R v Buschemeyer, 2021 ABQB 1008

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v Buschemeyer, 2021 ABQB 1008 Date: 20211216 Docket: 190633156Q2 Registry: Lethbridge Between: Her Majesty the Queen Crown - and - Reginald Charles Buschemeyer Accused Restriction on Publication Identification Ban – See the Criminal Code ,

section 486.4 . By Court Order, information that could identify S.S. and K.S. must not be published, broadcast, or transmitted in any way. NOTE: Identifying information has been removed from this judgment to comply with the ban so that it may be published. _______________________________________________________ Sentencing Reasons of the Honourable Mr. Justice M. David Gates _______________________________________________________

Introduction and Overview [ 1 ] The Accused, Reginald Charles Buschemeyer, (“Mr. Buschemeyer”) was convicted by a jury in Lethbridge, Alberta, on March 3, 2021 of a series of offences relating to two young persons, S.S. and K.S. He was charged with three counts of sexual assault, two relating to S.S., the first alleged to have occurred between July 1, 2018, and August 31, 2018, and the second between November 1, 2018, and November 30, 2018.

The third count of sexual assault was alleged to have taken place between April 1, 2018, and August 31, 2018, relative to K.S. [ 2 ] In addition, the Accused was charged with three counts of sexual exploitation, Count #3 and #4 and #6 in the indictment, all alleged to have taken place during the same period of time as the offences of sexual assault set out in Count #1, #2 and #5 of the Indictment. [ 3 ] On my instructions, the jury were instructed that they could not return guilty verdicts on any of the counts charging sexual exploitation, but that they were to consider the included offence of sexual interference, contrary to s. 151 of the Criminal Code . [ 4 ] The jury returned verdicts of guilty on Count #1, #2, #3, and #4 on the Indictment.

They found the Accused not guilty of the offence of sexual assault set out in Count #5, but guilty of the lesser and included offence of common assault, contrary to s. 266 of the Criminal Code . In addition, they found the Accused not guilty of Count #6, the alleged sexual exploitation/sexual interference relative to K.S. [ 5 ] In the absence of the jury, the Accused also entered pleas of guilty to two counts of failing to comply with an order of prohibition directing him not to have any communication with any person under the age of sixteen years, contrary to s. 161(4) of the Criminal Code .

These offences are set out as Count #1 and Count #7 on the Q-1 Indictment. [ 6 ] Following the jury verdict, I directed Alberta Health Services, Southern Alberta Forensic Psychiatry Centre, to prepare a pre- sentence report and risk assessment relative to Mr. Buschemeyer. Their report was filed with the Court on October 22, 2021. [ 7 ] The offence of sexual assault, contrary to

section 271 of the Criminal Code , carries a maximum punishment of 10 years when prosecuted by Indictment. However, if the complainant is under the age of 16 years, the

section provides that the maximum punishment is 14 years imprisonment. In addition, the Criminal Code provides that an accused is subject to a minimum punishment of 1 year in such circumstances. [ 8 ] The offence of assault, contrary to

section 266 of the Criminal Code , carries a maximum punishment of 5 years imprisonment when prosecuted by Indictment. [ 9 ] The offence of sexual interference, contrary to

section 151 of the Criminal Code , carries a maximum sentence of 14 years imprisonment and a minimum punishment of 1 year. [ 10 ] Finally, the offence of breach of a prohibition order carries a maximum sentence of four years imprisonment when prosecuted by Indictment. [ 11 ] The sentencing hearing took place in Lethbridge, Alberta, on November 29, 2021. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, I sentenced Mr. Buschemeyer to a global sentence of 69 months imprisonment, less enhanced credit for time spent in pre-trial custody. I also made a series of ancillary orders.

I indicated at the time that the reasons for my sentencing decision would be filed separately. These are my reasons for decision. Facts [ 12 ] In accordance with

section 724 of the Criminal Code , the parties have agreed to the following set of facts for the purposes of this sentencing hearing:

a) The Offender, R.B., was subject to conditions that prohibited him from having contact with children under the age of 16 years, yet entered into a relationship with a female who had two teenage children, then approximately ages 11 and 14.

b) The Offender breached the Prohibition Order by being in contact with two children, S. S. and K. S., when he specifically was advised this was not approved.

c) During the relationship the Offender had sexual contact with the child, S. S., and touched her for a sexual purpose while she was under the age of 16 years, with his hand, contrary to

section 151 of the Criminal Code , on two occasions:

i) in her bedroom where he touched her bare chest between her covers; ii) in the garage under the card table when he rubbed her leg and groin region.

d) During the relationship the Offender assaulted the child, K. S., by pushing her onto her bed and putting his hand on her shoulder and upper chest without her consent. [ 13 ] All of these offences took place while the Accused was in a romantic relationship and residing with the Mother of S. S. and K. S. in Lethbridge, Alberta.

Principles of Sentencing [ 14 ] The principles of sentencing are set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code . These statutory provisions provide a clear and comprehensive outline of the factors that I must take into consideration in sentencing Mr. Buschemeyer for the various offences before the Court today. [ 15 ]

Section 718 provides as follows: The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing sanction that have one or more of the following objectives:

a) To denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

b) To deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;

c) To separate offenders from society, where necessary;

d) To assist in rehabilitating offenders;

e) To provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

f) To promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community. [ 16 ]

Section 718.01 provides that the objectives of denunciation and deterrence are to be given primary consideration in relation to offences that involve the abuse of children under the age of eighteen years. This principle recognizes the significant vulnerability of children to the unlawful conduct of others. [ 17 ] In accordance with s. 718.1, a sentence must be proportional, that is that it must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. [ 18 ] Finally, s. 718.2 of the Criminal Code provides that:

a) A sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;

b) Where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh;

c) An offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and

d) All available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. [ 19 ] The application of these principles during the sentencing process is one of the most difficult tasks facing trial judges.

Fortunately, there are a large number of decided cases by various courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada and provincial appellate courts, that provide significant guidance in terms of the proper application of these principles. A number of these decisions are discussed later in these Reasons. The Circumstances of the Accused [ 20 ] The Accused is currently 44 years of age. He has a lengthy criminal record dating back to 2009, Exhibit #S-2. He has three previous convictions for offences involving violence, notably a December 2014 conviction for sexual assault.

As set out in the forensic report prepared by Dr. David Tano, Southern Alberta Forensic Psychiatry Centre, this conviction involved multiple acts of sexual violence visited upon the Accused’s biological daughter over a number of years. Mr. Buschemeyer was sentenced to 48 months in jail in relation to that matter following a guilty plea. In conjunction with that conviction, he was placed under a 20-year order, pursuant to

section 161 of the Criminal Code , prohibiting him from having any contact with anyone under the age of 16 years. [ 21 ] I also note that the criminal record includes a number of convictions for breach of court orders, including probation orders and the terms of release orders. Further, the criminal record includes a conviction for possession of stolen property in April 2021, a conviction entered following the jury verdict in the within matter, but prior to the sentencing hearing. As a subsequent conviction, I do not attach the same significance to this offence as I would to a prior conviction.

However, the circumstances relating to this subsequent conviction are important to a complete understanding of Mr. Buschemeyer’s current custodial status. [ 22 ] Mr. Buschemeyer obtained judicial interim release relative to the various matters that are now before the court. His common law partner, D.G., the biological mother of S.S. and K.S., agreed to stand as a surety. However, following his conviction by the jury, D.G. reported to the police that Mr. Buschemeyer had stolen various pieces of jewellery and other items from her home and had pawned these items in order to obtain cash. Mr.

Buschemeyer was subsequently charged and plead guilty to possession of stolen property. At around this same time, D.G. applied to withdraw as Mr. Buschemeyer’s surety. This application was heard and granted by Kubik J. Thereafter, Mr. Buschemeyer surrendered himself into police custody at the end of March 2021. He has been in custody every since. [ 23 ] As outlined above, the Court has the benefit of a forensic report and risk assessment prepared by Dr. David Tano, dated October 25, 2021.

[ 24 ] The Report contains an extensive description of Mr. Buschemeyer’s personal circumstances, notably his very troubled past. He is the middle child in a sibling line of three children, born in Chatham, Ontario. He moved to Newfoundland with his family at the age of 6 months, and subsequently to Calgary, when he was in Grade 3 or 4, on account of his father’s employment. He attended school until the end of Grade 12, but did not graduate. He subsequently obtained his GED and then his welding ticket.

In his medical records, it is revealed that he indicated at one point that he also had a diploma in marine biology, though there is no evidence to suggest that this is accurate. [ 25 ] His parents are both deceased. He left home at the age of 13 years, and had virtually no contact with his parents or siblings thereafter. Indeed, he had limited contact with his older sister and younger brother even while residing in the same home. [ 26 ] The family were devout members of Jehovah Witness, but Mr. Buschemeyer questioned the teachings of the church from an early age and was ultimately excommunicated from the church.

His perceived lack of faith caused significant friction within the family. [ 27 ] According to Mr. Buschemeyer, he was subjected to significant abuse during his childhood; physical abuse by his father; emotional abuse by his mother who wanted nothing to do with him; and sexual abuse at the hands of a maternal uncle and a friend of that uncle. Between the ages of 7 and 9, he visited this uncle’s farm and was sexually assaulted, tied up and beaten in a barn. When he reported the abuse to his parents, he was called a liar and informed that this sort of thing did not happen in their religion. Mr.

Buschemeyer also disclosed this abuse to his former common law partner, D.G. However, on another occasion, he told her that this same uncle was his favorite uncle whom he loved spending time with. [ 28 ] After he left home at the age of 13, Mr. Buschemeyer was homeless and lived on the streets of Calgary for about 2 years. He also lived at a series of group homes or shelters according to his nursing records. At the age of 15, he claims to have been taken in by the Grim Reapers motorcycle gang after they encountered him selling drugs for the club. Mr.

Buschemeyer reports that the club allowed him to live at their clubhouse in Calgary, terminated his drug trafficking activities, and assisted him in reconnecting with school. He discontinued his association with the Grim Reapers at the age of 17 after they amalgamated with the Hell’s Angels. He reported his association with the Hell’s Angels to D.G., telling her that he had to “do things to people” that he could not talk about, and that he had trouble sleeping because of “what he knew”. [ 29 ] He obtained unspecified employment and his own accommodation after separating from the motorcycle gang.

At the age of 19, he met L.D., who was 17 years of age and homeless at the time. They had two children together, a daughter, now 24 years of age, and a son, now 22 years of age Mr. Buschemeyer describes the relationship with L.D. as volatile. They separated when their eldest child was approximately 3 years of age. The children moved back and forth between the two parents, with their daughter living with her father on a full-time basis for a period of time. [ 30 ] The son’s memories of his early childhood involved his father being drunk and fighting with the neighbours.

He recalled that his father drank alcohol on a daily basis, and that he used marihuana and crack cocaine. The two children moved to Ottawa with their mother when they were 9 and 11 years of age, respectively. While Mr. Buschemeyer reported contact with the children every few months after they moved to Ottawa, he maintains that he last had contact with his daughter when she was 12 years of age. [ 31 ] As outlined in the Forensic Report, Mr. Buschemeyer may have fathered two other children, but he is not certain. He does not report any contact with any of these other children. [ 32 ] Mr.

Buschemeyer was involved in a motorcycle accident 10-15 years ago. He reports damage to the frontal lobe, spine and neck problems that aggravated existing issues with headaches. He claims that the accident has also created significant issues with his memory, though there is no medical evidence to support this assertion. His former common-law partner, D.G. reported that he told friends from time to time that he is dying of brain cancer, though this clearly does not appear to be the case.

I note that in the Forensic Report, the validity scale test results obtained on the MMPI-2-PF, a self-report measure of personality and psychopathology, raised concerns about the possible impact of over-reporting of symptoms. It was also noted that he did not display any significant memory deficits during the course of the assessment itself. [ 33 ] These particular test results, as well as the anecdotal information provided by D.G. and Mr. Buschemeyer’s son, leave me skeptical regarding Mr. Buschemeyer’s reliability as a narrator of past and present events.

Indeed, his son suggested that “He’ll say anything to save his own skin; to make himself out to be the victim”. I note in this regard that the Assessment Report also found that Mr. Buschemeyer suffered from a narcissistic personality disorder, and that he displayed entitled-like behaviour throughout most of his interactions with staff during the assessment process.

The Report also noted (at p. 20) that “impact on the victims has rarely, if ever, arose as a significant issue for him and rather, his focus was more on how he is a victim, misunderstood, falsely accused, and is now focused on his future endeavours of creating a non-profit organization and moving on with his life”. [ 34 ] Mr. Buschemeyer’s son contacted his father approximately 3 years ago and came to stay with Mr. Buschemeyer and D.G. for a few days in Lethbridge. The son continued to have contact with his father via Facebook thereafter, though the communication stopped in March 2021. [ 35 ] Mr.

Buschemeyer lived in various communities in Ontario and Alberta following his break-up with L.D. He returned to Calgary in 2014, as he was then the subject of a Canada-wide warrant for the sexual assault of his biological daughter. As noted above, he was charged with sexual assault, entered a guilty plea, and was sentenced to 48 months in jail. After completing his sentence at the Bowden Institution in 2016, he was released on parole and lived in a half-way house in Lethbridge. There is some suggestion in the evidence that he was re-committed to custody as a result of parole violations.

However, once released, he returned to Lethbridge and commenced a relationship with D.G. sometime in 2017. They resided together in D.G.’s home for approximately three years until late March 2021. According to D.G., the relation was marked by abusive behavior on the part of Mr. Buschemeyer. [ 36 ] Mr. Buschemeyer has a long history of employment, though he has had some difficulty sustaining that employment. It is reported that he has difficulty maintaining consistent attendance, getting along with other employees, and that he sometimes lacks focus.

During his most recent common-law relationship, D.G. reported that he was off work for a period of approximately one year.

[ 37 ] The Forensic Report documents a long history of substance abuse dating back to Mr. Buschemeyer’s early childhood. He began consuming alcohol at the age of 9 years. Prior to the occurrence of the events giving rise to the most recent charges, both Mr. Buschemeyer and D.G. report that he started drinking right after morning coffee and was consuming a mickey or a 26-ounce bottle of vodka each day, together with a fifteen pack of beer. In addition, he reported daily use of marihuana since the age of 10 years. He also reported using crack cocaine for a year when he was in his late 20’s.

He admitting using crack on two occasions in recent years, but stopped as D.G. did not approve. Based on the input of D.G. in the preparation of the Forensic Report, it would appear that his use of hard drugs was more extensive in recent years that he is currently prepared to acknowledge. [ 38 ] Mr. Buschemeyer has never participated in alcohol or drug treatment programs, other than attending AA meetings while serving at the Bowden Institution. He candidly acknowledges that he did not embrace that opportunity. It seems clear that Mr.

Buschemeyer has, at least until now, lacked the required motivation to seek assistance for his substance abuse issues. [ 39 ] The Forensic Report concludes that Mr. Buschemeyer poses a moderate to high risk of re-offending in a sexually inappropriate manner. In this regard, Dr. Tano notes that his sexual offences are opportunistic, as opposed to predatory, in nature, and that his current offences do not display any escalation of sexual violence from his earlier sexual offence. He also expresses the view that Mr.

Buschemeyer “meets the diagnostic criteria for pedophilic disorder, non-exclusive type, sexually attracted to females”: Forensic Report, p 19. [ 40 ] The Report identifies the factors that would increase Mr. Buschemeyer’s risk for future sexual misconduct in the following terms (at p 21): The primary risk factors which would increase his risk for future recidivism would be substance use difficulties, as well as situations where he has the opportunity to victimize children.

It does not appear that he is predatory, nor does it appear that he has grooming-like behaviours, bur rather tends to offend in opportunistic fashions, ie where the victim (ex, his own biological children or the children of his girlfriend at the time) are within his household and accessible. [ 41 ] The Forensic Report recommends that Mr. Buschemeyer receive sex offender treatment programming, as well as treatment for substance abuse.

At p 21 of the Report, it also recommends that “[E]xploration into further treatment into child abuse trauma will be of significant benefit, along with improving his stress-management and coping strategies.” [ 42 ] Dr. Tano concludes that Mr. Buschemeyer suffers from a substance abuse disorder primarily related to alcohol and marijuana as well as a narcissistic personality disorder and some traits associated with an antisocial personality disorder. Finally, Dr. Tano recommends that Mr. Buschemeyer be assessed in the future for post-traumatic stress disorder given his history of childhood abuse.

Victim Impact Statements [ 43 ] No written victim impact statements were filed in relation to this matter. I am, however, satisfied that both S.S. and K.S. were informed of their right to provide such statements for this sentencing hearing. [ 44 ] K.S., together with her Father and her Mother, D.G. attended the sentencing hearing. Through Crown Counsel, K.S. related to the Court that she has been greatly affected by the incident. She reported that she is currently seeing a counsellor. She also reported but that she does not trust men, other than her Father, as a result of what happened.

K.S. believes that this incident will stay with her for the rest of her life. K.S. is currently living with her grandmother. [ 45 ] K.S. related that her sister, S.S., is also seeing a counsellor. S.S. is currently living with her Father. While K.S. was not able to provide a detailed account of how these offences have affected S.S., she did indicate that S.S. is struggling more than K.S. as a result of what took place. The Position of the Crown [ 46 ] The Crown suggests that a global sentence of 7 years is appropriate in this instance.

Specifically, the Crown proposes a sentence of five years of imprisonment for each of the counts of sexual interference, to be served concurrently to one and other; six months consecutive for the assault in relation to K. S.; and a period of 18 months imprisonment for each of the

section 161 convictions, concurrent to one another, but consecutive to the other sentences to be imposed. Further, the Crown seeks a series of ancillary orders – a DNA order; a lifetime Firearms Prohibition Order; a lifetime SOIRA order; a no contact order pursuant to

section 743.21 of the Criminal Code ; and a lifetime prohibition order pursuant to

section 161 of the Criminal Code relating to communication with anyone under the age of 16 years. [ 47 ] The Crown relies of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Friesen , 2020 SCC 9 . The Crown says that Friesen changed the landscape on sentencing for sexual violence against children.

The Crown maintains that the Supreme Court directed that sentences should be increased in these types of cases to reflect the high degree of moral blameworthiness of such offences, as well as the very harmful effect of sexual violence on children. [ 48 ] The Crown contends that the decision in Friesen reflects Parliaments intent to increase the penalties for sexual offences relating to children, as well as society’ developing understanding of the wrongfulness of these types of offences.

Further, the Crown urges the Court to find that Friesen refocuses sentencing ranges that may have existed in the past and mandates substantial sentences in these kinds of cases. Finally, according to the Crown, the Supreme Court called on trial courts to increase the sentences for such offences beyond the precedents and starting-points that may have previously been established.

The Position of the Defence [ 49 ] Relying on the decision of Kraus J. in R v E.F. , 2021 ABQB 639 , and the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Exell , 2015 ONCA 704 , the Defence urges the Court to impose a global sentence of 4 years – a total of 3 years for the offences relating to S.S.; 2 months consecutive for the assault on K.S.; and 10 months for each of the convictions for breach of the prohibition order.

The Defence says that these latter sentences should be served concurrently to one and other, but consecutively to the sentences imposed for the remaining offences. [ 50 ] The Defence seeks enhanced credit on a 1.5:1 basis for the 225 days that Mr. Buschemeyer has spent in pre-sentence custody. [ 51 ] Further, the Defence filed a document, Exhibit #S-4, briefly outlining the very challenging conditions that Mr. Buschemeyer has faced at the Lethbridge Correctional Center as a result of the protocols and procedures established to address Covid-19.

The Defence asks this Court to acknowledge these extra-ordinary circumstances as a mitigating circumstance supporting a modest reduction in the global sentence that Mr. Buschemeyer would otherwise be required to serve in this instance. [ 52 ] During the period of March 29, 2021 to April 13, 2021, Mr. Buschemeyer was placed in quarantine as a new inmate entering the Lethbridge Correctional Center. During this two-week period, he spent 23.5 hours per day in lock-down. He was permitted to be out of his cell for one, twenty-minute phone call per day.

He was only allowed to shower once per week and only given one pair of socks and one pair of underwear for the entire period. Similarly, he was only provided with one set of bedding. Similar conditions existed during a two-week lockdown that took place between April 27 and May 12, 2021, though showers were permitted twice a week. I accept Mr. Buschemeyer’s assertion that various other lockdowns took place during the period of time that he was on remand at the Lethbridge Correctional Center. [ 53 ] Exhibit #4 also outlines the triple-bunking situation that existed during the period of May 15 to July 21, 2021.

There were three Covid outbreaks at the Center during this period of time that led to 22 hour per day lockdowns, limited access to showers and to clothing exchanges. Mr. Buschemeyer also indicated that it was extremely hot and crowded in the cells at the time such that he suffered from heat exhaustion on two occasions. Analysis [ 54 ] I agree with the essence of the Crown’s submissions regarding the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Friesen as regards our previous approach to sentencing in relation to sexual offences involving children.

Based on my review of Friesen , and some of the decision that have applied this new approach, I am satisfied that these offences call for a substantial period of imprisonment. However, for the reasons that follow, I am of the view that a fit and proper sentence in this instance falls between the global sentences proposed by the Crown and the Defence.

I find that a global sentence of 6 years is appropriate in this instance. [ 55 ] Given the very significant shift in our approach to sentencing mandated by Friesen , I propose to briefly outline the Supreme Court’s directions in this regard. [ 56 ] First, I would refer to para 5 in Friesen , in which the Chief Justice and Rowe J stated: …we send a strong message that sexual offences against children are violent crimes that wrongfully exploit children’s vulnerability and cause profound harm to children, and communities. Sentences for these crimes must increase.

Courts must impose sentences that are proportional to the gravity of sexual offences against children and the degree of responsibility of the offender, as informed by Parliament’s sentencing initiatives and by society’s deepened understanding of the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual violence against children.

Sentences must accurately reflect the wrongfulness of sexual violence against children and the far-reaching and ongoing harm that it causes to children, families, and society at large. [ 57 ] I would also note that the Crown referred the Court to para 113-114 of Friesen during the course of their sentencing submissions. I would reproduce portions of these two paragraphs: 113. Much like the offence of impaired driving causing death, sexual offences against children can cover a wide variety of circumstances (see Lacasse , at para 66).

Appellate guidance should make clear that sentencing judges can respond to this reality by imposing sentences that reflect increases in the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender... 114 . D. (D.) , Woodward , and S. (J .), and this Court’s own decision in M. (C.A.) and L.M. make clear that imposing proportionate sentences that respond to the gravity of sexual offences against children and the degree of responsibility of offenders will frequently require substantial sentences. Parliament’s statutory amendments have strengthened that message.

It is not the role of this Court to establish a range or to outline in which circumstances such substantial sentences should be imposed. Nor would it be appropriate for any court to set out binding or inflexible quantitative guidance – as Moldaver J wrote in D. (D.) , “Judges must retain the flexibility needed to do justice in individual cases” and to individualize the sentence to the offender who is before them ( at para 33).

Nonetheless, it is incumbent on us to provide an overall message that is clear (D. (D.) , at paras 34 and 45)... [ 58 ] At para 114, the decision in Friesen addressed the proper use of maximum sentences in the following terms: In addition, as this Court recognized in L.M. , maximum sentences should not be reserved for the “abstract case of the worst crime committed in the worst circumstances” (para 22).

Instead, a maximum sentence should be imposed whenever the circumstances warrant it (para 20). [ 59 ] I am grateful to my colleague Kraus J for his very thorough and comprehensive analysis of the Friesen decision in R v E.F. , 2021 ABQB 639 , one of the decisions relied on by the Defence in this instance. I would respectfully adopt Justice Kraus’s

summary of

the key principles flowing from Friesen , found at paras 32-38 of his reasons in E.F. : 32. The Supreme Court declared that protecting children from harm is the overarching objective of the criminalization of sexual activity with them (para 42), and that sentencing judges must properly understand the wrongfulness of sexual offences against children and the profound harm that they cause (at para 50). The SCC declared (at para 76): Courts must impose sentences that are commensurate with the gravity of sexual offences against children.

It is not sufficient for courts to simply state that sexual offences against children are serious. The sentences imposed must reflect the normative character of the offender’s actions and the consequential harm to children and their families, caregivers and communities (see M (C.A.) , at para. 80; R v Morrisey , 2000 SCC 39 , [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, at para. 35 ). We thus offer some guidance on how courts should give effect to the gravity of sexual offences against children.

Specifically, courts must recognize and give effect to (1) the inherent wrongfulness of these offences; (2) the potential harm to children that flows from these offences; and (3) the actual harm that children suffer as a result of these offences. We emphasize that sexual offences against children are inherently wrongful and always put children at risk of serious harm even as the degree of wrongfulness, the extent to which potential harm materializes, and actual harm vary from case to case. 33.

The SCC explained that sexual offences against children are especially wrongful because the offenders exploit the vulnerability of children (para 65). 34. The SCC cautioned that sexual interference with a child should not be treated less serious than sexual assault of a child. The SCC stressed the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual interference, stating (at para 75): In particular, courts need to take into account the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual offences against children when applying the proportionality principle.

Accurately understanding both factors is key to imposing a proportionate sentence ( R v Nur , 2015 SCC 15 , [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773, at paras 43-44 ). The wrongfulness and the harmfulness impact both the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Taking the wrongfulness and harmfulness into account will ensure that the proportionality principle serves its function of “ensur[ing] that offenders are held responsible for their actions and that the sentence properly reflects and condemns their role in the offence and the harm they caused” ( Nasogaluak , at para. 42). 35.

The SCC explained that physical contact of a sexual nature with a child is a wrongful act of physical and psychological violence, even if it is not accompanied by additional physical violence and does not result in physical or psychological injury (at para 77). 36. The SCC cautioned against the myth that harm to the victim depends on the type of sexual activity involved (at paras 120 and 144): 120. It is an error of law to treat sexual interference as less serious than sexual assault.

As stated above, Parliament has established the same maximum sentence for both sexual interference and sexual assault of a person under the age of 16. The elements of the offence are similar, and a conviction for sexual assault of a child and for sexual interference with a child can frequently be supported on the same factual foundation ( R v M. (S.J.) , 2009 ONCA 244 , 247 OA.C. 178, at para 8 ). 144.

Specifically, we would strongly caution courts against downgrading the wrongfulness of the offence or the harm to the victim where the sexually violent conduct does not involve penetration, fellatio, or cunnilingus, but instead touching or masturbation. There is no basis to assume, as some courts appear to have done, that sexual touching without penetration can be [TRANSLATION] “relatively benign” (see R v Caron Barrette , 2018 QCCA 516 , 46 C.R. (7 th ) 400, at paras. 93-94 )... 37. The SCC directed that such offences be punished more harshly than they have been in the past (paras 45 and 95 to 100).

The SCC indicated that mid-single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children should be considered normal and double-digit penitentiary terms should be neither unusual nor reserved for rare or exceptional circumstances. Substantial sentences can be imposed where there was only a single instance of sexual violence and/or a single victim (para 114). 38. Finally, the SCC identified a number of specific considerations which govern the determination of a fit sentence. These factors are:

a) the likelihood that the offender will reoffend (paras 122 to 124),

b) the abuse of a position of trust or authority (paras 125 to 130),

c) the duration and frequency of the sexual violence (paras 131 to 133),

d) the age of the victim, recognizing that disproportionately low sentences were historically imposed in cases involving adolescents (para 134 to 136),

e) the degree of physical interference (paras 137 to 147), and

f) participation of the victim (paras 148 to 154). Application of the Friesen Considerations

a) Likelihood the Offender will Reoffend [ 60 ] I accept Dr. Tano’s conclusion set out in the Assessment Report that Mr. Buschemeyer poses a moderate to high risk of reoffending. Dr. Tano identifies his primary risk factors as continuing substance abuse difficulties and opportunities in which he has the chance to interact with children. [ 61 ] Mr. Buschemeyer’s lack of acknowledgement to date of the nature and extend of his substance abuse, coupled with his lack of

action to address this addiction, gives rise to significant concern. Likewise, previous court direction through the form of a prohibitionorder did not have the intended effect of restricting Mr. Buschemeyer’s opportunities to interact with children under the age of 16 years.As previously discussed, less than a year following his release from custody for his prior conviction for sexual assault, he was residingin the residence of his girlfriend and her two adolescent daughters. [62] As more fully discussed below, Mr.

Buschemeyer’s expressions of regret and remorse during the course of the sentencinghearing offer some reasons to be hopeful that this most recent conviction has provided him with some new insights into his underlyingbehaviours. Nonetheless, his risk of reoffending remains a very serious concern.

b) The Abuse of a Position of Trust or Authority [63] At the time of these offences, S.S. and K.S. were spending significant periods of time in the care of their Mother and residingin her home. A shared parenting arrangement existed at the time such that the two young women were going back and forth between theresidence of their Father and the residence of their Mother. [64] Mr. Buschemeyer’s relationship with D.G. commenced sometime in the fall of 2017. By the spring of 2018, when theseoffences began, he was certainly residing at D.G.’s residence on a full-time basis.

As such, he had ready and frequent access to S.S. andK.S. It is noteworthy that the assault on K.S. took place in her bedroom. One of the incidents of sexual interference with S.S. also tookplace in her bedroom. The other incident of sexual interference with S.S. took place in the garage of her Mother’s residence. [65] The fact that all of the incidents took place within the home that S.S. and K.S. occupied at least on a part-time basis is anaggravating circumstance in this instance.

Children are entitled to feel safe in every part of the world that they occupy, but particularly intheir own home and in the intimate and private space represented by their bedroom. Likewise, they are entitled to feel safe from thoseadults, including parents, close family members, and the intimate partners of their primary care-givers, who have ready and generallyunrestricted access to them. As a fellow-occupant of the residence, Mr. Buschemeyer had opportunities to be alone with the childrenwhile their Mother was at work.

On the evidence before the jury, there is no suggestion that there were any limits or restrictions placedon his access to all parts of the home, including the childrens’ bedrooms. [66] I am satisfied that Mr. Buschemeyer’s status as the live-in boyfriend of D.G. placed him in a position of trust or authorityrelative to S.S. and K.S.

c) The Duration and Frequency of the Sexual Violence [67] The sexual violence on S.S. took place on two separate occasions. In both instances, the actions of Mr. Buschemeyer wererelatively brief. The sexual violence visited upon S.S. did not involve any explicit threat or any other form of violence beyond the sexualviolence itself. However, I note the Supreme Court’s caution in Friesen about downgrading the wrongfulness of

an act of sexualinterference that involves sexual touching.

d) The Age of the Victim [68] S.S. was 11 years of age at the time of these two offences. As such, she was a young adolescent, soon to be entering herteenage years. In Friesen, the Court discussed the impact of sexual violence on adolescents. At para 136, the Court stated: ...courts must also be particularly careful to impose proportionate sentences in cases where the victim is an adolescent.

Historically,disproportionately low sentences have been imposed in these cases, particularly cases involving adolescent girls, even though adolescentsmay be an age group that is disproportionately victimized by sexual violence (Benedet, at pp. 302, 304 and 314; L. (D.O.), at pp. 464-65,per L’Heureux-Dube J). In particular, sexual violence by adult men against adolescent girls is associated with high rates of physicalinjury, suicide, substance abuse, and unwanted pregnancy (I. Grant and J.

Benedet, “Confronting the Sexual Assault of Teenage Girls:The Mistake of Age Defence in Canadian Sexual Assault Law” (2019), 97 Can. Bar Rev. 1, at p. 5; “The ‘Statutory Rape’ Myth”, at p.269; R v Hess, (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 906, at pp. 948-49, per McLachlin J.).

e) The Degree of Physical Interference [69] The offences involving S.S. involved sexual touching. Some physical force was obviously used in briefly interfering withS.S.’s bodily integrity in areas of her body recognized to be very private. [70] Even prior to Friesen, the Supreme Court had recognized the potentially profound implications of “even mild non-consensualtouching of a sexual nature”: R v JA, 2011 SCC 28, at para 63. See also R v McCaw, , [1991] 3 SCR 72.

Dating back to1992, the Court of Appeal expressed a similar view in R v S (WB) and R v P(M), (AB CA), 73 CCC (3d) 530, at 535: When a man has assaulted a child for his sexual gratification, then, even if no long-lasting physical trauma is suffered by the child, it isreasonable to assume that the child may have suffered emotional trauma, the effects of which may survive longer than bruises or brokenbones, and may even be permanent. [71] I note that in Friesen, the Supreme Court referred, at para 60, to the harm caused to complainants and their families insituations of sexual offences: Sexual violence causes additional harm to children by damaging their relationships with their families and caregivers.

Because sexualviolence against children is committed by a family member, the violence is often accompanied by breach of a trust relationship (R vD.R.W., 2012 BCCA 454, 330 B.C.A.C. 18, at para. 41). If a parent or family member is the perpetrator of the sexual violence, the otherparent or family members may cause further trauma by taking the side of the perpetrator and disbelieving the victim (see “The ‘Statutory

Rape’ Myth”, at p. 292). [ 72 ] The evidence of actual victim impact in this instance is very limited. What is known, however, is that S.S. is currently residing with her Father, while K.S. is living with her Grandmother. As such, the impact of these offences includes a very significant disruption to the living arrangements of S.S. and K.S., both of whom were required to leave their Mother’s home on account of Mr. Buschemeyer’s continuing presence even after these charges were instituted.

Indeed, he continued to reside with D.G. for a brief period of time following his conviction by the jury in early March of this year, albeit as a condition of his release. [ 73 ] The evidence that is before me is that both S.S. and K.S. are in counselling. K.S. advises that S.S. is not doing well, though no elaboration was provided in this regard. K.S. did, however, express a lack of trust for men as a result of Mr.

Buschemeyer’s actions, as well as the fact that she anticipated that these events will stay with her for the rest of her life. [ 74 ] While it is not possible to predict the permanent or long-lasting impact of Mr. Buschemeyer’s conduct on the lives of either S.S. or K.S., It is clear that there is clearly some current significant impact giving rise to the need for on-going counselling. Under the circumstances, it seems reasonable for me to assume that both of these children, but particularly S.S., will continue to suffer emotional trauma in the long term.

Moreover, the childrens’ relationship with their Mother has been profoundly impacted as evidenced by the fact that they no longer reside with her, or, indeed, with each other. Mr. Buschemeyer cannot, of course, be held responsible for the actions and decisions of D.G. in allowing him to live in her home with her children despite the prohibition order. Nevertheless, the fact remains that his presence in the home, and the unlawful acts that he committed while living in that home, have had a profound impact on the childrens’ relationships with other members of their immediate family.

f) Participation of the Victim [ 75 ] There is no suggestion that S.S. or K.S. were anything other than the unsuspecting victims of these offences. Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances [ 76 ] I accept the Crown’s contention that the fact in these offences involved the abuse of a position of trust in relation to children is an aggravating circumstance.

As previously indicated, s 718.01 of the Criminal Code directs that the significant vulnerability of children under the age of eighteen years requires sentences that emphasize denunciation and deterrence for offences that involve the abuse of children. [ 77 ] I also take as aggravating the fact that Mr. Buschemeyer has a related criminal record involving other offences of family violence, notably a 2014 conviction for sexual assault on his biological daughter.

Further, the fact that he was on a prohibition order at the time of these offences that prohibited him from having any contact with persons under the age of sixteen years, other than through approved supervision, is also a seriously aggravating circumstance. [ 78 ] I am satisfied that this was not a single, isolated or technical breach of the order, but rather a flagrant breach of the order that persisted over an extended period of time and despite the intervention of Family and Childrens’ Services and the warning extended to D.G. Mr.

Buschemeyer was clearly aware that he was in breach of the prohibition order on an on-going and continuous basis while he resided in the same residence as S.S. and K.S. [ 79 ] In terms of mitigating circumstances, I accept that the Accused entered guilty pleas to the offences involving breaches of the prohibition order. However, I do no not attach a great deal of weight to this fact in these particular circumstances. Mr. Buschemeyer was in clear violation of this prohibition order over an extended period of time.

As such, there was no viable defence to these charges available to him in these circumstances. [ 80 ] I do, however, accept Mr. Buschemeyer’s apology to S.S. and K.S. in open court during the sentencing hearing to be a significant expression of remorse. In my view, this takes on added significance in light of the fact that this acceptance of responsibility stands in sharp contrast to his presentation during the course of the forensic assessment. Indeed, as previously indicated, Mr.

Buschemeyer’s lack of regard for the impact of his action on the victims was emphasized at several points in the Assessment Report. [ 81 ] I accept Mr. Buschemeyer’s apology, as well as his open acknowledgement to K.S. and her family members present in court on November 29 th that K.S. and S.S. were telling the truth in making the allegations underlying the charges before the court.

Further, I accept as genuine his expressions of regret made directly to K.S. and the members of her family during the court proceedings. [ 82 ] Kraus J discussed the significance of remorse in the sentencing process in EF, at para 59-60, in the following terms: Remorse, if genuine, can be a mitigating factor which affects the sentence.

As the SCC explained in Friesen , at para 165 , remorse is a relevant mitigating factor that gains significance when it is paired with insight and some indication that the offender has “come to realize the gravity of the conduct, and as a result has achieved a change of attitude or imposed some self-discipline which significantly reduces the likelihood of offending.” Although there is evidence of EF’s remorse, I am not convinced it is paired with insight into the gravity of his offence and its impact on CD.

EF’s remorse, although genuine, appears to be focused as much on the consequences of what he has done to himself as it is with the harm he has done to CD. [ 83 ] This is an apt description of the remorse demonstrated by Mr. Buschemeyer during his sentencing hearing on November 29, 2021. While I accept that his current remorse is genuine, I cannot entirely disregard the repeated references in the Assessment Report to the fact that he displayed little if any awareness of the impact of his actions on the victims. As in E.F. , I am of the view that Mr.

Buschemeyer’s remorse reflects a new-found awareness of the extent of his personal disfunction and, hopefully, at least the start of real

insight into the very serious impact of his actions on others.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision in Hajar [ 84 ] Neither counsel specifically referred to the decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal in R v Haja r , 2016 ABCA 222 , and the starting-point sentence of three years established in that instance for instances of major sexual interference. (The only cases referred to by counsel were Friesen , EF and Exell .) In Hajar , the Court defined ‘major sexual interference’ as involving “a serious violation of the physical and sexual integrity of the child and is of a nature or character such that a reasonable person could foresee that it is likely to cause serious psychological or emotional harm, whether or not physical injury occurs” (at para 53).

The starting point established in Hajar assumes that there has been no guilty plea; the offender does not have a criminal record; and that the offender is of average good character. [ 85 ] Referring to Friesen , as well as the decision of Burrows J in EF #2, R v E.F. , 2021 ABQB 272 , Kraus J acknowledged in E.F. that the three-year starting point set in Hajar should be increased. He also acknowledged the Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Lemay , 2020 ABCA 365 , which determined that the three-year starting point should be increased in circumstances that involve the abuse of a trust relationship.

However, he ultimately concluded that Hajar did not apply as he was not satisfied that a major sexual interference as defined in Hajar had been made out in that instance. In reaching that conclusion, Kraus J referred to the Supreme Court’s caution in Friesen regarding the possible downgrading of sexual offences against children that do not involve penetration, fellatio, or cunnilingus. [ 86 ] In E.F. , the accused was convicted by a jury of one count of sexual interference. The complainant in that instance was the fourteen-year old daughter of the accused.

The findings of fact made pursuant to s. 724 of the Criminal Code revealed that the accused pinned the complainant’s hands above her head as she was lying on her back on the couch in the living room. He then lifted up her shirt, touched her breasts, and squeezed her nipples. The incident lasted approximately one minute. [ 87 ] E.F. was 48 years of age at the time of the offence and had no record of previous criminal convictions. He did, however, have several subsequent convictions, one of which involved the offence of sexual interference and luring.

Kraus J sentenced the accused to 24 months imprisonment. [ 88 ] While I caution myself in accordance with the Supreme Court’s direction in Friesen regarding downgrading the wrongfulness of the instances of sexual interference that are before me for sentencing in this instance, I find that the facts of this case do no meet the definition of major sexual interference set out in Hajar .

In reaching this conclusion, I am mindful of the significant emotional and/or psychological harm occasioned to S.S. in this instance. [ 89 ] While I find that the starting point sentence set out in Hajar , and as appropriately revised in light of Friesen , does not apply in this instance, I am of the view that a significant jail term is required in this instance given the accused’s prior record, the breach of trust inherent in the circumstances of these offences, and the fact that Mr. Buschemeyer was bound by the terms of a prohibition order at the time these offences were committed.

Given the high degree of moral blameworthiness that I find to exist in this case, I am of the view that a sentence of four years is an appropriate sentence for each of the convictions relating to sexual interference. I direct that these sentences be served concurrently to one and other. Breach of the Prohibition Order [ 90 ] As previously stated, the Defence relies on the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Exell , specifically the six-month sentence imposed by the Court of Appeal for the offence of breach of a prohibition order made pursuant to s 161 of the Criminal Code .

The Defence fairly acknowledges that the circumstances of both the offence and the offender in Exell are different from those in the case at bar, but suggests that the six-month sentence should serve as a base or a guide for this Court in crafting an appropriate sentence in this instance. [ 91 ] In Exell , the accused was convicted of sexual interference and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two years less a day. A period of probation of three years was imposed to follow the jail term.

The sentencing court also made an order under s. 161 of the Criminal Code prohibiting the accused from attending any location where persons under the age of sixteen years might be expected to be present. The order specifically referred to school grounds. [ 92 ] Approximately four years following the accused’s conviction, he attended a day spa at a secondary school, along with members of his church group. While attending the spa, the accused received a hair cut and a fingernail trim from students.

Both the complainant from the original charge of sexual interference, as well as her brother, attended the school in question. The complainant’s brother saw the accused and reported his presence at the school to the police. The accused entered a plea of guilty to breaching the prohibition order and received an absolute discharge. At the sentencing hearing, the Crown sought a six-month prison term, followed by a further period of probation of three years. [ 93 ] In allowing the appeal, the Court of Appeal substituted a sentence of six months followed by a probationary term of three years.

At para 8, the Court addressed the applicable sentencing principles relevant to this particular offence: The predominant sentencing principles that control the disposition in cases involving a breach of s. 161 order are denunciation and deterrence, both specific and general. This was not a technical breach. The respondent attended a secondary school, on a school day, where he would predictably interact with students, who were to perform spa services.

It would be obvious to any person, who was subject to such an order, that such was its purpose and the conduct in which he engaged breached it. [ 94 ] I agree with the Ontario Court of Appeal’s statement that denunciation and deterrence are the primary sentencing objectives when dealing with an offence under s. 161 of the Criminal Code . I also agree that the circumstances of this particular offence and this particular offender are significantly different from those before the Court of Appeal in Exell . First of all, Mr. Buschemeyer is

significantly younger than the offender in Exell. He also has a significant criminal record. There is no reference to Mr. Exell having anycriminal record beyond the conviction for the offence giving rise to the prohibition order. [95] The circumstances in the within matter are, in my view, significantly more serious than those in Exell. Based on the evidenceadduced at trial, as well as the contents of the Assessment Report, it seems clear that Mr.

Buschemeyer moved into the residence of themother of the complainants sometime in 2017, very soon after his release from imprisonment on the sexual assault charge involving hisbiological daughter. He continued to reside at D.G.’s residence for approximately three years. At the time, the two complainants weresubject to a shared parenting arrangement whereby they went back and forth between the homes of their father and mother on a regularbasis. For at least a portion of this timeframe, the two complainants were living primarily with their mother. As such, they were infrequent and regular contact with Mr.

Buschemeyer. In my view, he stood in a position of trust relative to the complainants given hisstatus as the live-in partner of the childrens’ mother. Furthermore, he used the proximity arising from his cohabitation with the childrenand their mother to assault both girls. [96] The circumstances in this instance are significantly more aggravating than those in Exell. As such, a substantial period ofimprisonment is called for in this instance.

While the decision in Exell may provide a useful guide in terms of the proper approach tosentencing relative to this particular offence, the sentence imposed in that instance is wholly inadequate for this matter. In the result, Ifind that a sentence of 18 months is appropriate given the gravity of the underlying circumstances.

Sentence Reduction on Account of Harsh Prison Conditions dueto Covid-19 [97] I accept the Defence contention that harsh presentence incarceration conditions can, in appropriate circumstances, amount to amitigating circumstance apart from and beyond the 1.5:1 credit referred to in section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code. [98] In both R v Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754 and R v Brown, 2020 ONCA 196, the Ontario Court of Appeal appear to endorse thenotion that additional “credit” beyond the 1.5:1 statutory formula may be appropriate in situations involving particularly harsh prisonconditions.

Similarly, in R v Adams, 2016 ABQB 648, and R v Leclair, 2020 ONCJ 260, the sentencing judge reduced the sentence thatmight otherwise have been appropriate on account of what were characterized as the mitigating circumstances presented by adverse orharsh prison conditions. [99] In R v Gordie, 2020 ABQB 425, I found that harsh prison conditions arising as a result of Covid-19 preventative measuresconstituted a mitigating circumstance justifying a sentence reduction of 112 days from the sentence otherwise appropriate in thecircumstances. [100] Such credit would, however, have to be accorded other than through the awarding of enhanced credit for pre-trial custody overand above the statutorily prescribed maximum ration of 1.5:1.

In R v Summers, 2014 SCC 26, the Supreme Court confirmed theconstitutionality of the legislative amendments that placed a cap on enhanced credit at 1.5 to 1. [101] In this instance, I am satisfied that the harsh conditions experienced by Mr. Buschemeyer on account of Covid-19 precautionsimplemented at the Lethbridge Correctional Center rise to the level of a mitigating circumstance to be taken into account in determininga fit and proper sentence in this instance. Conclusion [102] For the reasons set out above, I am of the view that these offences call for the imposition of a significant period ofimprisonment.

As such, I sentence Mr. Buschemeyer as follows:

a) On Count #1, the offence of sexual assault relative to S.S., between July 1, 2018, and August 31, 2018, with the agreement ofcounsel, I would impose a judicial stay relative to this count on the basis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Kienapple, (SCC), [1975] 1 SCR 729;

b) On Count #2, the offence of sexual assault relative to S.S. between November 1, 2018, and November 30, 2018, with theagreement of counsel, I would impose a judicial stay relative to this count on the basis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R vKienapple, (SCC), [1975] 1 SCR 729;

c) On Count #3, the offence of sexual interference relative to S.S., between July 1, 2018, and August 31, 2018, I sentence you to 46months imprisonment;

d) On Count #4, the offence of sexual interference relative to S.S. between November 1, 2018, and November 30, 2018, I sentenceyou to 46 months imprisonment, to be served concurrently;

e) On Count #5, the offence of assault relative to K.S. between April 1, 2018, and August 31, 2018, I sentence you to 5 monthsimprisonment, to be served consecutively;

f) On the offence of breach of the prohibition order relative to S.S., between July 1, 2018, and August 31, 2018, I sentence you to 18months imprisonment, to be served consecutively; and

g) On the offence of breach of the prohibition order relative to K.S., between April 1, 2018, and August 31, 2018, I sentence to you 18months imprisonment, to be served concurrently.

[ 103 ] The total sentence is 69 months, or 5 years and 9 months. I would deduct from this sentence the time Mr. Buschemeyer spent in pre-trial custody following his conviction and prior to sentencing. I accept the Defence submission that Mr. Buschemeyer has spent a total of 225 days in pre-trial custody. I would give him credit at the rate of 1:5 to 1 and, as such, credit him for 338 days of pre-trial custody. I would reduce his overall sentence from 69 months by 338 days, leaving a balance of approximately 4 years and 10 months remaining to be served. Ancillary Orders [ 104 ] At the request of the Crown, and with the agreement of the Defence, I make the following ancillary orders:

a) A DNA order, pursuant to

section 487.051 of the Criminal Code . Count #3 and #4 are primary designated offences, whereas Count #5 is a secondary designated offence;

b) A SOIRA Order, pursuant to

section 490.012 of the Criminal Code , with respect to Count #3 and #4. The SOIRA Order is for life;

c) A Firearms Prohibition Order, pursuant to

section 109 of the Criminal Code , with respect to Count #3 and #4;

d) An Order pursuant to

section 743.21 of the Criminal Code prohibiting Mr. Buschemeyer from having any contact, direct or indirect, with S.S. and K.S. while serving the terms of imprisonment imposed in relation to these matters; and

e) An Order pursuant to

section 161 of the Criminal Code , prohibiting Mr. Buschemeyer for life from having any contact, including communication by any means, with a person who is under the age of sixteen years, unless he does so under the supervision of a person the Court considers appropriate. Heard on the 29 th day of November, 2021. Dated at the City of Lethbridge, Alberta this 16 th day of December, 2021. M. David Gates J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: D. Janecke for the Crown G.J. White for the Accused