TAS v GAS, 2020 ABQB 761

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: TAS v GAS, 2020 ABQB 761 Date: 20201207 Docket: 4803 182567 Registry: Edmonton Between: TAS Applicant/Cross Respondent - and - GAS Respondent/Cross Applicant _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice M. J. Lema _______________________________________________________ A. Introduction [ 1 ] A mother applies to change shared parenting of four children to primary parenting by her.

The father resists, seeking continuation of shared parenting or a shift of primary parenting to him. [ 2 ] The mother also seeks school and health decision-making, ongoing and retroactive child support, and sale of the matrimonial-home property and an adjoining property on terms set by her.

[ 3 ] The father resists on sole decision-making and disputes the amount of child support sought (both ongoing and retroactive).

He agrees that both properties should be sold but he seeks an opportunity to buy out the mother’s interest (after an appraisal of both properties). [ 4 ] I find that shared parenting should continue and same for joint decision-making, that the father is in arrears of child support for 2018 and the first half of 2019, that his income is largely as calculated by him in those periods, that I cannot determine whether the father is in arrears of child support since mid-June 2019 to the present or set ongoing support (in light of further disclosure needed from the father in respect of his second corporation and missing information from both parties on s. 9(

c) Guideline elements), and that the properties should be listed for sale after an appraisal and an opportunity for the father to buy out the mother’s interest. B. Preliminary issue – father’s reliance on pre-application affidavits [ 5 ] Each party prepared, and relied principally on, one affidavit i.e. that prepared for the application heard October 1 st (mother – affidavit sworn August 28, 2020; father – affidavit sworn September 14, 2020).

Neither filed a reply affidavit. [ 6 ] As part of his application materials, the father included three earlier affidavits sworn by him (February 22, 2018, September 3, 2018, and June 25, 2019). [ 7 ] At the application, the mother argued that the earlier affidavits were not properly before the Court on this application.

The father responded that he did not intend to run afoul of Family Practice Note 2 (discussed below), that his brief referenced the earlier affidavits as materials to be relied on (i.e. he gave notice of his intention to rely on them), and that, given the proposed “major change” to parenting, providing the “full [parenting] history” was necessary. Ultimately, the father said he would leave this point to the Court. [ 8 ] Family Law Practice Note 2 (Family Law Regular and Special Chambers (effective April 3, 2018)) provides (in part): 26.

Except with leave of the Court, the affidavit filings by each party are limited to the following: [affidavits prepared for the application , namely, the main, reply, and update affidavits i.e. implicitly excluding pre-existing affidavits ] 31. Other affidavits in the same action must not be appended as exhibits. 35. The Court will not consider evidence contained in additional affidavits or statements that are not permitted by this Practice Note, unless the party has obtained leave of the Court (see paragraph 56). 56.

A party seeking leave to: d. file additional affidavits; …. must seek leave of a Justice in Regular Family Chambers or, if a Justice has already been assigned to the hearing, then the party must seek leave of the hearing Justice. In all cases, the party seeking leave must provide reasonable notice to the opposing party. 64. If a party does not comply with this Practice Note, the presiding Justice may refuse to hear the application and/or award costs against the non-complying party. [emphasis added] [ 9 ] In this case, the father did not seek advance permission to draw in the pre-existing affidavits.

With the mother not consenting, I decline to waive these Practice Note requirements and, accordingly, did not consider the earlier affidavits in deciding the issues here. C. Background [ 10 ] The parties started living together in 2003, married in August 2006, and separated in November 2017. They have four children, ages 12, 10, 9, and 7. [ 11 ] The most recent general parenting order, instituting shared parenting, was a consent order granted by Inglis J. on May 10, 2019. [ 12 ] The parenting issue is largely driven by the mother’s complaints about the father’s parenting since shared parenting began.

As she sees it, his performance has been so deficient that shared parenting should cease, with primary parenting reverting to her. D. Analysis 1. On parenting, does the mother first have to show a material change in circumstances?

[13] The answer is yes, as explained by the Court of Appeal in Mills v Mills[1]: … there was ample evidence before the case management judge on May 3, 2018 to show a material change in circumstances since thegranting of the Interim Consent Parenting Order. Mr. Mills himself maintained that Ms. Mills continued to breach the order regardingshared parenting in relation to his access to the children.

Simply because the earlier order was made by consent does not remove orlimit a judge’s jurisdiction, particularly a case management judge, to subsequently vary it when a material change incircumstances has occurred: see generally Hearn v Hearn, 2004 ABQB 75 at paras 17-20, 352 ABQB 75; Rayner v Gratton, 2012ABQB 617 at para 13; Cheng v Li, 2015 ABCA 322 at paras 22-27.

Further, s 34(3) of the Family Law Act provides: 34(3) Before the court makes a variation order in respect of a parenting order, the court shall satisfy itself that a change in the needs orcircumstances of the child has occurred since the making of the parenting order or the last variation order made in respect of that order,and in making the variation order, the court shall consider only the best interests of the child...as determined by reference to that change.[Emphasis added] No special status or presumptive weight is given to the existing Consent Interim Parenting Order on such an application simplybecause it was a consent order.

It is not difficult to imagine changes in circumstances which mandate a change in a consentparenting arrangement required to protect the child. [emphasis added] [14] The Divorce Act counterpart to the noted FLA provision is ss. 17(5): Before the court makes a variation order in respect of a custody order, the court shall satisfy itself that there has been a change in thecondition, means, needs or other circumstances of the child of the marriage occurring since the making of the custody order or the lastvariation order made in respect of that order, as the case may be, and, in making the variation order, the court shall take intoconsideration only the best interests of the child as determined by reference to that change. [15] In Hearn v Hearn (cited above), Slatter J. (as he then was) outlined the “material change” general rule: Where the court has made an order respecting custody and access, the general rule is that an applicant seeking to vary that regimemust show a material change of circumstances since the order was made.

Once a significant change of circumstances has occurred,the best interests of the children must be examined at large. In Gordon v. Goertz, (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, the Courtstated at para 10: 10. Before the court can consider the merits of the application for variation, it must be satisfied there has been a material change inthe circumstances of the child since the last custody order was made. Section 17(5) provides that the court shall not vary a custody oraccess order absent a change in the “condition, means, needs or other circumstances of the child”.

Accordingly, if the applicant is unableto show the existence of a material change, the inquiry can go no farther. … 11. The requirement of a material change in the situation of the child means that an application to vary custody cannot serve as anindirect route of appeal from the original custody order. The court cannot retry the case, substituting its discretion for that of the originaljudge; it must assume the correctness of the decision and consider only the change in circumstances since the order was issued. . . . 13.

It follows that before entering on the merits of an application to vary a custody order the judge must be satisfied of: (1) achange in the condition, means, needs or circumstances of the child and/or the ability of the parents to meet the needs of thechild; (2) which materially affects the child; and (3) which was either not foreseen or could not have been reasonablycontemplated by the judge who made the initial order. [emphasis added] [16] Slatter J. (as he then was) returned to this subject in Foreman v Foreman[2], where he reiterated: “To the extent that thecustody arrangements have been reduced to a consent judgment, then the provisions of s. 17 of the Divorce Act apply.” [17] In Rayner v Gratton (also cited above), Veit J. held (paras 12 and 13): The mother has not established a material change of circumstance.

This is not a situation where the court is entitled, by reason of the proceedings themselves, to consider parenting afresh.

The courtmight have been in that position if the interim consent order entered into between the parties had explicitly stated that parentingcould be reviewed at any time, or if it had said that the interim consent order was to be in effect until further order of the court,or if it had used any analogous wording to indicate that the parties were not intending a usual interim order, that is one whichwould apply until a trial of the parenting issue.[3] Indeed, the parties’ intention that this should be the “usual” type of interim orderwas made clear to the court by the statement to the effect that negotiations would be undertaken to resolve the balance of the then currentapplication, which included property issues.

In the absence of any language to the effect that the court had the authority to considerparenting afresh at the request of either parent, a party applying to vary the February 27, 2012 consent order must establish amaterial change of circumstance. [emphasis added] [18] Here is the Court of Appeal’s exploration of this issue in Cheng v Li (also cited above, at paras 23-27): Where custody agreements have been reduced to a consent order, the provisions of s 17 of the Divorce Act apply, requiring amaterial change of circumstances: Foreman v Foreman, 2005 ABQB 343, 53 Alta LR (4th) 319 at paras 13, 23.

Furthermore when the consent order was signed, it is presumed that the court had discharged its duty under the Act to ensure that theorder met the best interests of the child: Hearn v Hearn, 2004 ABQB 75, 352 AR 260 at para 38. For the mother to now suggest that the 2012 Consent Variation Order was not in the best interests of the child is to essentially collaterallyattack that order, without having sought to appeal it and after having received the benefit of it.

Moreover, in the case of a consent order the court presumes that when parties are in agreement they usually know what is best forthe family, and what is in the best interests of their children. The parties must keep their promises once they are made. If a partyhas compromised one advantage to achieve another, that party should not lightly be allowed to resile from the bargain freelymade: Hearn v Hearn, at para 31. There are limits to permitting any perceived change to result in a change to a custody order entered into by the consent of theparents.

Endless relitigation of custody issues serves the interests of no one, including the children involved.

The utility ofsettlements respecting custody and access would be considerably diminished if parties could agree to a consent order and then bepermitted to resile from it without meeting a considerable threshold test of change in circumstances in the condition, means,needs or circumstances of the child or the ability of a parent to meet the needs of a child which materially affects the child andwhich was either not foreseen or could not have been reasonably contemplated by the judge who made the initial order. [emphasisadded] [19] In DB v MB[4], involving the Family Law Act, the Court of Appeal held that variation of a consent shared-parenting orderrequired a change in circumstances: The respondent has now remarried a man who resides in Kelowna, and they have had a new baby.

She applied to relocate to Kelownawith the child of the relationship. The ability of the respondent to obtain a variation of the November consent order depended on a“change in the needs or circumstances of the child” since the making of the previous order: Family Law Act, ... ss. 34(3). [emphasisadded] [20] See as well Fraser J. in BS v SJ[5]: In order to reopen the agreement, I must be satisfied that there has been a material change in circumstances of the children sincethe last order was made. In Gordon v.

Goertz, (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27 the court set out a three-part test inparagraph 13 of the decision as follows: It follows that before entering on the merits of an application to vary a custody order the judge must be satisfied of: (1) a change in thecondition, means, needs or circumstances of the child and/or the ability of the parents to meet the needs of the child; (2) which materiallyaffects the child; and (3) which was either not foreseen or could not have been reasonably contemplated by the judge who made theinitial order. [emphasis added] [21] And Loparco J. in JEB v JS[6]: Since there are final parenting orders in place, before the Court can determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to besubject to a shared parenting regime, the father must overcome the hurdle of showing that there was a material change incircumstances to warrant such a change. [emphasis added] [22] And Veit J. again in Milne v Milne[7]: The evidence establishes that, in 2003, Ms.

Milne consented to share parenting of Tristen with his father; indeed, it may be moretechnically accurate to say that Mr. Milne consented to share parenting of Tristen with Ms. Milne as Ms. Milne had not taken Tristen withher when she left the matrimonial home at the time of separation. In any event, when Ms. Milne consented to that type of parentingregime, she was represented by a lawyer.

In a general way, when a party knowingly consents to a parenting regime, that parent isnot entitled to withdraw, or undermine, their consent until there has been a material change of circumstances: promises andundertakings should be kept. [emphasis added] 2.

What kind of pre-existing parenting order are we dealing with here? [23] Here are the key features of the noted Inglis order[8]: • its facial name is “Consent Order”, with (as noted above) no express reference to “interim”, “interlocutory”, “without prejudice”or anything else signaling impermanence or conditionality; • both parties were represented by counsel in the lead-up to and negotiation of the consent arrangement; • nothing in the body of the order states or signals that the core shared parenting provision (first paragraph of the parenting terms) was reviewable, time-limited or otherwise conditional[9]; and • by contrast, another parenting term (right of first refusal) was expressly reviewable (para 6). [24] I find that the analyses in the decisions above apply to this non-interim consent order.

As a result, the mother must show amaterial change of circumstances before a fresh review of parenting is possible.[10] 3. Was there a material change of circumstances here? [25] The mother points to three things: (1) the Covid-19 pandemic; (2) her move in with her new partner; and (3) the birth of a sonto her and her new partner. [26] The mother did not explain how these changes have affected parenting “on the ground” as between herself and the father orhow they bear on whether the existing shared parenting should change.

[ 27 ] Aside from stating that the children “are close to [the new baby] and my partner”, she provided no evidence of the impact of the baby’s arrival or the move on the parties’ parenting. [ 28 ] As for the pandemic, it has undoubtedly been, and continues to be, a globe-shaking phenomenon. And the mother gave evidence of the father not communicating the details of a “Covid-19 scare” experienced by him and the children in September 2020 or the fact that they were all tested then (fortunately, no positive tests).

But here too, she did not show (beyond that) how the pandemic has changed parenting here or, more precisely, how it bears on whether parenting should change. [ 29 ] I see the “Covid scare” incident not as reflecting a material change bearing on parenting but, instead, as shedding light (“how much” to be discussed later) on the father’s overall parenting performance. [ 30 ] Given the mother’s various complaints about the father’s parenting performance, she is really arguing that his substandard care (as she sees it) is the material change here .

Cheng v Lee (cited above) confirms that parenting performance can be such a change (para 27): ... a considerable threshold test of change in circumstances [requires changes] in the condition, means, needs or circumstances of the child or the ability of a parent to meet the needs of a child which materially affects the child and which was either not foreseen or could not have been reasonably contemplated by the judge who made the initial order. [emphasis added] [ 31 ] The father contests many of the mother’s cited examples of subpar care.

And I am not in a position, on the basis of affidavit evidence only, to resolve “black and white” conflicts here e.g. “the children do not shower at the father’s home, or at least do not shower enough”, versus “the children do indeed shower enough.” [ 32 ] The mother recognized this, emphasizing various admissions made by the father in either his affidavit or in cross-examination on it.

Per the mother, these admissions, pieced together, create a damning portrait of subpar parenting, to the extent both that a material change has occurred and that the mother must be reinstated as the primary parent. [ 33 ] I turn then to considering the mother’s complaints about the father’s parenting. 4. Has the father’s parenting been materially subpar? [ 34 ] Here are the key complaints, with my comments: • Covid-19 scare (noted above): the record does not disclose the details of the Covid scare.

As far as I can tell, the father acted responsibly in noting symptoms or, at minimum, in recognizing that a risk of infection had occurred, and in arranging testing for the children and himself. The mother’s justifiable concern here is that he did not tell her anything about it. This is a serious blemish on the father’s record in this shared-parenting setting: if a parent does not communicate something as serious as a close encounter with Covid- 19, complete with all-children testing, how can the other parent trust that first parent will communicate anything bearing on the children’s interests?

I wonder how the father would have reacted if the roles had been reversed here? • father not pursuing counselling in last year or any anger-management counselling at all : the mother gave evidence of the father’s anger about various events, but none about disproportionate, overly frequent or otherwise alarming anger in the context of parenting the children; • father’s criminal convictions for “2 out of 3 of mischief, causing a disturbance, and uttering threats” : I do not see this unfortunate event, in January 2018, and resulting in an 18-month peace bond (with no evidence of any breach), as bearing on whether the shared parenting since June 2019 should continue; • mother taking children to vast majority of medical and other appointments : this seems to square with their pre-separation and pre-shared-parenting division of responsibilities.

Plus, the mother did not give evidence of asking the father to take on more, or even any, of the appointments; • father not following up on younger son’s suspected ADHD : the father indeed balked at the family pediatrician’s diagnosis, advised that he would arrange for testing, and blamed his failure on a lack of funds, such lack not apparent on cross-examination about his income (more later). That is obviously not ideal. But the mother did not give evidence of following up on her own, whether with the father (“What are you doing about this?”) or otherwise.

If she had been seriously concerned about the lags or non-performance here, I expect that she would have followed up with him and, if he had continued to balk, taken steps on her own to act on the diagnosis, or confirm it, or otherwise try to help this son, even to the extent of seeking an order dispensing with the father’s consent, if necessary; • father vetoing that son’s teacher’s recommendation that he repeat Grade 1 : the evidence showed that, while that was indeed the teacher’s recommendation, the school principal’s decision to advance him to Grade 2 was congruent with the school board’s general policy on grade-repeating.

In other words, I am not satisfied that the father’s involvement sparked or at least drove the “advance” decision. In any case, the mother did not introduce evidence of continuing struggles for this son in Grade 2 or that the school’s ultimate approach to his schooling has prejudiced him in any way; • father leaning on baby-sitter care through much of the March through August 2020 period : the father, like the mother, is entitled to arranged for temporary third-party care of the children during his parenting time. In this case, care came from his mother and his cousin’s 16-year-old daughter.

No evidence showed that the care they provided was subpar in any way; • no braces for older daughter : the father may not have been as diligent as possible here. But, as above with the younger son’s ADHD issue, the mother did not give evidence of following up with the father or taking up the reins on her own, or of any particular “dental prejudice” to this daughter;

• that daughter’s screen time : the father may have been lax in this department, but the mother did not provide evidence of communicating her concerns and expectations (or at least wishes) about this daughter’s screen time.

Her complaint here, as with others above, would have more force if she had followed up with the father or done anything else to “elevate” the issue i.e. before complaining about an apparently long-running problem; • father not calling children during “mother’s week” : with an alternating-week parenting rhythm, I do not see this as a sign of uninvolved parenting or anything negative at all; • school friends not visiting at father’s home : the father disputed this. I mention it because, even on his evidence, friends appear to come into the mix more at the mother’s house than his place.

But no evidence shows that the children have complained about this or have been adversely affected by the difference. (Of course, these days, all intra-household socializing is off, at least for the next couple of weeks, per Alberta’s pandemic directives); • father not arranging psychological counselling for older son : no evidence that the mother has done so herself or taken any other steps on behalf of this son in regard to the reported statement(

s) of despair. This obviously requires attention, but I do not see a parenting differential here; • sons’ weight gains : even accepting the mother’s evidence (disputed by the father) that the boys have put on too much weight since shared parenting began, no evidence shows the particular cause(s). As with many of the mother’s complaints, she points to a (perceived) problem and attributes it to the father’s parenting, without any “causation” evidence i.e. without showing how the problem stems from something he is or is not doing.

On the weight theme, she complains that the children are not eating well (i.e. nutritiously) at the father’s home, but she does not detail her concerns (as she understands it, what are they eating over there?) or detail the meal/snack/nutrition approach in her own household. Same for her evidence that the children now, since the start of shared parenting, have cavities. She complains about tooth-brushing (lack of or inadequate) at the father’s house.

He contests; she provides no evidence of the dental-hygiene approach; • father’s admission of one-time, pre-separation spanking of older son : no evidence of any continued such discipline; no evidence of circumstances of the occasion in question; too remote to be of any consequence here; • children’s overall mental health : the mother gives evidence of the older daughter voicing a preference to live with her (i.e. no more shared parenting for her), that daughter being “anxious and sad”, to the older son being angry and “anxious at the transition” to the father’s home, and to the younger son’s “social adjustment problems related to the separation”, among other issues.

But the problem (for her) is that she presented no evidence that any of these problems stem from the father’s “parenting performance” or from the shared parenting generally. These kids, with the exception of the younger daughter, appear to be experiencing various difficulties coping with their parents’ separation. But without evidence (for example, from a third-party professional familiar with diagnosing children’s mental- health difficulties in a divided-family setting), I am not prepared to infer that the father’s parenting lies at the root of these problems, and same for shared parenting itself.

Cases exploring the impact of differing parenting styles [ 35 ] Before concluding on the father’s parenting performance and its impact on the children’s best interests, I reproduce some helpful guidance from cases considering different parenting styles. [ 36 ] In LH v CH [11] , Maisonville J. was faced with a mother’s application to shift away from shared parenting to various options enlarging her role.

She concluded that the mother had not sufficiently detailed her concerns and that shared parenting should continue, albeit with the support of a parenting coordinator: I find there is no valid reason being advanced why one parent should have certain parenting responsibilities in lieu of the other. While the claimant said she wanted to have the responsibility in numerous areas the only reasons advanced were that it would be “unworkable” and that the respondent was “controlling” without any explanation for why she held these opinions. [ 37 ] In Stanners v Alexandre [12] , D. K.

Miller J. found that shared parenting should continue despite differences in parenting styles, albeit the father should work harder to provide overall consistency between households in core dimensions: It is apparent to this court that the problem in this case is not that there has been a “change in circumstances” but that there is a clear difference in parenting styles or parenting philosophies. However, the differences are not substantial enough to require a change in custodial relationships ….

The applicant’s parenting style needs to be more in tune with the respondent in order that the boys have a consistent, predictable and regulated home life. As well, when parenting decisions conflict, the solution is not to run to the court but to communicate with the other parent and work to resolve the differences. The law and court decisions have a pedagogical function.

Family law litigants need to be aware that simple differences in approaches to parenting cannot be an excuse to come back to court. … [emphasis added] [ 38 ] In Hearn v Hearn [13] , Slatter J. (as he then was) examined the impact of different parenting styles: … This is not a case where one party suggests that the other is an unfit parent; while they have different parenting styles and different strengths, each party recognizes that the other is a loving and fit parent. … The agreement for joint custody and shared parenting is a sensible one, and is consistent with the principle of maximum contact.

It kept the children within their home environment, at their regular schools, in contact with their established peer group, and in regular contact with both parents. … [ 39 ] In Nissen v Nissen [14] , G. R. Fraser J. found shared parenting to be in order despite difficulties perceived by the mother, including the father having to rely on others (grandparents) for assistance at times (para 120).

[ 40 ] I do not contend that incompetent or otherwise materially substandard parenting is a “style of parenting” to be accommodated. I find that the father’s parenting is not such parenting.

Instead, he has been parenting at an acceptable level and, in any case, not markedly inferior to the mother’s own parenting. [ 41 ] For contrast, I look at handful of cases (below) where, whether because of one parent’s materially subpar parenting or a dysfunctional co-parenting relationship, shared parenting had to be discontinued Where shared parenting was not working and had to be discontinued [ 42 ] In TLF v SLF [15] , Coutu J. found that shared parenting was not working and should not continue, emphasizing these (among other) factors: It is clear that at the time of Dr.

Hindmarch’s assessment, S.L.F. harboured anger and resentment against T.L.F., had no respect for her and was exceptionally critical of T.L.F. as a parent. It is clear that one year later when Dr. Muller did her report, S.L.F.’s attitude has not changed. I agree with Dr. Hindmarch that shared parenting or joint custody will only work if the parents are capable of communicating in a meaningful and non-acrimonious manner. In this case, due to S.L.F.’s low opinion of T.L.F. as a parent and as a person, this is not possible. I might add, that having heard the evidence, there is no basis for S.L.F.’s viewpoint .

Everyone who has given evidence about R.L.F. indicates that he is a happy, well-adjusted and intelligent child. This includes R.L.F.’s day home and day care caretakers, Dr. Hindmarch and Dr. Muller, all of whom are independent witnesses. Obviously, S.L.F.’s criticism of T.L.F.’s parenting is unfounded. The past 2½ years has proven that joint custody, in this case, is not working. The parties have not been able to agree or co- operate on anything.

They could not agree on potty training, the use of a soother, the use of corporal discipline, the child attending Sunday School, whether the child should be in a day home or daycare and which daycare the child should be in. The evidence shows these parties have very different parenting styles. … [emphasis added] [ 43 ] So too in Caisse v Caisse [16] , where Smith J. found: … I find that the current arrangement of shared parenting and unspecified access is not working well and that in the present circumstances it is not workable between these parties .

Although an arrangement of alternating weeks with each parent apparently worked out over the summer, the evidence of both parties clearly establishes a history of continuous conflicts about the care of and access to Aaron, and an inability or unwillingness to resolve them.

A good part of the evidence from each party that I heard was taken up with recounting incidences of such conflict. … The evidence from both parties was consistent in portraying ongoing conflict, often over trivial matters, and an unwillingness to communicate, discuss disagreements and resolve conflicts. [emphasis added] [ 44 ] And in NC v NC [17] , where Saunders J. observed and then concluded: Shared parenting , ideally, will take place in the context of an intra-parental relationship where the parenting styles are compatible, behavioural standards are consistently enforced between households, and the parents work to reinforce each other.

Sadly, these parties have demonstrated they are incapable of parenting to that standard. A child with J.’s emotional needs requires stability and consistency. Despite a shared parenting regime having been in effect for more than three years up to March 2017, there is no evidence of improvement in J.’s fragile emotional state.

There is every reason to be concerned that J.'s behavioural issues reflect emotional turmoil that is being exacerbated by the shared parenting . [emphasis added] [ 45 ] See also Friedlander v Claman [18] , where the BCCA upheld the trial judge’s shutdown of shared parenting, in favour of sole parenting by the father, in light of egregious misconduct by the mother including failing to execute a parenting-coordinator agreement, abide by pick-up locations and times, abide by telephone access schedule, or communicate respectfully, making false or derogatory statements in front of the child in question or to the public, and publicizing information about the family-law proceedings. [ 46 ] I do not see equivalent subpar parenting by the father here or completely intractable communication difficulties as in some of the above cases.

Conclusion on whether shared parenting should continue [ 47 ] Has the father’s parenting been ideal? Obviously not, especially as reflected in the non-communication about the Covid scare and the failure to follow up on the ADHD front and the older son’s statement(

s) of despair. But, while the mother has extensively criticized the father for perceived parental shortcomings, she is largely a blank slate as a comparator. [ 48 ] For example, she tags the father with responsibility for the boys’ weight gain and for cavities, not to mention the stresses and strains some of them are undergoing.

But with next-to-no evidence about differential approaches between households (i.e. with details, such as on nutrition, dental hygiene, and overall “child management”), I cannot, and do not, assign the responsibility solely to the father’s parenting approach or even approach an allocation of responsibility as between the two of them. [ 49 ] The mother argues that the children are showing the adverse effects of their parents’ separation. That seems to be the case.

But that, on its own, does not implicate the father’s parenting or the fact of shared parenting. [ 50 ] Where the mother does provide “comparator” details, the “comparator” does not necessarily signal any needed change in the allocation of parenting. For example, contending that the father has allowed the older daughter to “screen” for upwards of 8 to 15 hours per day (which he disputed), she says that, at her home, she has limited her to 68 per cent of those totals i.e. 5.75 to 10 hours per day.

Either way, this seems like excessive screen time. At minimum, it does not reflect a radically different approach between the households. [ 51 ] As for the mother’s evidence that the older daughter has expressed a preference to live with her full-time, the father disputed that that is the daughter’s preference and notes that the older boy has expressed the opposite (live with father) view. Given the ages of these children (12 and 10) and the absence of any third-party exploration of their views (e.g.

Voice of the Child report), I do not factor their possible preferences into my parenting analysis. [ 52 ] My overall impression was that, while the father needs to realize that shared parenting requires a core level of communication about the children’s interests, and to perform better in that vein, he is fundamentally an involved parent.

He communicates with the children at their respective levels, spend engaged time with them, wants them to succeed, and has shown a willingness to step up even more to ensure their best interests are maximized. (For example, he said he would be open to setting a “both households” screen-time policy and enforcing it, and also to obtaining the input of professionals, and acting on it, in gauging how the children’s various needs might be better met.) [ 53 ] These parents have different parenting approaches.

But, on the evidence here, the father’s performance is not materially subpar or, in any case, so dramatically inferior to the mother’s that he should he should pay with the loss of shared parenting. [ 54 ] Viewed from the overarching perspective of the children’s best interests, the evidence does not convince me that narrowing the father’s role to that of an access parent would serve their best interests. [ 55 ] And, largely for the same reasons, I am not prepared to allocate sole decision-making to the mother. [ 56 ] In closing on the parenting aspect, I invoke the perspective of Pentelechuk J. (as she then was) in AJU v GSU [19] : Communication issues and lack of cooperation for a couple caught in the turbulence of divorce should not be compared to an impossible standard that does not exist in the most functional of families.

I doubt there exists a household with happily married parents who always communicate well and never disagree on parenting issues . It is normal for one parent to assume more of the disciplinary role, or one parent to be better at homework, or for disagreements to arise as to the type and number of extracurricular activities children should participate in. Parenting has its seasons. One parent may be more adept at dealing with a colicky infant or the tantrums of a toddler, while the other parent may have greater skill in dealing with the challenges of adolescence.

In the vast majority of cases, including this one, parents bring individual strengths and perspectives to the table. Parenting is a complex and nuanced task and parents are well advised to step back and consider the other parent’s approach and perspective before rigidly and dogmatically insisting on their own. Children are entitled to a loving, nurturing relationship with both parents. For children to survive and thrive through the divorce process, they need permission and freedom to love each parent, in an environment with minimal conflict . [emphasis added] 5.

What were the parenting arrangements on separation until June 2019 (when shared parenting started)? [ 57 ] The parties separated on November 6, 2017. [ 58 ] The initial post-separation parenting, for about two months (until early January 2018), was shared (mother’s August 20, 2020 affidavit, para 5; father’s September 14, 2020 affidavit, para 3).

Parenting in 2018 [ 59 ] Neither provided evidence about the parenting between early January 2018 and late February 2018, when Khullar J. (on February 26 th ) ordered a ramp-up to shared parenting, in phases, with increasing parenting by the father, aiming for full shared parenting by September 1, 2018. [ 60 ] From that order, I assume that parenting was not shared in January and February 2018 i.e. the starting point for Khullar J.’s order was primary parenting with the mother. [ 61 ] Neither did the parties provide evidence, or any detailed evidence, about parenting “on the ground” during the ramp-up periods i.e. whether they followed, or did not follow, the division of parenting outlined by Khullar J.

With no such evidence, I will assume that they parented in line with her order. [ 62 ] In the first ramp-up period (February 26, 2018 to April 8, 2018), the father was to parent for 72 hours per two-week period i.e. 21 per cent of the time. In the second period (April 9, 2018 to May 21, 2018), his parenting was to increase to 102 hours per two-week period i.e. 30 per cent of the time. [ 63 ] As I understand the parties’ evidence, it was at this point (roughly early June 2018) that the father relocated to Manitoba for work reasons (father’s affidavit, paras 5 and 6).

His evidence is not clear on when he finished working in MB; I infer from paragraph 41 of his affidavit that he worked out there until early 2019, when his work shifted to Drayton Valley, through to “spring 2019”, when shared parenting started (mid-June 2019). [ 64 ] The father states (his affidavit, para 44) that “I believe I had the children 40% of the time in 2018”, but he provides no details or calculations. Yet, per his brief (“Relevant Facts – “E”):

By early April 2018 … it was agreed [father and mother] that [he] would go to Manitoba on a job … [he] remained away, except for when he was able to return home about twice per month, until approximately the spring of 2019. [ 65 ] I find, based on the above findings (reflecting initial primary parenting in 2018 by the mother, the two sub-40-per-cent ramp- up periods of parenting by the father, and then apparently his absence from Alberta for effectively the balance of 2018), that he did not actually have anywhere close to 40 per cent of the parenting in that year. [ 66 ] I conclude that the mother had primary parenting for 2018. [20] Parenting in 2019 [ 67 ] The father states (affidavit, para 44) that “[i]n 2019 I had the children more than 40% of the time”, again without any details or calculations. [ 68 ] From his statement (affidavit, para 7) that “[i]n May of 2019 we were ready to implement the shared parenting regime” (i.e. that ordered by Khullar J. in late February 2018 but interrupted by the father’s out-of-town work) and the above reference (father’s brief) to him largely remaining away from April 2018 through spring 2019, I infer that the mother had continued to carry the primary parenting from the end of 2018 through to (at minimum) May 2019. (More confirmation comes from the mother’s description of the father’s out- of-town work: her affidavit, para 16.) [ 69 ] The parties agree that shared parenting did not actually launch until mid-June 2019. [ 70 ] The father did not detail, in his affidavit for the application, any access-level parenting exercised by him during his working- away periods.

I infer that he largely remained away for those periods, effectively leaving the mother with all of the parenting. [ 71 ] Accordingly, on the evidence provided, I do not accept the father’s assertion of 40-per-cent parenting for 2019 (at least up to mid-June) and find that the mother was the primary parent from the start of the year through to mid-June, when equal shared parenting began, and which continues, and which (per this judgment) will continue. 6.

What retroactive support is payable for 2018 and first half of 2019? [ 72 ] The mother seeks retroactive child support for these periods, asserting particular income figures for the father, outlining her (minimal) income, and noting that only $9,000 in direct child support paid by the father. [ 73 ] The father counters that the mother has overstated his income for both 2018 and 2019 and that, per an agreement with the mother, he provided indirect support in the form of payments down or reductions in various matrimonial debts and also various purchases and direct-expense payments benefiting the children (school fees, clothing, computers, and other supplies). [ 74 ] The father also asserted insufficient evidence to perform the required adjustments under subsection 9(

c) of the Guidelines (shared-parenting adjustments, if any, in light of the “conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse and any child …”). I discuss this position further below, concerning child support once shared parenting began. This argument has no bearing on support for 2018 and 2019 (to mid-June), in light of my “mother as primary parent” findings for these periods above. [ 75 ] The father did not otherwise argue against retroactive support e.g. invoking any DBS reasons that retroactive support was not warranted.

Per his brief, he “agrees that there should be a determination of retroactive child support, if any….” [ 76 ] Accordingly, I turn to gauging the father’s income for these first two periods and, afterwards, his “expenses paid” and “matrimonial debt” arguments. Father’s income in 2018 and 2019 [ 77 ] The mother asserts a 2018 income figure for the father of $142,911, based on certain adjustments to income from a numbered Alberta corporation (137) through which he conducts business.

Per the mother’s affidavit (para 50): … the Father’s guideline income should reflect his gross earnings of his company plus any other additional employment income he may earn personally. I recognize that he does have some business expenses; however, the business expenses he claims for tax purposes are not reflective of the income available to him.

In my view, a reasonable deduction for business expenses would be $10,000.00 per year. [ 78 ] The 2018 income statement for 137 indeed reflects revenue of $152,911 (i.e. the figure acknowledged by the mother, before the $10,000 in expenses acknowledged by her as proper). [ 79 ] That statement reflects the following expenses and associated amounts: advertising and promotion ($811); amortization ($11,303); automotive ($10,874); equipment rentals ($1,643); insurance and licenses ($3.773); interest and bank charges ($10,599); interest on long-term debt ($527); office expenses ($6,012); professional fees ($12,738); repairs and maintenance ($2,190); subcontractors ($2,190); supplies ($4,339); telephone ($3,022); training ($626); and travel and entertainment ($29,619), yielding pre-tax income of $53,233 and post-tax income of $47,501. [ 80 ] The mother points to the father’s 2018 personal tax return as confirming true income for the father in the range of $140,000.

She submitted (brief, para 20(b)): In 2018, [the father’s] net income before taxes was $53,233.00 (from 137) and his line 150 income on his tax return was $72,610.00 for a total of $125,843.00. This was before any personal expenses paid on his behalf by his companies are added back.

[ 81 ] However, it appears the mother is double-counting here. I could not find a copy of the father’s 2018 tax return or notice of assessment in the record. But the mother made the same argument about 2019, for which I could find the father’s tax return. Here is what she submitted about his 2019 income: In 2019 his net income before taxes was $75,428.00 (from 137) and his line 150 income on his tax return was $47,400.00 for a total of $122,82.00.

This is before any personal expenses paid by his companies on his behalf are added back. [ 82 ] 137’s 2019 income statement reflects “income before provision for income taxes” of $74,428.

The starting point is revenue of $146.902, with expenses for amortization ($9,604); automotive ($7,666); insurance and licenses ($1,330); interest and bank charges ($6,594); interest on long-term debt ($1,751); management fees ($6,000); office expenses ($4,290); professional fees ($1,933); repairs and maintenance ($2,346); subcontractors ($815); supplies ($8,715); telephone ($2,674); travel and entertainment ($20,652); and workers compensation ($336), yielding “income from operations” of $72,196 and, after adding a “gain on disposal of property, plant and equipment” of $3,232, the noted pre-tax income of $75,428. [ 83 ] Switching focus to the father’s 2019 tax return, it includes, under “total income”, taxable dividends from taxable Canadian corporations” of $41,400.

Combined with a reported $6,000 in self-employment business income, his total income was reported at $47,400 (as the wife noted above). [ 84 ] However, looking deeper into his return, one sees a T5 (statement of investment income) reflecting actual dividends of $36,000 (grossed up to $41,400 as the taxable amount) received from 137. In other words, 137 dividended out $36,000 from retained earnings in 2019, which category had been in negative territory at the start of that year.

In other words, 137 distributed, out of its 2019 earnings, the grossed-up amount of $41,400 to the father, which he included in his income. (That dividend is reflected in the statement of retained earnings forming part of 137’s financial statements for 2019.) [ 85 ] All to say: the mother double-counted the father’s income for 2019 by including the full pre-tax income for 137 and then including his full reported-for-personal-tax-purposes income which included a portion of that corporate income (i.e. $36,000, before gross-up). [ 86 ] In other words, if the starting point in measuring the father’s income for child-support purposes is assigning to him the entire income of his solely-owned corporation (initially, just 137), however expense-adjusted, it does not “compute” to also allocate to him dividend income sourced from that very corporate income.

Doing so is double-counting. [ 87 ] If the mother took the same approach in 2018, same problem.

I will assume that she did; if that turns out (once the father’s 2018 tax return is reviewed) that no double-counting occurred, I will revisit the father’s income for that year. [ 88 ] For now, I proceed on the basis that the mother’s one adjustment (adding in the dividend component of the father’s personal income) needs to be backed out. [ 89 ] The focus then shifts to 137’s reported income and the appropriate adjustments, if any, to reflect the father’s true ability to pay child support. [21] [ 90 ] The problem here, for the mother, is that she did not substantiate her position that, aside from an uncharacterized $10,000 component, all of 137’s expenses need to be added back as to accurately reflect the father’s true able-to-fund-child-support income i.e. all of them... [ 91 ] For his part, the father (his affidavit, exhibit

D) calculated his 2018 and 2019 income, working from the same 137 income statements, differently.

Instead of effectively factoring out all expenses except for $10,000, he recognized (per his affidavit) all expenses as legitimate corporate outflows except for (for 2019) amortization of $9,604 and management fees of $6,000 and (for 2018) amortization of $11,303 (no management fees that year). [ 92 ] His so-adjusted income, from 137, came out at $64,536 for 2018 and $87,800 for 2019. [ 93 ] At the application, his counsel submitted that the “per affidavit” figure for 2018 was “maybe a little light” and that the more appropriate figure (implicitly adjusting the corporate expenses to more accurately reflect his true ability to pay child support) was at or near $80,000. [ 94 ] For ease of reference, I reproduce the mother’s contrasting figure of $142,911 for both years. [ 95 ] Without the benefit of questioning by the mother about the ins and outs of 137’s various expenses or an x-ray from a financial expert, I cannot discern, simply from their labels (e.g. transportation and entertainment), which additional expenses (i.e. beyond the acknowledged should-be-added-back amounts for amortization and management fees) should be added back, if any. [ 96 ] As I see it, the mother had the onus to at least call into question the soundness or “legitimacy” of any “impugned” expense items, which would have cast an onus onto the father to show why a given expense should not be factored out when measuring ability to pay child support. [ 97 ] By merely asserting that “only $10,000 in expenses can be justified as true expenses”, the mother did not discharge her initial onus. [ 98 ] Accordingly, I proceed on the basis that the father’s income for 2018 and 2019 is as reflected in his exhibit “D” , as reflected above, with an adjustment to the 2018 income to $80,000 (as discussed above).

Per-Guideline child support for 2018 and 2019 (to mid-June)

[ 99 ] Per the father’s (ex

D) chart, and working from the “section 3 Table” column, the net preliminary result is child support payable, for 2018, of $18,012 ($1,501 x 12 months) and, for 2019, of $11,170.50 ($2,013 x 5.5 months i.e. up to mid-June 2019, when shared parenting started). [ 100 ] The combined total is $29,182.50. [ 101 ] The mother acknowledged receiving $9,000 in direct support, which reduces the preliminary arrears amount to $20,182.50. [ 102 ] As noted above, I have set the father’s 2018 income at $80,000. I leave it to the parties to calculate the

section 3 support at that level of income in place of the “per exhibit D” figure and to adjust the arrears figure accordingly. Father’s “expenses paid” argument [ 103 ] The evidence was thin here. As far as I can tell, the father contends that he paid for clothing for the children (approximately $2,000) and certain school fees ($500). [ 104 ] The mother responds that the paternal grandmother paid for these things.

The mother did not argue that the expenses were not made, that they did not benefit the children, that the actual benefit experienced should be valued below “face value”, or that she would not have had to incur these expenses herself. [ 105 ] The source of the payment is irrelevant. Would it have made a difference if the father had received a gift or loan of money from his mother and used the proceeds to pay for these items?

The answer is no. [ 106 ] Accordingly, the father is entitled to a $2,500 credit against the above arrears Father’s “matrimonial-debt payments” argument [ 107 ] This takes us to the father’s argument that, per an agreement with the mother, various payments made by him against various matrimonial debts were to be treated, effectively, as a substitute for child support. [ 108 ] Per his affidavit (paras 5, 12 and 44): Faced with insurmountable debt and not really any way to pay all of the bills, I realized that I would have to take at least one more job out of town to try to pay down our line of credit as much as possible, to pay the company [137’s] taxes, and try to be caught up financially enough that I could work [locally] ….

We agreed that the majority of the funds from the Manitoba job would go toward paying down the line of credit and paying the corporate taxes. … My first real job after separation [November 2017] [started] June 2018 in Manitoba, and given that I was paying all the marital debt, we agreed through counsel that I would not pay child support. … … At separation we had almost $100,000 in debt …. As deposed above, we agreed that the company [137] would pay down its line of credit with the [proceeds of] the Manitoba job.

By the spring of 2019 the line of credit was down to about $35,000. … [ 109 ] The mother’s child-support chart (her affidavit, Ex

J) does not reflect any credits for the asserted matrimonial-debt payments. In her brief she stated: The Father claims he did not pay child support because he was left with the marital debt. He confirmed [in questioning] that the marital debt was his corporation’s line of credit and a credit card …. He has since paid the credit card off (at least once) and paid down the line of credit ….

The Father confirms that at times he draws on the line of credit for his own use …. [ 110 ] After the application, I received, from both parties and with their mutual agreement, synopses of key undertaking responses provided by each party to the other after questioning. The mother’s synopsis (of information provided by the father) included: … [the father] provided the outstanding balances on his company line of credit for the year ending December 2018 ($48,524), 2019 ($50,904) and 2020 ($81,730). [The father] indicated he did not pay child support as he was paying matrimonial debt.

However, it is clear that he is using this line of credit for personal expenses. Further, it had been paid down and then was increased due to his use of the same. [ 111 ] The father did not argue that the line of credit in question, in the name of 137, was used exclusively for family (versus corporate) expenses.

Neither did he provide a breakdown of the line of credit balances, at any given point, among corporate, family, and purely personal expenses. [ 112 ] Given this evidence shortfall, I cannot determine what amount of matrimonial debt the father actually agreed to shoulder (assuming such an agreement between the parties) or the amount, if any, by which the matrimonial debt has been reduced via his line-of- credit payments. [ 113 ] Accordingly, I make no adjustment to the above arrears for any line-of-credit payments. 7.

Support since mid-June 2019 and ongoing [ 114 ] The focus shifts to support since shared parenting began. Here the father’s “insufficient evidence for subsection 9(

c) analysis” is engaged. He points to the absence of a child-expense budget for either party and income and expense-sharing information (as applicable) for each party’s new partner. Given those gaps, no proper child-support analysis is possible.

[ 115 ] The mother did not address these dimensions in her affidavit or brief. At the application, she asserted that I can, and should, determine child-support arrears to the present and also set ongoing support, based on the existing record. [ 116 ] I see two difficulties, one raised by the mother herself. Father’s second corporation [ 117 ] First, she points to a second income-generating, corporation set up by the father, apparently in summer 2019, and to the absence of financial statements for that corporation.

One of her undertaking synopses identified bank deposits for that corporation totaling approximately $128,000 between September 2019 and August 2020. [ 118 ] The father did not provide much information about that corporation, other than post-application submissions via his counsel that bank deposits are a poor proxy for income. [ 119 ] Given that this corporation apparently came into play around when shared parenting started, it is premature to calculate the child support that should have been paid, if any, from mid-June 2019 forward or ongoing without more information about this corporation, specifically how (if at all) it bears on his income. [ 120 ] I direct that the father provide the customary disclosure for this corporation to the mother.

If the parties cannot agree on the scope and timing of this disclosure, I will set the details. Missing subsection 9(

c) information [ 121 ] Equally important, without child-expense budgets, “other partner” income and expense-sharing evidence (as applicable) and anything else required to perform a proper ss 9(

c) analysis, I cannot calculate the post mid-June 2019 arrears or set ongoing support. [ 122 ] Here I invoke and adopt the analysis of Feth J. in Ranachala (Holland) v Holland [22] : [78] The Father initially submitted that a set-off is presumptively applicable in these circumstances and that evidence addressing s 9(

b) and (

c) of the Guidelines is therefore unnecessary. As a consequence, he did not provide evidence about increased expenses arising from shared custody, nor the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each parent and the Child. [79] Similarly, little evidence was presented by the Mother about those factors. She argues that due to the inadequate evidence, the Father’s application to vary child support should fail. [80] During oral argument, I rejected the submission that there should be a presumptive set-off.

Contino makes plain that no such presumption exists and that all three factors operate conjunctively. A simple set-off between the parents’ respective Table amounts serves as an appropriate starting point for the analysis, but more is required. [81] Counsel for the Father then sought permission to introduce additional evidence for that purpose.

In effect, he was asking to adjourn part of the application. [82] The Supreme Court of Canada in Contino and the Alberta Court of Appeal in MacDonald and Conway v Conway , 2011 ABCA 137 emphasized the obligation imposed on judges to ensure that proper financial information and budgets delineating child related expenses are before the Court prior to making a decision about child support under s 9.

The Supreme Court instructed that courts should demand information from the parties when it is deficient and suggested courts should adjourn a motion or application to permit a party to provide additional evidence : para 57. See also: Woodford v MacDonald , 2014 NSCA 31 at para 37 where that Court concluded the judge should have asked for more information before proceeding. [83] Since child support serves the best interests of the Child, failing to demand the information and merely dismissing the application might inflict a disadvantage on the Child by creating an imbalance between households .

As noted by the Court of Appeal in MacDonald at para 12 , a “critical inquiry” is whether the Child will experience a difference in the standard of living as she moves between the two households. Great disparities between the households are to be avoided. In my view, some procedural inefficiency should be tolerated if that promotes the Child’s best interests . [84] The evidence currently raises a realistic possibility that an imbalance between households will arise if child support is not varied.

The Father refers to his ongoing financial difficulties and the possibility that the Mother, who has re-partnered, might have greater means. However, more information is required. [85] I conclude that the Father should be allowed to introduce additional evidence for this application, with reply evidence from the Mother, so that the parties may address the remaining factors in s 9 of the Guidelines .

As observed in Desjardins v Bouey , 2013 ABQB 714 , at para 39 [ Desjardins ] , both parents should provide evidence or risk an adverse result. [86 ] The Mother raises a concern about the inefficiency of re-opening the evidence and bifurcating the hearing of this application. The Court is always concerned about judicial economy and the prudent use of parents’ resources. However, in these circumstances, the best interests of the Child favour that step.

Much of the Mother’s burden arising from the inefficiency can be addressed through the costs award after the determination of the application. [87] I am mindful that this inquiry under the second stage of the s 9 analysis should not be unduly burdensome to the parties. The complexity of the evidence should respect the magnitude of the financial interests in play. That is consistent with the efficiency objective under the Guidelines . [88] With the benefit of oral submissions from counsel about the scope of the necessary evidence here, I am directing the parties to provide the following:

a) Statements of income, assets and liabilities (Schedule A to Form FL-17);

b) Household budgets;

c) Child expense budgets; and

d) Disclosure of the financial contributions of the Mother’s new partner to their household expenses and his 2019 and estimated 2020 incomes. (This information is relevant to ascertaining the standard of living enjoyed in the Mother’s household: see Desjardins at para 43 . ) [89] As discussed with counsel, the parties are encouraged to make admissions and stipulations that reduce the need for supporting documents. The budgets and additional disclosure need only be supported by brief affidavits, unless the parties place them before me by agreement. [90] I remain seized of this application.

Counsel are directed to explore a timetable for the exchange of the new evidence and brief written submissions, and to report to me in writing with a proposal within 15 days. A date for the continuation of the hearing will then be set. [emphasis added] [ 123 ] The same additional materials are needed here to resolve the post-mid-June 2019 arrears (if any) and set ongoing child support. 8.

Should the matrimonial home (and an adjoining parcel) be listed for sale? [ 124 ] The mother requested this relief and sought sole control over the sale process. [ 125 ] The father did not contest the need to sale those properties. However, he seeks an appraisal of the parcels and a reasonable opportunity to seek financing to buy out the mother’s position in both. [ 126 ] I do not see why the mother should have sole control over any sale process. The father’s requests are reasonable. E.

Conclusion [ 127 ] I summarize (and elaborate): 1. shared parenting and joint decision-making to continue; 2. retroactive arrears figure for 2018 and up to mid-June 2019 set at father’s Exhibit D figure (to be upward-adjusted for the noted setting of his 2018 income at $80,000); 3. arrears payments shall commence effective January 1, 2021 at a minimum rate of $1,000 monthly; 4. calculation of any post-mid-June 2019 arrears (to the present) and ongoing child support to be completed once father provides disclosure of second-corporation information and the parties provide the requested “subsection 9(c)” information; and 5. two properties to be appraised (cost borne equally) and, if the father does not buy out the mother’s interest by a to-be-set deadline or obtain her agreement to an extension of that deadline, the properties will be listed for sale, with the opening list price(

s) as agreed by the parties and, if no agreement, at the appraised price(s). [ 128 ] If the parties require directions or clarification on any aspect (e.g. if they cannot agree on any aspect where I have asked them to attempt to agree), I invite them to contact me (via my assistant) with a very brief sketch of the issue(

s) and their respective positions. [ 129 ] I will address costs of the application once the requested follow-up information has been provided and I have decided the remaining points or, if the parties come to terms on those points, after they so advise. Heard on the 1 st day of October, 2020. Dated at Edmonton, Alberta this 7 th day of December, 2020. M. J. Lema J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances:

Laura Bruyer Bruyer & Mackay LLP for the Applicant/Cross Respondent Barbara L. Acton Nelson Tymafichuk Law Office for the Respondent/Cross Applicant