Rana v Baker, 2021 ABQB 1028
Opinion
Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Rana v Baker, 2021 ABQB 1028 Date: 20210622 Docket: 2101 06413 Registry: Calgary Between: Salim Rana Plaintiff - and - Erin Baker Defendant Corrected judgment: A corrigendum was issued on May 16, 2023; the corrections have been made to the text and the corrigendum is appended to this judgment. _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Associate Chief Justice J.D. Rooke _______________________________________________________
I. Introduction [ 1 ] On May 18, 2021, Salim Rana [Mr. Rana] filed a Statement of Claim with the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, naming Erin Baker [Ms. Baker] as the Defendant. Ms. Baker is Counsel for the Defendant, Zahir Rana, Attorney for Gulzar Rana, in a second lawsuit initiated in 2015 by Mr. Rana: Rana v Rana , Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket 1501 02379. [ 2 ] On June 16, 2021, Counsel for Ms. Baker by letter referred the Statement of Claim as a candidate Apparently Vexatious Application or Proceeding [AVAP] pursuant to Civil Practice Note No. 7 [CPN7] paragraph 6.
The Defendant takes the position that the May 18, 2021 Statement of Claim is vexatious, a collateral attack on a previous now terminated lawsuit, and makes allegations that are hopeless. I am designated to receive and review potential CPN7 processes in Southern Alberta. [ 3 ] The earlier lawsuit in question was an action filed on November 4, 2020 by Mr. Rana that named Ms. Baker as the Defendant, alleging a range of misconduct, and seeking $11.7 million in damages [First Action]. The First Action was also the subject of a CPN7 process. Mr.
Rana was asked to rebut five prima facie fatal defects in his litigation: Rana v Baker , 2021 ABQB 277 at para 24 [ Rana #1 ]. As he did not do so, the First Action was struck out in toto , and Mr. Rana was ordered to pay $2,000 in costs: Rana v Baker , 2021 ABQB 352 at paras 27-28 . [ 4 ] Briefly, Mr. Rana styles his current lawsuit [Second Action] as a defamation lawsuit. He says he has been defamed on many bases, including: 1. Ms. Baker allegedly had lied to the Court. 2. Ms.
Baker made misrepresentations about an email from the Alberta Court of Appeal Case Management Officer, “thereby defrauding not only the Plaintiff but also the court. ...”. 3. “Numerous third parties” have accused Mr. Rana of “ill-intent”. Mr. Rana concludes that Ms. Baker therefore “uttered such statements somewhere other than in a court proceeding”. One such individual is “Lou, a hairdresser of the wife of Ms. Baker’s client ...”. 4. “Ms.
Baker has continuously claimed that she has nothing to do with the herein Plaintiff, however, the transcript of hearings suggest that she maliciously misrepresented the latter thereby creating a stigma to the person of the Plaintiff.” [ 5 ] Mr. Rana also makes various statements complaining about the conduct of the Rana v Rana action, and Ms. Baker’s activities in that proceeding. [ 6 ] Mr. Rana says Ms.
Baker’s “malicious” defamatory statements: 1. were intended to “sever” his ties to his family, “alienating him from his family and relatives”; 2. created “... such stigma casted ... unto the Plaintiff’s person hindered future earnings ...”, though no examples of that result are indicated, simply that “some business partners ... negating in engagement in business ventures”; and 3. caused “... immense emotional and mental distress on the part of the Plaintiff ... emotional distress, and sleepless nights ...”. [ 7 ] Mr.
Rana on this basis seeks: 1. $250,000 in damages for defamation, 2. $500,000 for lost business ventures, 3. $360,000 in general damages, 4. $200,000 in special damages due to loss of profit in Mr. Rana’s “business ventures” and “the costs spent in the prosecution of this action”, 5. $100,000 in punitive damages because Ms. Baker breached “... the natural obligation of an advocate of law to affirm the utmost morals in her profession. ...”. [ 8 ] After review of Mr.
Rana’s Second Action Statement of Claim, I conclude it exhibits characteristics of abusive litigation, is an AVAP, and should be subject to a CPN7 “show cause” document-based review. II. CPN7 [ 9 ] CPN7 is a practice implemented by the Court to better manage litigation that, on its face, appears to be unmeritorious, has no prospect of success, or is otherwise abusive and vexatious.
This practice is intended to provide a timely, proportionate, and cost-effective response to the litigants: Unrau v National Dental Examining Board , 2018 ABQB 874 [ Unrau #1 ]. [ 10 ] If, on initial review by the Court, the pleading appears to be unmeritorious, has no prospect of success, or is otherwise abusive and vexatious, then the Court issues a first written decision that identifies the apparent issue(
s) which may be a basis to apply Rule 3.68 and strike out the pleading. The party who filed the pleading is then given an opportunity, within 14 days, to provide the Court with a Written Submission of up to a total of ten pages in length that responds to, and demonstrates why, the pleading is a legitimate action and
should be permitted to continue. The Written Submission must be served on the other parties to the litigation. [11] CPN7 is not for “close calls”, but instead the Court intervenes by this mechanism when the defect(
s) in question are “apparenton the face of the pleading”, and the suspect pleadings are “clearer cases of abuse”: Unrau #1, at paras 22, 24. Only restricted forms ofevidence are considered by the Court when it conducts a CPN7 review, since this process has a very narrow focus, and operates toexamine a single document and its content: Ubah v Canadian Natural Resources Limited, 2019 ABQB 347 at paras 24-48 [Ubah #2].There are exceptions to that rule.
For example, the Court may examine other documents in the same proceeding that are related to thesuspect filing (Ubah #2 at para 35), or documents and records that are evidence that the AVAP is an attempt to litigate an issue that hasalready been decided or closed [Ubah #2 at para 45]. III CPN7 Analysis [12] The Mr. Rana’s Second Action Statement of Claim exhibits a number of apparent issues. A. Inadequate Pleadings [13] An application or statement of claim sets the issues to which the opposing party must respond, and alerts that party of the caseit must meet: Whiten v Pilot Insurance Co, 2002 SCC 18 at para 87.
Proper pleadings require more than simply bare assertions, or “baldallegations” of wrongdoing: GH v Alcock, 2013 ABCA 24 at para 58; Mancuso v Canada (National Health and Welfare), 2015 FCA227 at paras 16-20. Pleadings must provide a basis for the Court and other litigants to make a meaningful response, and indicate to theresponding parties the “... who, when, where, how and what gave rise to its liability.”: Mancuso v Canada (National Health andWelfare) at para 19. [14] Mr.
Rana cannot file inadequate pleadings and then either supplement those claims, or expect the Defendants to “fill in theblanks”: Mancuso v Canada (National Health and Welfare) at para 20. A lack of specificity is not merely a technical defect, but goes tothe core of the claim: GH v Alcock at para 58, citing AL v Ontario (Minister of Community and Social Services) (2006), (ON CA), 274 DLR (4th) 431, 218 OAC 150 (Ont CA).
Inadequate pleadings abuse the court’s process because a respondentcannot defend against unclear and non-specific claims and the court cannot control the proceedings, identify the proposed argument, ormake findings on the relevant facts: Unrau v National Dental Examining Board, 2019 ABQB 283 at para 629 [Unrau #2]. [15] Much of the Second Action Statement of Claim are simply bald allegations, or fail to provide the “who, when, where, how,and what” of the alleged misconduct. For example, why are Ms. Baker’s statements “malicious”? How does Mr. Rana know “Lou” wasrepeating Ms. Baker’s statements?
What specifically were those statements? Where does “Lou” work? How did Mr. Baker learn aboutwhat “Lou” said? When did that happen? What is the name of “the wife of Ms. Baker’s client”? Is that the wife of Gulzar Rana, orsomeone else? [16] Mr. Rana says he lost business opportunities, and demands $700,000 on that basis. Who are those business partners? Whatwere the lost business ventures? How does Mr. Rana conclude he lost $700,000 in value and profits? How does Mr. Rana link somethingMs. Baker said to the outcome of his business ventures? How is Ms.
Baker linked to the “numerous third-parties”? [17] Further, Alberta Rules of Court, Alta Reg 124/2010, Rule 13.7 states: 13.7 A pleading must give particulars of any of the following matters that are included in the pleading: ... (
b) fraud; ... (
f) defamation. [18] The Second Statement of Claim states Ms. Baker defrauded “... not only the Plaintiff but the court ...”. How did that “fraud”occur? Furthermore, Mr. Rana makes bald allegations of second-hand defamation, such as by “Lou” and other unnamed “numerousthird-parties”. The Second Statement of Claim does not appear to provide the particulars of any of that alleged defamation. [19] I therefore ask that Mr. Rana explain how his Second Action Statement of Claim provides a basis for the Court and Defendantto make a meaningful response, and satisfies the requirements of Rule 13.7. B.
Collateral Attack [20] A collateral attack is a litigation step or proceeding that challenges, directly or indirectly, a prior court decision or result.Collateral attacks are generally prohibited and an abuse of process: British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v Figliola, 2011SCC 52 at para 28. Collateral attacks subvert “the orderly and functional administration of justice”: Dagenais v Canadian BroadcastingCorp, (SCC), [1994] 3 SCR 835 at 871, 120 DLR (4th) 12.
Any action or application that is identified as a collateralattack should be terminated, immediately: Alberta v Pocklington Foods Inc, 1995 ABCA 111 at para 14. [21] Examples of prohibited collateral attacks include: 1. bringing proceedings to determine an issue that has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
2. using previously raised grounds and issues improperly in a subsequent proceeding, 3. conducting a proceeding to circumvent the effect of a court order, and 4. conducting multiple proceedings with the same litigation objective. [Unrau #2 at para 619.] [22] In Rana #1, I concluded that Mr. Rana, in the First Action Statement of Claim, had alleged Ms.
Baker had: 1. made false statements (Rana #1 at para 4); 2. “defrauding not only the Plaintiff but also the presiding judges of the trial courts.” (Rana #1 at para 4); 3. intentionally caused emotional distress and mental pain and suffering (Rana #1 at paras 3-4); 4. acted in breach of her duties as a lawyer (Rana #1 at paras 3, 5); and 5. caused “financial injury”, including lost business profits (Rana #1 at para 4). [23] On that basis, Mr.
Rana sought an only loosely defined set of damages, including general damages, special damages,aggravated damages, and punitive damages: Rana #1 at para 5. [24] I have reviewed and summarized the claims in the Second Action Statement of Claim. It appears that the Second ActionStatement of Claim addresses the same issues and damages as were dismissed in Rana #2. Furthermore, the First Action Statement ofClaim appears to be some kind of tort action. The Second Action Statement of Claim is explicitly a defamation action, a subcategory oftort litigation.
It would therefore appear that the Second Action Statement of Claim offends the Supreme Court of Canada’s rule inCahoon v Franks, (SCC), [1967] SCR 455 that “... there is only one cause of action for a single wrongful or negligentact and damages resulting from the single tort must be assessed in the one proceeding ...”. That proceeding would be the First Action,that is now terminated. [25] I ask Mr. Rana to indicate how the Second Action Statement of Claim is not a collateral attack on the First Action that wasstruck out as an abuse of the Court in Rana #2. C.
Excessive Remedies [26] Excessive or impossible remedies make litigation a hopeless proceeding that is an abuse of the Court: Unrau #2 at paras 620-625. Mr. Rana is seeking very large sums, but, as previously discussed, provides no bases for those amounts. As previously indicated,Mr. Rana claims $700,000 in damages for lost business opportunities and profits, but provides no information on how those amountswere determined. [27] Mr. Rana seeks $360,000 for general “pain and suffering” damages.
That amount is nearly the maximum amount of generaldamages that may be claimed for pain and suffering that was set in Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd, (SCC), [1978]2 SCR 229, 83 DLR (3d) 452 at $100,000. After inflation, the Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd general damages cap is now about$365,000. That amount was for a young adult whose injuries led to near total disability. Mr. Rana’s claim nearly reaches that cap.
Mr.Rana does not allege injury that would warrant the near maximum $365,000 amount, but, instead, his Statement of Claim only makesbald allegations of “emotional and mental suffering” and “immense emotional and mental distress”. [28] Mr. Rana is asked to indicate how the remedies sought in his Statement of Claim are not excessive. IV. Conclusion [29] Mr. Rana’s Second Action Statement of Claim appears to be a suitable candidate for review per CPN7. The Court thereforeseeks a response from Mr. Rana to four questions: 1.
How does the Second Action Statement of Claim provide an adequate basis for the Court and Defendants to make a meaningfulresponse? 2. How does the Second Action Statement of Claim satisfy the pleadings requirements of Rule 13.7? 3. How is the Second Action Statement of Claim not a collateral attack on the First Action that was struck out as an abuse of theCourt in Rana #2? 4. How are the damages sought by Mr. Rana not excessive? [30] As a result of this analysis, I order that Mr. Rana’s Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket 2101 06413 Statement of Claim isstayed. CPN7 now advances to its second step. 1. Mr.
Rana has until 14 days after this decision is filed to file and serve a Written Submission of no more than a total of 10 pages,pursuant to CPN7, para 3(b). The Written Submission should be clearly addressed: “To the Attention of Associate Chief Justice Rooke”. 2. If no Written Submission is received by the Court by that deadline, the Court will proceed to render its final decision on whetherthe Statement of Claim should be struck out in whole or in part, pursuant to Rule 3.68 (CPN7, para 3(c)).
3. If Mr. Rana provides and serves a Written Submission, then the Defendant has seven days to each make a Written Reply of up to a total of 10 pages in length (CPN7, para 3(d)). The Written Replies should be clearly addressed: “To the Attention of Associate Chief Justice Rooke”. 4. After receipt of Mr. Rana’s Written Submission, and the Defendant’s Written Reply, if any, the Court will render its final decision on whether the Docket 2001 13453 Statement of Claim should be struck out in whole or in part, pursuant to Rule 3.68 (CPN7, para 3(e)). [ 31 ] The Court will prepare and serve the Order staying this Action.
Mr. Rana’s approval of that Order is dispensed with, pursuant to Rule 9.4(2)(c). Mr. Rana may be served this Decision and the corresponding Order by email to: salimrana@icloud.com. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 22 nd day of June, 2021. J.D. Rooke A.C.J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Stuart J. Weatherill Emery Jamieson LLP for the Defendant _________________________________________________________ Corrigendum of the Memorandum of Decision of The Associate Chief Justice J.D. Rooke _______________________________________________________ The citation has been changed from 2021 ABQB 995 to 2021 ABQB 1028
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