Paraniuk v Pierce, 2018 ABQB 1015

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Paraniuk v Pierce, 2018 ABQB 1015 Date: 20181213 Docket: 1503 05933 Registry: Edmonton Between: Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk Plaintiff - and - Andrew Pierce, Scott Carter, Kyle Stasiuk, Andrew Melney, Robert Carusi, Michael Kembel, Dwayne Welfl, Rod Knecht, Chief of the Edmonton Police Service, Raelene Keefe, Paul Keefe, Arthur Zajdler, Group Three Property Management Inc., Condominium Corporation No. 302 2787 Defendants _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Mr. Justice J.S. Little _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction

[ 1 ] This decision arises from a two-day hearing which addressed a range of applications by both the Plaintiff, Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk [Mr. Paraniuk], and the Defendants in this Action: 1. Andrew Pierce, Scott Carter, Kyle Stasiuk, Andrew Melney, Robert Carusi, Michael Kembel, and Dwayne Welfl [the Police Defendants], who all are or were officers of the Edmonton Police Service [EPS]; 2. Rod Knecht, Chief of the Edmonton Police Service [Chief Knecht]; 3. Raelene Keefe and Paul Keefe [the Keefes]; and 4.

Arthur Zajdler, Group Three Property Management Inc., and Condominium Corporation No. 302 2787 [the Condo Defendants]. [ 2 ] Before discussing the applications it is helpful to briefly describe the nature of this dispute. Mr. Paraniuk on April 22, 2015 filed a Statement of Claim, alleging that: 1. certain of the Police Defendants had inappropriately and negligently responded to noise and threat complaints by Mr. Paraniuk and an April 23, 2013 incident where Mr. Paraniuk was allegedly assaulted by an unidentified person, 2.

Chief Knecht was “vicariously liable for the actions of the Police Defendants, pursuant to the Police Act ”, and 3. the Keefes, who are residents in the same condominium building as Mr. Paraniuk, were parties to the alleged April 23, 2013 assault. Mr. Paraniuk sued for $100,000.00 and full indemnity costs. [ 3 ] On October 29, 2015 and April 13, 2016, Mr. Paraniuk filed an Amended Statement of Claim and Amended Amended Statement of Claim. The final version of Mr.

Paraniuk’s lawsuit: 1. adds a further two Police Defendants; 2. provides further details concerning the Keefes’ alleged wrongdoing, including that Raelene Keefe had made false statements about Mr. Paraniuk and obtained a restraining order against Mr. Paraniuk under false auspices; 3. added the Condo Defendants, whose alleged misconduct was:

a) failing to adequately respond to Mr. Paraniuk’s complaints about the Keefes,

b) failing to collect video records which were relevant to the Keefes’ misconduct and the April 23, 2013 assault, and

c) a condo board member falsely reported to the EPS that Mr. Paraniuk had engaged in mischief; and 4. Chief Knecht had improperly responded to complaints about the Police Defendants. Mr. Paraniuk now seeks $300,000.00 in damages. [ 4 ] In late 2017 all the Defendants applied to have Mr. Paraniuk’s Amended Amended Statement of Claim struck out. [ 5 ] The November 22-23, 2018 hearing to address multiple applications, including the striking motions, was ordered by Master Schlosser on January 15, 2018. Mr.

Paraniuk sought to make a late appeal of that decision, but his appeal was dismissed on April 5, 2018 by Justice Shelley. The January 2018 decision of Master Schlosser gave Mr. Paraniuk until February 28, 2018 to apply to file a Further Amended Statement of Claim. Mr. Paraniuk failed to do so, but instead filed an application to set aside the January 15, 2018 order. Mr.

Paraniuk then filed an application to extend the February 28, 2018 deadline, which was denied by Master Schlosser. [ 6 ] A further appeal from Master Schlosser was heard and denied by Ross J on June 28, 2018. [ 7 ] Despite being denied permission to further amend his pleadings, Mr. Paraniuk on October 19, 2018 applied to amend his Amended Amended Statement of Claim. That application was dismissed by Master Birkett on October 29, 2018. His application indicates Mr.

Paraniuk sought yet a further increase in the damages for this action to $800,000.00. [ 8 ] This lawsuit is not the only proceeding that has resulted from Mr. Paraniuk’s allegations of misconduct by the Police Defendants. Mr. Paraniuk was not satisfied by the results of the December 1, 2015 investigation by the EPS concerning Mr. Paraniuk’s complaints about the EPS response to Mr. Paraniuk’s complaints and the alleged assault. Mr. Paraniuk appealed that result to the Alberta Law Enforcement Review Board [LERB], which, after dismissing five preliminary complaints by Mr.

Paraniuk, on June 14, 2017 dismissed his appeal as a whole. A subsequent appeal to the Alberta Court of Appeal was rejected: Paraniuk v Edmonton (Police Service) , 2017 ABCA 338 .

[ 9 ] Mr. Paraniuk also made a formal complaint that the review of the initial complaint, which was conducted by Detective Hood, was defective. This allegation was rejected by Chief Knecht on August 19, 2016. Mr.

Paraniuk commenced but then abandoned a LERB complaint of the August 19, 2016 decision, saying that the EPS was not disclosing materials, and the LERB exhibited bias by accepting that. [ 10 ] The November 22-23, 2018 hearing responds to a number of applications, which the remainder of this decision will address as follows: 1. applications by the Keefes and the Condo Defendants that they be struck from the Amended Amended Statement of Claim; 2. a joint application of the Police Defendants and Chief Knecht that Mr. Paraniuk’s action against them be struck out, Mr.

Paraniuk be found to be a vexatious litigant, and that Mr. Paraniuk be made subject to court access restrictions; 3. ancillary applications by Mr. Paraniuk in relation to review of costs and penalties for late filing of the Affidavits of Record; and 4. costs resulting from this hearing. II. The Keefes’ and Condo Defendants’ Applications to Strike [ 11 ] I am first analyzing the Keefes’ and Condo Defendants’ applications, since the result of those analyses is relevant to the joint application by the Police Defendants and Chief Knecht.

The Keefes and Condo Defendant applications seek that these parties be struck out under both Alberta Rules of Court , Alta Reg 124/2010, Rules 3.68 and 7.3 . These parties argue the Amended Amended Statement of Claim does not disclose any issue or reasonable claim that requires trial, and that these proceedings are frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process. A. The Condo Defendants [ 12 ] Arthur Zajdler is the property manager for the condo building where Mr. Paraniuk and the Keefes live. He is an employee of Group Three Property Management Inc.

Condominium Corporation No. 302 2787 owns the condo building where Mr. Paraniuk and the Keefes live. [ 13 ] The Condo Defendants argue that the Amended Amended Statement of Claim fails to plead alleged facts to support a cause of action against the Condo Defendants. To the degree a complaint may be established by the Amended Amended Statement of Claim against the Condo Defendants, the Condo Defendants argue that Mr. Paraniuk’s complaint is that Mr. Zajdler’s wrongdoing was his interactions with the EPS investigators who responded to Mr. Paraniuk’s complaints.

Counsel for the Condo Defendants suggest that three potential causes of action may distilled from the Amended Amended Statement of Claim: conspiracy, defamation, and malicious prosecution. The Condo Defendants say that elements of each offence are absent, or inadequately pled, and so the Condo Defendants should be struck from this action per Rule 3.68 . [ 14 ] Mr. Paraniuk indicated that he has identified defamation by Mr. Zajdler and failures by the other Condo Defendants to take steps to deal with misconduct by the Keefes. They failed to maintain important video evidence. He says Mr.

Zajdler, the Keefes, and investigation EPS officers collaborated to ensure video evidence was lost. [ 15 ] The test to strike out a pleading per Rule 3.68 is comprehensively reviewed in Al-Ghamdi v Alberta , 2017 ABQB 684 at paras 101-128 . Briefly, the modern approach to Rule 3.68 conducts this process in light of the “culture shift” that courts must provide a fair but proportionate response to civil litigation: Hryniak v Mauldin , 2014 SCC 7 , [2014] 1 SCR 87; O’Connor Associates Environmental Inc v MEC OP LLC , 2014 ABCA 140 , 572 AR 354.

Ultimately, the question is whether an action has “a reasonable prospect of success”: R v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd , 2011 SCC 42 , [2011] 3 SCR 45. [ 16 ] In evaluating pleadings, the Court accepts pleaded facts as true, but those facts must be pled clearly. That said, a Court when evaluating a Rule 3.68 application may reject alleged facts which “... are patently ridiculous or incapable of being proven ...”: Grenon v Canada Revenue Agency , 2017 ABCA 96 at para 6 , 49 Alta LR (6th) 228, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 37584 (21 September 2017).

Similarly, “bald allegations” are not a basis for an cause of action: GH v Alcock , 2013 ABCA 24 ; Merchant Law Group v Canada Revenue Agency , 2010 FCA 184 , 321 DLR (4th) 301. The critical underlying question is whether pleadings permit the responding party to understand and reply to the allegations made against it: Whiten v Pilot Insurance Co , 2002 SCC 18 at para 87 , [2002] 1 SCR 595. [ 17 ] The Condo Defendants argue that there are fatal gaps for each possible cause of action derived from the Amended Amended Statement of Claim. I agree.

Al-Ghamdi v Alberta also reviews the minimal necessary pleadings for allegations of conspiracy (at paras 142-143) and defamation (at paras 151-156). Mr. Paraniuk’s pleadings, for example, do not precisely set out any alleged defamatory statement. Instead, I conclude those allegations are nothing but bald assertions. As for a possible claim of malicious prosecution, Stout v Track , 2013 ABQB 751 , 95 Alta LR (5th) 32, aff’d 2015 ABCA 10 makes clear that a valid action of this kind requires an actual prosecution, and not merely a complaint to police.

Here, no prosecution occurred or is alleged. [ 18 ] Further, there is no link between these Defendants and Mr. Paraniuk’s damages claim, which flows from him being assaulted by the unknown person. Nothing Mr. Paraniuk alleges against the Condo Defendants contributed to that event.

[ 19 ] Globally, these defects in the Amended Amended Statement of Claim mean the action, as pled, has no reasonable prospect for success. Further, its bald allegations and incomplete claims leave the Condo Defendants’ unable to make a meaningful response. They “... are left both embarrassed and unable to defend [themselves].”: kisikawpimootewin v Canada , 2004 FC 1426 , 134 ACWS (3d) 396; Arabi v Alberta , 2014 ABQB 295 , 589 AR 249. That makes Mr. Paraniuk’s allegations against the Condo Defendants not merely unmeritorious, but abusive. That will be relevant when I evaluate whether Mr.

Paraniuk has engaged in vexatious litigation and should be made subject to court access restrictions. [ 20 ] I therefore grant the Condo Defendants’ application to be struck from the Amended Amended Statement of Claim, per Rule 3.68 . This aspect of Mr. Paraniuk’s action is terminated. B. The Keefes [ 21 ] The Keefes argue that the elements of the Mr. Paraniuk’s application directed to them should be struck out by

summary judgment, per Rule 7.3 . They agree and acknowledge there was conflict between Paul and Raelene Keefe and Mr. Paraniuk. That led to EPS investigations, though no charges were filed. Ms. Keefe obtained a restraining order against Mr. Paraniuk. [ 22 ] The Keefes identify three possible bases for Mr. Paraniuk’s action, namely that the Keefes: 1. were “parties” to the alleged April 23, 2013 assault on Mr. Paraniuk by an unknown person, 2. made false statements about Mr. Paraniuk to the EPS and Mr. Zajdler, and 3. made false statements to obtain the restraining order against Mr.

Paraniuk. [ 23 ] The Keefes deny these allegations and say there is no merit to these claims. They argue they should be struck from this action, applying the modern test for

summary judgment, which asks whether a fair and just determination can be made on the merits of the lawsuit or defence on the record and without a trial: Hryniak v Mauldin ; Windsor v Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd ; Access Mortgage Corporation

(2004) Limited v Arres Capital Inc , 2014 ABCA 280 , 584 AR 68. [ 24 ] The Keefes’ position is that Mr. Paraniuk’s allegations they were involved in the April 23, 2013 assault are pure speculation. Mr. Paraniuk has not particularized the alleged false and defamatory statements. In any case, the Keefes say what they reported was true, and their statements are either subject to absolute or qualified privilege. [ 25 ] Mr. Paraniuk has filed a total of six affidavits dated between December 5, 2017 and January 10, 2018 which provide what Mr. Paraniuk says is the basis for his allegations against the Keefes.

Substantial parts of these affidavits are legal argument and therefore not appropriate for an affidavit. The affidavits also complain that the current process is unfair to Mr. Paraniuk. Beyond that, Mr. Paraniuk’s affidavits provide some detail on what he says are false statements by the Keefes, though Mr. Paraniuk does nothing but denounce the Keefes’ statements as wrong and malicious. Mr. Paraniuk links the Keefes to the assault on the basis that Raelene Keefe appeared in video recordings of the condo building entrance. [ 26 ] At the November 22-23, 2018 hearing, Mr.

Paraniuk commented at length on the reasons why his evidence should be preferred over the Keefes’ denial of wrongdoing and making false statements. He criticizes the Keefes as unreliable sources who lie about important facts. He argued this matter must instead go to trial since I cannot fairly evaluate which affidavit evidence should be preferred. Mr. Paraniuk also takes the position that since the Keefes did not include their Statement of Defence with their application that the Keefes have provided no evidence of their position. [ 27 ] Al-Ghamdi v Alberta also provides a useful review of the law of

summary judgment at paras 129-132. I adopt Justice Goss’

summary of the relevant principles and post “culture shift” approach to this litigation management mechanism: [131]

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue requiring a trial, and the judge is able to make a fair and just determination on the merits. The Court of Appeal in McDonald v Brookfield Asset Management Inc, 2016 ABCA 375 at para 14 said that the process must, therefore: (1) allow the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) allow the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) be a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result. [132] A very recent Alberta Court of Appeal decision, Wolfe v.

Shawcor Ltd (appeals by Composite Technologies Inc. and Proflex Pipe Corp.), 2017 ABCA 160 , has summarized the law in this area, and I draw the following list from that decision:

• The applicant for

summary dismissal will have an unassailable position if its likelihood of success is very high and the respondent’s prospects for success are very low (para 76); • Each party must put forth their strongest case, described as a “bet-the-farm” application (para 77); and • An applicant for

summary dismissal need not have pleaded the argument raised in the application in its statement of defence, and in fact can bring an application to dismiss without having filed defences (paras 82-84) [ 28 ] First, I have no difficulty concluding that Mr. Paraniuk’s allegations the Keefes had a role in the alleged assault on Mr. Paraniuk has no possibility of success. It fails to meet the threshold for a valid claim per Rule 3.68 , as this claim is nothing more than a bald allegation of complicity. I conclude that aspect of Mr.

Paraniuk’s Amended Amended Statement of Claim should be struck out, and, per kisikawpimootewin v Canada and Arabi v Alberta , Mr. Paraniuk’s allegation against the Keefes being “parties” to the assault is an abuse of the court’s processes. [ 29 ] If I am wrong in that, I, in the alternative, conclude that Mr. Paraniuk’s allegation that the Keefes were involved in the April 23, 2013 assault has a very low prospect of success on full trial. Mr.

Paraniuk has the obligation to present evidence to advance his “strongest case” or “put his best foot forward”, and cannot rely on speculation or proposed evidence: Pyrrha Design Inc v Plum and Posey Inc , 2016 ABCA 12 . While Mr. Paraniuk has established (and the Keefes do not dispute) that there was animosity and conflict between the Keefes and Mr. Paraniuk, Mr. Paraniuk has provided nothing other than suspicions that the Keefes were “parties” to the assault. I therefore conclude this aspect of the Amended Amended Statement of Claim should also be struck out by

summary judgment per Rule 7.3 . [ 30 ] That leaves the defamation allegations and Mr. Paraniuk’s claims that the restraining order against him was obtained on the basis of false testimony. The Keefes argue that it is settled law that absolute privilege applies to judicial proceedings, and even false and malicious statements made in that context cannot be a basis for a defamation action: Prefontaine v Veale , 2003 ABCA 367 , 339 AR 340. I agree, and that fact is fatal to Mr. Paraniuk’s complaints concerning the restraining order obtained by Raelene Keefe. [ 31 ] A second defect in Mr.

Paraniuk’s challenge to the restraining order is that ultimately he is attacking the validity of an order of this Court. The proper way to challenge the correctness of the order obtained by the Keefes’ was an application to vary, set aside, or appeal the restraining order, as illustrated by Severson v Alberta Health Services , 2018 ABCA 106 . That makes Mr. Paraniuk’s allegations concerning the illegality of the restraining order against him a collateral attack on that order. It is not as though Mr. Paraniuk was unaware of the order.

He, however, chose to let it stand, and now has no basis to complain about how it was obtained or its substance. [ 32 ] That leaves Mr. Paraniuk’s allegation that he was defamed by Raelene Keefe’s statements to the EPS and Mr. Zajdler. The Keefes argue that those statements are protected by qualified privilege, since they were made to persons who had a special interest in receiving the Keefes honestly held views, citing Elkow v Sana , 2015 ABQB 803 , 29 Alta LR (6th). [ 33 ] The recipients of these communications by the Keefes are candidates for a claim of qualified privilege. Mr.

Zajdler’s job was to manage interactions between the condo building’s occupants. The EPS officers’ duty was to investigate possible illegal actions. While the specifics of the conflict between Mr. Paraniuk and the Keefes is obviously disputed, there can be no question that the Keefes perceived Mr. Paraniuk as hostile individual. [ 34 ] The test for qualified privilege is ( Elkow v Sana , at para 100 ): Whether this privilege applies depends on the subject matter and the circumstances of the publication, and not on the subjective state of mind of the defendant.

The test is whether a reasonable person, having regard to the relationship of the parties and the surrounding circumstances, as a matter of public policy, should be entitled to speak in the way in which he or she did . [Emphasis added.] [ 35 ] I find a reasonable person would conclude, in light of the acknowledged conflict between Mr. Paraniuk and the Keefes, that the Keefes should be entitled to present to the condo building management and EPS their side of the story. That establishes qualified privilege. The burden then shifts to Mr. Paraniuk to rebut that presumption: Elkow v Sana , at para 102 . Mr.

Paraniuk has an obligation at this

summary judgment proceeding to put his “best foot forward” and establish he has a high probability of success in rebutting the Keefe’s qualified privilege. [ 36 ] Elkow v Sana , at para 103 identifies three bases to rebut qualified privilege: The defendant is not entitled to the privilege if the plaintiff proves: 1. The defamatory remark was communicated to a person not entitled to receive it; 2. The defamatory remark was in excess of or unrelated to the occasion; or 3. The defamatory remark was motivated by actual or express malice. [ 37 ] I have already concluded that Mr.

Zajdler and the investigating EPS authorities were properly qualified to receive the Keefes’ statements. Mr. Paraniuk has not explained how the alleged defamation goes beyond the admitted conflict between him and the Keefes.

[ 38 ] Last, I find that Mr. Paraniuk has not established that the Keefes’ statements were motivated by malice. Rather, I conclude that I may on the record conclude that Mr. Paraniuk cannot establish that the Keefes’ statements were malicious because Mr. Paraniuk’s own claims indicate the opposite. [ 39 ] Mr. Paraniuk’s hostility, accusations, and interactions with the Keefes are a basis for the Keefes to have a valid concern. For example, Mr. Paraniuk insists that the Keefes were “parties” to the April 23, 2013 assault on him, though he has no basis for that allegation beyond suspicions. Mr.

Paraniuk says the EPS were conspiring with the Keefes to ensure that assault went unpunished. Similarly, in his January 3, 2018 Supplementary Affidavit, Mr. Paraniuk describes barricading himself in his condo in May 2013, with dresser drawers stacked in front of the condo door. Mr. Paraniuk says he did that because “... I could not possibly rely on EPS to arrive in a timely manner if [the Keefes] or their associates tried to break into my property ...” [emphasis in original.] All this evidence of Mr. Paraniuk does not establish malice on the part of the Keefes.

Instead, it provides a powerful foundation for why the Keefes had a reason to be deeply concerned over Mr. Paraniuk’s beliefs and behaviour. [ 40 ] I therefore agree with the Keefes that they may claim qualified privilege in relation to Mr. Paraniuk’s allegation that they made defamatory statements to Mr. Zajdler and the EPS investigators. The Keefes also argue, in the alternative, that Mr. Paraniuk’s allegations of defamation do not meet the requirements of Rule 13.7. I agree that is another basis to strike out these claims per Rule 7.3 [ 41 ] In

summary, I conclude that Mr. Paraniuk’s claims against the Keefes should be struck out under Rules 3.68 and 7.3 . This component of Mr. Paraniuk’s lawsuit is also terminated. III. The Police Defendants’ and Chief Knecht’s Joint Applications [ 42 ] That leaves the allegations against the Police Defendants and Chief Knecht. [ 43 ] While I have concluded that Mr. Paraniuk’s allegations concerning the Keefes and the Condo Defendants have no substance and are nothing more than bald allegations, or have no basis in fact or law, Mr.

Paraniuk’s allegations concerning the Police Defendants and Chief Knechts offer more detail. [ 44 ] In their Statements of Defence the Police Defendants acknowledge that certain Police Defendants have responded to complaints by Mr. Paraniuk and Raelene Keefe concerning noise and alleged harassing activities. They also acknowledge that Mr. Paraniuk claimed the Keefes were involved in the alleged assault. The Police Defendants state there was not enough evidence to lay charges, and note that in this time period Mr. Paraniuk was assessed by Alberta Health Services - Crisis and Access Services, who concluded that Mr.

Paraniuk was suffering from paranoid hallucinations. [ 45 ] Chief Knecht responded to the Amended Amended Statement of Claim by noting he has had no personal involvement with Mr. Paraniuk and investigations concerning Mr. Paraniuk, except to respond to a complaint made by Mr. Paraniuk to the EPS Professional Standards Branch on August 15, 2013. [ 46 ] The Police Defendants and Chief Knecht conclude that they did not owe Mr. Paraniuk the alleged duty of care, and, in any case, any action by Chief Knecht and the Police Defendants was authorized by law, and done in good faith. Further, Mr.

Paraniuk’s action is barred by the Limitations Act , RSA 2000, c L-12. [ 47 ] Like the Condo Defendants and the Keefes, the Police Defendants and Chief Knecht seek to have Mr. Paraniuk’s Amended Amended Statement of Claim struck out, however they do so on two essentially separate, parallel bases: 1. Mr. Paraniuk’s action has no merit, is futile, and should be struck out, and 2. regardless of whether Mr. Paraniuk’s action is or is not valid, he has conducted this action in a vexatious manner that warrants the action being struck out. [ 48 ] I will address the second alternative basis for the relief sought first.

A. Is Mr. Paraniuk’s Litigation Vexatious? 1. The Law [ 49 ] Rule 3.68 states:

3.68(1) If the circumstances warrant and a condition under subrule (2) applies, the Court may order one or more of the following: (

a) that all or any part of a claim or defence be struck out; ...

(2) The conditions for the order are one or more of the following: ... (

c) a commencement document or pleading is frivolous, irrelevant or improper; (

d) a commencement document or pleading constitutes an abuse of process; ... [50] The Police Defendants and Chief Knecht argue that Mr. Paraniuk’s action against them and the other Defendants is vexatious,and therefore should be struck out on that basis. While Rule 3.68 does not use the language “vexatious”, “vexatious” litigation may bestruck under either Rule 3.68(2)(

c) or (d), as that term is synonymous with impropriety and abuse of process: Wong v Leung, 2011ABQB 688 at para 33, 530 AR 82; Mcmeekin v Alberta (Attorney General), 2012 ABQB 144 at para 11, 537 AR 136; Chutskoff vBonora, 2014 ABQB 389 at paras 80-84, 590 AR 288, aff’d 2014 ABCA 444, 588 AR 303. [51] The Court has a parallel inherent jurisdiction authority to prevent abuse by control of court processes by striking out vexatiousand abusive litigation: Mcmeekin v Alberta (Attorney General), at para 14; Reese v Edmonton (City), 2011 ABCA 238 at para 17, 335DLR (4th) 600, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 34454 (26 April 2012); AB v CD, 2012 ABCA at paras 40-41, 2012 ABCA 131, 522 AR 187. [52] It is immaterial if at first there was an apparently good cause of action: Dykun v Odinshaw, 2000 ABQB 548 at para 42, 267AR 318, affirmed 2001 ABCA 204, 286 AR 392, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 28784 (31 January 2002); Del Bianco v 935074Alberta Ltd, 2007 ABQB 150 at para 39, 156 ACWS (3d) 786; Chutskoff v Bonora, at paras 88, 94. [53] An inquiry into whether a person has engaged in abusive litigation conduct is a broad-based.

A court may refer to theallegedly abusive action, and: 1. activities both inside and outside of the courtroom (Bishop v Bishop, 2011 ONCA 211 at para 9, 200 ACWS (3d) 1021, leave toappeal to SCC refused, 34271 (20 November 2011); Henry v El, 2010 ABCA 312 at paras 2-3, 5, 193 ACWS (3d) 1099, leave to appealto SCC refused, 34172 (14 July 2011); 2. the litigant’s entire public dispute history (Thompson v International Union of Operating Engineers Local No 995, 2017 ABCA193 at para 25, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 37974 (7 June 2018)), including:

a) litigation in other jurisdictions (McMeekin v Alberta (Attorney General), 2012 ABQB 456 at paras 83-127, 543 AR 132; Curle vCurle, 2014 ONSC 1077 at para 24; Fearn v Canada Customs, 2014 ABQB 114 at paras 102-105, 586 AR 23; Hill v Bundon, 2018ABQB 506 at paras 68-80, 91-96; Alberta Lawyers Insurance Association v Bourque, 2018 ABQB 821 at paras 41-51);

b) non-judicial proceedings (Bishop v Bishop, at para 9; Thompson v International Union of Operating Engineers Local No 995, atparas 24-25); and

c) public records that are a basis for judicial notice (Wong v Giannacopoulos, 2011 ABCA 277 at para 6, 515 AR 58); and 3. whether the person has previously engaged in abusive litigation conduct, and/or was declared a “vexatious litigant” or madesubject to court access restrictions: Canada v Olumide, 2017 FCA 42 at para 37, [2017] GSTC 17; Hill v Bundon, at paras 68-80;Alberta Lawyers Insurance Association v Bourque, at paras 153-158; Fabrikant v Canada, 2018 FCA 171 at paras 14-15. [54] The characteristics, or “indicia” that identify abusive litigation were comprehensively reviewed in Chutskoff v Bonora, atpara 92.

Briefly, these are: 1. collateral attacks, 2. hopeless proceedings, 3. escalating proceedings, 4. bringing proceedings for improper purposes, 5. initiating “busybody” lawsuits to enforce alleged rights of third parties,

6. failure to honour court-ordered obligations, 7. persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions, 8. persistently engaging in inappropriate courtroom behaviour, 9. unsubstantiated allegations of conspiracy, fraud, and misconduct, 10. scandalous or inflammatory language in pleadings or before the court, and 11. advancing Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument (OPCA) strategies. [ 55 ] Additional indicia categories have been identified in subsequent decisions of Canadian courts: 1. using court processes to further illegal activities ( Re Boisjoli , 2015 ABQB 629 at paras 98-103 , 29 Alta LR (6th) 334; Rothweiler v Payette , 2018 ABQB 288 at para 35 ; McKechnie (Re) , 2018 ABQB 677 at paras 3 , 30); 2. “judge shopping” ( Onischuk (Re) , 2017 ABQB 659 at para 18 ; McCargar v Canada , 2017 ABQB 729 at paras 8-9 , 68 Alta LR (6th) 305; Re Botar , 2018 ABQB 193 at paras 23-28 ; Bourque v Tensfeldt , 2018 ABQB 419 at paras 17-18 ; Lymer (Re) , 2018 ABQB 859 at paras 72-75 ); 3. “forum shopping” ( 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee) , 2017 ABQB 548 at paras 91-97 ; MacLeod v Bank of Montreal , 2018 ONSC 5795 at para 7 ); 4. bad faith litigation strategies to pre-empt, divert, or sabotage proceedings that address court access restrictions ( Alberta Lawyers Insurance Association v Bourque , at paras 159-160, 175 ); 5. where a litigant indicates an intention to engage in future abuse of court processes ( Lofstrom v Radke , 2017 ABCA 362 at para 8 ; Van Sluytman v Muskoka (District Municipality) , 2018 ONCA 32 at paras 23-24 , leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38057 (1 November 2018); Templanza v Ford , 2018 ABQB 168 at para 120 , 69 Alta LR (6th) 110; Rothweiler v Payette , at paras 42-44 ; ET v Calgary Catholic School District No 1 , 2017 ABCA 349 at para 11 , leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38081 (8 November 2018); Lee v Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 ABQB 464 at para 148 ); 6. where litigation has a political focus and is directed towards acknowledgement and correction of perceived government shortcomings, rather than asserting a right recognized in law ( Van Sluytman v Muskoka (District Municipality) , at paras 23-24 ; Rothweiler v Payette , at para 36 ); 7. where the litigant minimizes or dismisses litigation defects and abuse on the basis that the person is a self-represented litigant ( Van Sluytman v Muskoka (District Municipality) , at paras 23-24 ; Re Bruce , 2018 ABQB 283 at paras 8-9 ; Alberta Treasury Branches v Hawrysh , 2018 ABQB 618 at paras 36-46 ); and 8. employing proxy actors to circumvent court orders, court access restrictions, impede litigation, and improperly communicate with the court ( Onischuk v Edmonton (City) , 2017 ABQB 647 at paras 24-25 , 32; Onischuk (Re) , at paras 11, 21 ; MacKinnon v Bowden Institution , 2018 ABQB 144 at paras 44-85 , 71 Alta LR (6th) 267). [ 56 ] Any indicium of abusive litigation is a basis to conclude that litigation is vexatious and an abusive of court processes: Chutskoff v Bonora , at para 93 .

Multiple indicia generally favour court intervention: e.g. Chutskoff v Bonora , at paras 131-132 ; Re Boisjoli , at para 104 ; Ewanchuk v Canada (Attorney General) , 2017 ABQB 237 at para 158 , 54 Alta LR (6th) 135, appeal abandoned, Edmonton 1603-0287AC (Alta CA). 2. The Parties’ Submissions a.

The Defendants [ 57 ] In his November 22, 2018 submissions, counsel for Chief Knecht stressed the underlying policy purpose of the Court’s authority to terminate abusive litigation, and how the Hryniak v Mauldin “culture shift” means Canadian courts should exercise their inherent and legislated authority as ‘gatekeepers’ to ensure valid litigation proceeds, while abusive proceedings are brought to a timely but just and fair close. [ 58 ] In Chief Knecht’s opinion the manner in which this action has proceeded and its broader context favours the Court striking out this action as an abuse of court processes, per Rule 3.68 .

Chief Knecht argues that even if there was originally some merit to Mr. Paraniuk’s litigation, the manner in which he has conducted himself means this action should be terminated.

[ 59 ] This applicant argues there are numerous indicia of abusive litigation activities by Mr. Paraniuk. [ 60 ] The second application to file a Further Amended Statement of Claim which was dismissed by Master Birkett is a collateral attack on the prior decision of Master Schlosser. Mr. Paraniuk returned to an earlier decided issue, and attempted to evade the effect of Master Schlosser’s order. [ 61 ] Mr.

Paraniuk has repeatedly engaged in futile proceedings before the LERB, this Court, and most recently (the Law Society’s decision was issued November 21, 2018) in a Law Society of Alberta complaint directed at counsel for Chief Knecht. Chief Knecht notes that Mr. Paraniuk seeks $300,000.00 in damages, which is disproportionate and excessive to his identified injuries from the alleged April 23, 2013 assault. Mr. Paraniuk in his latest attempt to file a revised statement of claim increased that amount to $800,000.00. [ 62 ] A further identified indicium of abusive litigation is that Mr.

Paraniuk’s litigation is expanding and escalating. This is obvious simply from the pleadings filed in this action. Mr. Paraniuk adds, or seeks to add, new parties, and makes new allegations. The Amended Amended Statement of Claim is 31 paragraphs long. Mr. Paraniuk’s proposed Further Amended Statement of Claim attached to his May 9, 2018 materials is over 440 paragraphs in length. Chief Knecht observes that when Mr. Paraniuk receives a result he does not like, he simply adds that party to his disputes.

Most recently that was the complaint to the Law Society of Alberta seeking that counsel for Chief Knecht be disbarred. [ 63 ] Mr. Paraniuk litigates for an improper, ulterior purpose. He has admitted he wants the Keefes charged criminally, and is using his litigation activities to obtain evidence towards that goal. Mr. Paraniuk has failed to pay costs awarded against him, and while this Applicant acknowledges that certain issues concerning costs awarded against Mr. Paraniuk were set to be heard at this proceeding, Mr.

Paraniuk has not paid a subsequent $1,000.00 cost award against him which resulted from his collateral attack application before Master Birkett. Mr. Paraniuk has a pattern of engaging in persistent unsuccessful appeals, both in relation to his complaints about the EPS and at the LERB. Mr.

Paraniuk has unsuccessfully appealed a LERB decision at the Alberta Court of Appeal, and made two appeals of Masters’ orders in this action. [ 64 ] The next three indicia categories are interlinked: 1) inappropriate courtroom behaviour, 2) unsubstantiated allegations of conspiracy, fraud, and misconduct, and 3) scandalous or inflammatory language. Chief Knecht identifies as examples Mr. Paraniuk’s allegations: the courts and the LERB are corrupt; lawyers involved in this action have engaged in fraud, forgery, and have deceived the Court; Master Schlosser was a biased dupe of the EPS.

The Applicant argues review of the transcripts of this action and Mr. Paraniuk’s materials clearly illustrates these three indicia categories. [ 65 ] Chief Knecht concludes that there is a clear and obvious basis to find that Mr. Paraniuk’s conduct of this proceeding is vexatious and abusive, and so his Amended Amended Statement of Claim should be struck out, en toto . The other Defendants adopted these arguments. b. Mr. Paraniuk [ 66 ] Mr. Paraniuk rejects that he should be classified as having engaged in vexatious proceedings.

In his November 8, 2018 Affidavit, he writes this application: ... is categorically and wholly without merit and is an extraordinary and unprecedented abuse of process. As an extraordinary abuse of process, the Application is unprecedented in Edmonton, if not in all of Alberta, if not in all of Canada. ... The Application is astounding, mainly if not solely, vindictive and punitive. The Application is fatally one-sided and biased. ... [ 67 ] Mr. Paraniuk responded that he conducts himself properly, and if he has made missteps, those were inadvertent.

He explained he finds these proceedings stressful, and unfair, and said: I have to proactively apologize for any tone of voice I have, because this is very distressing to me ... it is personal to me, it is very personal to me, I am very concerned about facts and truth. The Plaintiff says he has experienced psychological damages and is in a difficult mental state. In his submissions Mr. Paraniuk repeatedly indicated he has memory issues. [ 68 ] Mr.

Paraniuk believes he had the right to seek to apply to file a further expanded Statement of Claim, stressing he has much additional information that should be put before the Court. Mr. Paraniuk explained that the lawyer he retained to prepare the original Statement of Claim, Tom Engel, had done a poor job and not understood the basis for Mr. Paraniuk’s lawsuit. That is why Mr. Paraniuk has had to add new parties and issues. His damages claims are appropriate. [ 69 ] As for his interactions with the Law Society concerning counsel for Chief Knecht, Mr. Paraniuk explained that what he submitted was not a complaint.

The form document provided by the Law Society of Alberta referred to “information”, and Mr. Paraniuk

said that is the context in which he made the statements he did about Chief Knecht’s lawyer. He was providing “information”. Mr. Paraniuk never thought of this as a complaint. [ 70 ] Mr. Paraniuk denied he conducts his litigation and other dispute-related activities for ulterior, improper purposes. While he admitted he has indeed used these proceedings to obtain information to incriminate the Keefes, Mr. Paraniuk explained that was “a purpose” of his litigation, not the “only purpose” of it. Mr. Paraniuk stressed this is an import distinction. [ 71 ] As for paying costs, Mr.

Paraniuk said that as long as the question of costs is live and before the Court he should not be obliged to pay them. Since Justice Ross ordered the judge hearing the November 22-23, 2018 applications also review earlier cost awards, Mr. Paraniuk should not be criticized for his waiting for the result of that. [ 72 ] As for the appeals that he has made, Mr. Paraniuk says everything he did was authorized in law, and so he had a right to take those steps. If he was unhappy with a lower tribunal decision, he is allowed to appeal. Mr. Paraniuk says he cannot be criticized for that. [ 73 ] Mr.

Paraniuk says the allegations of inappropriate courtroom behaviour, unsubstantiated allegations of conspiracy, and scandalous and inflammatory language have no basis. He emphasized the Defendants had identified no examples of these things. He would never use the word “conspiracy” or “fraud” because that is a Criminal Code offence. Mr. Paraniuk does admit he has alleged the LERB and Master Schlosser were biased, but he says he proved that with evidence. The same is true of when he alleged lawyers in these proceedings were dishonest. He stands by what he said and wrote because it is the truth.

He has a right to freely say these things. [ 74 ] Mr. Paraniuk concluded the Defendants’ application that he is a vexatious litigant, and conducts vexatious litigation, is an extraordinary, strong allegation. He submits I must reject this application. His litigation is valid because he operates on and relies on a foundation of facts that cannot be refuted. In Mr. Paraniuk’s opinion, the late filed allegations of vexatious litigation simply are another illustration of the Defendants’ bad faith.

They knew they were going to lose in their attempts to strike his lawsuit on the issues, so now they allege he abuses the Court. Mr. Paraniuk categorically denies he ever intentionally did that. 3. Analysis [ 75 ] There is no question that Mr. Paraniuk’s litigation activities exhibit indicia of vexatious and abusive litigation. I generally accept Chief Knecht’s submissions as to the extent and form of Mr. Paraniuk’s litigation misconduct. I have also previously concluded that aspects of Mr. Paraniuk’s lawsuit against the Condo Defendants and Keefes are abusive and vexatious. [ 76 ] While I accept Mr.

Paraniuk’s reasoning concerning the unpaid costs that I will subsequently review, I completely reject his claim that his Law Society of Alberta “information” against counsel for Chief Knecht was anything other than a complaint intended to remove that lawyer from this action. In response to the item, “What would you like to see happen as a result of your submission?”, Mr. Paraniuk wrote: To be blunt, [counsel for Chief Knecht] should be disbarred.

If not disbarred, the maximum punishment allowed by the Law Society should be administered. ... [ 77 ] In the interest of judicial economy I will not conduct a complete review of Mr. Paraniuk’s problematic activities, however I will highlight certain illustrative examples to explain the basis for my conclusion that Mr. Paraniuk’s Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench action has become abusive in a form and to a degree that warrants court intervention. [ 78 ] I accept the Defendants’ argument that Mr.

Paraniuk’s October 19, 2018 application to file a revised and expanded statement of claim was a collateral attack on a previously decided issue. This kind of litigation misconduct carries significant weight because of how it fundamentally abuses court and litigant resources. A party who disagrees with an unfavourable result gets to appeal it, but not repeatedly make the same lawsuit or application. Res judicata is a critical aspect of UK tradition common law litigation - settled issues are settled. [ 79 ] The record clearly establishes that Mr.

Paraniuk acknowledges he is conducting his litigation as a method to obtain information to establish a criminal case against persons he thinks wronged him. For example, in his submissions to the LERB on September 22, 2016 he writes: From the PSB process , I expected to receive answers to questions about the events in this case in order to pursue criminal charges against Raelene Keefe , Paul Keefe , and Arthur Zajdler . ...

As I mentioned in my documents, I am still in the process of writing an information document to launch a criminal investigation regarding the people involved in this entire sequence of events. ... [Emphasis in original.]

[ 80 ] I have already commented on Mr. Paraniuk’s pattern of unsuccessful applications and appeals in this court and to his complaints about the EPS and its officers. [ 81 ] I also agree with Chief Knecht that Mr. Paraniuk’s damages claim is grossly excessive given his complaint.

In his argument, counsel for Chief Knecht noted how in Ewanchuk v Canada (Attorney General) , at paras 118-119 Thomas J observed that a $100,000.00 claim could not be warranted by the complaints in that action, and noted that in Blackwater v Plint , 2005 SCC 58 at para 88-89 , [2005] 3 SCR 3 the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed a general damages award of $125,000.00 for “an aboriginal plaintiff who had been the subject of repeated and brutal sexual assaults and other abuse while he was a resident of a residential school.” Justice Thomas continued to observe how this illustrated how the claimed damages “... are inconsistent with Canadian law, if not unrelated to it.” [ 82 ] The same is true here.

Mr. Paraniuk originally sought $100,000.00 for “Concussion, bruising and lacerations”, “Mental pain and suffering”, “Loss of income”, and “Out of pocket expenses” (none of which is particularized in Mr. Paraniuk’s Statements of Claim or submissions to the Court). That does not align with the amount initially claimed, and certainly not with either his current damages sought ($300,000.00) or his latest proposed quantum ($800,000.00). [ 83 ] I also agree that Mr. Paraniuk’s litigation is expanding and escalating. That is obvious from the record.

It would be one thing if the various appeals, amendments to his pleadings, and submissions had the effect of refining the scope of his litigation, but here Mr. Paraniuk is adding parties who have no connection to his complaint (the Condo Defendants), and alleging an ever broader network of parties and persons who supposedly collaborate against him. First the police, then the LERB, and now the Court are allegedly covering up the Keefes’ role in the alleged assault (which, as I have earlier found, has no substance.) [ 84 ] Anyone who disagrees with Mr.

Paraniuk’s conclusions is wrong, or a part of the conspiracy against him. His escalating proceedings are a strong indication this lawsuit is an abuse of court processes and should be terminated. [ 85 ] As for Mr. Paraniuk’s statements and allegations, what follows are several examples to illustrate that. Mr. Paraniuk’s January 9, 2016 filing with the LERB illustrates how he expresses beliefs concerning the Keefes and the Police Defendants: This is a case where Pierce covered-up a violent crime ( assault ) against myself.

Pierce knew exactly who ( Keefe ) conspired this assault against me, and had video evidence showing K eefe interacting with the male who attacked me, within 40m of the attack site, within 90 seconds of the attack. Pierce covered up this crime because K eefe had made claims of “ harassing ” against me to EPS (_including Pierce _). ...

I want an official response from EPS to this question: when I am the victim of a violent physical crime requirement medical attention twice ( stitches to my face and a concussion a week later ), is this known crime against me a lower priority (basically zero ) than baseless and imaginary claims of “ harassing ” made against me within 23 house of that violent crime against me? That is exactly what happened . That is what the priority was. By disregarding and ignoring the vast majority of my complaint, EPS is attempting to destroy the documented history of my complaint.

I vehemently refuse to allow EPS to destroy and rewrite history . ... EPS is trying to ignore and cover up written, documented, history which I attempt to use to show them their negligence in investigating, and their deliberate cover up of , a violent crime against myself. [Emphasis and formatting in original.] [ 86 ] The LERB dismissed Mr. Paraniuk’s complaints, concluding: In this appeal the Board finds that the investigation conducted by the Chief was reasonable and there is no basis on which we might conclude that the investigation was tainted, flawed, grossly inadequate or compromised. ...

In reaching that conclusion the LERB examined and rejected Mr. Paraniuk’s many arguments, including claims of tampering of video records, and that one of the Police Defendants was biased after receiving a witness statement where lower case “i”s were ‘dotted’ with small hearts. [ 87 ] Mr. Paraniuk did not respond favourably to this result. In a November 21, 2016 email to the LERB, Chief Knecht, the Alberta Minister of Justice, and others, Mr.

Paraniuk indicated he was going to contact the Alberta Director of Law Enforcement and the Alberta Serious Incident Response Team to investigate the response to his complaints against the EPS. Mr. Paraniuk complains of ... EPS’s deliberate and remarkably deceitful production of the LERB record for each of the two complaint appeals. ... violations of which LERB seems to not have any concerns with, as there seem to be no consequences or ramifications to those violations.

This lack of concern for those violations raises serious issues related to the perception, if not the concept itself, of bias and partiality on LERB’s

part in favour of EPS in these appeals. [ 88 ] Mr. Paraniuk’s rhetoric escalated in a subsequent exchange of emails, leading to a December 12, 2016 email to the LERB

associate secretary: No, you don’t believe that . You are absolutely lying by implying that. You are absolutely lying with your December 6 response because I challenged your inconsistent responses between May 9 / August 24, and December 1. ... I don’t believe for a second, after my communications with you / LERB over the last 11 months, that “The Board is an independent, impartial appeal tribunal.” You have implied partiality in favour of EPS counsel many times . ... EPS has basically driven this appeal.

LERB is passively, or actively, assisting EPS in this regard. [Emphasis in original.] [ 89 ] Conspiratorial allegations continue, and even more intense language emerges when Mr. Paraniuk then took his LERB complaint to the Court of Appeal. In an affidavit dated July 14, 2017, Mr. Paraniuk starts: The Law Enforcement Review Board ( “LERB” ) Decision from June 14, 2017 , is a disgustingly deceitful misrepresentation of my complaints against the Edmonton Police Service (“EPS” ). The Decision is a disgustingly deceitful misrepresentation of my appeal to LERB of the disposition of my complaints against EPS.

The Decision is astoundingly corrupt. It perpetuates the lies and deceit from the related EPS investigations, and the lies and deceipts from the EPS Professional Standards Branch ( “PSB” ) investigations of my complaints. It contains new lies and deceit produced by LERB itself. ... [Emphasis in original.] [ 90 ] Mr. Paraniuk subsequently deposes the LERB colluded with the EPS, covered-up Mr. Paraniuk’s complaints, and that “... LERB falsified its Decision on my Appeal for the purpose of burying my complaints against EPS and eliminating evidence of my complaints from documented history.” He concludes: ...

It is absolutely mind-boggling, disgusting, and shameful, how much evidence of corruption I described in my complaint documentation has been buried and eliminated by EPS, PSB, and LERB. [ 91 ] These allegations of deceit, concealing evidence, and tampering with evidence were rejected by the Alberta Court of Appeal: Paraniuk v Edmonton (Police Service) , 2017 ABCA 338 . [ 92 ] The Karen Track Affidavit in support of the Joint Application includes numerous examples of Mr. Paraniuk alleging lawyers engaged in inappropriate conduct. Beyond the habitual allegations of lying, Mr.

Paraniuk also makes more serious allegations. For example, Mr. Paraniuk repeatedly asserts that the January 24, 2018 order of Master Schlosser is “a forged document”, and therefore not binding on him. It allegedly contained “fabricated clauses”, and as a consequence the opposing lawyers “... were able to deceive Master W.S. Schlosser, Q.C. into endorsing statements he did not pronounce ...”. This, allegedly, constitutes forgery per Criminal Code , s 366. [ 93 ] Mr. Paraniuk makes these allegations in Court.

When Shelley J dismissed his application for an extension to appeal Master Schlosser’s order he responded: I’m going to go to the Law Society and tell them that you forged a document, that Master Schlosser did not pronounce it ... That was directly after Mr. Paraniuk was admonished by Justice Shelley against making claims that opposing counsel were dishonest, and that Master Schlosser did not properly discharge his duties. [ 94 ] Mr. Paraniuk continued the same allegations about Master Schlosser at a May 9, 2018 Assessment Officer hearing: “[h]e was duped.” by counsel for Chief Knecht.

This hearing includes further statements that illustrate Mr. Paraniuk’s allegations of a broad-based, persecutory conspiracy: The police corruption that is underneath this -- this case is astronomical. Like, you just cannot even imagine what these guys covered up. It’s amazing. It’s like to this day you’ve covered up a crime on behalf of the Keefes to this day. It’s all in your brief ...

And that’s the thing, like, I mean, you know, you want to destroy me financially so that this never comes to light, that’s your entire plan, that’s basically all you want to do because you have no intention of ever, like, admitting the truth or coming clean about anything. You want to destroy me financially, that’s all you can do. All you can do is hide and try to destroy me financially. [ 95 ] Another noteworthy feature of Mr. Paraniuk’s materials is how he identifies misconduct in minutiae.

For example, in his November 14, 2018 Affidavit he complains that highlighting in an Affidavit filed by Chief Knecht makes that document “a false document”:

... Any and all highlighting added to that document is “a material addition to a genuine document”. If the highlighting added to that document were not intended to be a material addition to that document, that highlighting would not have been added to that document. [Emphasis in original.] [ 96 ] Subsequently in the same Affidavit Mr. Paraniuk complains that the presence of sheriffs at his hearings was an illegitimate attempt to portray him as a vexatious litigant.

He notes non-verbal communications between counsel for Chief Knecht, and the sheriffs: At the end of the April 5, 2018 hearing, I watched [counsel for Chief Knecht] leave the Courtroom. As [counsel for Chief Knecht] left, he unmistakably nodded knowingly at the Sherriff , and the Sherriff nodded back. ... [Emphasis in original.] Similarly on October 29, 2018, Mr. Paraniuk observes when counsel for Chief Knecht arrived “... he unmistakably nodded knowingly at the Sherriff , and the Sherriff nodded back.” [emphasis in original]. [ 97 ] Mr. Paraniuk concludes: ...

The lawyers requested those Sheriffs, misusing if not abusing Court resources, merely to blatantly and disgustingly misrepresent the situation we are all in, and to intimidate me in a situation in which I am in an extreme disadvantage ... [ 98 ] In conclusion, the evidence I have received leads me to find that the current lawsuit is now a vexatious proceeding. It exhibits many indicia of abusive litigation, including very serious litigation misconduct. Mr. Paraniuk’s pursuit of the Defendants should not be permitted to continue as it is an abuse of the Court’s processes. [ 99 ] I therefore strike out Mr.

Paraniuk’s Amended Amended Statement of Claim, en toto . This conclusion is an additional alternative basis why I would strike out the litigation against the Condo Defendants and the Keefes beyond the reasons I have previously indicated. B. Is Mr. Paraniuk’s Litigation Against the Police Defendants and Chief Knecht Otherwise Futile and/or Improper? [ 100 ] As I have previously stated, the Police Defendants and Chief Knecht have also in the alternative applied to be struck out of the action on the basis that Mr.

Paraniuk’s litigation does not disclose a cause of action. [ 101 ] Their argument is simple and may be succinctly summarized in this manner. Mr. Paraniuk’s action stems from his being (allegedly) assaulted on April 23, 2013. He complains about “Concussion, bruising and lacerations”, “Mental pain and suffering”, “Loss of income”, and “Out of pocket expenses”. [ 102 ] However, the allegations against the Police Defendants are about a faulty investigation, and that is not captured in the police duty of care.

The Joint Applicants note that the duty of care for police defendants is narrow, and only applies to warn a narrow and distinct group of potential victims to a specific threat, or to a potential victim who raises fears about being victimized: Wellington v Ontario , 2011 ONCA 274 at para 20 , 333 DLR (4th) 236, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 34294 (13 October 2011); Gilchrist v Levin , 2016 ABQB 474 at para 18 , 42 Alta LR (6th) 158.

There is no duty of care that flows from the conduct of an investigation. [ 103 ] Second, in tort, a plaintiff must show “a causal connection” between an alleged breach of a duty of care and the resulting injury: Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board , 2007 SCC 41 at paras 93-94 , [2007] 3 SCR 129. However, the vast majority of what Mr. Paraniuk identifies as police-related misconduct post-dates the alleged assault. [ 104 ] There is therefore no cause and effect between what the Police Defendants and Chief Knecht allegedly did wrong, and the injuries Mr. Paraniuk claims to have suffered. Mr.

Paraniuk’s claim largely fails this “but for” test. [ 105 ] The Joint Applicants admit that Mr. Paraniuk’s claim that Constable Kembel failed to document pre-April 23, 2018 complaints by Mr. Paraniuk of threats is a potential basis for a duty of care. However, they submit that Mr. Paraniuk has provided no basis to link the Keefes to the alleged April 23, 2018 assault, and I agree with that submission. In the context of a

summary judgment, where Mr. Paraniuk is obliged to “put his best foot forward”, this absence of data is fatal. [ 106 ] Mr. Paraniuk rejects the Joint Applicants’ characterization of his claim. He explained at the November 22-23, 2018 hearing that the Joint Applicants’ argument misrepresents his Amended Amended Statement of Claim. His action is not just about a noise complaint. He has documents to back that up.

[107] I agree with the Joint Applicants submissions on this point, and this is therefore a second independent basis on which I concludethe litigation against Chief Knecht and the Police Defendants should be struck out. IV. Court Access Restrictions [108] The Defendants submit that Mr. Paraniuk should be subject to court access restrictions by what is sometimes called a “vexatiouslitigant order”.

While this application was made per Judicature Act, RSA 2000, c J-2, ss 23-23.1, this Court now evaluates this issueunder its inherent jurisdiction, which provides a superior alternative to determine whether court access restrictions are warranted, andwhat form they should take: Templanza v Ford, at para 103; Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), at paras 42-79. [109] That said, I note that the Defendants notified the Attorney General of their application, per Judicature Act, s 23.1(1). [110] The modern approach to court access restrictions is to evaluate on a prospective basis whether a person will plausibly engage infuture abuse of the court and its procedures: 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), at paras 42-76; Templanza v Ford, atparas 102-104.

If true, then the Court may impose “gatekeeper” steps to help manage that future litigation misconduct. [111] The usual access limitation placed on an abusive litigant is a requirement that he or she must seek permission - “leave” - prior toinitiating a new action or application, or continuing an existing lawsuit.

This is a very modest imposition on a problematic litigant: Hok vAlberta, 2016 ABQB 651 at paras 32-33; Wong v Giannacopoulos, at para 8; Canada v Olumide, 2017 FCA 42 at paras 26-29, [2017]GSTC 17; Bossé v Immeubles Robo Ltée, at para 38 (NBCA). [112] When evaluating whether court access limitations are appropriate, a court asks what can be anticipated from a litigant: ... when a court considers limits to future court access by a person with a history of litigation misconduct the key questions for a courtare: 1.

Can the court determine the identity or type of persons who are likely to be the target of future abusive litigation? 2. What litigation subject or subjects are likely involved in that abuse of court processes? 3. In what forums will that abuse occur? (Hok v Alberta, at para 36) ...

Court access restrictions are designed in a functional manner and not restricted to formulaic approaches, but instead respond in acreative, but proportionate, manner to anticipated potential abuse ... (Rothweiler v Payette, at para 45, referencing Bhamjee v Forsdick (No 2), [2003] EWCA Civ 1113 (UK CA)). [113] The court evaluates whether intervention is warranted to control future plausible abusive litigation. Future litigation abuse maybe suggested by a person’s litigation history (issues, targets and forums where abuse may be anticipated), however the critical issue iswhat the court can anticipate.

Therefore, statements of intent, motivation, political ideology, and behavioural pathology are also in someinstances highly relevant: 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), at paras 42-79. [114] I have already established that Mr. Paraniuk’s litigation exhibits multiple indicia and examples of abusive litigation. Thatfavours Mr. Paraniuk being made subject to court access restrictions: e.g. Chutskoff v Bonora, at paras 131-132; Re Boisjoli, at para104; Ewanchuk v Canada (Attorney General), at para 158. [115] Three indicia of abusive litigation exhibited by Mr.

Paraniuk are particularly relevant to my decision as to what step to take.First, he re-litigates decided issues. That means he is plausibly not going to limit himself to this lawsuit, but will engage in other abusivelitigation. Second, he exhibits an escalating conflict pattern where his complaint activities are expanding through multiple proceedings,and adding new issues and parties. That means it is not possible to limit his court access restrictions to a particular set of parties, orsubjects. Third, he makes unmeritorious appeals. [116] A further critical factor is Mr.

Paraniuk claims he has identified a pattern of wrongdoing, conspiracy, cover-ups, lies, andmisconduct. He says there is a much bigger picture - and he is uncovering that web of bad conduct where he is at the epicentre and itstarget. As he told me in court: “So much more than to this than meets the eye.” [117] Further, Mr. Paraniuk is clear that he intends to pursue what he sees as illegal and corrupt conduct. It is important to him. Hebelieves that his claims rest on a real foundation. Mr.

Paraniuk made this very clear at the November 22-23, 2018 hearing: There’s nothing that I’ve written that isn’t backed up by something. I don’t just spout, y’know, I don’t just say you lie you lie you lie.Like, that’s not me. Like, I’m a pretty articulate person. I don’t think you could write hundreds of pages about this and respond toeverything unless you have some degree of understanding, and, y’know, for lack of a better word, passion about it, I guess. I believe inwhat I say.

[ 118 ] I have no doubt he means that. I do not believe Mr. Paraniuk will accept my striking out his Amended Amended Statement of Claim. He will take further steps, or attempt to take further steps, against anyone with whom he disagrees. [ 119 ] In light of Mr. Paraniuk’s “passion” for this subject, and his metastasizing pattern of conflict disputes and litigation, I conclude that Mr. Paraniuk should be subject to a global leave requirement to initiate or continue any action in Alberta courts. [ 120 ] There is a further, more unusual limitation I am placing on Mr. Paraniuk.

I order he may not personally submit private informations to a judge per Criminal Code , ss 504, 507.1. He instead may only take that step while represented by a member in good standing of the Law Society of Alberta, or another person authorized to represent Mr. Paraniuk in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench pursuant to the Legal Profession Act , RSA 2000, c L-8. [ 121 ] This Court has imposed this court access restriction in instances where it is plausible that a person will submit abusive, unfounded private informations: e.g.

Lee v Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 ABQB 464 at paras 160-164 ; Hill v Bundon , at para 125 , Alberta Lawyers Insurance Association v Bourque , at para 204 ; McKechnie (Re) , at para 37 ; Lymer (Re) , at para 135 ; Potvin (Re) , 2018 ABQB 835 at paras 17-18 ; Scotia Mortgage Corporation v Landry , 2018 ABQB 951 at para 56 . This step is to protect abuse of the Provincial Court and its resources. In Mr. Paraniuk’s case I conclude this step is appropriate because: 1. he has expressed an intention to initiate criminal litigation vs the Keefes and Mr.

Zajdler, and 2. he has no legal basis for that beyond empty suspicions. [ 122 ] I therefore under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction order: 1. Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk is a vexatious litigant, and is prohibited, under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, from commencing, or attempting to commence, or continuing any appeal, action, application, or proceeding: (

i) in the Alberta Court of Appeal, Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, or the Provincial Court of Alberta, and (ii) on his own behalf or on behalf of any other person or estate, without an order of the Court in which the proceeding is conducted. 2. Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk must describe himself, in the application for leave or document to which this Order applies, as “Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk”, and not by using initials, an alternative name structure, or a pseudonym. 3. To commence or continue an appeal, application, or other proceeding in the Alberta Court of Appeal Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk must apply to a single appeal judge for leave to commence or continue the proceeding, and (

i) The application for leave must be made in writing by sending a Letter addressed to the Case Management Officer explaining why the new proceedings or the continuance of an existing proceeding is justified. (ii) The Letter shall not exceed five double-spaced pages. (iii) The Letter is to contain no attachments other than, for a new proceeding, the proposed notice of appeal, application or other proceeding. (iv) If the single appeal judge requires further information, he or she can request it. (

v) The single appeal judge can respond to and dispose of the leave application in writing, or hold the application in open Court where it shall be recorded. (vi) If the single appeal judge grants Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk leave to commence an appeal, Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk may be required to apply for permission to appeal under Rule 14.5(1)(j). An application for permission to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Alberta Rules of Court and must be accompanied by an affidavit:

a) attaching a copy of this Order restricting Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk’s access to the Alberta Court of Appeal;

b) attaching a copy of the appeal, application, or proceeding that Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk proposes to file;

c) deposing fully and completely to the facts and circumstances surrounding the proposed appeal, application, or proceeding, so as to demonstrate that it is not an abuse of process, and that there are reasonable grounds for it; and

d) indicating whether Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk has ever sued some or all of the respondents previously in any jurisdiction or Court, and if so providing full particulars. 4. To commence or continue an appeal, application, or other proceeding in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench or the Provincial Court of Alberta, Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk shall submit an application to the Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or Chief Judge, or his or her designate: (

i) The Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or Chief Judge, or his or her designate, may, at any time, direct that notice of an application to commence or continue an appeal, action, application, or proceeding be given to any other person.

(ii) Any application shall be made in writing. (iii) Any application to commence or continue any appeal, action, application, or proceeding must be accompanied by an affidavit:

a) attaching a copy of this Order arising from this Decision, restricting Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk’s access to the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, and Provincial Court of Alberta;

b) attaching a copy of the appeal, pleading, application, or process that Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk proposes to issue or file or continue;

c) deposing fully and completely to the facts and circumstances surrounding the proposed claim or proceeding, so as to demonstrate that the proceeding is not an abuse of process, and that there are reasonable grounds for it;

d) indicating whether Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk has ever sued some or all of the defendants or respondents previously in any jurisdiction or Court, and if so providing full particulars;

e) undertaking that, if leave is granted, the authorized appeal, pleading, application or process, the Order granting leave to proceed, and the affidavit in support of the Order will promptly be served on the defendants or respondents; and

f) undertaking to diligently prosecute the proceeding. (iv) The Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or Chief Judge, or his or her designate, may:

a) give notice of the proposed claim or proceeding and the opportunity to make submissions on the proposed claim or proceeding, if they so choose, to: (1) the involved potential parties; (2) other relevant persons identified by the Court; and (3) the Attorney Generals of Alberta and Canada;

b) respond to and dispose of the leave application in writing; and/or

c) hold the application in open Court where it shall be recorded. 5. Leave to commence or continue proceedings may be given on conditions, including the posting of security for costs, and proof of payment of all prior cost awards. 6. An application that is dismissed may not be made again, directly or indirectly. 7. An application to vary or set aside this Order must be made on notice to any person as directed by the Court. 8. Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk is prohibited from: (

i) providing legal advice, preparing documents intended to be filed in court for any person other than himself, and filing or otherwise communicating with any court, except on his own behalf; and (ii) acting as an agent, next friend, McKenzie Friend (from McKenzie v McKenzie , [1970] 3 All ER 1034 (UK CA) and Alberta Rules of Court , Alta Reg 124/2010, ss 2.22-2.23), or any other form of representative in court proceedings before the Provincial Court of Alberta, Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, and Alberta Court of Appeal. 9.

No information shall be received by a justice from Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk per Criminal Code , RSC 1985, c C-46, s 504 unless Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk is represented by a member in good standing of the Law Society of Alberta, or another person authorized to represent Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench pursuant to the Legal Profession Act , RSA 2000, c L-8. 10. The Clerks of the Provincial Court of Alberta, Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, and Alberta Court of Appeal shall refuse to accept or file any documents or other materials from Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk, unless: (

i) Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk is a named party in the action in question, and (ii) if the documents and other materials are intended to commence or continue an appeal, action, application, or proceeding, Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk has been granted leave to take that step by the Court. 11. All fee waivers granted Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk by the Clerks of the Provincial Court of Alberta, Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, and Alberta Court of Appeal are revoked. 12.

The order titled “Interim Court Filing Restrictions for Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk”, filed in Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench action Docket 1503 05933, dated November 23, 2018, is vacated immediately. 13. The Chief Justice of the Alberta Court of Appeal and the Chief Judge of the Provincial Court of Alberta, or his or her designate, may, on his or her own authority, vary the terms of this Order in relation to the requirement, procedure or any preconditions to obtain leave to initiate or continue litigation in their respective Courts.

[ 123 ] The Court will prepare and file the appropriate Order to reflect these court access restrictions. Mr. Paraniuk’s approval of this order is dispensed with per Rule 9.4(2)(c). V. Ancillary Issues [ 124 ] What remains are a number of additional ancillary applications by both the Plaintiff and Defendants. A. Penalty for Late Filing of Affidavit of Records [ 125 ] Mr. Paraniuk has applied for the Court to order that the Defendants pay a penalty for late service of their Affidavits of Records, per Rule 5.12(1): 5.12(1) In addition to any other order or sanction that may be imposed, the Court may impose a penalty of 2 times the amount set out in item 3(1) of the tariff in Division 2 of

Schedule C, or any larger or smaller amount the Court may determine, on a party who, without sufficient cause, (

a) does not serve an affidavit of records in accordance with rule 5.5 or within any modified period agreed on by the parties or set by the Court, (

b) does not comply with rule 5.10, or (

c) does not comply with an order under rule 5.11.

(2) If there is more than one party adverse in interest to the party ordered to pay the penalty, the penalty must be paid to the parties in the proportions determined by the Court.

(3) A penalty imposed under this rule applies irrespective of the final outcome of the action. [ 126 ] Mr. Paraniuk advances this complaint against all four groups of Defendants. His complaint has a number of aspects. First, he says that the Affidavits of Records are false affidavits. Mr. Paraniuk argues he was promised the Affidavits of Records by counsel for the Defendants, and they did not meet the promised timelines. These were agreements in writing, which were breached. He says the Alberta Rules of Court provide for a penalty, which therefore should be imposed.

Rule 5.12 is there for a reason, and: “In a lawsuit there should be an understanding that your work is worth the sentiment behind it.” [ 127 ] When I asked Mr. Paraniuk whether these failures to meet timelines had caused harm, he did not identify any harm that resulted, though he did complain that he could not provide his latest planned Further Amended Statement of Claim without that information. [ 128 ] The Defendants respond that no penalty ought to be imposed in this scenario. Counsel for the Keefes observed that Mr.

Paraniuk had received an unsworn Affidavit of Records prior to the deadline, which was identical to the ultimate sworn Affidavit of Records, so Mr. Paraniuk’s complaint is, at best, a technicality. [ 129 ] The other Defendants identify a broader issue. Mr. Paraniuk’s pleadings were not finalized, and instead were expanding, which meant what was relevant and ought to be included in the Affidavit of Records was also evolving. A penalty in this circumstance is not warranted. Mr. Paraniuk’s litigation strategy was inducing delay. [ 130 ] I conclude no Rule 5.12 penalties should be imposed in this matter.

I note this provision does not mandate automatic penalty awards, instead “... the Court may impose a penalty ...” [emphasis added]. Whether or not a penalty is appropriate should be evaluated in light of the general Rule 1.2 statement of the purpose and intention of the Alberta Rules of Court . I agree with the Defendants that Mr. Paraniuk cannot complain where he is the architect of much of the delay and complication in this proceeding. I instead find that the Defendants have attempted to carry this litigation forward in a cost effective, timely manner. Mr. Paraniuk is the obstacle to that. B.

Costs Review [ 131 ] On June 28, 2018 Ross J dismissed an appeal by Mr. Paraniuk but ordered that earlier cost awards that flowed from a March 21, 2018 decision of Master Schlosser and the April 5, 2018 appeal before Justice Shelley should be reviewed at the November 22-23, 2018 hearing. [ 132 ] Mr. Paraniuk argued he should not be subject to cost awards, despite him being unsuccessful in those proceedings. In his opinion the Defendants did not properly oppose his application and appeal with a valid objection or response. They do not deserve costs

on that basis. Mr. Paraniuk also argues he should not be obliged to pay costs where the Defendants do not take positive steps to collectfrom him. In any case, he submits the costs against him are unwarranted, excessive, and punitive. [133] The Defendants’ position is that I should confirm the prior cost awards. They note the Rule 10.29 presumption is that asuccessful party is due costs per

Schedule C. Mr. Paraniuk should not be immune to this principle. [134] I agree, and confirm the prior cost awards. [135] The Police Defendants, Chief Knecht, and Condo Defendants seek $1,000.00 each in costs for their June 28, 2018 appearancewhere Justice Ross dismissed Mr. Paraniuk’s appeal. That order is granted. C. Costs of Adjournment of Late Filing of Affidavit of Records [136] Finally, the Police Defendants argue they should receive a cost award for their unnecessary appearance in Chambers beforeMaster Schulz to obtain an adjournment of Mr. Paraniuk’s Rule 5.12 application.

The Police Defendants had approached Mr. Paraniukand asked that he voluntarily agree to adjourn his application, but Mr. Paraniuk refused that step. [137] The Police Defendants argue that this appearance would be moot if Mr. Paraniuk’s Amended Amended Statement of Claim wasstruck out. They should receive $1,000.00 in costs. [138] Mr. Paraniuk counters that Rule 5.12(3) indicates that the late affidavit of records penalty is separate and distinct from thequestion of the merits of his action (or lack thereof).

Thus, striking out his Amended Amended Statement of Claim would not make theRule 5.12 penalty moot. [139] I agree with Mr. Paraniuk on this point. The Legislature clearly intended to disconnect Rule 5.12 from the outcome of thelawsuit as a whole. However, that does not negate the fact that Mr. Paraniuk unsuccessfully opposed the Police Defendants’ application.I therefore order $1,000.00 in costs against Mr. Paraniuk, per Rule 10.29. VI. Costs [140] The Defendants have been entirely successful in relation to all applications heard on November 22-23, 2018.

They arepresumptively due their costs, per Rule 10.29. [141] In Fiander v Mills, 2015 NLCA 31 , 2015 NLCA at para 56, 368 Nfld & PEIR 80, Chief Justice Green observed thatwhen responding to abusive litigation, lump sum cost awards are an appropriate step “... to bring this proceeding to a conclusion and tosend a message that this type of litigation will be dealt with swiftly and decisively ...”. [142] This approach to costs in abusive litigation scenarios has been adopted in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, e.g.

AlbertaLawyers Insurance Association v Bourque, at para 226; d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 438 at paras 22-23. [143] A lump sum award is appropriate here to end this matter, and manage the already considerable expenses imposed onDefendants by Mr. Paraniuk’s unmeritorious lawsuit. I therefore order costs of $20,000.00 payable by Mr. Paraniuk in favour of eachgroup of Defendants. [144] This, and all other cost awards made against Mr. Paraniuk are payable immediately. Heard on the 22nd and 23rd days of November, 2018. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 13th day of December, 2018.

J.S. Little J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Gregory Lincoln Paraniuk for the Self-Represented Litigant Joseph Feraco Weir Bowen LLP For the Defendants Andrew Pierce, Scott Carter, Kyle Stasiuk, Andrew Melney, Robert Carusi, Michael Kembel, Dwayne Welfl Jeremy L. Taylor Field LLP for the Defendant Rod Knecht, Chief of the Edmonton Police Service Rebecca

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