TLH v MGD, 2017 ABQB 408

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: TLH v MGD, 2017 ABQB 408 Date: 20170628 Docket: 4801 147188 Registry: Calgary Between: T.L.H. Applicant/Plaintiff - and - M.G.D. Respondent/Defendant _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Mr. Justice Bryan E. Mahoney _______________________________________________________ [ 1 ] This Memorandum of Decision arises out of a case management hearing held on March 6, 2017 in an extremely high- conflict family matter.

Background [ 2 ] The parties, T.L.H. (the “Mother”) and M.G.D. (the “Father”), were married and began cohabitating on February 20, 2010. They separated on February 15, 2011 and on this same day, the Mother filed a Statement of Claim for Divorce and an Application for a Restraining Order Without Notice in a Family Law Situation. [ 3 ] The Mother is represented by Adam Benarzi of Horne Wytrychowski. The Father is self-represented. [ 4 ] The parties have two sons, K who is 7 years old and T who is 6 years old (together the “Children”).

[ 5 ] The parties have made numerous appearances in Court for various matters over the years. My involvement in this matter began in March 2016 when I presided over a four-day viva voce hearing. I released a Final Order stemming out of this hearing on April 26, 2016 (the “April 26, 2016 Final Order”). The April 26, 2016 Final Order is very detailed. It includes 79 paragraphs and spans 14 pages. [ 6 ] Regrettably, the detail of the April 26, 2016 Final Order has done little to reduce the conflict between the parties.

As a result, I remained seized with this matter until December 15, 2016, when I assumed case management of it and enlisted the assistance of the Court’s Case Management Counsel, Susan Borsic-Drummond QC. [ 7 ] Ms. Borsic-Drummond had two full-day case management meetings with the parties on January 31 and February 24, 2017 during which she was able to assist them to resolve some of their outstanding issues.

These resolutions are set out in Consent Orders pronounced by me on February 1 and February 27, 2017. [ 8 ] In the Consent Order pronounced on February 27, 2017 (the “February 27, 2017 Consent Order”), the parties agreed on the following agenda for the case management hearing with me on March 6, 2017: (1) determination of how much time the Children were in the care and control of each of the parties since January 1, 2012; (2) determination of the amount of retroactive

section 3 child support and

section 7 expenses payable between the parties since January 1, 2012; (3) determination of the amount of ongoing

section 3 child support and

section 7 expenses payable between the parties; (4) determination of how previous costs Orders shall be paid; (5) determination of how tax credits for the Children shall be divided between the parties since January 1, 2012; (6) determination of how the Children’s annual Easter Break will be divided between the parties beginning with their 2017 Easter Spring Break; (7) determination of how the Children’s annual Spring Break will be divided between the parties beginning with 2018 Spring Break; and (8) determination of contempt of Court applications, if any. [ 9 ] I will now deal with each of these issues.

Issue 1: Determination of how much time the Children were in the care and control of each of the parties since January 1, 2012 [ 10 ] I am asked to determine how much time the Children were in the care of each of the parties since January 1, 2012 in order to determine whether the child support payable between the parties for this period should be calculated based on

section 3 or

section 9 of the Child Support Guidelines . The Father argues that child support should be calculated pursuant to

section 9 of the Child Support Guidelines from January 1, 2012 to the present. The Mother argues that

section 3 is applicable for this period. [ 11 ] As noted above, the parties separated on February 15, 2011. However, in paragraph 2 of the February 27, 2017 Consent Order, the parties agreed that no retroactive child support is payable for the period between their separation and December 31, 2011. This is why I am only asked to determine how much time the Children were in the care of each of the parties since January 1, 2012. [ 12 ] The parties agree that

section 3 of the Child Support Guidelines is applicable unless I find that a shared custody arrangement existed.

Section 9, which applies in shared custody arrangements, reads: Shared custody 9. Where a spouse exercises a right of access to, or has physical custody of, a child for not less than 40 per cent of the time over the course of a year, the amount of the child support order must be determined by taking into account (

a) the amounts set out in the applicable tables for each of the spouses; (

b) the increased costs of shared custody arrangements; and (

c) th e conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse and of any child for whom support is sought. [ 13 ] Accordingly, I am not required to determine precisely how much time the Children were in the care of each of the parties since January 1, 2012 but rather only whether they were in the care of each of the parties at least 40% of the time. [ 14 ] On the evidence before me, I find that the Father has never had the Children in his care 40% of the time or more since January 1, 2012.

I note that during some of this time, the Father admits that he had very limited supervised access and, during some periods, no access at all with the Children because of various allegations that he was abusive to the Children. These allegations began with a Restraining Order Without Notice that the Mother obtained against the Father the day they separated on February 15, 2011.

Court records indicate that the Mother previously obtained an Ex Parte Restraining Order against the Father in June 2010 and subsequently obtained an Interim Without Prejudice Queen’s Bench Protection Order against the Father in October 2014. Court records also indicate that the Father was found not guilty in the Provincial Court of Alberta in May 2015 of criminal charges related to allegations of abuse

against the Children. [ 15 ] The Alberta Child and Family Services (“CFS”) has a history of involvement with this family. CFS became involved in the days leading up to the March 6, 2017 case management hearing because the Mother made new allegations of abuse against the Father. At my request, a social worker from CFS attended the March 6 case management hearing. I will say more about CFS later in this Memorandum of Decision. [ 16 ] The Father argues that the Mother is using unfounded allegations of abuse to prevent him from having parenting time with the Children. He asks me to find that

section 9 of the Child Support Guidelines is applicable in this case because he “wanted to, tried to, should’ve and could’ve” had the Children in his care at least 40% of the time since January 1, 2012 had the Mother not made unfounded allegations of abuse against him. [ 17 ] I am unable to accept the Father’s argument. The plain wording of

section 9 calls for an assessment of whether or not the Father “exercise[d] a right of access to, or ha[d] physical custody of, [the Children] for not less than 40 per cent of the time over the course of a year.” Nothing in

section 9 or elsewhere in the Child Support Guidelines suggests that Parliament intended Courts to disregard parenting arrangements that actually existed and consider whether or not different parenting arrangements “should have” or “could have” existed had circumstances been different. Indeed, conducting such an inquiry would defeat many of the objectives of the Child Support Guidelines as set out in

section 1 thereof: Objectives 1. The objectives of these Guidelines are (

a) to establish a fair standard of support for children that ensures that they continue to benefit from the financial means of both spouses after separation; (

b) to reduce conflict and tension between spouses by making the calculation of child support orders more objective; (

c) to improve the efficiency of the legal process by giving courts and spouses guidance in setting the levels of child support orders and encouraging settlement; and (

d) to ensure consistent treatment of spouses and children who are in similar circumstances. [ 18 ] Having found that the Father has never in fact had the Children in his care 40% of the time or more since January 1, 2012, I conclude that a shared custody arrangement as contemplated by

section 9 of the Child Support Guidelines did not exist during this period. Issue 2: Determination of the amount of retroactive

section 3 child support and

section 7 expenses payable between the parties since January 1, 2012 [ 19 ] In the February 27, 2017 Consent Order, the parties agreed that their Guideline Incomes were as follows: Father Mother 2012: $76,661.00 (47.61%) 2012: $84,344.00 (52.39%) 2013: $80,864.00 (52.74%) 2013: $72,455.00 (47.26%) 2014: $77,593.00 (40.02%) 2014: $116,300.00 (59.98%) 2015: $80,080.23 (34.84%) 2015: $149,747.00 (65.16%) 2016: $79,387.71 (34.65%) 2016: $149,747.00 (65.35%) 2017: $79,387.71 (34.65%) 2017: $149,747.00 (65.35%) [ 20 ] To date, the issue of child support in this matter has been addressed in at least seven Orders of this Court, the first of which was pronounced on January 24, 2012 and the last of which is the February 27, 2017 Consent Order.

Four of these Orders purport to set Guideline Incomes for the parties but only the February 27, 2017 Consent Order specifies the period for which the Guidelines Incomes are applicable and states whether or not they are final or reviewable.

For instance, the February 27, 2017 Consent Order clearly states that the Father’s 2015 Guideline Income and both parties’ 2016 and 2017 Guidelines Incomes as set out in that Order are reviewable in the event that they differ from Notices of Assessment or Reassessment issued by the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) for the applicable taxation year. [ 21 ] I find that where the parties’ Guideline Incomes set out in the various Orders differ, the amounts in the February 27, 2017 Consent Order should prevail because this Order is the most recent pronouncement on the matter and because this Order was made on the consent of both parties. [ 22 ] Based upon the Father’s Guideline Income as set out in the February 27, 2017 Consent Order, I find that the following amounts of

section 3 child support were payable by the Father to the Mother for the period January 1, 2012 to February 28, 2017: 2012: $1,094.78 per month x 12 months = $13,137.36 2013: $1,156.96 per month x 12 months = $13,883.52 2014: $1,108.90 per month x 12 months = $13,306.80 2015: $1,145.20 per month x 12 months = $13,742.40 2016: $1,134.66 per month x 12 months = $13,615.92 2017: $1,134.66 per month x 2 months = $2,269.32 Total

Section 3 Child Support Payable: $69,955.32

[ 23 ] In the February 27, 2017 Consent Order, the parties agreed that the Father has paid the Mother the following amounts: January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2012: $8,948.74 in

section 3 child support January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013: $11,530.00 in

section 3 child support January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014: $13,702.00 in

section 3 child support and

section 7 expenses January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015: $15,560.83 in

section 3 child support and

section 7 expenses January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016: $15,253.60 in

section 3 child support and

section 7 expenses January 1, 2017 to February 22, 2017: $3,235.60 in

section 3 child support and

section 7 expenses Total

Section 3 Child Support &

Section 7 Expenses Paid: $68,230.77 [ 24 ] As this chart indicates, while the parties were able to agree on exactly how much

section 3 child support the Father paid to the Mother in 2012 and 2013, for later years they were only able to agree on how much the Father paid to the Mother in combined

section 3 child support and

section 7 expenses. I note that the Father only began paying

section 7 expenses in 2014. [ 25 ] In the February 27, 2017 Consent Order, the parties agreed that the Director of Maintenance Enforcement (“MEP”) approved the following amounts of

section 7 expenses submitted by the Mother for reimbursement from the Father: 2014: $6,275.40 ($522.95 per month or 8.09% of the Father’s Guideline Income) 2015: $5,764.99 ($480.42 per month or 7.2% of the Father’s Guideline Income) 2016: $9,882.00 ($823.50 per month or 12.45% of the Father’s Guideline Income) [ 26 ] I note that the Father has never submitted any

section 7 expenses to MEP for reimbursement by the Mother and does not now seek reimbursement from the Mother for any

section 7 expenses. [ 27 ] While both parties agree that the above

section 7 amounts were approved by MEP, they both argue that the amounts are incorrect. The Father argues that the amounts are too high and exceed what he should be required to pay the Mother for

section 7 expenses. The Mother argues that the amounts are too low and seeks reimbursement for additional

section 7 expenses over and above the amounts approved by MEP. In her materials, the Mother indicates that she is seeking reimbursement from the Father for the following

section 7 expenses: Total Expenses Percentage and Amount Sought from the Father 2012: $30.01 43% or $12.90 from the Father ($1.08 per month or .017% of the Father’s Guideline Income) 2013: $7,698.49 50% or $3,849.25 from the Father ($320.77 per month or 4.76% of the Father’s Guideline Income) 2014: $10,450.48 50% or $5,225.24 from the Father ($435.44 per month or 6.73% of the Father’s Guideline Income) 2015: $18,311.14 50% or $9,155.57 from the Father ($762.96 per month or 11.43% of the Father’s Guideline Income) 2016: $22,587.73 50% or $11,293.87 from the Father ($941.16 per month or 14.23% of the Father’s Guideline Income) Jan & Feb 2017: $0 nil Total

Section 7 Expenses: $59,077.85 Total

Section 7 Expenses Sought From The Father 29,536.83 [ 28 ] In order to determine the amount of retroactive

section 3 child support and

section 7 expenses payable between the parties since January 1, 2012, I find that the $68,230.77 already paid by the Father to the Mother should be attributed towards the $69,955.32 in

section 3 child support owing by the Father since January 1, 2012. The Father therefore owes the Mother $1,724.55 in retroactive

section 3 child support for the period January 1, 2012 to February 28, 2017. [ 29 ] I will now consider the amounts owing by the Father to the Mother for

section 7 expenses since January 1, 2012. As stated above, the Mother is seeking $29,536.83 in

section 7 expenses from the Father. [ 30 ] In 2012, the Mother indicates that she incurred

section 7 expenses of $30.01 for food and parking when she took the Children to medical appointments. The Mother seeks 43% or $12.90 of this amount from the Father as “medical expenses” based on a Consent Variation Order pronounced by Justice B.L. Rawlins on September 7, 2012 (the “September 7, 2012 Consent Order”), which directs the following apportionment of

section 7 expenses: 5. [The Father] shall pay to [the Mother] his share of the following special expenses for the children which may arise from time to time:

a) child care – shall be paid directly to the care provider 43%

b) Medical/dental insurance of both parties [sic] plan 100%

c) Agreed upon extracurricular expenses 43%

6. [The Mother] shall maintain her share with medical/dental insurance from her plan. [ 31 ] A review of the Mother’s 2012

section 7 receipts reveals a parking receipt dated June 18, 2012 and stamped “Alberta Children’s Hospital” and a receipt dated August 14, 2012 from a restaurant several kilometres from the Alberta Children’s Hospital. I find that the September 7, 2012 Consent Order does not direct the Father to reimburse the Mother for medical expenses. I find further that the Mother’s parking and meal expenses are not recoverable from the Father under any category of

section 7 expense. Accordingly, no retroactive

section 7 expenses are owing by the Father to the Mother for the period January 1 to December 31, 2012. [ 32 ] In 2013, the Mother indicates that she incurred

section 7 expenses of $7,698.49. The Mother seeks 50% or $3,849.25 of this amount (or $320.77 per month) from the Father based on a Consent Variation Order pronounced by Justice B.E. Romaine on August 28, 2013 (the “August 28, 2013 Consent Order”), which directs that the following expenses be apportioned between the parties on a 50 – 50 basis commencing July 15, 2013: child care; medical/dental insurance; medical/dental expenses; school expenses; extracurricular expenses; and post-secondary expenses. [ 33 ] A review of the Mother’s 2013

section 7 receipts reveals that she is claiming “medical expenses” of $234.49 for gas, parking and meals when she took the Children to medical appointments. I find that the Mother’s gas, parking and meal expenses are not recoverable from the Father under any category of

section 7 expense. [ 34 ] In 2013, the Mother is also claiming school expenses of $177.00. All of the Mother’s school receipts include the name and contact information of the service provider and the dates the services were provided. I find that the $177.00 claimed by the Mother is a

section 7 school expense. [ 35 ] The Mother claims $7,287.00 for childcare expenses in 2013. The Mother’s childcare receipts all include the name of the service provider. Some of the receipts include the service provider’s telephone number, other receipts include the service provider’s telephone number and address, and receipts totalling over $3,000.00 include no contact information whatsoever for the service provider. Several receipts, amounting to over $3,500.00, also do not specify the date or dates the services were provided.

For instance, one receipt for $1,316.00 is dated October 4, 2013 but presumably is not just for services provided on this day. The Mother has handwritten “October 2013 – Childcare” next to this receipt. All of the receipts are signed by the service providers but one receipt for $2,037.00 is not signed even though the service provider named thereon has signed other receipts produced by the Mother. I find that the $7,287.00 claimed by the Mother for childcare should be reduced by 25% to account for the evidentiary deficiencies with her receipts. As such, $5,465.25 is a

section 7 childcare expense. [ 36 ] The Mother is therefore entitled to contribution from the Father for total

section 7 expenses of $5,642.25 in 2013. I find that these expenses should be shared equally between the parties as they agreed in the August 28, 2013 Consent Order. [ 37 ] The Father therefore owes the Mother $2,821.13 in

section 7 expenses in 2013. Accordingly, retroactive

section 7 expenses of $2,821.13 are owing by the Father to the Mother for the period January 1 to December 31, 2013. [ 38 ] In 2014, the Mother indicates that she incurred

section 7 expenses of $10,450.48. The Mother seeks 50% or $5,225.24 of this amount (or $435.44 per month) from the Father based on an Order pronounced by Justice W.P. Sullivan on July 10, 2014 (the “July 10, 2014 Order”), which directs that

section 7 expenses be apportioned between the parties on a 50 – 50 basis.

Section 7 expenses are not specified in the July 10, 2014 Order but the Order states that the August 28, 2013 Consent Order remains in effect. Accordingly, the same

section 7 expenses are reimbursable, namely: child care; medical/dental insurance; medical/dental expenses; school expenses; extracurricular expenses; and post-secondary expenses. [ 39 ] A review of the Mother’s 2014

section 7 receipts reveals that she is claiming “medical expenses” of $39.49 for gas and meals when she took the Children to medical appointments. I find that the Mother’s parking and meal expenses are not recoverable from the Father under any category of

section 7 expense. [ 40 ] In 2014, the Mother is also claiming $263.98 for extracurricular activities and $630.00 for school expenses. The extracurricular and school receipts include the names and contact information of the service provider and the dates the services were provided. I find that the $263.98 claimed by the Mother is a

section 7 extracurricular expense and the $630.00 claimed by the Mother is a

section 7 school expense. [ 41 ] The Mother claims $9,517.00 for childcare expenses in 2014. With the exception of one receipt, none of childcare receipts specify the date or dates the services were provided. I find that the $9,517.00 claimed by the Mother for childcare should be reduced by 20% to account for the evidentiary deficiencies with her receipts. As such, $7,613.60 is a

section 7 childcare expense. [ 42 ] The Mother is therefore entitled to contribution from the Father for total

section 7 expenses of $8,507.58 in 2014. I find that these expenses should be shared proportionately between the parties based on their 2014 Guideline Incomes, 40.02% for the Father and 59.98% for the Mother. I am intentionally not apportioning

section 7 expenses between the parties on a 50 – 50 basis as set out in the July 10, 2014 Order because this is not a final Order or an Order made on consent. The parties subsequently agreed that the Father’s 2014 Guideline Income was $77,593.00 and the Mother’s 2014 Guideline Income was $116,300.00. Therefore, I find that an equal allocation would be unfair given the disparity between the parties’ Guideline Incomes. [ 43 ] The Father therefore owes the Mother $3,404.73 in

section 7 expenses in 2014. Accordingly, retroactive

section 7 expenses of $3,404.73 are owing by the Father to the Mother for the period January 1 to December 31, 2014. [ 44 ] In 2015, the Mother indicates that she incurred

section 7 expenses of $18,311.14. The Mother seeks 50% or $9,155.57 of this amount (or $762.96 per month) from the Father based on the July 10, 2014 Order. This amounts to an extraordinary 11.43% of the Father’s 2015 Guideline Income. [ 45 ] A review of the Mother’s 2015

section 7 receipts reveals that she is claiming medical expenses of $530.00 for a hearing aid for T. According to the Mother, the hearing aid cost $4,130.00, of which the government covered $3,600.00 and she paid $530.00. The

Father argues that he should not be responsible for this expense because the hearing aid would have been partially covered under his healthcare benefits plan if the Mother had provided the receipt to him to submit under his plan. The Father also argues that the Mother may have in fact been reimbursed for the some portion of the $530.00 under her own healthcare benefits plan. The Mother did not provide responding evidence to these arguments.

I find that the Mother has failed to provide evidence regarding why she did not provide the $530.00 hearing aid receipt to the Father to submit under his healthcare benefits plan. She has also failed to provide evidence regarding whether or not she received reimbursement for any portion of the $530.00 under her own healthcare benefits plan. In these circumstances, I find that the $530.00 is not recoverable from the Father as a

section 7 expense. [ 46 ] In 2015, the Mother is also claiming $706.00 for extracurricular activities. The Mother’s extracurricular receipts include the name and contact information of the service providers and the dates the services were provided. I find that the $706.00 claimed by the Mother is a

section 7 extracurricular expense. [ 47 ] The Mother claims school expenses of $1,640.00 in 2015. To support this claim, the Mother provides receipts indicating that she paid $1,230.00 (not $1,640.00) for T to attend “private child care Montessori approach.” The name of the service provider is not legible on these receipts and there is no contact information whatsoever for the service provider on the receipts. I also note that while the Mother claims Montessori as a school expense, the receipts she provided have “child care” written on them.

The Father argues that he should not be responsible for this expense, which was incurred by the Mother in addition to her ordinary childcare expenses. He also argues that in the event that the expenses are for private school, he should not be responsible for reimbursing the Mother for them because he did not agree to either of the Children attending private school. Due to the serious evidentiary deficiencies with the Mother’s receipts and because the Mother is already claiming childcare expenses of $15,435.14 in 2015, I find that the $1,640.00 claimed by the Mother is not recoverable from the Father as a

section 7 expense. [ 48 ] The vast majority of the

section 7 expenses claimed by the Mother in 2015 ($15,435.14 of $18,311.14) are for childcare. The Mother has broken this amount down into two categories: $14,626.35 for “childcare expenses” and $808.79 for “additional nanny expenses.” [ 49 ] The Mother’s childcare expenses of $14,626.35 in 2015 include both standard childcare and the services of a live-in nanny. According to the Mother’s evidence, she employed a live-in nanny from September 2015 until June 2016.

The Father does not dispute these dates. [ 50 ] Much attention was paid to the issue of the live-in nanny by both parties in their affidavit evidence and during their oral submissions at the March 6, 2017 case management hearing. According to the Mother, the services of a live-in nanny were essential because she travelled for work and the nanny provided stability, consistency and a routine for the Children. The Mother argues that the Order pronounced by Justice K.M.

Horner on January 24, 2012 (the “January 24, 2012 Order”) granted her the “privilege” of hiring a live-in nanny and seeking reimbursement from the Father for this expense. The Mother also points out that the Father never appealed the January 24, 2012 Order. [ 51 ] The January 24, 2012 Order contains a single reference to a nanny, which is as follows: 9.

The proposed Nanny shall be interviewed by the [Father] as soon as practical to determine if the proposed Nanny is acceptable. [ 52 ] In response, the Father argues that he cannot afford to pay for a nanny and should not be required to reimburse the Mother for this expense.

The Father also submits evidence that suggests that the Mother received personal benefits from the live-in nanny above and beyond childcare, such as assistance with household chores. [ 53 ] After considering both parties’ evidence and submissions on the issue of the live-in nanny, I find that the additional expenses associated with the services of a live-in nanny are not recoverable from the Father as a

section 7 expense. I reach this conclusion based on a number of factors. First, while a nanny is mentioned in the January 24, 2012 Order, which was pronounced less than a year after the parties separated, a nanny is not mentioned in a single one of the many subsequent Orders pronounced in this case. The Mother takes the position that “[t]his privilege was never revoked in any orders that followed.” While this may be true, it is equally true that the issue of a nanny was not affirmed in any subsequent Orders either.

I note that the Mother engaged the live-in nanny some 3½ years after the January 24, 2012 Order was pronounced. In the interim, the issue of child support had been revisited in several Orders but none of them address the issue of a nanny. [ 54 ] Second, even the January 24, 2012 Order contains no reference to a live-in nanny who might be responsible for performing household chores in addition to providing childcare services. [ 55 ] Finally, the Mother states in her affidavit evidence that “Justice Horner’s Order is a Parenting Application and makes no mention to [sic] Child Support or

Section 7 Expenses.” Through this statement, it appears that the Mother recognizes, and rightly so in my view, that there is a difference between an Order that permits her to engage the services of a nanny and an Order that requires the Father to reimburse her for the services of a nanny should she choose to engage one. The January 24, 2012 Order does nothing more than permit the Mother to engage the services of a nanny and, should she decide to do so, it grants the Father the right to interview the nanny.

The January 24, 2012 Order does not require the Father to reimburse the Mother for any portion of the cost of a nanny, let alone 50% of the cost of a live-in nanny as the Mother now argues. In my view, given the Father’s income, it would be unfair to impose 50% of an expense as potentially costly as a live-in nanny on the Father in the absence of an Order that clearly imposes this obligation on him. [ 56 ] Having found that the Mother cannot recover the additional expenses associated with these services of a live-in nanny from the Father as a

section 7 expense, I am left to decide what childcare expenses the Mother should be permitted to recover from the Father in 2015. [ 57 ] The Mother engaged the live-in nanny in September 2015. Prior to this, a review of the Mother’s

section 7 receipts reveals that from January until the end of August 2015, the Mother is claiming childcare expenses of $9,998.00. I find that one of the Mother’s receipts in the amount of $300.00, which indicates on its face that it is to “supplement [the Father’s] payment to S.A. for supervised visits”, is not recoverable from the Father as a

section 7 expense. This leaves the Mother with a claim of $9,698.00 for childcare

expenses for the period from rom January 1 until the end of August 2015. None of the Mother’s receipts specify the date or dates the services were provided. I find that the $9,698.00 claimed by the Mother for childcare should be reduced by 20% to account for the evidentiary deficiencies with her receipts. As such, $7,758.40 is a

section 7 childcare expense for the period January to August 2015. This amounts to $969.80 per month. [ 58 ] Turning now to the period from September until December 2015 when the Mother employed the live-in nanny, the Mother’s receipts indicate that she is claiming $4,114.00 for this period. Only two of the Mother’s receipts for this period specify the date or dates the services were provided. I find that the $4,114.00 should be reduced by 20% to account for the evidentiary deficiencies with her receipts. As such, $3,291.20 is a

section 7 childcare expense before consideration of the live-in nanny issue. Having found that the Mother cannot recover the additional expenses associated with these services of a live-in nanny from the Father as a

section 7 expense and considering all of the circumstances, for the months of September to December 2015, I will allow the lesser of (

i) the amount found to be a

section 7 expense for this period, namely $3,291.20, before consideration of the live-in nanny issue and (ii) the average monthly amount for the period January to August 2015, being $3,879.20 ($969.80 x 4 months). Accordingly, $3,291.20 is a

section 7 childcare expense for the period September to December 2015. [ 59 ] I therefore find that $11,049.60 ($7,758.40 + $3,291.20) is

section 7 childcare expense in 2015. [ 60 ] The “additional nanny expenses” being claimed by the Mother are for gas and maintenance of the nanny’s vehicle. A review of the Mother’s receipts reveals a gas receipt from the Superstore and a receipt from Canadian Tire for, among other things, tires. I find that the Mother’s “additional nanny expenses” are not recoverable from the Father as

section 7 expenses. [ 61 ] The Mother is therefore entitled to contribution from the Father for

section 7 expenses of $11,755.60 in 2015. I find that these expenses should be shared proportionately between the parties based on their 2015 Guideline Incomes, 34.84% for the Father and 65.16% for the Mother. Again, I note that I am intentionally not apportioning

section 7 expenses between the parties on a 50 – 50 basis as set out in the July 10, 2014 Order because this is not a final Order or an Order made on consent and, in circumstances where the parties subsequently agreed that the Father’s 2015 Guideline Income was $80,080.23 and the Mother’s 2015 Guideline Income was $149,747.00, I find that an equal allocation would be unfair given the disparity between the parties’ Guideline Incomes. [ 62 ] The Father therefore owes the Mother $4,095.65 in

section 7 expenses in 2015. Accordingly, retroactive

section 7 expenses of $4,095.65 are owing by the Father to the Mother for the period January 1 to December 31, 2015. [ 63 ] In 2016, the Mother indicates that she incurred

section 7 expenses of $22,587.73. The Mother seeks 50% or $11,293.87 of this amount (or $941.16 per month) from the Father based on the July 10, 2014 Order. This amounts to an astonishing 14.23% of the Father’s 2016 Guideline Income. [ 64 ] A review of the Mother’s 2016

section 7 receipts reveals that she is claiming extracurricular expenses of $423.75. The Mother’s extracurricular receipts include the name and contact information of the service providers and the dates the services were provided. However, one receipt indicates that the Mother paid a deposit of $25.00 but she has provided no evidence regarding how much of this deposit was returned to her. Accordingly, I find that $398.75 ($423.75 less $25.00) is a

section 7 extracurricular expense. [ 65 ] In 2016, the Mother also claims school expenses of $2,565.00. To support this claim, the Mother provides receipts indicating that she paid $2,460.00 for T to attend “Montessori private child care.” The name of the service provider is not legible on these receipts and there is no contact information whatsoever for the service provider on the receipts. I also note that while the Mother claims Montessori as a “school expense”, the receipts she provided have “child care” written on them.

For the reasons set out above regarding the Mother’s equivalent 2015 school expenses, I find that the $2,460.00 claimed by the Mother is not recoverable from the Father as a

section 7 expense. [ 66 ] The Mother also provides a receipt indicating that she paid an instructional resource fee of $110.00 for K. This receipt includes the name of the school and the school year for which the fees are payable. I find that $110.00 is a

section 7 school expense. [ 67 ] The Mother is claiming medical expenses of $235.07 in 2016. The Mother specifically notes that she paid this amount out-of- pocket over and above other amounts paid for by her healthcare benefits plan. The Father argues that he should not be responsible for these expenses because they may have been covered under his healthcare benefits plan if the Mother had provided the receipts to him to submit under his plan. The Father also argues that he should not have to reimburse the Mother for naturopathic interventions because he does not believe in this form of medical treatment.

I find that the Mother has failed to provide evidence regarding why she did not provide her medical receipts to the Father to submit under his healthcare benefits plan. In these circumstances, I find that the $235.07 is not recoverable from the Father as a

section 7 expense. [ 68 ] Once again, the vast majority of the

section 7 expenses claimed by the Mother in 2016 ($19,363.91 of $22,587.73) are for childcare expenses. The Mother’s childcare expenses include both standard childcare and the services of a live-in nanny. As set out above, the Mother employed a live-in nanny from September 2015 until June 2016. [ 69 ] Having already found that the additional expenses associated with the services of a live-in nanny are not recoverable from the Father as a

section 7 expense, I am left to decide what childcare expenses the Mother should be permitted to recover from the Father in 2016. [ 70 ] At the outset, it is important to note that in paragraph 70 of the April 26, 2016 Final Order, I specifically addressed childcare expenses as follows: 70. Both parties shall be responsible for arranging and paying for childcare, if necessary, during their parenting time. Neither party shall have a “right of first refusal” to provide childcare for the other party. However, both parties can on a voluntary basis offer childcare to the other party. [ 71 ] Despite paragraph 70 of the April 26, 2016 Final Order, the Mother seeks to recover

section 7 childcare expenses from the

Father after April 2016. Indeed, the Mother seeks to recover

section 7 childcare expenses from the Father for all twelve months of 2016. [ 72 ] The Father argues that paragraph 70 of the April 26, 2016 Final Order prevents the Mother from recovering

section 7 childcare expenses from him after April 2016. The Mother argues that I should disregard paragraph 70 because, according to her, the current parenting

schedule is built around the Father’s work schedule, which results in him never having to incur childcare expenses. In response, the Father states that he also incurs childcare expenses because he sometimes works different shifts, is on-call and is required to attend work-related training courses. [ 73 ] I pronounced the April 26, 2016 after presiding over a four-day viva voce hearing from March 14, 2016 to March 17, 2016. I also heard further submissions from the parties on March 30, 2016. I note that in paragraph 78 of the April 26, 2016 Final Order, I directed: 78.

If the parties cannot agree on past or future child support including s. 7 extraordinary expenses then either can bring on [sic] application for Justice Mahoney to decide the amount of past and future child support and s. 7 expenses. [Emphasis added.] [ 74 ] As it turned out, the parties were unable to agree on the amount of child support payable between them, which is why I was asked to determine the issue at the March 6, 2017 case management hearing.

Paragraph 78 speaks only to “the amount” of child support and nothing in the April 26, 2016 Final Order suggests that, absent a material change of circumstances, I would or could go beyond calculating amounts payable and revisit my decision that both of the parties are responsible for paying for childcare during their parenting times. The April 26, 2016 Final Order, is, as the name suggests, a final Order and I reject the Mother’s argument that I should allow her to recover childcare expenses from the Father after April 2016 despite my clear direction otherwise in paragraph 70.

I therefore find that no childcare expenses are payable between the parties after April 2016. [ 75 ] As stated above, the Mother is seeking reimbursement from the Father for childcare expenses of $19,363.91 in 2016. A review of the Mother’s 2016

section 7 receipts indicates that $9,068.88 of this amount is for the period January to April 2016, during which time the Mother employed the live-in nanny. None of the Mother’s receipts for this period specify the date or dates the services were provided. I find that the $9,068.88 should be reduced by 20% to account for the evidentiary deficiencies with Mother’s receipts. As such, $7,255.10 is a

section 7 childcare expense before consideration of the live-in nanny issue. [ 76 ] Having already found that the Mother cannot recover the additional expenses associated with these services of a live-in nanny from the Father as a

section 7 expense and considering all of the circumstances, for the months of January to April 2016, I will allow the lesser of (

i) the amount found to be a

section 7 expense for this period, namely $7,255.10 before consideration of the live-in nanny issue and (ii) the average monthly amount for the period January to August 2015, being $3,879.20 ($969.80 x 4 months). [ 77 ] Accordingly, $3,879.20 is a

section 7 childcare expense for the period January to April 2016. [ 78 ] A review of the Mother’s

section 7 receipts reveals that from May to December 2016, she is claiming childcare expenses of $10,295.03. I find that, on the basis of paragraph 70 of the April 26, 2016 Final Order, none of this amount is recoverable from the Father as a

section 7 expense. [ 79 ] I therefore find that $3,879.20 is a

section 7 childcare expense in 2016. [ 80 ] The Mother is therefore entitled to contribution from the Father for

section 7 expenses of $4,387.95 in 2016. I find that these expenses should be shared proportionately between the parties based on their 2016 Guideline Incomes, 34.65% for the Father and 65.35% for the Mother. I am intentionally not apportioning

section 7 expenses between the parties on a 50 – 50 basis as set out in the July 10, 2014 Order because this is not a final Order or an Order made on consent. Since the parties subsequently agreed that the Father’s 2016 Guideline Income was $79,387.71 and the Mother’s 2016 Guideline Income was $149,747.00, I find that an equal allocation would be unfair given the disparity between the parties’ Guideline Incomes. [ 81 ] The Father therefore owes the Mother $1,520.42 in

section 7 expenses in 2016. Accordingly, retroactive

section 7 expenses of $1,520.42 are owing by the Father to the Mother for the period January 1 to December 31, 2015. [ 82 ] The Mother is claiming no

section 7 expenses for the period January 1 to February 28, 2017. No retroactive section7 expenses are therefore owing by the Father to the Mother for the period January 1 to February 28, 2017. [ 83 ] In

summary, I have found that for the period January 1, 2012 to February 28, 2017: (

A) the Father owes the Mother $1,724.55 in

section 3 child support arrears; and (

B) the Father owes the Mother in $11,841.93 in

section 7 expense arrears. [ 84 ] The Father will pay the Mother $13,566.48 ($1,724.55 + $11,841.93) for arrears of

section 3 child support and

section 7 expenses in accordance with the following repayment schedule: a minimum of $200.00 per month commencing August 1, 2017 and continuing until the $13,566.48 is paid in full but under no circumstances should any of the $13,566.48 remain outstanding after December 31, 2022. [ 85 ] Finally, pursuant to the February 27, 2017 Consent Order, the Father’s 2015 Guideline Income and both parties’ 2016 and 2017 Guidelines Incomes as set out in that Order are reviewable in the event that they differ from Notices of Assessment or Reassessment issued by the CRA for the applicable taxation year.

In the event that any of these Guideline Incomes change, any subsequent review of child support for 2015, 2016 and 2017, or any of these years, should be returned to me for a reassessment based on the principles set out in this Memorandum of Decision. I note that any reassessment of

section 7 expenses for the period January 1, 2015 to February 28, 2017 will be limited to a recalculation of the proportionate amounts payable by the parties based on their revised Guideline Incomes. There will be no review of the amounts payable between the parties for

section 3 child support or

section 7 expenses for the period January 1, 2012 to February 28, 2017 except as set out in this paragraph.

Issue 3: Determination of the amount of ongoing

section 3 child support and

section 7 expenses payable between the parties [ 86 ] In the February 27, 2017 Consent Order, the parties agreed that their 2017 Guideline Incomes are as follows: Father Mother 2017: $79,387.71 (34.65%) 2017: $149,747.00 (65.35%) [ 87 ] Based upon the Father’s Guideline Income of $79,387.71, I find that ongoing

section 3 child support of $1,134.66 per month is payable by the Father to the Mother commencing March 1, 2017 and continuing until further Order of the Court. [ 88 ] Turning now to

section 7 expenses, as noted above, the Father has never submitted any

section 7 expenses to MEP for reimbursement by the Mother and does not now seek reimbursement from the Mother for any

section 7 expenses. The Father takes the position that both parties should be responsible for paying their own ongoing

section 7 expenses. When asked in oral argument what amount should be set for

section 7 should an amount be payable by him, the Father had no suggestion as to an amount but requested that a ceiling be put on any

section 7 payments he is required to make to the Mother. [ 89 ] In oral submissions, the Mother also requested that a specified amount be set for

section 7 expenses so that she is not required to submit receipts to MEP. The Mother requested that this amount be set based on her incurring average annual

section 7 expenses of $22,000.00, which amount the Mother suggests should be divided between the parties proportionately based on their incomes. The Mother estimates that 80 – 85% of her $22,000.00 estimate is for childcare but she takes the position that extracurricular

section 7 expenses will increase as the Children get older, which will result in her overall

section 7 expenses remaining at approximately $22,000.00 per year notwithstanding the decrease in her childcare expenses as the Children get older. [ 90 ] Based on the above-mentioned 2017 Guideline Incomes, the Mother’s estimated

section 7 expenses of $22,000.00 per year would result in the Father paying annual

section 7 expenses to the Mother of $7,623.00 per year or $635.25 per month. [ 91 ] Based on a review of the Mother’s past

section 7 expense receipts, her expenses fall into the following categories: childcare; medical; extracurricular; and education. [ 92 ] Turning first to childcare expenses, as stated above, pursuant to paragraph 70 of the April 26, 2016 Final Order, the parties are both responsible for paying for childcare during their parenting time. Nothing in the parties’ evidence or oral submissions convinces me that this approach should be changed.

I reiterate to the parties, as set out in paragraph 70 of the April 26, 2016 Final Order, that while neither of them has a “right of first refusal” to provide childcare for the other party, they may both offer to provide childcare to the other party on a voluntary basis. [ 93 ] With respect to the Mother’s

section 7 medical expenses, I note that both parties have healthcare benefits plans. In the past, it appears that the parties have not cooperated and this may have resulted in the Mother unnecessarily incurring medical expenses out of her own pocket. Even so, a review of the Mother’s receipts for medical expenses since 2012 reveals that her out-of-pocket expenses have been minimal. I do not include in this amount the Mother’s claim for reimbursement of gas, parking and meals when she took the Children to medical appointments, which I have found are not recoverable from the Father under any category of

section 7 expense. [ 94 ] I find that no amount is payable between the parties for ongoing

section 7 medical expenses. Instead, the parties are to cooperate in the future so that the Children get the benefit of coverage under both of their healthcare benefits plans. [ 95 ] Turning next to the Mother’s extracurricular expenses, as explained above, the Mother takes the position that extracurricular

section 7 expenses will increase substantially as the Children get older. The Father agrees with the Mother that extracurricular activities are important for the Children but he takes the position that he cannot afford to pay for any and all extracurricular activities in which the Mother decides to enroll the Children. [ 96 ] I noted above that the parties had two full-day case management meetings with Ms. Borsic-Drummond, which resulted in two Consent Orders. One of these Consent Orders was pronounced by me on February 1, 2017 (the “February 1, 2017 Consent Order”).

In the February 1, 2017 Consent Order, the parties agreed on how they would share the cost of K’s hockey equipment. I commend the parties for reaching this resolution and encourage them to attempt to reach a resolution regarding the Children’s other extracurricular expenses. Unless and until further resolution is reached and agreed to in writing by both parties, the following principles apply to the reimbursement of both parties’

section 7 extracurricular expenses: (

A) the cost of K’s hockey equipment will be shared between the parties based on their agreement as set out in the February 1, 2017 Consent Order, which remains in full force and effect; (

B) the Mother shall pay 100% of the expenses related to any extracurricular activities in which she enrolls the Children and the Father shall pay 100% of the expenses related to any extracurricular activities in which he enrolls the Children; (

C) extracurricular activities are only reimbursable between the parties as

section 7 expenses if the parties have reached an agreement to this effect regarding the particular extracurricular activity, which agreement must be in writing; and (

D) in this paragraph, “extracurricular activities” includes but is not limited to any and all sporting activities and endeavours, any and all musical activities and endeavours, and any and all day and away camps. [ 97 ] I note that paragraphs 19 to 25 of the April 26, 2016 Final Order deal with decision-making related the Children’s activities and these paragraphs remain in full force and effect. [ 98 ] The Mother’s final category of

section 7 expenses is education. A review of the Mother’s receipts for education expenses

since 2012 reveals that her expenses are related primarily to T’s attendance at Montessori private child care. It remains unclear to me whether she has enrolled T in private school or in private daycare. In the event that the Mother has enrolled T in private school, I note that she is entitled to do so pursuant to the April 26, 2016 Final Order.

I note also that paragraphs 13 to 17 of the April 26, 2016 Final Order deal with decision-making related the Children’s education and these paragraphs remain in full force and effect. [ 99 ] It does not follow, however, that just because the Mother is entitled to make decisions related to the Children’s education, including whether they attend public or private school, the Father is required to reimburse the Mother for substantially increased education expenses related to her decisions. To this end, I note that the Mother’s expenses for T’s attendance at Montessori private child care vastly exceed the

section 7 expenses she submitted for K’s attendance at public school. Assuming that the Mother is able to provide more detailed receipts regarding T’s attendance at Montessori private child care and assuming that these receipts establish that the expenses are for education rather than child care, I find that the Mother has nonetheless failed to establish that either of the Children needs to attend private school.

Accordingly, I find that the Father is not required to reimburse the Mother for increased education expenses related to any decision by the Mother to enroll either or both of the Children in private school. [ 100 ] Given the long history of conflict between the parties, I find that the Father should pay the Mother a specified amount per month for

section 7 education expenses and any other

section 7 expenses that the Mother may incur on behalf of the Children. This approach benefits both parties. For his part, the Father will know what he has to pay for

section 7 expenses each month and will be able to budget accordingly. For her part, the Mother will know how much she has available to spend on

section 7 expenses each month and will not have to submit receipts to MEP for reimbursement. [ 101 ] Considering all of the circumstances, including the Children’s needs and best interests, and the reasonableness of the

section 7 expenses being claimed by the Mother in relation to the means of the parties, I find that the Father should pay the Mother ongoing

section 7 expenses of $100.00 per month commencing March 1, 2017 and continuing until further Order of the Court. [ 102 ] Finally, I again note that pursuant to the February 27, 2017 Consent Order, both parties’ 2017 Guidelines Incomes as set out in that Order are reviewable in the event that they differ from Notices of Assessment or Reassessment issued by the CRA for the applicable taxation year. In the event that either or both of these Guideline Incomes changes, any subsequent review of child support for 2017 should be returned to me for a reassessment based on the principles set out in this Memorandum of Decision. There will be no review of the $100.00 set amount for

section 7 expenses payable by the Father to the Mother for the period March 1, 2017 to December 31, 2018 unless the Father’s income has increased or the Mother’s income has decreased by a minimum of 10% from the 2017 Guideline Incomes agreed to by the parties in the February 27, 2017 Consent Order, namely $79,387.71 for the Father and $149,747.00 for the Mother. Issue 4: Determination of how previous costs Orders shall be paid [ 103 ] The Mother asks me to determine how two outstanding costs Orders against the Father should be paid: an Ex Parte Order pronounced by Justice C.L.

Kenny on December 9, 2016, pursuant to which the Father is directed to pay the Mother costs of $1,000.00; and an Order pronounced by Justice D.K. Miller on June 25, 2015, pursuant to which the Father is directed to pay the Mother costs of $250.00 (together the “Previous Costs Orders”). In response, the Father argues that the Previous Costs Orders were unjustified and should not have been made against him.

He also states that he cannot afford to pay the Previous Costs Orders and points to previous behaviour of the Mother, which he argues should have resulted in costs Orders being made against her too. [ 104 ] The Father did not appeal the Previous Costs Orders and I have no jurisdiction to review or change these Orders.

However, because further litigation between the parties will negatively impact the Children, I exercise my broad authority as Case Management Justice under Rule 4.14 of the Alberta Rules of Court and direct that the $1,250.00 payable by the Father to the Mother pursuant to the Previous Costs Orders be collected by MEP as child support. This amount will be payable by the Father as follows: the Father will pay the Mother $25.00 on the first day of every month commencing March 1, 2017 and continuing until the $1,250.00 is paid in full.

This $25.00 monthly payment is over and above the Father’s payments of ongoing child support and child support arrears as set out elsewhere in this Memorandum of Decision. Issue 5: Determination of how tax credits for the Children shall be divided between the parties since January 1, 2012 [ 105 ] As explained above, the issues to be determined at the March 6, 2017 case management hearing were agreed by the parties and included in the February 27, 2017 Consent Order. “Determination of how tax credits for the Children shall be divided between the parties since January 1, 2012” is one such issue.

Pursuant to paragraph 22 of the February 27, 2017 Consent Order, both parties were permitted to file and serve applications for the March 6 case management hearing. The Mother filed her application on February 28, 2017 but the Father did not file an application. [ 106 ] The Mother does not take issue with how tax credits for the Children have been divided and so did not raise this issue in her application. The Mother points out that because the Father did not file an application, the tax credit issue was not properly before me on March 6 and should not be determined by me.

I agree and decline to address this issue. Issue 6: Determination of how the Children’s annual Easter Break will be divided between the parties beginning with their 2017 Easter Spring Break Issue 7:Determination of how the Children’s annual Spring Break will be divided between the parties beginning with 2018 Spring Break [ 107 ] Before addressing any of the specific parenting issues raised by the parties, I reiterate that the detail of the April 26, 2016 Final

Order did little to reduce ongoing conflict between the parties. As noted above, CFS has a history of involvement with this family and again became involved in the days leading up to the March 6, 2017 case management hearing because the Mother made new allegations of abuse against the Father. At my request, a social worker from CFS attended the March 6 case management hearing to inform the Court of the nature and purpose of their current investigation and involvement. After hearing from CFS, I directed that there would be no changes to the current parenting

schedule until the CFS investigation has been completed. [ 108 ] I also note that in her oral submissions on March 6, the Mother advised the Court that she wishes to bring another mobility application for permission to move to Australia with the Children. By way of background, the Mother previously sought sole custody and permission to move to Australia with the Children during the four-day viva voce hearing I presided over in March 2016.

I declined to grant the Mother this relief at that time and advised the parties that if the Mother brings another mobility application to move to Australia, I will not hear that application. [ 109 ] In light of the continued involvement of CFS in this matter and in light of the Mother’s stated intention to bring another mobility application, I find that it is in the Children’s best interests to be represented by counsel from the Children’s Legal and Educational Resource Center (“CLERC”) and I so order. There will be no changes to the current parenting

schedule until the Children are represented by counsel from CLERC. [ 110 ] Turning now to the issue of the Children’s annual Easter and Spring Breaks, I note that Easter Break and Spring Break were not addressed in the April 26, 2016 Final Order. I find that the parties will share these Breaks equally as follows: (

A) even-Numbered Years: The Father will have the Children in his care during their entire Easter Break and the Mother will have the Children in her care during their entire Spring Break; (

B) odd-Numbered Years: The Mother will have the Children in her care during their entire Easter Break and the Father will have the Children in his care for their entire Spring Break; and (

C) the party who has the Children in their care during their Easter Break/Spring Break will pick up the Children at their schools at the end of the school day on their last day of school before the Break and drop them off at their schools on their first day of school after the Break. [ 111 ] The April 26, 2016 Final Order will remain in full force and effect except for these changes regarding the Children’s Easter and Spring Breaks.

These changes will commence in 2018 but only if the two above-mentioned preconditions are met, namely that the CFS investigation has been completed and the Children are represented by counsel from CLERC. Issue 8: Determination of contempt of Court applications, if any [ 112 ] The Mother asks me to find the Father in contempt of Court for an alleged “breach” of paragraph 34 of the April 26, 2016 Final Order, which reads: 34.

Neither party may remove the Children from school to travel within or outside Alberta unless they have the written consent of the other party or an Order of the Court (emphasis in original). [ 113 ] According to the Mother, the Father should be found in contempt of Court for not providing his consent under paragraph 34. I find that the Mother has fallen far short of establishing an evidentiary basis that would warrant the exercise of the Court’s discretionary contempt of Court jurisdiction against the Father.

Costs and Preparation of Court Orders [ 114 ] Each party shall bear their own costs of all steps taken in this litigation that have not been the subject of any prior costs Order up to and including the date of the March 6, 2017 case management hearing. [ 115 ] Ms. Borsic-Drummond shall prepare two Orders stemming out of this Memorandum of Decision for my review and approval, one appointing counsel from CLERC for the Children and one setting out all other directions in this Memorandum of Decision. Rule 9.4(2)(

c) of the Alberta Rules of Court is invoked with respect to both of these Orders. Heard on the 6 th day of March, 2017. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 28 th day of June, 2017. Bryan E. Mahoney J.C.Q.B.A.

Appearances: Adam Benarzi for the Applicant/Plaintiff M.G.D. not represented by counsel