Perrin v Mason, 2019 ABQB 933

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Perrin v Mason, 2019 ABQB 933 Date: 20191205 Docket: 1901 16778 Registry: Calgary Between: Troy Perrin Plaintiff - and - Jody Mason, John Prowse and the Government of Alberta Defendants _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Associate Chief Justice J.D. Rooke _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] On November 27, 2019, Troy Perrin filed a Statement of Claim naming Master Jody Mason, Master John Prowse and the Government of Alberta (“GOA”) as Defendants.

The Statement of Claim was brought to my attention to be reviewed by the Court as an Apparently Vexatious Application or Proceeding (“AVAP”) under Civil Practice Note No. 7 (“CPN7”). I am designated to receive and review potential CPN7 processes in the Judicial Centre of Calgary. I have reviewed the Statement of Claim and conclude that it is an AVAP that should be reviewed under the CPN7 document-based “show cause” procedure. [ 2 ] In addition, I have reviewed Mr. Perrin’s litigation conduct to date and have determined that it exhibits certain indicia of abusive litigation. Therefore, I find that Mr.

Perrin should be made subject to interim court access restrictions. II. CPN7 [ 3 ] CPN7 lays out a process that allows the Court to manage a claim that, on its face, appears to be unmeritorious, has no prospect of success or is otherwise abusive and vexatious.

CPN7 is intended to provide a timely, proportionate and cost-effective response to litigants: Unrau v National Dental Examining Board , 2018 ABQB 874 (“ Unrau #1 ”). [ 4 ] If, on an initial review by the Court, a pleading appears to be unmeritorious, to have no prospect of success or to be otherwise abusive and vexatious, the Court issues a first written decision that enumerates the apparent issues identified as a potential basis to apply

Rule 3.68 and to strike out the pleading. The party who filed the pleading is then given an opportunity to provide the Court and the other parties to the litigation, within 14 days, with a written submission not to exceed ten pages in length that responds to those issues and demonstrates why the pleading is a legitimate claim and should be permitted to continue. [ 5 ] CPN7 is not for “close calls”. The Court intervenes by this mechanism where the pleading is a “clearer case of abuse” and the defects in question are “apparent on the face of the pleading”: Unrau #1 at paras 22, 24 .

This process usually has a very narrow focus and operates to examine a single document: Ubah v Canadian Natural Resources Limited , 2019 ABQB 347 at paras 24-48 ( Ubah #2 ). There are exceptions, however. For instance, the Court may examine other documents in the same proceeding that are related to the suspect filing ( Ubah #2 at para 35 ), or documents and records that are evidence that the AVAP is an attempt to litigate an issue that already has been decided ( Ubah #2 at para 45 ). III.

The Statement of Claim [ 6 ] The Statement of Claim references an attached typewritten document, the body of which states as follows: J. Mason and J.T. Prowse are now here by both charged with obstruction, on one count – Obstructing a Federal Army Office (.207 RGIC). These charges pending are the results of incidents that occurred on the mornings of October 31, 2019 and November 19, 2019 in court room 904. For the cost and equity involved in such an ordeal! The Canadian Military is seeking the minimum sentencing time of forty eight months per judge with local municipal status.

This rate can be expedited at a rate of twenty five million dollars per judge per annum with a grand total of one hundred million dollars for the inconvenience. Because of these two’s local municipal status, and with a charge code related to the Royal Canadian Infantry Guard Under sub-section (.207) acting deliberately, inconsequentially and without rhymer reason. I hereby order these funds in the amount of one hundred million dollars (Canadian currency only) released and awarded to Major T.

Perrin (RCIG) and his expenditures. [ 7 ] The Statement of Claim discloses no reasonable claim and constitutes an abuse of process. The “incidents” to which it refers are decisions made by Masters Mason and Prowse for which no liability attaches. If Mr. Perrin is unhappy with those decisions, his remedy is to file an appeal. Indeed, he did exactly that in respect of Master Prowse’s October 31, 2019 decision. His appeal was dismissed by Justice Horner on December 3, 2019.

The suggestion that their decisions render Masters Mason and Prowse liable to imprisonment or fines is simply absurd. [ 8 ] Further, the remedies sought by Mr. Perrin are grossly disproportionate and are not supported by the facts he recites. [ 9 ] Accordingly, I conclude that Mr. Perrin’s Statement of Claim appears to be an abuse of this Court’s processes. The Court therefore seeks a response from Mr.

Perrin as to how the Statement of Claim provides an adequate basis for a meaningful response by the Defendants, how the Statement of Claim seeks a remedy that is available from this Court and how the financial remedies sought in the Statement of Claim may be justified. Accordingly, this Action is stayed pending further Order and the CPN 7 procedure now advances to its second step: 1. Mr. Perrin has until 14 days after this decision is filed and served to prepare a written submission of no more than 10 pages, to be filed and served, per CPN7, para 3(b). 2.

If no written submission is received by the Court by that deadline, the Court will proceed to render its final decision on whether the Statement of Claim should be struck out in whole or in part, per Rule 3.68 (CPN7, para 3(c)). 3. If Mr. Perrin provides and serves a written submission, the Defendants have seven days to make a written reply of up to 10 pages in length (CPN7, para 3(d)). 4. After receipt of Mr.

Perrin’s written submission and the Defendants’ written reply under item 3, if any, the Court will render its final decision on whether the Statement of Claim should be struck out in whole or in part, per Rule 3.68 (CPN7, para 3(e)). IV. Court Access Restrictions [ 10 ] Unfortunately, it is my view that the CPN7 process alone is not sufficient to address Mr. Perrin’s litigation conduct to date and that it may be necessary to impose court access restrictions.

The modern approach to court access restrictions issued under this Court’s inherent jurisdiction in response to abusive litigation was set out in Hok v Alberta , 2016 ABQB 651 . This is a prospective case management step that responds to anticipated abuse of court processes; it is imposed where future abusive litigation is anticipated.

The scope of the restrictions depends upon the level of anticipated future litigation abuse, but the most common court access restriction prohibits a person from initiating or continuing litigation except with leave of the Court: Hok at paras 34-37. [ 11 ] In Unrau v National Dental Examining Board, 2019 ABQB 283 (“ Unrau #2 ”) at para 559 , I summarized the process the Court undertakes as follows: Instead, vexatious litigant order proceedings are conducted by the Court following the two-part Hok v Alberta #2 process, which was first applied in Hok v Alberta #1 , court restrictions imposed Hok v Alberta #2 .

The Court: 1. issues a first decision on its own motion and under its inherent jurisdiction that:

a) identifies indicia of abusive litigation relevant to the candidate abusive litigant,

b) reviews the law and principles that guide when and how the Court imposes court access restrictions,

c) invites written submissions and affidavit evidence from the candidate abusive litigant and other parties, and sets deadlines for those materials, and

d) imposes interim court access restrictions. 2. receives those materials, if any, and 3. issues a second decision that:

a) reviews the total information available to the court relevant to the candidate abusive litigant, including information from the candidate abusive litigant,

b) determines whether that information predicts abusive litigation activity from the candidate abusive litigant which warrants court access restrictions,

c) assesses the plausible future litigation misconduct of the candidate abusive litigant as to subject matter, parties, forums, and special aggravating factors,

d) imposes ongoing court access restrictions that respond to the plausible future litigation conduct, if appropriate, and

e) terminates the interim court access restrictions. [ 12 ] Accordingly, the first step is to determine whether a litigant has exhibited certain “indicia” of abusive litigation that I summarized in Unrau #2 as follows: a. collateral attacks; b. hopeless proceedings; c. escalating or expanding proceedings; d. proceedings with an improper purpose; e. attempts to evade Court litigation management; f. persistent unsuccessful appeals; g. failure to abide by Court orders; h. inappropriate demeanour or unjustified belief. [ 13 ] This Action is the second filed by Mr.

Perrin in recent days, the first having been struck by Master Prowse with the appeal of that decision being dismissed by Justice Horner. The two actions filed by Mr. Perrin exhibit indicia of abusive litigation, as detailed below. [ 14 ] In reviewing the indicia of abusive litigation, I will take into account both of the actions filed by Mr. Perrin.

In Unrau #2 at paras 579-595 , I reviewed in detail the kinds of evidence that are relevant when the court is considering imposing court access restrictions and found at para 580 that “The entire dispute history of the litigation and the candidate abusive litigant is potentially relevant, including ... activities both inside and outside of the courtroom [and] the litigant’s entire public dispute history...”. A. Collateral Attack [ 15 ] As noted above, this Action resulted from Mr. Perrin’s dissatisfaction with the decisions made by Masters Mason and Prowse.

This is an inappropriate procedure and clearly constitutes an unlawful collateral attack on those decisions. B. Hopeless Proceedings [ 16 ] Mr. Perrin’s original claim arose from his belief that he was unlawfully removed from certain lands in downtown Calgary, where he had erected some kind of structure. Mr. Perrin’s position, as set out in an “Incident Report” attached to his affidavit dated October 31, 2019, is that he is a “Federal Army Officer in the Canadian Military” and is engaged in “Operation: Kingston Cannon”. As such, he is of the view that he was on the lands with colour of right.

The evidence before me, however, is that the location in question is a parking lot on 9 th Avenue S operated by Impark. [ 17 ] Also attached to Mr. Perrin’s October 31, 2019 affidavit is a document entitled “Statement of Claim” detailing the following alleged losses arising from Mr. Perrin’s removal from the site in question and the dismantling of his structure: 4 Mid-grade skids $300 each $1,200.00 16 High-grade skids $500 each $8,000.00

20 2x4x10 feet lumber $15.00 each $300.00 5 sheets of ply-wood $100.00 each $500.00 9 sheets of heavy ply-wood $200.00 each $1,800.00 4 2x6x14 feet lumber $75.00 each $300.00 14 sand bags $50.00 each $700.00 3 wood shop magazines $32.00 each $96.00 1 14 foot by 7 foot slate chalk board (sentimental value) $32,000.00 1 Tan shopping car with grey running racks (25 year old classic) $55,000.00 (sentimental value) 9 piece of 16 inch x 16 inch x 12 foot length $4,000.00 each $36,000.00 of unmilled lumber 1 10 inch x 10 inch x 8 foot $5,000.00 each $5,000.00 pressure treated wood post Finished oak would counter top with restaurant quality $1,150.00 steel edge attached 400 hours of work lost Rate: $1,000.00 per hour $400,000.00 Approximately 55 days of lost work days since the time of latest incident being, unable to work on the land. (FEDERAL ARMY LINE, Notice to Post) 2,000.00 per day $110,000.00 Stress $90,000.00 Restitution $500,000.00 Sub-Total $1,242,046.00 Total from 1 st affidavit $539,181.00 Total from 2 nd affidavit $101,047.00 Grand Total: $1,882,274.00 [ 18 ] On the face of the document, these figures appear to be disproportionate to the nature of the claim.

Moreover, as discussed above, in his second action, Mr. Perrin claims one hundred million dollars, another disproportionately large sum. [ 19 ] In his second action, Mr. Perrin also seeks the imprisonment of Masters Mason and Prowse. It is unclear on what basis the Court could grant this relief, even if it were inclined to do so. C. Escalating or Expanding Proceedings [ 20 ] Mr. Perrin’s initial action was against Impark and various individuals allegedly involved in his removal from the location in question.

When that action was struck, he expanded his attack to include Masters Mason and Prowse, as well as the Government of Alberta. Accordingly, I find that this indicium is made out. D. Inappropriate Demeanour or Unjustified Belief [ 21 ] As stated above, Mr. Perrin’s actions stem from his belief that he is acting on behalf of the “Canadian Military”. In various documents, he styles himself “Major T. Perrin, C.O. of the Royal Canadian Infantry Guard (R.C.I.G.), (F.A.O.) Federal Army Officer to the Canadian Military, Sr.

Member to (N.A.A.A.O.) North American Armies and Affiliated Organizations”. [ 22 ] There is no evidence before me to indicate that Mr. Perrin is a member of the Canadian Armed Forces and a brief search by the Court reveals that the “Royal Canadian Infantry Guard” to which Mr. Perrin refers is not a genuine branch of the Canadian Armed Forces. Therefore, Mr. Perrin’s belief and representation appear to be unjustified, if not fraudulent, and I find that this indicium is made out.

[ 23 ] Based on the foregoing, I conclude that it is reasonable to anticipate future litigation misconduct by Mr. Perrin. Therefore, the next step in the Hok process is to invite submissions as to whether: 1. Troy Perrin should be subject to indefinite court access restrictions and, if so, 2. the appropriate form for those court access restrictions. [ 24 ] This process will be conducted in writing only: Unrau #1 at paras 565-570 . Mr. Perrin has until December 23, 2019 to file submissions and serve in response to these issues. If he does, the Defendants may make reply submissions, due January 17, 2020.

In that event, Mr. Perrin then may make a reply to the submissions of the Defendants, due January 31, 2020. The Court will issue a decision following receipt of all submissions filed within the deadlines set. [ 25 ] Pending those submissions and the Court’s decision, I am satisfied that interim court access restrictions should be imposed on Mr. Perrin. I order that Mr. Perrin is prohibited from filing any material on any Alberta Court file except for the submissions identified above and that Mr.

Perrin may not continue or institute further court proceedings in Alberta without leave of the Alberta Court in question, per Hok at para 105, enforced in Hok v Alberta (Justice & Solicitor General) , 2016 ABCA 356 at para 7 and Bourque v Alberta Lawyers Insurance Association , 2018 ABCA 257 at paras 5-7 . [ 26 ] The Court will, contemporaneous with this Memorandum, prepare and file, and provide to the parties, the resulting Interim Court Access Restriction Order. Approval of that Order by Mr. Perrin is not required pursuant to Rule 9.4(2)(c). Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 5 th day of December, 2019.

J.D. Rooke A.C.J.C.Q.B.A.