Wu v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 ABQB 902

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Wu v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 ABQB 902 Date: 20191126 Docket: 1903 20166 Registry: Edmonton Between: Weimin Wu Applicant - and - Attorney General of Canada and Correctional Service of Canada Respondent _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Mr. Justice V.O. Ouellette _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] On October 2, 2019, Weimin Wu [Mr.

Wu or Applicant] filed a “Notice of Motion of a Writ of Habeas Corpus ” with an Affidavit, sworn August 14, 2019, as endorsed on the Notice of Motion along with a stand-alone “Exhibit A” [Application], and a Fee Waiver. [ 2 ] The Applicant is currently an inmate detained at the Bowden Institution, which is a medium security prison operated by Correctional Service of Canada. [ 3 ] Mr.

Wu’s Originating Application reads, in part: Basis for this Claim: • “The powerless victim has been victimized by the powerful perpetrator on May 10, 2019 by being illegally and egregiously kidnapped from the minimum-security Stony Mountain Institution Unit 7 to the medium-security Bowden Institution on June 7, 2019 all because the perpetrator’s malice and spite to inflict Chinese citizens under its control due to the ongoing political spat between Canada and China”.

• “The powerful perpetrator justifies its monster’s evil deed by only invoking and relying its controlled criminal’s deceitful andmisleading lies alleging fantasized inappropriate behavior arbitrarily projected on the victim.” Remedy sought: • “Order the perpetrator to immediately return/transfer the powerless victim to a minimum-security prison, preferably B-16 inQuebec or any other minimum-security prison near Montreal in Quebec of Canada”; • “Order the perpetrator to pay damages to the victim for his over 30 days of the ultimate harm and infliction in the hole/segregationUnit 5 of Stony Mountain Institution in an amount this honorable judge deem enough to demonstrate all nations around the world thatthis honorable judge does not tolerate anyone who despises the rule of law.” [4] In this Application, Mr.

Wu fundamentally alleges that the acting Warden [A/Warden] initially changed his minimum-security classification at Stony Mountain Institution, Manitoba to administrative segregation/placement on May 10, 2019; and ultimatelyto medium-security level, when he was transferred to Bowden Institution, Alberta on June 6, 2019. [5] The stand-alone “Exhibit A,” which was not specifically referenced in Mr. Wu’s Affidavit, was “presented” along with theApplication. It contains a Correctional Service Canada [CSC] document described as “Decision 234” of June 6, 2019. The contents ofthis CSC document include the: (

i) reasons for placing Mr. Wu in administrative segregation, pursuant to the Corrections andConditional Release Act, SC 1992, c 20 [CCRA], s 31(3)(a); (ii) Reintegration Action Plan; (iii) Recommendation from theAdministrative Segregation Review Board; and (iv) the Final Decision of the A/Warden of the Stony Mountain Institution in theprovince of Manitoba, Canada [Decision]. [6] In the First Decision – indexed as: 2019 ABQB 796 – I requested Mr. Wu to provide written submissions on specific issuesidentified in that decision (at para 21). [7] In compliance with that direction, Mr.

Wu filed his Written Submission on October 30, 2019. II. Issues [8] The issues identified by this Court that are for discussion at this second stage of the CPN7 procedure are: i. Since the reclassification and transfer Decision being challenged was made by the A/Warden at Stony MountainInstitution, Manitoba, does the Alberta Court have jurisdiction to conduct a habeas corpus review of the Decision? ii. What specific information forms the basis for Mr. Wu’s claim that the A/Warden’s Decision was unreasonable? iii. What specific information forms the basis for Mr.

Wu’s claim that the A/Warden’s Decision was procedurallyunfair?; and iv. Given established jurisprudence to the contrary, can this Court consider Mr. Wu’s civil claim for damages in anapplication for the writ of habeas corpus? III. Discussion Issue 1 – Jurisdiction [9] Mr.

Wu submits that, “Alberta Court [has] jurisdiction to conduct this habeas corpus review of the Decision made by theA/Warden of Stoney Mountain Institution, Manitoba because the physical deed/action/harm underway being inflicted upon [him] isbeing perpetrated in Alberta” (sic). [10] The central question as to whether or not this Court (in Alberta) has the jurisdiction to consider Mr. Wu’s habeas corpusapplication has arisen in this CPN7 assessment because both the initial decision to change Mr.

Wu’s minimum-security classification atStony Mountain Institution, Manitoba to administrative segregation/placement on May 10, 2019 and ultimately to medium-security level,before his transfer to Bowden Institution, Alberta on June 6, 2019 were made by the A/Warden of an Institution in the province ofManitoba. [11] While the local accessibility of habeas corpus is of paramount importance, it is unclear from the existing jurisprudence whatthis principle implies for an administrative decision made by a federal administrative decision-maker operating in a federal institutionthat is located in a different province or jurisdiction outside of where an habeas corpus application is actually filed: R v Gamble, (SCC), [1988] 2 SCR 595 at paras 47-54, 89 NR 161 ; Mission Institution v Khela, 2014 SCC 24, at paras 47, 62,[2014] 1 SCR 502; and May v Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82 at para 70.

See also Rule 3.68(2)(

a) of the Alberta Rules of Court,Alta Reg 124/2010. [12] Nevertheless, assuming without deciding the legal issue flagged above that this Court has the jurisdiction to consider Mr.Wu’s habeas corpus application, I proceed to consider whether there is any validity to his Application. Issue 2 – Is the A/Warden’s Decision unreasonable? [13] In his written arguments, Mr. Wu submits that the impugned Decision was unreasonable because “the ‘information’ [used] to

justify [the A/Warden’s] egregious decision was but lie-based fiction and fraud and fantasy without any evidence to prove otherwise.”Further, the Applicant argues that even if the information relied upon by the A/Warden was true, he – i.e. Mr.

Wu – “acted within thelaw because it is not illegal, inappropriate, or immoral [to] seek relationship with another human being.” [14] The Supreme Court of Canada has indicated in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47, [2008] 1 SCR 190, that: Reasonableness is a deferential standard animated by the principle that underlies the development of the two previous standards ofreasonableness: certain questions that come before administrative [decision-makers] do not lend themselves to one specific, particularresult. Instead, they may give rise to a number of possible, reasonable conclusions....

A court conducting a review for reasonablenessinquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes....[Reasonableness] is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-makingprocess. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible inrespect of the facts and law. [15] The written reasons contained in the Decision of the A/Warden demonstrate the basis or grounds for the changes to Mr.

Wu’sdetention level. [16] The Decision reveals that prison officials received information which indicates: “Mr. Wu has been approaching other inmatesseeking [predatory] relationships [that] these individuals are not comfortable with...” [17] Following investigation, the A/Warden issued the impugned Decision that changed Mr.

Wu’s security classification level;and as such, resulted in the deprivation of his residual liberty. [18] The Decision indicated, among other things, that: “Given Wu’s continued refusal to integrate into an open population, theCMT [Case Management Team] is pursuing an involuntary transfer to another site to alleviate segregation status.” [19] The Decision also confirmed that while some other Institutions – such as Saskatchewan Penitentiary medium security, GrandCache medium security and Drumheller medium security – were unwilling to accept Mr.

Wu, the Bowden Institution in Alberta wasprepared to take him in. [20] Finally, the Decision of the A/Warden of Stony Mountain Institution, Manitoba stated, inter alia: Mr. Wu, in order to facilitate your placement/transfer to Bowden Institution, you will be released from segregation effective 2019-06-06. You were placed in administrative segregation under

Section 31 3 (

A) due to your predatory behavior towards other inmates at Unit 7.The CMT notes that you were recently reassessed from minimum to medium security and approved for involuntary transfer to BowdenInstitution. In addition, you have been nominated and approved for the June intra-regional bus transfer.

As such, your release isrecommended to facilitate transfer/placement. [21] Based on existing case law and my review of the materials filed by the Applicant – which included the Decision of theA/Warden of the Stoney Mountain Institution, Manitoba – I am satisfied that the impugned Decision met the requirements prescribed, inDunsmuir at para 47, for the assessment of the reasonableness of an administrative decision. Issue 3 – Is the A/Warden’s Decision procedurally unfair? [22] Mr.

Wu submits that the A/Warden’s Decision was procedurally unfair “because there was absolutely nothing to authenticateor corroborate [the decision-maker’s] lie-based ‘information’ (received from vicious and deceptive convicted criminals) upon which [theimpugned Decision] was made.” [23] The purpose of the duty of procedural fairness “is to ensure that administrative decisions are made using a fair and openprocedure, appropriate to the decision being made and its statutory, institutional, and social context, with an opportunity for thoseaffected by the decision to put forward their views and evidence fully and have them considered by the decision-maker”: Baker vCanada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at paras 21-22, 174 DLR (4th) 193 (emphasis added). [24] In that regard, I observe that, on page 1 of Decision 234, the A/Warden wrote that over a period of time – starting in August2018, when the Applicant made up a campaign poster offering females inappropriate services – the Applicant was counselled sometimein December 2018, “for being inappropriate to other inmates” (sic).

The A/Warden also indicated in the written reasons that theApplicant “has been warned multiple times and has received 5-minor charges since his arrival” at the Stony Mountain Institution.

Inaddition, the A/Warden expressly indicated that “[all] procedural safeguards were provided to the inmate upon placement insegregation.” [25] Further, on page 4 of Decision 234, the A/Warden stated, inter alia, that the “reasoning for Wu’s placement was discussedwith him” following which he denied the information gathered through investigation as being “framed by inmates in his house, who havebeen harassing him about his sexual preference.” [26] Also noteworthy is that in a

section of the Decision, captioned “Regional Review,” the Applicant was advised of his right to areview process, including the provision of “the opportunity to submit written representations to the Regional Segregation review Boardfor consideration.” [27] I am satisfied that the procedural safeguards afforded Mr. Wu – in the context of Stony Mountain Institution in Manitoba as acorrectional institution – was satisfactory and met the requirements of procedural fairness, as recognized by the Supreme Court ofCanada in Baker.

Issue 4 – Claim for Damages [ 28 ] Mr.

Wu indicates in his Written Submissions that this Court “can consider [his] civil claim for damage/harm inflicted upon him in this application for writ of habeas corpus because the two issues are inseparable parts of the respondent’s one single harm inflicted on [him].” [ 29 ] On this issue, I reiterate that it is a generally acknowledged principle of law that the only relief available to an applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is release from unlawful detention and “damages do not flow from habeas corpus ”: Hamm v Canada (Attorney General) , 2019 ABQB 247 at paras 264-265 .

The current jurisprudence asserts that habeas corpus “is incompatible with, and different from, other civil processes. It has no relevance to civil proceedings between the detained person and the involved state actor”: Ibid at para 80. IV. Disposition [ 30 ] Mr. Wu’s application is dismissed, per Rule 3.68 (CPN7, para 3(c)). [ 31 ] Mr. Wu is neither entitled to cost nor damages. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 26 th day of November, 2019. V.O. Ouellette J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Weimin Wu Self-Represented Litigant None For the Respondent