Laiken 2015 SCC 17; Bhatnager v.

Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (SCC); Susin v Susin 2014 ONCA 733; Armoyan v Armoyan 2015 NSSC 174; Mohan v Mohan [2013] EWCA Civ 586. 1. Background [10] Partly because Mr. Milbury has behaved unwisely in ignoring court process, the history of these proceedings, althoughchronologically short, is complex. [11] On November 8, 2016, Ms. Milbury issued a Statement of Claim for Divorce and Division of Matrimonial Property, a FamilyLaw Application, an affidavit in support of her application and a Notice to Disclose/Application. [12] Mr.

Milbury behaved offensively to his wife when she attempted to serve him with these documents: his coarse language andapproach are established by the text messages that he sent to his wife on November 9, 2016. [13] On November 23, 2016, based on the text messages and additional evidence from the process server, Ms. Milbury obtained anorder from this court allowing her to serve Mr. Milbury with the November 8, 2016 documents substitutionally by email and by postingthem to the front door of the matrimonial home. The material which could be so served totalled at least 47 pages.

The order did not dealwith the status of future documents. [14] On December 2, 2016, Ms. Milbury filed an affidavit of service indicating that, on November 23, 2016, she served Mr.Milbury electronically as required in the November 23 order. [15] Ms. Milbury’s Family Law Application was set to be heard on December 2, 2016. Her application requested: - primary care of the parties’ children and granting Mr. Milbury reasonable and generous access to the children as may be agreedbetween the parties; - gross annual income to be imputed to Mr.

Milbury at $235,179.00; - interim child support based on his imputed income; - an order directing that the defendant pay, on an interim basis, 100% of the children’s

section 7 expenses; - “spousal support based on an imputed income of $235,179.00 or in such an amount as determined by this Honourable Court . . .”;and, - exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. [16] On December 2, 2016, in Mr. Milbury's absence but in reliance on the substitutional service order and the affidavit of service,

the court: - gave the mother primary care of the children of the marriage; - imputed income of $235,179.00 to Mr.

Milbury; - gave him access to his children "on his days off from work, pursuant to the status quo "; - ordered him to pay $3,240.00 in child support commencing December 1, 2016 along with 100% of "Munchkins in Motion, Dawe Dancers, Jazz and Ballett"; - ordered him to pay monthly spousal support of $3,000.00 on December 1, 2016 and continuing on the 1 st day of every month thereafter until further order of the court, with a further hearing on spousal support to be heard on January 13, 2017; - gave his wife exclusive possession of the matrimonial home; - gave his wife exclusive possession and sole use of the 2014 Ford Flex; and - ordered him to provide his full financial disclosure no later than January 30, 2016 [which was obviously a typing error for 2017] “failing which Mr.

Milbury was to appear in Chambers in person”. The December 2, 2016 order did not require Ms. Milbury to serve Mr. Milbury with a copy of the order. [ 17 ] When comparing the November 8, 2016 application and the December 2, 2016 court order, it is obvious that the court order: - set s. 7 expenses although Mr. Milbury had not been given notice of which expenses Ms. Milbury alleged qualified as s. 7 expenses; - awarded spousal support although Mr. Milbury had not been given notice of how much Ms. Milbury was requesting in spousal support.

As opposed to child support, the Spousal Support Guidelines are merely guidelines, they are not a legal requirement as are the Federal Child Support Guidelines; - dealt with the Ford vehicle, which was not identified as an issue in the November 8 application; - dealt with financial disclosure although financial disclosure was not part of the Family Law Application and was scheduled to be dealt with in court on December 16, 2016. [ 18 ] As to the last point, Ms. Milbury’s November 8, 2016 Notice to Disclose/Application set the date of that hearing as December 23, 2016.

A handwritten change to the date of the hearing was made on the face of that document, bringing the date forward to December 16, 2016. I am advised by the Court Coordinator that this change would have been made at the counter when the Notice to Disclose/Application was filed. One presumes, therefore, that the copy of the Notice to Disclose Application served on Mr. Milbury electronically indicated that the financial disclosure issues would be in court on December 16, 2016. [ 19 ] On December 16, 2016, this matter was not spoken to in court. [ 20 ] On January 13, 2017, in the absence of Mr.

Milbury and relying on the substitutional notice given to Mr. Milbury of the November 8, 2016 application and the affidavit of electronic service of the November 8, 2016 application, this court varied the December 2, 2016 order by requiring Mr. Milbury to pay monthly spousal support of $5,433.00 commencing January 1, 2017. The form of order signed by the court did not require Mr. Milbury to be served with a copy of the order. [ 21 ] On January 30, 2017, in the absence of Mr. Milbury and relying on the substitutional notice to Mr.

Milbury of the November 8, 2016 application which did not refer to disclosure, and the December 2, 2016 order which did contain a provision relating to disclosure but which did not include a term requiring service of the order on Mr. Milbury, this court ordered Mr. Milbury to provide his “full financial disclosure” to Ms. Milbury by 10:00 a.m. in morning chambers on February 1, 2017 “or the Defendant shall provide a reasonable explanation on why such disclosure was not provided. Failing to provide his full financial disclosure, the Defendant shall pay costs of $1,000.00 forthwith”.

No affidavit had been filed by Ms. Milbury for the January 30, 2017 hearing; undoubtedly oral submissions were made with respect to the status of Mr. Milbury’s financial reporting. The January 30 order required that Mr. Milbury be served with a copy of the order by email; Ms. Milbury filed an affidavit of service on February 1, 2017 to the effect that she served Mr. Milbury electronically on January 30 with the order of the same date. [ 22 ] On February 1, 2017, in the absence of Mr. Milbury but in reliance on the substitutional notice given to Mr.

Milbury of the November 8, 2016 application, and presumably on the service on Mr. Milbury of the January 30, 2017 order, this court: - declared that Mr. Milbury had failed to comply with the January 30, 2017 order by failing to provide complete financial disclosure and by failing to be present in court; - ordered Mr. Milbury to pay a penalty of $50.00 per day, commencing February 1, 2017 and continuing daily until February 22, 2017 at 10:00 a.m. when Mr. Milbury must appear in morning chambers “to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court, and not arrested by the RCMP”; - ordered Mr.

Milbury to pay $3,500.00 in costs, forthwith; and, - ordered that the February 1, 2017 order be served on Mr. Milbury by email. There is no affidavit of service of the February 1, 2017 order. I am informed by the Court Coordinator that, presumably, the February 1,

2017 order was not served on Mr. Milbury because counsel did not receive the filed order from the Courthouse until February 22, at which time the file was back in court. The fact that Mr. Milbury was not in court on February 1, 2017 was recorded by the court clerk. [ 23 ] On February 16, 2017, Ms. Milbury filed a Family Law Application returnable on February 22, 2017 requesting an order: - specifying the father’s access as being from 12 noon on Friday, March 10, 2017 until Sunday March 12, 2017 at 4:30 p.m. and so on every third week when Mr.

Milbury was off from work; - that if the “Defendant does not show up for his access time with the children, that he will not be granted any make-up time for his missed access”; - that the access exchange day and time be facilitated by Women’s Outreach; - that the Defendant not take the children outside of Alberta without first obtaining the written consent of the Plaintiff, and “must advise the Plaintiff if he is leaving the City of Red Deer with the children”; - to prevent the Defendant from removing the children from school, without the Plaintiff’s written consent; - an RCMP assistance clause; - an order shortening the time for service.

The February 16 application was supported by an affidavit which outlined some of the difficulties which the mother had experienced in relation to access. The February 16, 2017 application was served on Mr. Milbury electronically at one of the same email addresses set out in the November 23, 2016 substitutional service order. [ 24 ] On February 22, 2017, in morning chambers, Mr. Milbury was not in court. Ms.

Milbury presented an order that would have the effect of: - enforcing the order made on February 1, 2017 imposing costs for each day on which full financial disclosure has not been made; - granting the requests made in the February 18, 2017 application; - granting to each parent the right to reasonable telephone access to the children when they are in the other’s care; - finding Mr. Milbury in contempt of court and ordering that he be arrested by the RCMP and detained until such contempt has been purged; - requiring Mr. Milbury to pay costs of the application. 2.

Parenting issues [ 25 ] The first issue to be addressed in relation to the February 16, 2017 application is service. Ms. Milbury served Mr. Milbury electronically with her application. Rule 11.21 allows electronic service of post-commencement documents electronically if the person to be served has specifically provided an electronic address and the agent receiving the documents to be served is able to use the documents and the electronic transmission has been successfully completed. Ms.

Milbury’s affidavit of service of the February 16 application deals with each of these requirements except for the requirement that Mr. Milbury has specifically provided the electronic address to which the documents were sent. [ 26 ] In the circumstances here, given the history of the file and the evidence in relation to the November 23, 2016 order for substitutional service, I deem the electronic service on Mr. Milbury of the parenting application of February 16 to be good and sufficient. [ 27 ] Ms.

Milbury has amply justified the need of the children, and her own need, to have less stressful access exchanges: Mr. Milbury’s text messages are vulgar, and offensive to Ms. Milbury’s lawyer. In this high conflict situation, it is reasonable to have specified access times that will be facilitated by the agency chosen by Ms. Milbury. It is also reasonable, in the circumstances here, to provide that there will be no make-up time if Mr. Milbury misses an access weekend. At the same time, given the restricted access which Mr.

Milbury has because of his work schedule, during his access periods he will not be required to take the children to any commitments which the mother may have made for the children during their weekend with their father. [ 28 ] The mother’s request that the father not remove the children from their school without the mother’s consent is reasonable in light of the mother’s responsibility for their education. Similarly, the mother’s request that the father not remove the children from the province is reasonable.

However, the mother’s request that the father not remove the children from the City of Red Deer is excessive; she has not provided any evidence that would support such a restriction. [ 29 ] It is a useful addition to the parenting regime that each parent shall have reasonable telephone access to the children while in the other parent’s care; this will be particularly helpful to allow the children to maintain a link with their father during the relatively long periods when they cannot meet with him in person. [ 30 ] The mother’s request for police assistance in enforcing access periods is denied: there is no evidence that the father has breached a parenting order.

Involving the police in parenting is a last resort; although Mr. Milbury has been vulgar, and somewhat difficult to deal with, we are not yet in a last resort situation: 3. Fine for failure to provide financial disclosure [ 31 ] In her February 16 application, Ms. Milbury does not refer to the financial penalty imposed in the court’s February 1, 2017

order. Not surprisingly, therefore, in her affidavit in support of that application, she does not refer to the state of financial disclosure. [32] Because there is no evidence before the court on February 22, 2017 with respect to financial disclosure, this court does notimpose the $1,100.00 in costs referred to in the February 1, 2017 order; the application for these costs can be brought again on evidencein relation to disclosure. 4. Contempt [33] In her February 16 application, Ms. Milbury does not refer to contempt or to a sanction for contempt.

However, presumablyrelying on the February 1, 2017 order which states that Mr. Milbury “shall appear in Morning Chambers to show cause why he shouldnot be held in contempt of Court, and not arrested by the RCMP”, in the form of order she presents on February 22, 2017, Ms. Milburyasks for a finding of contempt and for imprisonment as a sanction for the contempt. [34] For the reasons which are set out below, I deny the contempt relief requested by Ms. Milbury.

a) General principles relating to civil contempt [35] Rule 10.52 of Alberta’s Rules of Court states: . . . before an order declaring a person in civil contempt of Court is made, notice of the application in Form 27 for a declaration of civilcontempt must be served on the person in the same manner as a commencement document. [36] Form 27 is the standard form for every kind of application. [37] We must therefore look to the law of contempt to learn what must be contained in an application for contempt.

Fortunately forus, the Supreme Court of Canada has recently reviewed the law of civil contempt: Carey. [38] Carey states that contempt proceedings are, in practice if not explicitly required in the Rules of Court, bifurcated: 17 In Ontario, civil contempt proceedings are governed by rule 60.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. Underthis rule, a party may move to obtain a contempt order: rule 60.11(1).

A judge, in dealing with such a motion, can "make such order as isjust" and, following "a finding" of contempt, he or she may order the contemnor to be [page88] imprisoned, pay a fine, do or refrain fromdoing

an act, pay just costs, and comply with any other order the judge considers necessary: rule 60.11(5). Upon motion, "a judge maydischarge, set aside, vary or give directions in respect of an order under subrule (5) ... and may grant such other relief and make suchother order as is just": rule 60.11(8). 18 The Rules do not prescribe the form of contempt proceedings. However, as a general rule, proceedings are bifurcated into a liabilityphase - where the case on liability proceeds and a defence is offered - and, if liability is established, a penalty phase.

In contemptproceedings, liability and penalty are discrete issues: College of Optometrists (Ont.) v. SHS Optical Ltd., 2008 ONCA 685, 241 O.A.C.225, at paras. 72-75. [39] Given the resource pressures on our courts, it may be appropriate, therefore, for persons applying for contempt orders toanticipate the necessity of setting two dates for the contempt hearing, one for the liability phase and another for the penalty phase. It maybe that, in circumstances such as these where Mr.

Milbury has chosen to represent himself, he may nevertheless choose to be representedby a lawyer at least for the penalty phase of the contempt hearing. [40] As to the liability phase, the applicant for contempt must clearly state what the alleged contemnor has done wrong: 33 The first element is that the order alleged to have been breached "must state clearly and unequivocally what should and should notbe done": Prescott-Russell, at para. 27; Bell ExpressVu, at para. 28, citing with approval Jaskhs Enterprises Inc. v. Indus Corp., (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 40.

This requirement of clarity ensures that a party will not be found in contempt where an order isunclear: Pro Swing, at para. 24; Bell ExpressVu, at para. 22. An order may be found to be unclear if, for example, it is missing anessential detail about where, when or to whom it applies; if it incorporates overly broad language; or if external circumstances haveobscured its meaning: Culligan Canada Ltd. v. Fettes, 2010 SKCA 151, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 463, at para. 21. [41] A statement to the effect that Mr.

Milbury must make full financial disclosure is, for the purposes of contempt, overly broad.Where, as here, an application for financial disclosure has been served, the applicant for contempt must outline the specifics of the gapsbetween what was requested and what is missing from the disclosure.

That specificity is necessary not only so that the respondent canmake full answer and defence to the allegation of contempt but also so that the respondent, can, if determined to be in contempt andimprisoned until he purges his contempt, apply for release upon easily enforceable conditions. [42] The applicant for contempt must also prove knowledge of the order; Bhatnager requires personal service of the citation incontempt; 34 The second element is that the party alleged to have breached the order must have had actual knowledge of it: Bhatnager, at p. 226;College of Optometrists, at para. 71.

It may be possible to infer knowledge in the circumstances, or an alleged contemnor may attractliability on the basis of the wilful blindness doctrine [43] Lastly, the applicant for contempt must also prove intentionality: 35 Finally, the party allegedly in breach must have intentionally done the act that the order prohibits or intentionally failed to do theact that the order compels: Sheppard v. Sheppard (1976), (ON CA), 12 O.R. (2d) 4 (C.A.), at p. 8. [44] The law has also established that a person who is cited in civil contempt is entitled to a fair hearing.

The elements of a fairhearing were set out in Armoyan as follows:

3 Traditionally, the procedural protections afforded to an alleged contemnor faced with civil contempt have included the following:

(1) The right to be provided with particularized allegations of the contempt;

(2) The right to a hearing;

(3) The right to be presumed innocent until such time as guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt;

(4) The right to make full answer and defence, including the right to retain and instruct counsel, the right to cross-examine witnesses and the right to submit or call evidence;

(5) The right not to be compelled to testify at the hearing. [ 45 ] Dealing with the last point, it may be that some refinement of our law in relation to compellability in matters of civil contempt is foreshadowed by the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Mohan where the court held: 33. More or less at the same time consideration was being given to the simplification of the tangled mechanisms for the enforcement of maintenance orders. The sensible outcome was the introduction of a general application which might result in the making of one or more from a menu of five enforcement mechanisms.

The judgment summons is not included in the menu which is confined to orders that do not carry the risk of penal sanction. So, on the one hand there are the non-penal enforcement orders for one or more of which a general application is issued and the judgment act summons which seeks only the imprisonment of the debtor.

The protections arising under the Human Rights Act 1998 in the single penal process have no application to the menu of 5 available orders and accordingly the respondent to such an application is compellable and may be subjected to examination as to means in advance of the hearing and before the creditor elects which of the orders on the menu is being sought. [Emphasis added] In other words, if a contempt application were to restrict itself to a coercive, as opposed to punitive, requested sanction, such as, for example, the striking out of matrimonial property pleadings, the respondent in contempt proceedings may be compellable.

It is not, of course, necessary to decide that issue in the circumstances here. [ 46 ] The last point, the non-compellability of the respondent in a contempt hearing, arises – at least in part – from the application by the courts of Charter principles to the contempt process.

Section 7 of the Charter states that everyone has a right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. One of those fundamental principles is that persons who are summoned into proceedings to which the Charter applies must be told what jeopardy they face. It goes without saying that, although non-compellable, Mr. Milbury and every other respondent in civil contempt proceedings, is a competent witness should he choose to explain why he has not complied with the order for financial disclosure.

He can choose to explain why he has not complied with an order, but he can’t be compelled to provide evidence against himself. [ 47 ] In order to emphasize the contemporary approach to compellability in contempt proceedings, Form 47 of the Rules of Court should perhaps be modified: although "show cause" is the traditional language of contempt proceedings, because the respondent is not compellable in contempt proceedings where jail or a punitive fine are realistically available sanctions, the language of the form should perhaps be changed to reflect the post-Charter position that, in contempt proceedings, the burden is on the applicant throughout. [ 48 ] In the result, the Form 27 Notice of Application must set out with precision what Mr.

Milbury must do to comply with his obligation to provide financial disclosure; if he has provided some disclosure, the missing disclosure must be itemized. [ 49 ] The application should also advise Mr. Milbury that he is in jeopardy of being imprisoned if he is found in contempt of court. [ 50 ] Finally, the application should also advise Mr. Milbury that he is not compellable to provide evidence at the contempt hearing. [ 51 ] Once a proper application has been prepared, it must be served on Mr. Milbury in the same way as a commencement document.

b) Applying the law of civil contempt to the circumstances here [ 52 ] For the following reasons, I have concluded that Ms. Milbury is not entitled to the order of imprisonment for contempt which is sought in her February 22, 2017 application: - I begin by acknowledging that failing to comply with an order to make financial disclosure can be a proper basis for an order of contempt; - however, Ms. Milbury has never filed any Form 27 Application to hold Mr. Milbury in contempt.

She has filed a total of 3 applications; the first one, filed on November 8, 2016, and returnable on December 2, 2016 did not mention contempt. The second one, filed on November 8, 2016 and returnable on December 16, 2016, did not mention contempt. The third one, filed on February 16, 2017, does not request a contempt hearing. In order to hold Mr. Milbury in contempt and to obtain a sanction against him for his contempt, Ms. Milbury must file a Form 27 application setting out the requirements discussed in the previous section; - even assuming that electronic service to Mr.

Milbury of his jeopardy in the matter of contempt could be retroactively approved, the fact is that Mr. Milbury was not served, by any method, with the February 1 order of the court; - although I acknowledge that there are situations in which personal service of contempt applications is not required, I conclude that this is not one of those situations. Mr. Milbury has behaved unwisely in thumbing his nose at the court process, and behaved offensively in referring to Ms. Milbury’s lawyer. However, it appears from the materials which Ms. Milbury has filed that, at least at the

beginning of these proceedings, she was aware that Mr. Milbury was regularly employed out of town. It is not clear, for example, if the February 1 date chosen on January 30 allowed time for Mr. Milbury to actually receive notice and if that date anticipated that Mr. Milbury could appear in court without jeopardizing his employment. In any event, as stated above, contempt proceedings must be treated as a new and separate subset of proceedings within this divorce and property proceeding. Ms. Milbury must personally serve Mr.

Milbury with her application for contempt, or apply for substitutional service of that application. The only substitutional order granted so far in these proceedings is the order of November 23, 2016, which does not explicitly provide that all future applications in the proceedings can be served electronically. Moreover, that order refers only to specific documents; the documents which are specifically referred to in that order do not include the February 16, 2017 application. Even if the order of November 23, 2016 could be seen as authorizing notice to Mr.

Milbury of the January 13, January 30 and February 1 proceedings, it cannot authorize a contempt order because of the requirement in the Rules that contempt be treated as a separate proceeding. [ 53 ] Finally, as the Supreme Court of Canada reminded us in Carey , contempt is a remedy of last resort rather than of first resort. Once the court knows exactly how Mr. Milbury’s financial disclosure is deficient and once Ms. Milbury explains how a failure to provide the required disclosure affects her and the children, the court will be in a position to decide if Mr.

Milbury is in contempt and, if so, whether imprisonment is the appropriate sanction in the situation. For example, in the materials filed by Ms. Milbury, there is reference to a matrimonial home; the equity in that home might be substantial; Mr. Milbury’s interest in that home might possibly be used to satisfy his child and spousal support obligations. 5. Costs [ 54 ] If the parties are not agreed on costs, I may be spoken to within 30 days of the release of this decision. Heard on the 22 nd day of February, 2017. Dated at the City of Red Deer, Alberta this 5 th day of April, 2017. J.B. Veit J.C.Q.B.A.

Appearances: Seal S. Nulliah, Red Deer Law Group LLP for the Plaintiff, Ms. Milbury