R v Liao, 2018 ABQB 984

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v Liao, 2018 ABQB 984 Date: 20181203 Docket: 171264716Q1 Registry: Calgary Between: Her Majesty the Queen Crown - and - Yu Chieh Liao Accused Restriction on Publication Judicial Interim Release – See the Criminal Code ,

section 517. By Court Order, this decision and the evidence taken, information given or representations made may not be published, broadcast, or transmitted in any way. NOTE: This decision is available from the court file. It may be published after the accused is discharged after a preliminary inquiry or, if the accused is committed to stand trial, after the end of the trial. _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Mr. Justice J.T. Eamon

_______________________________________________________ Introduction and bail principles [1] Yu Chieh Liao is charged with the murder of Hanock Afowerk and an accessory after the fact to the murders of CodyPfeiffer, Tiffany Ear, and Glynnis Fox. She seeks judicial interim release. [2] Her co-Accused, “TK”, is charged with Afowerk’s murder and an accessory after the fact to the murder of Pfeiffer. [3] The Crown’s theory is that the Accused and TK murdered Afowerk, while he was being held for ransom money, in thepresence of Pfeiffer.

Shortly after, to eliminate witnesses, TK murdered Fox and Ear, and an associate (“DW”) murdered Pfeiffer. Afterthe killings, the Accused assisted in disposing of Afowerk’s body and assisted TK in escaping legal consequences, including bydestroying evidence of the offences. [4] Judicial interim release is a protected Charter right under s. 11(

e) of the Charter: not to be denied reasonable bail without justcause. This constitutional guarantee contains two distinct elements: In Pearson [ (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665], Lamer C.J., for the majority, held that s. 11(

e) contained two distinctelements: (1) the right to “reasonable bail” in terms of quantum of any monetary component and other applicable restrictions; and (2) theright not to be denied bail without “just cause”. He interpreted the term “just cause” as meaning that bail could only be denied (1) in anarrow set of circumstances, where (2) denial was necessary to promote the proper functioning of the bail system. (R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, 2002 SCC 64 at para 16; see also R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at para 67). [5] Pre-trial detention is only justified where it meets the requirements of subsection 515(10) of the Criminal Code:

(10) For the purposes of this section, the detention of an accused in custody is justified only on one or more of the following grounds: (

a) where the detention is necessary to ensure his or her attendance in court in order to be dealt with according to law; (

b) where the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the public, including any victim of or witness to the offence, or anyperson under the age of 18 years, having regard to all the circumstances including any substantial likelihood that the accused will, ifreleased from custody, commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice; and (

c) if the detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to all the circumstances, including (

i) the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case, (ii) the gravity of the offence, (iii) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was used, and (iv) the fact that the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment or, in the case of an offence thatinvolves, or whose subject-matter is, a firearm, a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of three years or more. [6] As always, the necessity principle applies to all the grounds for detention. Detention is not necessary if conditions willsuffice (R v Lysyk, 2003 ABQB 256 at para 74). [7]

Section 522 of the Criminal Code governs judicial interim release in cases of murder and being an accessory after the fact tomurder:

(2) Where an accused is charged with an offence listed in

section 469, a judge of or a judge presiding in a superior court of criminaljurisdiction for the province in which the accused is charged shall order that the accused be detained in custody unless the accused,having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so, shows cause why his detention in custody is not justified within the meaning ofsubsection 515(10). In this regard,

section 469 includes the offences of murder (s 469 (a)(viii)) and being an accessory after the fact to murder (s 469(b)). [8] Although the reverse onus provision applies, the basic principles of necessity and the constitutional presumption of innocence are not displaced.

Trotter, The Law of Bail in Canada (Carswell: 3rd ed, looseleaf) states at pp 5-28.2-5-28.3 as follows: Reversing the onus of proof does not mean that the accused must disprove the commission of the offence, his or her involvement in it,the strength of the evidence pointing to culpability, or any of the other factors ... that the prosecution might rely upon.

The reversal of theonus merely means that the accused must satisfy the judge on a balance of probabilities that, in all of the circumstances, his or herdetention is not justified on the primary, secondary or tertiary grounds [footnote deleted] This passage has been accepted by Alberta Courts (for example, R v Cheeseman, 2008 ABQB 282 at para 64, and a very recent ABQBdecision cited by counsel and subject to a publication ban). [9] Similarly, in R v White, 2006 ABCA 65, a murder case to which the reverse onus applied, the Court observed: [17] Still, pre-trial detention in the name of public confidence in the administration of justice must be seen in context with otherbasic legal principles and Charter rights.

Specifically, in our system of justice all those accused of crime are presumed to be innocent – a

presumption which remains with the accused person unless and until the contrary is found to have been proven at trial. Also, s. 11 (

e) ofthe Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees that accused persons shall not be denied reasonable bail without just cause. Furthermore,a person is not to be punished before having been found guilty. These are not merely concepts to which we pay lip service; they are someof the fundamental tenets on which our system of justice is based. [10] The defence argues in this case that the ladder principle applies, notwithstanding the reverse onus, citing R v Mead, 2016ONCJ 308 which discussed commentary and judicial authority on the point including some decisions of Madam Justice Veit of thisCourt.

I did not receive extensive argument on the point, and given the terms of the release proposed by the defence and thecircumstances of this case, the question of who bears the onus if detention is not necessary has little practical effect.

Without decidingthis issue, I approach the matter as suggested by Veit, J in R v Alcantara, 2007 ABQB 247 on the basis that if I am satisfied the Accusedcan be released, the ladder principle then applies with the onus on the Crown to justify the upward steps. [11] There are no categories of offence for which bail is not available (R v Blind, , [1999] SJ No 597, 139 CCC(3d) 87, at para 15; R v MacIsaac, 2006 ABQB 215 at para 25; Trotter at p 3-6). The Court has released persons accused of seriousoffences including first and second degree murder (Lysyk at para 108; R v Rivas-Magana, 2014 ABQB 362 at para 59).

Many examplescan be found in reported cases where persons accused of murder were granted bail (R v Coulson, 1996 ABCA 327; Blind at para 16; R vHabib, 2006 BCCA 361; R v Hennessey, 2008 ABQB 242, leave to appeal refused, 2008 ABCA 240; Cheeseman; Modeste v R, ; R v Gale, 2011 ONCA 144; R v Bigby, 2014 ONSC 4510; R v Trudeau, 2015 ONSC 5134; R v Manasseri, 2017 ONCA226; R v CW, 2018 ONSC 4783).

Counsel also cited a recent ABQB case subject to a publication ban, and unpublished Ontarioauthority, to like effect. [12] In applying the first ground, necessity is only met where the flight risk cannot be overcome by other conditions (Modeste atpara 19). The seriousness of the alleged offence and the potential penalty, the likelihood of conviction (cautiously applied and in thecontext of the presumption of innocence), ties to the community, criminal record and compliance with previous court orders, behaviourprior to apprehension (flight or surrender) and the plan of release are relevant considerations (Trotter,

Chapter 3,

Section 2; see alsoModeste at para 25). The Court must not reason that an accused person is probably guilty so detention is not a hardship (Trotter at p 3-8). [13] Again, the strength of the Crown’s case is among the relevant factors under the second ground. It is also relevant that theaccused attempted to interfere with witnesses or evidence in the matter for which he or she is charged or otherwise tried to obstructjustice (Modeste at paras 27-28). [14] The tertiary ground was extensively reviewed in R v St Cloud, 2015 SCC 27. The Court stated: [87] I would summarize the essential principles that must guide justices in applying s. 515(10)(

c) Cr. C. as follows: • Section 515(10)(

c) Cr. C. does not create a residual ground for detention that applies only where the first two grounds fordetention ((

a) and (b)) are not satisfied. It is a distinct ground that itself provides a basis for ordering the pre-trial detention of anaccused. • Section 515(10)(

c) Cr. C. must not be interpreted narrowly (or applied sparingly) and should not be applied only in rare cases orexceptional circumstances or only to certain types of crimes. • The four circumstances listed in s. 515(10)(

c) Cr. C. are not exhaustive. • A court must not order detention automatically even where the four listed circumstances support such a result. • The court must instead consider all the circumstances of each case, paying particular attention to the four listed circumstances. • The question whether a crime is “unexplainable” or “unexplained” is not a criterion that should guide the analysis. • No single circumstance is determinative.

The justice must consider the combined effect of all the circumstances of each case todetermine whether detention is justified. • This involves balancing all the relevant circumstances. At the end of this balancing exercise, the ultimate question to be asked bythe court is whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

This is the test to be met under s.515(10)(c). • To answer this question, the court must adopt the perspective of the “public”, that is, the perspective of a reasonable person who isproperly informed about the philosophy of the legislative provisions, Charter values and the actual circumstances of the case.

However,this person is not a legal expert and is not able to appreciate the subtleties of the various defences that are available to the accused. • This reasonable person’s confidence in the administration of justice may be undermined not only if a court declines to orderdetention where detention is justified having regard to the circumstances of the case, but also if it orders detention where detention is notjustified. [15] Many cases decided before St Cloud stated that the case for detention under the tertiary ground is rare or exceptional.

In StCloud the Supreme Court of Canada, while recognizing that recourse to this ground for bail denial may not arise frequently, held that thetertiary ground is not necessarily limited to rare or exceptional circumstances, to the most heinous of crimes, or to certain classes ofcrimes (St Cloud at paras 5, 47, 49-54, 50, 87). [16] In applying the tertiary ground, the public is the reasonably informed person who accepts the fundamental underpinnings ofthe criminal justice system.

Again, quoting from St Cloud: [79] Thus, a reasonable member of the public is familiar with the basics of the rule of law in our country and with the fundamental

values of our criminal law, including those that are protected by the Charter. Such a person is undoubtedly aware of the importance ofthe presumption of innocence and the right to liberty in our society and knows that these are fundamental rights guaranteed by ourConstitution. He or she also expects that someone charged with a crime will be tried within a reasonable period of time, and is aware ofthe adage that “justice delayed is justice denied”: R. v. Trout, 2006 MBCA 96 , 205 Man. R. (2d) 277, at para. 15.

Finally, areasonable member of the public knows that a criminal offence requires proof of culpable intent (mens rea) and that the purpose ofcertain defences is to show the absence of such intent…. [80] In short, the person in question in s. 515(10)(

c) Cr. C. is a thoughtful person, not one who is prone to emotional reactions, whoseknowledge of the circumstances of a case is inaccurate or who disagrees with our society’s fundamental values. But he or she is not alegal expert familiar with all the basic principles of the criminal justice system, the elements of criminal offences or the subtleties ofcriminal intent and of the defences that are available to accused persons. [17] The four considerations mentioned in subsection 515(10)(

c) do not exhaust the relevant considerations in deciding whether itis necessary to detain the Accused on the tertiary ground. Examples of additional circumstances are provided at para 71 of St Cloud: … personal circumstances of the accused (age, criminal record, physical or mental condition, membership in a criminal organization,etc.) may also be relevant. The justice might also consider the status of the victim and the impact on society of a crime committed againstthat person. In some cases, he or she might also take account of the fact that the trial of the accused will be held at a much later date.

See also Lysyk at para 60. The Crown and defence information [18] Both the Crown and defence put forward information in support of their respective positions. As with most applications likethis, the hearing proceeded on the basis of information gathered by police. [19] In this case, the information consisted mainly of CCTV obtained from third parties, cell phone tower records, texts seizedfrom cell phones, autopsy results, and information derived from transcripts of interviews of the Accused and third parties.

The Crown’sinitial brief was written in such a way that it was difficult to separate information collected by police from the Crown’s or policesuppositions or theories, making it very difficult to assess the strength of the Crown’s case or the strength of information said todemonstrate the grounds for detention. After discussion the Crown filed a revised brief containing more detailed references toinformation obtained by the Crown and relied on to support its theories. [20] I must also consider any defences raised by the Accused if there appears to be any basis for them (St Cloud at para 59).

Thedefence responses in the present case were drawn from the police interviews of the Accused and a third party (identified in these reasonsas “MK”) contained in the Crown disclosure. [21] I recognize that the information from both sides concerning the apparent strength of the Crown’s case is untested and indeed,some of it may never be adduced at a trial. For example, the Accused might never take the stand, or witnesses might recant, change theirevidence or add nuances which could significantly change inferences. Some of the evidence, cell tower records for example, will requireexpert analysis and

interpretation in order for a trier of fact to understand its limitations. The most obvious example in this case is thepotential margin for error in using cell tower information in locating a specific mobile device at a specific time particularly in rural areaswhere towers are more widely spaced or congested urban areas where large buildings may interfere with reception. All of these potentialweaknesses must be considered in relation to the strength of this circumstantial case of murder. [22] I do not intend to set out all the Crown’s information. The most pertinent is as follows: (

a) On July 10, 2017 at 701 am, the Calgary police and fire department responded to reports of a motor vehicle on fire beside ahome under construction in the Sage Hill community in North West Calgary. This vehicle was a black Chevrolet. (

b) A witness later told police she observed at 630 am a white sport utility vehicle (SUV) pull into a parking lot nearby somenew homes under construction and a male get out of the passenger side. He then walked over to the black Chevrolet and crouched nearit. The white SUV made a u-turn and stopped nearby. A few minutes later the witness heard some popping noises just before seeing theblack Chevrolet engulfed in flames. There is some information that the stature of this male matches that of the co-accused in this case,TK. (

c) The white SUV and the black Chevrolet were captured on CCTV driving together at 651 am near the scene of the fire, andthe white SUV was captured on the same camera driving the opposite direction at 655 am at a high rate of speed. The informationpresented on the application includes photos of a white Jeep SUV rented by the Accused on May 23, 2017 and returned to the rentalagency on July 12, 2017. It appears identical to the white SUV in the CCTV footage (of course, there may be many such Jeep vehicles ofthe same colour on the road). (

d) The black Chevrolet was found to contain the bodies of Mr Pfeiffer, Ms Ear and Ms Fox. Autopsy results revealed that MrPfeiffer had been shot 7 times including wounds on or through his chest, thigh, head, left shoulder, back, left lower abdomen, and leftforearm. Ms Ear was found to have single gunshot wound to the back of her neck. Ms Fox was found to have multiple gunshot wounds toher body, 18 in total, including head, chest, shoulder, abdomen, groin, back, hand, buttocks, and thigh. The autopsy results indicate theseindividuals were shot to death, then burned in the car.

A forensic report indicates two guns were used to shoot these victims. Cartridgecasings were found in the car, and there were bullet holes in some parts of the interior of the car.

(

e) The black Chevrolet was registered to Hanock Afowerk. Police searched for him, including making a plea to the public. (

f) Afowerk’s body was discovered around 6 am on July 12, 2017 by some cyclists passing by, in a ditch along highway 22 near its intersection with highway 8 west of Calgary. An autopsy determined the cause of death to be multiple blunt force head injuries. Afowerk’s body displayed multiple injuries to his head, skull and face, including lacerations, abrasions, contusions, and fractures. There were two gunshot wounds to his back, and one that damaged both shoulders and spinal cord.

His body was found with his underpants down to his mid-thighs, his pants pulled down to his ankles, black tape wrapped around in 4 layers around his neck, black tape over one shoe, and zip ties around his left wrist. (

g) Investigation revealed that on July 7, 2017, the Accused and her co-accused TK rented a hotel room in a hotel in Calgary. According to a hearsay statement, on July 8, 2017 Afowerk was commissioned by a third party to produce false identification for the Accused. On the same day, CCTV captured the Accused with her rented Jeep SUV at a local gas station in Calgary. (

h) Text messages seized in the investigation indicate that on the morning of July 9, 2017, TK was planning for a “job” he intended to do later that day and solicited help for this endeavour including from the Accused, Pfeiffer, and another male believed to be a criminal associate of TK. (

i) Telephone records indicate that throughout the day of July 9, 2017, TK was in constant contact with the Accused and Pfeiffer. (

j) At about 545 pm on July 9, 2017, Afowerk called his roommate and asked her to return home as he needed his car to meet someone at 645 pm. The roommate arrived home at about 6 pm and could hear machinery running which indicated to her that Afowerk was making false identifications. Afowerk told her he would return in an hour and left in the black Chevrolet. (

k) Around 8 pm on July 9, 2017, Afowerk contacted a friend wanting $30,000. Afowerk placed 3 more calls to this friend that night, the last one at 959 pm. During one call, the friend could hear Afowerk telling someone on the other end of the phone “you are going to get the money”. At 1105 pm, Afowerk telephoned his roommate and told her to gather up his belongings and give them to his girlfriend. As far the roommate knew, he did not have a girlfriend.

At 1130 pm, the Accused and TK arrived at the home and picked up Afowerk’s property contained in bags, including his equipment for manufacturing false identifications and credit cards. The Accused told the roommate they had to leave as “Hanock is waiting”. (

l) Around midnight Afowerk called his roommate in a frantic state, saying he had to pay “some guys” and looking for money he said was missing from the bags. Afowerk last spoke to his roommate at 112 am on July 10, 2017. (

m) Around midnight, Pfeiffer left his residence, saying “their ride is here”. (

n) Around 5 am on July 10, 2017, Pfeiffer contacted a friend, saying he had to leave Calgary. The tone of his text messages was frantic, “Yo bro this is an emergency” and “Can you come get me. I need to get the Fuck out of here.” Around the same time he contacted a relative, saying things were not good. (

o) Sometime on July 10, 2017, the Accused, TK, and another man (DW) drove to Edmonton in the Accused’s rented Jeep, where they picked up MK. According to MK’s statement, the Accused told MK when they were travelling together after the murders that she overheard DW and TK say “they tried to rob a black guy and in the process three people saw their faces; [DW] shot the white guy, and [TK] shot the two girls”. (

p) The Accused, MK, TK and DW drove on to Saskatchewan. They dropped DW at the Saskatoon airport. TK gave DW his identification, which DW used to fly to Calgary and then on to Ethiopia via Frankfurt. (

q) Later on July 10, 2017 the Accused, TK and MK arrived in Moose Jaw SK. There, the Accused, together with TK and MK,

were caught on CCTV in a local retail store purchasing cleaning supplies. MK stated the three of them cleaned the Jeep with carpet cleaner, Lysol wipes and bleach purchased at that retailer. (

r) On July 11, 2017, the Accused contacted the rental agency and told them she wanted to switch out the Jeep because she didn’t like it and wanted a new vehicle with Saskatchewan license plates. (

s) The Jeep was returned to the rental agency on July 12, 2017. The Accused was driving the Jeep when it was returned, accompanied by a male and female (the Crown says, based on descriptions and other information that the male was TK and the female was MK). It was returned without floor mats and had white powdery spots and air fresheners in it. It also appeared to have ash in it. A later forensic search of the Jeep determined some parts of it had been damaged by a corrosive solution and the interior had the smell of an unknown cleaning solution. A rear passenger seatbelt was found to have Afowerk’s blood on it, and a piece of the rear floor area was found to have Afowerk’s DNA. (

t) Also in Moose Jaw on either or both of July 11 and 12, 2017, TK and the Accused burned clothing. The Accused cut her hair and dyed it red. The Accused and TK dropped off bags of Afowerk’s property with a third party. These bags were later found by investigators to contain Afowerk’s computer and printing equipment. The last identification on Afowerk’s printer ribbon was in the name of Christina Nguyen, and the photo on that identification is of the Accused. (

u) On July 13, 2017 the Accused arranged third persons to drive her, TK and MK to Redcliff Alberta in another vehicle. The driver was a person with whom the Accused had prior dealings. Prior to this group arriving at a local restaurant parking lot in Redcliff on July 14, 2017, CCTV captured a black Ford Escape vehicle arrive. The driver got out, never to return to it. At 152 am, the Accused and a male and female arrived, transferred bags into the Ford Escape, and left in the Ford Escape. A CCTV photo captured TK’s image driving the Ford Escape shortly before it departed the parking lot.

The Accused’s telephone records indicate she facilitated this vehicle (which the Crown says belonged to TK) to be driven to Redcliff. (

v) The trio of the Accused, TK and MK began to travel east in the Ford Escape. They drove into Quebec, then to Toronto. (

w) On July 19, 2017 TK was arrested in Toronto in the Ford Escape for unrelated offences. A later search of this vehicle located Afowerk’s drivers license and credit card both cut into small pieces, Afowerk’s cell phone, and a prescription bottle labelled with Mr Pfeiffer’s name on it. (

x) DW returned to Canada in the Fall 2017. He was arrested by Thunder Bay police in an unrelated drug investigation. He is presently incarcerated, having pled guilty to drug offences. DW has not been charged with offences arising from the foregoing although the Crown theory is that DW was involved. (

y) Following a Calgary Police Service media release and investigation attempting to locate the Accused, she was found (according to the Crown) “hiding” in a shower at her boyfriend’s residence. The Crown further says the Accused covered herself when entering that apartment to avoid CCTV.

Her wallet contained a drivers license in the name of another person (JH), with the same photo of the Accused as on Afowerk’s printer ribbon; a SIN card in the name of JH; an Ontario drivers license bearing the likeness of the Accused and Ontario health care card in the name of another person (HN); and a Calgary airport identification card with the Accused’s real name. The Accused’s cell phone was found to be completely erased. (

z) The Crown provided drawings showing and comparing the locations of the Accused’s two cell phones (one having an Alberta area code and one having a Saskatchewan area code), and the cell phones of TK, Afowerk, Pfeiffer and Ear during the evening of July 9 and morning of July 10, 2017.

As mentioned above, these would provide some indication of the location of these mobile devices during the times in question, and that some of the devices were in communication with other devices, but the degree of accuracy remains to be assessed through qualified opinion evidence. (aa) Cell phone tower data indicate Afowerk’s cell phone was near a particular autobody shop in an industrial area of SE Calgary during the evening of July 9 after about 638 pm and into the early morning of July 10, 2017. The last call from this phone was 1258 am.

The Accused’s AB cell phone and TK’s cell phone were in the same area at various times on the evening of July 9 and the early morning of July 10 th . The Crown’s theory is that Afowerk was detained at this autobody shop by TK and the Accused in the evening of July 9, 2017 and held there until he died sometime during the early hours of July 10, 2017.

(bb) Cell phone tower data indicate TK’s cell phone was in the area of Pfeiffer’s residence in the early hours of July 10, 2017, and, much later, near to the community of Sage Hill shortly after the burning black Chevrolet vehicle was reported. (cc) Cell phone tower data indicate the cell phones of Pfeiffer, the Accused and TK were located near the residence of Pfeiffer and Ear shortly after 2 am on July 10, 2017, and at 214 am, the Accused’s AB cell phone made a call to TK’s cell phone. (dd) Cell tower data indicate that shortly after, in the early morning hours of July 10, these devices moved to a rural area west of Calgary.

Shortly before 3 am, the Accused’s SK phone, TK’s phone and Pfeiffer’s phone were located about 10 km north along highway 22 from the place where Afowerk’s body was later discovered. Around 3 am, TK’s phone made a call to the Accused’s AB cell phone, which is then depicted about 1 km away. Records indicate the Accused’s AB cell phone was in the vicinity of the intersection of Highways 8 and 22 (near where Afowerk’s body was later found) shortly after 3 am, and that phone made a call from there to TK’s phone.

Shortly after, the Accused’s AB cell phone and TK’s cell phone were close together in west Calgary along the alignment of Highway 8/Glenmore Trail. Around this time, there are calls and text messages between the Accused’s AB cell phone and TK’s cell phone. (ee) Between approximately 530 and 6 am on July 10, the cell phones of the Accused, TK, Pfeiffer and Ear are shown near to each other, in the vicinity of the residence of Pfeiffer, Ear and Fox. The last communication to Ear’s phone is a call from TK’s phone, but Ear’s phone was apparently turned off.

Shortly after 6 am, Pfeiffer’s phone and TK’s phone are shown a short distance away in the East Fairview Industrial Park area, near to the same place within 4 minutes of each other, and a call came to TK’s phone from the Accused’s AB cell phone. The last call to Pfeiffer’s phone was at 609 am, and subsequent calls went to voice mail. (ff) Between 542 am and 622 am on July 10, the Accused’s AB cell phone and TK’s phone were in close proximity and there were calls back and forth between them.

Both phones were near to each other and in communication on Highway 2 (Deerfoot Trail) in South Calgary at 613 am, and then appear to have moved north on Highway 2, where they again were near to each other and communicated at 622 am.

TK’s phone was then further north at 633 am, near to the place where Afowerk’s vehicle was later found burning. (gg) The Crown suggests these cell tower data indicate that the Accused was present at and participated in Afowerk’s murder, participated in disposing of Afowerk’s body, saw the murders of Pfeiffer, Ear and Fox and participated in moving and attempting to dispose of their bodies. [ 23 ] Counsel for Accused provided additional information concerning the Accused’s statement to police.

She told police that she had been with two men, “TK” and another man who she identified by a street name (the information indicates this was DW). At one point, they, or one of them, had taken her rental vehicle and she was at another man’s place (this man was identified by a street name, whom I will refer to as “BT”). The Accused told MK during the trip following the deaths that the two men left her at BT’s. I was provided some information by defence that she arrived there at 2 am. The defence indicated that the Accused said the two men took her cell phone.

Counsel did not indicate whether the Accused stated to police when they took her phone, whether the Accused told police she had two cell phones or discussed which phone she says they took – or both. Counsel indicated that MK confirmed that TK and DW would not let the Accused have her cell phone to call her parents and threw it away. Again, I was provided no indication of when this was said to have occurred. The Accused told police she owed TK money, and TK told her she had to repay by picking up the bags at Afowerk’s home. She said she changed her appearance because TK made her do so.

She said TK had a gun and threatened to harm her family so she couldn’t call for help. [ 24 ] Counsel for the Accused noted it was not uncommon for the Accused to go to Moose Jaw SK. I note the rental agency’s Moose Jaw office had dealt with the Accused on previous occasions, supporting that she appeared to have a history of travelling in Moose Jaw on occasion. The defence also recalls that the Accused used her real name to rent the vehicle, and when she reached Toronto went to her boyfriend’s apartment. She submits this is inconsistent with flight from a crime.

The Accused’s father testified the Accused moved to Toronto in 2016. [ 25 ] The defence also notes the Accused was initially charged with an offence under s 342.01 of the Criminal Code , and was granted bail and lived with her father in compliance with her release conditions. When she was charged with murder she was again arrested and has been on remand ever since. Due to safety concerns, she was placed in remand in Edmonton, which causes difficulties for counsel (who is at the location of trial – Calgary) to review disclosure with her. She notes the Accused has no criminal record.

She observes that the reliability of the individuals from whom the Crown gathered information was not been tested. [ 26 ] The defence proposes stringent release conditions, as set out in their written materials filed November 20, 2016 and presented November 26, 2016.

In essence they propose a named surety (her father), no deposit, $50,000 to $100,000, and conditions including: living at her father’s residence; no visitors; remain at the residence at all times other than for medical emergencies, absences approved by her probation officer, or court appearances, professional appointments or religious services; wear a monitored and GPS enabled ankle bracelet provisioned and supplied by SafeTracks Canada and comply with all contractual conditions of the contract with SafeTracks; maintain a landline and answer the telephone when it rings; present to surveillance officers; and have no contact with a long list of individuals.

[ 27 ] In oral submissions the defence indicated the Accused’s mother could also be a co-surety, with up to another $100,000 (no deposit). [ 28 ] In oral submissions, the defence indicated that although the Accused’s father works each business day and lives alone, the Accused would not be left alone during the days because other family members would come to be with her. The father’s evidence was contradictory on this point. In cross-examination he said the Accused’s mother and family had not agreed to be with her during the day because “it would take time to be her company”.

He said her mother worked during the day, her sister works some days, and another sister goes to university during the days.

In re-examination, he said there will be other family members “babysitting” the Accused, and in response to a leading question, agreed that his former spouse is shutting down her business and so not working every day. [ 29 ] The proposed conditions do not provide for continuous monitoring by a family member. [ 30 ] The Accused’s father also testified that he did not know who the Accused’s friends were, he discussed with her family matters but they did not talk about her friends. [ 31 ] I heard testimony from a representative of SafeTracks. This company supplies and installs ankle bracelets.

The bracelets contain a GPS antenna which allows the unit to locate itself within an accuracy of 15 metres, using a network of satellites in the sky. The unit also contains a cellular device, through which it transmits its location to a ULC approved monitoring station. The cell connection also provides for voice communication between the monitoring station and the wearer.

An “app” or other software access is available to authorized users which enables them to see the location of the bracelet or where it has been (a trail of “breadcrumbs”). [ 32 ] The bracelet can generate a tamper alarm if someone attempts to cut it off; a low charge alarm if the user fails or refuses to charge the battery; and an alarm if the wearer leaves any pre-selected inclusion zone or enters any pre-selected exclusion zone. In the event of an alarm, the monitoring facility has protocols for contacting others. I heard the onboard alarm during a demonstration in the Court proceeding.

It is moderately loud. [ 33 ] The GPS unit is occasionally prone to GPS drift of up to a couple hundred yards. It usually corrects itself within 2 – 3 minutes. In such a case, it may appear the bracelet has left the required inclusion zone. In that event, the monitoring centre contacts one of two representatives of SafeTracks, either the witness or “Joanne”. In the event of drift, SafeTracks would then first call the house where the Accused is supposed to be or the Accused through the voice communication onboard the unit.

The witness referred to this as a 3 minute buffer for alerts except strap tampering, and the reasoning behind it is that SafeTracks does not want to call the police if the cause of the alarm was satellite drift. He testified that any protocol can be varied depending on the Court’s requirements. [ 34 ] There was no evidence of who operates the satellites or whether the accuracy is guaranteed or tested from time to time. If the satellite tracking is not operative, the unit includes a back-up means of locating the bracelet by triangulating among cell towers.

That provides a far less accurate location. [ 35 ] There was no evidence of the training or qualification of the witness or Joanne to assess satellite drift, nor of any protocols to ensure the SafeTrack representatives are available 24 hours a day or to provide any guaranteed response time for service. There is no evidence that SafeTracks is similar to an underwriters approved lab engaged in monitoring private alarm systems. [ 36 ] Alarm events, after screening by SafeTracks in the case of GPS drift, are called in by the monitoring station to 911.

The account can be configured to have the monitoring station send email alerts to specified individuals, such as the investigating officer. SafeTracks does not have a relationship with the City of Calgary police service to use the bracelets for monitoring compliance with bail conditions. The Crown provided evidence from the police of a lack of resources to participate in a program using these devices. [ 37 ] The representative testified that the ankle band recommended by SafeTracks contains steel bands, as well as fibre optics to detect an attempt to sever it.

On one occasion, a wearer with such a band was able to cut the bracelet off and escape. He has not been found. I was not provided any test data about the security of the band and its connection by screws to the device. I was provided anecdotal evidence from the witness that he tried to cut one off of himself and was unable to cut it within 20 minutes. [ 38 ] If there is some law enforcement standard to which these devices are made, I was not told about it.

If there is some industry standard to assess potential satellite drift, I was not told about it. [ 39 ] Anyone who participates in the digital age knows that GPS and cellular reception are not perfect, and can depend on where the device is located or under what covers. I did not hear any evidence about that, other than the example that signals may be lost in underground facilities like underground parking. [ 40 ] I accept that the bracelet likely provides some deterrent effect.

I am not persuaded that it would deter someone who otherwise is minded to flee, because I am not persuaded that the bracelet could not be removed and discarded before authorities were able to arrive, just as occurred in the example cited in the evidence. And as I discuss below, the Accused is the sort of person whom I would expect to try to have such thoughts and make such a plan. The primary ground [ 41 ] The Accused has no prior record. She complied with her release conditions, in relation to a far less serious offence.

During the time of her release, she probably knew she was under suspicion for involvement in the deaths. Notwithstanding, she did not flee. Also, since being placed on remand in October 2017 she has engaged with programming and received an indication of support and endorsement form the Elizabeth Fry Society who have worked with her while in remand. [ 42 ] The Accused has family in Calgary. Both parents are in Calgary, and two sisters.

It is obvious from her father’s testimony that she did not share information with her father about her friends or activities. [ 43 ] I do not have much information about how close she is with other members of her family. For example, I received no

information to suggest that when the Accused visited Calgary before the events in question, she stayed with family. To the contrary, the Crown provided information, backed by CCTV and banking records, that the Accused and TK rented a room at a local hotel on July 7, 2017. [ 44 ] The Accused has no apparent stable employment history. When arrested she was carrying, among other things, an ID card identifying her as an Air Canada representative at the Calgary airport, yet she does not work or live in Calgary.

The Crown asserts she has an itinerant lifestyle which has included criminal activity such as providing hard drugs or exploiting sex trade workers. On the evidence of her father (and an Equifax report obtained by the Crown), she appears to have been living in Toronto for about 1.5 years prior to her arrest but there is no information of what she was doing in Toronto. I did not receive any information that her relationship in Toronto was stable or ongoing.

The contrasting evidence that the Accused rented an apartment in Moose Jaw under one of her aliases in the spring 2017 belies claims of stability and a residence in Toronto. [ 45 ] The Crown also points out she received substantial amounts of funds into her bank accounts and paid out substantial amounts, during the period November 2016 to June 2017. The Crown says it is not aware of any employment which could generate such funds. [ 46 ] I received submissions from defence that her family, as well as some of her friends, are supportive of her and think highly of her honesty, empathy and work ethic.

Some of that information is at odds with the Crown’s information about the Accused’s involvement in the drug trade, by selling crack cocaine to a friend in Moose Jaw; the Crown’s hearsay information that the Accused at one time (2016) was involved in the sex trade and was seen beating one of her sex trade workers; her association with TK in the present case; and her numerous aliases and false identifications. [ 47 ] Overall, given her use of aliases and possession of false documents, it is not surprising that there are conflicting perceptions about her honesty and reliability. [ 48 ] Her jeopardy has changed drastically now that she has been charged.

If she is convicted, she faces far greater penalties – mandatory life imprisonment for murder with carrying parole eligibility depending on the degree, and up to life imprisonment for being an accessory after the fact ( Criminal Code , s 240). Although the range of sentence is wide for being an accessory ( R v Hubley , 2017 NSSC 124 and authorities cited therein), the offence is serious and the punishment severe ( R v Wisdom , [1992] O.J.

No. 3110 per Watt, J as he then was). [ 49 ] There is strong information that the Accused interfered with the administration of justice by interfering with the detection of crime and the identification of offenders, again by burning evidence or destroying it by cleaning the rental vehicle. The accused changed her appearance during the flight from Calgary. Telephone records indicate (circumstantially) that she helped arrange the vehicle switch that occurred in Redcliff. When she was arrested, she was found in possession of many false identifications.

The Crown’s information shows she had at least 2 aliases, and either had or was cultivating the third alias of Christina Nguyen. When she was arrested, she had a cell phone in her possession and the data on it was completely wiped. [ 50 ] She claims that she was compelled by threats from TK to assist in destroying evidence or changing her appearance and went home rather than flee.

While these issues will undoubtedly be part of the trial, I must assess the risk well before the trial on incomplete information. [ 51 ] In my opinion, given the information of her past criminal associations and activities, her behaviour involving false identifications, changing her appearance, and substantially interfering with the administration of justice by destroying evidence of murder and helping TK flee, and her jeopardy in these proceedings, she is very likely to flee either to escape these proceedings or escape pressure which might be brought to bear on her by others. [ 52 ] The proposed conditions, while very stringent, do not adequately protect in this case.

The information indicates she has shown herself able to rationalize flight, disguise and deceit. She may have sources of funds to assist in fleeing. Her father has sufficient equity in his home to support the surety amount and he is willing to commit it all in support of his daughter, but I am not satisfied that the prospect of causing her father (or her mother if she were a co-surety) significant financial harm in the event of breach of her conditions will deter her. Her father believes he can control her, but his cross-examination indicates a lack of familiarity with her activities.

He will not be present during ordinary business days as he runs a business outside his home. Evidence is lacking on the ability of other family members to control her or provide coverage so that she is supervised all the time. The proposed bracelet is likely only to ensure that the authorities are alerted after she has successfully fled. [ 53 ] The Accused has not discharged her onus on the primary ground.

The secondary ground [ 54 ] The Crown argues that the Accused is uncooperative and obstructive with police and has engaged in unsavoury or criminal conduct in the past. [ 55 ] The Accused was not obliged to cooperate with police in the examples provided by the Crown. [ 56 ] Although there are reports of some recent activity in providing drugs to others, those are limited to the area of Moose Jaw. [ 57 ] I am persuaded that detention is not justified on the secondary ground.

She probably won’t be dealing drugs, exploiting sex trade workers, or tampering with witnesses if on release in Calgary as the Crown suggests. The real risks are that she will not comply with her conditions and disappear, or that her release would significantly erode the public confidence in the administration of justice. The tertiary ground [ 58 ] The apparent strength of the case requires consideration of the quality, and to some extent, the quantity of the evidence available to the Crown to prove its case, and take cognizance of any defence(

s) advanced by the accused ( Manasseri at para 97 ).

[59] The Crown’s case for murder of Afowerk is based on primarily on circumstantial evidence, including the cell tower evidenceand post-offence conduct. [60] The Crown’s case need not be unassailable in order for detention to be ordered under the tertiary ground. A circumstantialcase may qualify.

In the case of R v Hall, 2002 SCC 64, which dealt with the constitutionality of the tertiary ground, the accused wasdetained under the tertiary ground and the case against the accused involved circumstantial evidence, being footprint evidence fromwhich certain inferences had to be drawn with respect to the identity of the killer. [61] Circumstantial evidence must be assessed on the standard in R v Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33. However, not every piece ofevidence must be only capable of a single inference.

Evidence must be assessed in context. [62] Post-offence conduct of flight or destruction of evidence might be relevant to the live issue of identity of the perpetrator orthat the Accused knew she had at least committed a culpable act (R v Barton, 2017 ABCA 216 at paras 60-61; 66; R v Keror, 2017ABCA 273 at paras 55, 61, 67-68; R v Jacquard, [1997] 1 SCR 314, at para 45; R v Ménard, , [1998]2 S.C.R. 109). It is not relevant and therefore not admissible if it supports competing inferences that are equally as persuasive as theinference sought to be drawn (R v White, 2011 SCC 13 at paras 36-38, 165-169).

If admissible, this evidence may be considered in thecontext of all the evidence, and the trier of fact is to determine whether that conduct is related to the commission of the offence asopposed to being explicable by reference to something else (Barton at paras 60-61, 67). [63] The intention needed for murder under s 229 of the Criminal Code is present when a person who causes the death of a humanbeing means to cause him bodily harm that he knows is likely to cause his death, and is reckless whether death ensues or not.

In R vRodgerson, 2015 SCC 38 the Court stated at para 19 that the requisite intention can be inferred in appropriate cases from the nature andextent of the injuries of the deceased and the degree of force required to inflict them. [64] It is not for the bail justice to judge the case, though he or she must consider the apparent strength of the case includingpotential defences. Given the information provided, it would be open to the trier of fact to infer that the evidence, as a whole, indicatedthat the Accused participated as a party to the offence of murder, having regard to all material evidence including: (

a) forensic evidence of the nature of Afowerk’s injuries and cause of death, (

b) the Accused’s pre-offence involvement including renting a room with TK, TK’s search for people to assist with a “job”, andarranging a meeting with Afowerk and his apparent abduction at that time, (

c) the use of her rented vehicle during the offences, as appears from CCTV footage and DNA evidence, (

d) the probable location, and extensive use, of her AB cell phone during the events, (

e) the probable location of her SK cell phone in the early morning hours of July 10, 2017, (

f) her involvement in picking up Afowerk’s possessions from his home late on July 9, 2017 and her statement that they mustgo because “Hanock is waiting”, (

g) at this early stage, the apparent dis-proportionality between the Accused’s extensive and prolonged after the fact conduct(destroying evidence, helping to arrange TK’s vehicle to be brought as transportation, and changing her appearance) and the explanationor justification asserted by her. [65] I consider the Crown’s case would be strong even before opinion evidence is tendered to show the degree of error in the celltower method of locating the mobile devices.

There is sufficient information to discern patterns from the cell maps indicating asignificant degree of coordination or proximity between the movement of TK’s device and the Accused’s device, and as the morningcarried on, Pfieffer’s and Ear’s devices as well.

The patterns are quite significant when one also considers the location of Afowerk’sdevice, and the locations where his body and those of the other victims were later found. [66] In considering cell tower evidence, I am mindful that there must be a basis for the reasonable inference that the accountowners were actually in possession of their respective mobile device(

s) during the events in question. Here, the mobile devices weremoving around and frequently communicating. The Court need not consider unreasonable or speculative inferences as to who was usingthem. Today, personal electronic devices typically contain a large amount of sensitive and private information.

I doubt that a Court wouldentertain, without some air of reality, theories that an adult’s personal device was moving around without its normal user, such as that itwas lost, stolen, loaned or taken away. [67] There is nothing to suggest that TK, Pfeiffer and Ear were not in possession of and using their respective devices. At this earlystage, there is some suggestion from information gathered by the Crown from MK or the Accused that at some point or points in time,TK took the Accused’s phone and vehicle from her. I was not provided clear information of when these were said to occur.

There is alsoa suggestion that TK and DW left the Accused with BT. Apparently the Accused’s statement indicated she was left at BT’s place at 2

am. Neither side provided me any information concerning when the Accused told police she left BT’s place, if she told them anything about that. [ 68 ] I was not provided the Accused’s or MK’s statements to police which are said to contain the explanations which may raise doubt that the Accused participated in the murder of Afowerk.

It may be that the information is so vague or implausible, particularly in the light of the Accused’s pre-offence participation, her flight with TK, and her participation in arranging for TK’s vehicle to be brought to Redcliff, that it is not reasonably capable of raising a doubt. [ 69 ] I was not provided sufficient information to conclude that the case is one which from all appearances at the present hearing the Crown will be able to prove.

At this point, I cannot ignore the potential that the Accused might be able, at the trial, to raise an alternative reasonable inference that she did not possess her mobile device(

s) at the critical times or may testify that she was at BT’s during material times, and some or each of these might be sufficient to raise doubt that she participated in the murder. Nevertheless, considering all the information provided at this time, in my opinion, the Crown’s case is strong that the Accused was a party to Afowerk’s murder. [ 70 ] An accessory after the fact to an offence is one who, knowing that a person has been a party to the offence, receives, comforts or assists that person for the purpose of enabling that person to escape ( Criminal Code , s 23).

The principal offender need not be charged or convicted of the offence in order to establish the offence of being an accessory after the fact ( Criminal Code , s 23.1). Therefore, the fact TK is not formally charged in these proceedings with the murders of Pfeiffer, Ear or Fox does not preclude the conviction of the Accused if the Crown proves these murders. [ 71 ] The Crown’s case is strong on the Accused being an accessory after the fact to the murders of Pfeiffer, Ear and Fox. Applying the method in Rodgerson discussed earlier, the forensic reports indicate these individuals were murdered.

There was obviously nothing accidental or unintentional about their deaths. The Crown’s information strongly suggests that TK was a party to some or all of those murders, whether alone or with help. As mentioned, the Crown has information that MK will say the Accused admitted to her that she overheard TK and DW say they killed the man and two women because they saw them rob the other guy, which provides a basis to find the Accused knew or was wilfully blind to the specific offences.

There is also circumstantial cell tower evidence that the Accused was nearby and in communication with TK when these three individuals were probably murdered and shortly afterward. The Accused assisted TK in fleeing and destroying or attempting to destroy evidence. [ 72 ] The Accused asserts duress in response to the charges for being an accessory after the fact, but I have serious doubts that defence would prevail. The Accused travelled with TK and MK for many days. Was there a safe avenue of escape by contacting law enforcement and seeking help?

On the information provided at this point it is not likely that Accused, evaluated on the modified subjective standard described in R v Ryan , 2013 SCC 3 , could establish that during the two days she was present in Moose Jaw she could not go to the police and seek protection for her and her family. [ 73 ] The gravity of the offences is measured objectively on the basis of the maximum and any minimum sentence permitted or required on conviction ( Manasseri at para 98 ). [ 74 ] Murder is among the most serious of offences, carrying a minimum life sentence. [ 75 ] Being an accessory after the fact carries a maximum life sentence ( Criminal Code , s 240), which indicates it is one of most serious crimes under our criminal law ( Wisdom at para 25).

In Wisdom , Justice Watt observed among other things at paras 25-30 that being an accessory after the fact to a crime is “an offence which constitutes an interference with the administration of justice” and “interferes with the investigation of crime and the detection of offenders such that the due administration of justice is defeated in the event of success”, and that “those who set out with such a purpose shall be punished, and severely”. [ 76 ] The circumstances surrounding the circumstances of the offence are not closed.

St Cloud provides examples: [61] Without drawing up an exhaustive list of possible circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence that might be relevant under s. 515(10) (c), I will mention the following: the fact that the offence is a violent, heinous or hateful one, that it was committed in a context involving domestic violence, a criminal gang or a terrorist organization, or that the victim was a vulnerable person (for example, a child, an elderly person or a person with a disability). If the offence was committed by several people, the extent to which the accused participated in it may be relevant.

The aggravating or mitigating factors that are considered by courts for sentencing purposes can also be taken into account. [ 77 ] Afowerk was captured, held against his will, and eventually restrained, beaten severely around his head, and shot three times (perhaps after he died). There were 4 layers of black duct tape wrapped around his neck. There were two interlocked zip ties around his left wrist. There was black duct tape over his right shoe. His pants and underwear were pulled down. [ 78 ] The crime against Afowerk was violent, heinous and terrifying.

The forensic evidence discloses a strong case of murder as opposed to manslaughter. It was also an appalling public display of this violence. His remains symbolized torture and execution, and leaving his remains in a ditch near a busy highway where they would be soon found by the public was likely to instill fear and concern among the community. [ 79 ] The crimes against Pfeiffer, Ear and Fox were equally atrocious public displays of terror.

Unless it eventually transpires that the Accused was at BT’s around 630 am, she would have seen the manner of at least some of these murders and the sickening manner in which they were left on public display in a burning vehicle. But as far as I can discern from the Crown’s brief, it is not alleged that she participated in or had the chance to control these events.

Without in any way diminishing the significance of the harm flowing the high degree of atrocity committed against Mr Pfeiffer, Ms Ear and Ms Fox, including the profound hurt which their family and friends must feel and the damage to the community, I have not considered these circumstances in assessing the tertiary ground because the Crown has not shown a strong case that the Accused could have done anything about these things. Nevertheless, her participation in destroying the evidence aggravates her role in the events.

[ 80 ] As to the fourth factor, there will be cases in which a claim of mitigating or aggravating circumstances appears to have sufficient merit for the justice to consider in determining whether the accused is liable for a potentially “lengthy term of imprisonment”. As far as possible, therefore, this fourth circumstance is assessed subjectively, unlike the second circumstance (the gravity of the offence) which is assessed objectively ( St Cloud at para 65 ). [ 81 ] If the Accused is convicted of murder, the life prison term is mandatory.

If convicted of being an accessory, her sentence would likely be lengthy even after taking her claim of feeling threatened into account (see Hubley and authorities cited therein). [ 82 ] In my view, the criteria indicate that the public confidence in the administration of justice would be seriously eroded if Ms Liao were released. [ 83 ] Someone who was capable of the crimes alleged against Ms Liao and the circumstances in which she allegedly committed them is a dangerous person who probably has no regard for the rules by which the community lives together or the well-being of fellow residents.

The public would understand that. [ 84 ] The public would also understand the values on which our criminal justice system is based, including the presumption of innocence. They would understand that the Crown case need not be unassailable, but ought to be substantial. [ 85 ] The public would insist that in such cases, the matter be tried in a timely way. Ms Liao’s trial will commence about two years after her detention on the murder charge, exposing her to the prospect of lost liberty which never can be recovered if she is acquitted.

The period from charge to trial is not excessive for a serious case such as this. [ 86 ] Ms Liao is also a serious flight risk, as I have found. Even if she were not, there is at least a non-trivial risk that she can and will disappear to escape trial or as a result of pressure by others even if under stringent conditions. The public would expect that these serious charges should be tried, not defeated by flight. I recognize that Ms Liao claims to have been threatened into participating in destroying evidence and changing appearances.

The truth and reliability of that explanation cannot be finally assessed until a trial can be held. In the meantime, who is to bear the risk of harm occasioned by the uncertainty and doubt over her trustworthiness? The Accused or the public? The Accused has shown herself to be someone who has made some very poor choices in her lifestyle and associations, having the capacity and a history of using deceit in relation to her identity.

In my opinion, a fair minded member of the public would lose confidence in a system that would leave the risk of flight on the public given the heinous nature of Mr Afowerk’s murder and its public display, and the serious information that she has interfered with bringing the murderer(

s) of Mr Pfieffer, Ms Ear and Ms Fox to justice. [ 87 ] I think the public would be less concerned, in these circumstances, with the inconvenience of the Accused being detained in Edmonton and her counsel being located at the place of trial, or the additional hardships in preparing for trial from remand. Those do not not override the necessity for detention. [ 88 ] The Accused has not satisfied me that detention is not justified on the primary and tertiary grounds. Heard on the 18 th day of October and the 26 th day of November, 2018. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 3 rd day of December, 2018. J.T.

Eamon J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Heather Morris for the Crown Susan Karpa for the Accused