R v Pettitt, 2021 ABQB 124

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v Pettitt, 2021 ABQB 124 Date: 20210222 Docket: 180979379Q1 Registry: Edmonton Between: Her Majesty the Queen Crown - and - Scott Bradley Pettitt Accused Restriction on Publication Identification Ban – See the Criminal Code ,

section 486.4 . By Court Order, information that could identify the victim must not be published, broadcast, or transmitted in any way. NOTE: Identifying information has been removed from this judgment to comply with the ban so that it may be published. _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision on a Voluntariness Voir Dire of the Honourable Mr. Justice W.N. Renke _______________________________________________________

[The following decision was delivered orally. Having reserved the right to do so, I’ve added citations and references to transcripts, andmade minor stylistic and grammatical amendments.] [1] Mr. Pettitt faces charges on a 4-count Indictment to be tried before a jury from February 1 to February 12, 2021. [2] On the first two days reserved for trial, an application was heard to determine the admissibility of statements made by Mr.Pettitt to members of the Edmonton Police Service in two interviews, the first on June 7, 2018 (the June 7 Interview), the second on June20, 2018 (the June 20 Interview). [3] Staff Sgt.

Shelley Fisher conducted the June 7 Interview. Detective Chris Luimes conducted the June 20 Interview. Sgt.Fisher, Det. Luimes, Sgt. Shelby Cech, and Mr. Pettitt testified in the voir dire. [4] No Charter issues were raised. The sole issue was whether the statements provided by Mr. Pettitt to the police officers werevoluntary. [5] I will briefly review the governing principles, identify matters not at issue, then turn to the admissibility of the statementsmade in the June 7 and June 20 Interviews. I.

Overview of the Law [6] The confessions rule was recently reviewed by the Court of Appeal in R v Tessier, 2020 ABCA 289. Some aspects of theCourt of Appeal’s

summary relevant to the current application are as follows: • the goals balanced by the confession rule are protecting the rights of the accused and society’s need to investigate and solvecrimes: at para 26 • the values protected by the confessions rule include the reliability of statements, trial fairness, and ensuring that individuals have a“meaningful choice” about whether to respond to police inquiries; and also ensuring that State agents obey the law and that the fairnessof the criminal justice system is protected: at paras 31, 38 (as Wigmore wrote, voluntariness is “shorthand for a complex of values:”Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn rev. 1970), vol. 3, § 826, at p. 351, quoted in R v Oickle, 2000 SCC 38 , [2000] 2 SCR 3,Iacobucci J at para 70) • the confessions rule is also an application of the principle against self-incrimination: at para 33 (see also R v Singh, 2007 SCC 48,Charron J at para 32) • four factors are often considered in voluntariness analyses – threats or promises (fear of prejudice or hope of advantage),oppression, operating mind, and police trickery: at paras 31, 27-30 • these factors, though, are not exhaustive – a voluntariness analysis should be contextual and case-specific, undertaken in light ofthe values protected by the confessions rule: at paras 31, 24-26 (see also Oickle at para 71 and R v Lavallee, 2018 ABCA 328 at para 26) • the Crown bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that an individual’s statement to a “person in authority” (suchas a police officer) was made voluntarily and an accused bears no burden, evidentiary or otherwise, of providing a foundation for thevoluntariness inquiry: Tessier at para 25 (see also R v Alas, 2016 ONSC 5709, Trotter J, as he then was, at para 31; Lavallee at para 25;R v Fernandes, 2016 ONCA 772, Hourigan JA at para 22; R v Hodgson, (SCC), [1998] 2 SCR 449, Cory J at para 12) • the focus of the inquiry is on the conduct of the police and the effect of that conduct on the suspect’s ability to exercise his or herfree will: Singh at para 36. [7] According to Justice Charron in Singh at para 36, “[t]he test is an objective one.

However, the individual characteristics ofthe accused are obviously relevant considerations in applying this objective test.” In Tessier, the Court of Appeal stated that a “modifiedobjective test,” then, must be applied – voluntariness must be assessed from the perspective of the person giving the statement. That is,the objective test concerns the reasonable person similarly situated to the person giving the statement. The test, though, is not purelysubjective. II. Matters Not at Issue [8] Mr. Pettitt was arrested and charged and each interview took place at a police station. When interviewed, Mr.

Pettitt was notmerely a suspect or person of interest, interviewed on the street, in his vehicle, or in his home. Detention can elevate an interviewee’ssense of compulsion and loss of control: Tessier at para 41; Singh at para 32. [9] Mr. Pettitt had an “operating mind,” in the sense that he suffered from no cognitive deficits or mental illness and was notintoxicated during either interview. He suffered from no physical ailments that impaired his thinking. [10] Mr. Pettitt was made aware that he had the right not to speak to the police and that if he did his statements could be usedagainst him.

He was cautioned before each interview commenced. Nothing suggested that Mr. Pettitt did not understand the cautions. Noclaim was made that Mr. Pettitt did not have a “meaningful understanding” of the right to remain silent. The language of the cautionswas not challenged.

[ 11 ] However, Mr. Pettitt did not speak to counsel prior to either interview. To that extent, his understanding of the right to silence was not reinforced by legal advice. In neither instance, though, was his right to counsel violated. [ 12 ] Mr. Pettitt had some understanding of criminal justice processes. In the June 7 Interview, he referred to time spent at Drumheller Institution (23.677-678) and in this interview (32.937) and in his testimony, he referred to getting release on a promise to appear.

His experience is relevant to his understanding of his right to remain silent: Tessier at para 36 ; R v Engel , 2016 ABCA 48 at para 17 . [ 13 ] The Defence did not claim, and there was no evidence to support a claim, that the police caused Mr. Pettitt to provide any information through threat or promise, through fear of prejudice or hope of advantage. No inducements were made and no quid pro quo was offered. [ 14 ] The police engaged in no trickery. Certainly nothing in the interactions between Mr. Pettitt and the police would “shock the community.” See Oickle at para 67 . [ 15 ] Mr.

Pettitt was not interviewed when hungry or thirsty. He did not evidence hunger during the interviews. He was offered water on numerous occasions during both interviews. [ 16 ] There was no evidence that Mr. Pettitt suffered from any medical condition that caused any distress during either interview. III. The Interviews A. Preliminary Issue [ 17 ] The Crown did not call as witnesses every police officer who interacted with Mr. Pettitt from arrest, through transportation to the police station and processing at the police station to the door of the interview room (Sgt.

Cech, for example, referred to two officers who drove Mr. Pettitt from his home to EPS HQ on June 20, after Mr. Pettitt’s arrest). [ 18 ] I accept the observation of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Bools , 2016 ONCA 554 at para 5 : [5] .... [T]here is no rule of law that the Crown must call each and every police officer who had any contact with the appellant prior to his giving his statement. The onus is on the Crown to prove voluntariness in the context of the facts of the particular case.

While the unexplained absence of a witness may raise a reasonable doubt, this is to be assessed by the trial judge on the basis of the record. [ 19 ] Absent admissions relating to interactions with identified officers, for the Crown to call all officers who interacted with an accused en route to providing a statement would be prudent, even if the testimony of many of the officers would be confined to confirming they said nothing or nothing of substance to the accused. [ 20 ] In this case, though, Mr. Pettitt testified in the voir dire .

Nothing in his evidence suggested that any officer who was not called as a witness said anything or anything of significance to him. Moreover, nothing in the two interviews suggested that any officer who was not called as a witness said anything or anything of significance to him. [ 21 ] I infer from this absence of evidence that no officer not called as a witness said anything relevant to voluntariness to Mr. Pettit en route to his interviews. This inference neutralizes any adverse inference that might be drawn from the failure to call all of the officers who interacted with Mr. Pettitt. B.

The June 7 Interview [ 22 ] Mr. Pettitt was arrested at his home at about 8:50 p.m. on June 6. He was transported to the NE Division Station. After processing, he was lodged in cells before being interviewed. [ 23 ] No issue was taken with the timing of this arrest. [ 24 ] He was in cells until about 1:30 a.m., when the interview began. [ 25 ] Mr. Pettitt was Chartered and cautioned before the interview. Mr.

Pettitt was re-cautioned respecting his right to silence before questioning began in the interview: 3.81-85. [ 26 ] The interview ran from 1:30 a.m. to 2:15 a.m, lasting about 45 minutes. [ 27 ] The Defence argued that two features of this interview, delay and interview timing, either separately or together raised at least a reasonable doubt about the voluntariness of the interview. These features amounted to a type of oppression or degrading treatment. The stress of the circumstances induced Mr. Pettitt to provide information to Sgt. Fisher or prevented Mr.

Pettitt from making meaningful decisions about whether to speak to Sgt. Fisher. 1. Delay [ 28 ] Taking into account transportation and intake and processing time, Mr. Pettitt was confined for at least 4 hours before he was interviewed. He had not been advised of the particulars of the allegations he faced. He was left alone in a cell. [ 29 ] There was no evidence or claim, though, that conditions in the cell were inhospitable (e.g. because of temperature, noise, or

lack of access to a washroom). He was not confined with another person. [ 30 ] Four hours alone can be a long time. The June 20 interview took place much more quickly, on the evidence, occurring shortly after arrival at the police station. I cannot say, though, that the June 6-7 delay was unreasonable. [ 31 ] Sgt. Fisher referred to the interview having occurred within the “natural progression.” [ 32 ] The time that elapsed fell well within the 24-hours-to-bail-hearing requirement: Criminal Code , s. 503 . Moreover, I did not have information about typical intake-to-interview times.

A police station is a big complex machine with many moving parts. Triage, priorization, and processing of other matters must occur. Outside of the application of statutory and constitutional rules, a Court should be reluctant, in effect, to dictate workflow and timelines following arrest or detention. I appreciate that four hours alone in a cell was hard for Mr. Pettitt. But I do not find, on an objective basis, that the delay adversely affected Mr. Pettitt’s exercise of his choice of whether or not to talk to the police.

The delay was a predictable incident of arrest. [ 33 ] Further, while I accept that degrading treatment could vitiate voluntariness, this delay could not be reasonably regarded as degrading: Fernandes at para 34 . 2. Timing [ 34 ] The interview did take place, as Defence Counsel pointed out, in the middle of the night. Conceivably, Mr. Pettitt could have been so tired that he lacked an operating mind. He could have been so tired that he couldn’t think straight. On the one hand, the timing of the interview reduced the reliability of Mr. Pettitt’s contributions.

On the other hand, the timing of the interview reduced his capacity to resist responding to police questioning. [ 35 ] Mr. Pettitt did suggest in his testimony that he had some sleep before he was interviewed, but said he had no time to wake up, to think. [ 36 ] The interview was, as police interviews go, relatively short, only 45 minutes. The interactions between Mr. Pettitt and Sgt. Fisher were cordial and relaxed. [ 37 ] On the evidence, Mr. Pettitt was very cooperative. In Sgt. Fisher’s estimation, Mr. Pettitt wanted to talk about the incident. I agree. [ 38 ] In cross-examination, it was put to Sgt.

Fisher that Mr. Pettitt claimed that he was tired. In Sgt. Fisher’s estimation, more would have to have occurred to support the conclusion that continuing with the interview was inappropriate. [ 39 ] Sergeant Fisher testified that Mr. Pettitt displayed no signs of being sleepy during the interview. He did not yawn. He did not dose off. He did not request to be permitted to sleep. He was animated during the interview and responded appropriately to all questions. Sgt.

Fisher stated that there was no problem with “logic flow.” These are my conclusions as well. [ 40 ] Sergeant Fisher said that it was prudent to do the interview at night. Otherwise it would have been done at 5 or 6 in the morning. This timing would not have been an improvement from Mr. Pettitt’s perspective. [ 41 ] The interview was late, but not that late. I do not find that the timing of the interview raised a reasonable doubt about the voluntariness of Mr. Pettitt’s participation in the interview. 3. Feelings [ 42 ] In assessing both delay and interview timing, I have taken into account Mr.

Pettitt’s testimony. He testified that he was terrified. He did not want to be there. He felt forced to say something so he could go home. He felt like there was pressure to talk to the police. He found the whole ordeal overwhelming. [ 43 ] The video provided no support for Mr. Pettitt’s claim to have been terrified. He was an active participant in a conversation with Sgt. Fisher. The interview was not hostile, aggressive, or intimidating. [ 44 ] Voluntariness is not determined purely subjectively.

In my opinion, on an objective basis, nothing in the circumstances of the June 7 interview impaired the voluntariness of Mr. Pettitt’s responses to Sgt. Fisher’s questioning. On the one hand, the feelings he experienced were the feelings experienced by many who are arrested. Those feelings are normal, not subversive of voluntariness.

See the comments of Justice Proulx in R c Otis , 2000 CarswellQue 3702 , leave app refd [2001] 1 SCR xvii at para 54: Certainly it is always prudent to keep in mind that any tension or pressure observed with a subject faced with his interrogator, either due to discomfort, embarrassment or shame, which he may feel following arrest, detention or confrontation with an investigator who brings him back to a reality he would prefer to forget at any price, must be deemed to be in the normal course of events. On the other hand, if Mr.

Pettitt had worked himself up emotionally – and the video did not provide evidence of this – his turmoil and feelings of pressure were internally generated, not caused by the circumstances of his detention and interview. I rely on the comment of Justice Hourigan in Fernandes at para 37 : “While the respondent’s inner compulsion may have led to his confession, there was nothing in the conduct of the police that would render the statement involuntary.” [ 45 ] On the evidence, the Crown has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements Mr. Pettitt made in the June 7 Interview were voluntary. C.

The June 20 Interview

[ 46 ] On June 20, Mr. Pettitt was arrested at about 8:30 p.m. at his home and transported to Downtown Police Headquarters. He was lodged in a holding cell at 8:40 p.m. Custody of Mr. Pettitt was transferred to Det. Luimes at about 9:19 p.m. Just after that time, his interview with Det. Luimes commenced. [ 47 ] Det. Luimes cautioned Mr. Pettitt: 3.85-87, 4.88-92. [ 48 ] Mr. Pettitt waived his right to counsel: 3.79-81 [ 49 ] No issue was taken with the timing of Mr.

Pettitt’s arrest or with the timing of the interview. [ 50 ] The Defence argued that four factors supported at least a reasonable doubt about the voluntariness of Mr. Pettitt’s June 20 interview. [ 51 ] First, Mr. Pettitt was operating under the influence of negative publicity published after June 7 and before June 20. The police contributed to this pre-trial publicity. [ 52 ] Second, at the Downtown station, at one point Mr. Pettitt was lodged in a cell or room that was dark. The lights did not work. He was there for 45 minutes to an hour. [ 53 ] The third and fourth factors concerned Det.

Luimes’s interview conduct. During the interview, Mr. Pettitt stated that he did not wish to speak about a particular complainant or about anything further at least 10 times. Det. Luimes ignored Mr. Pettitt’s desire not to speak and continued the interview without pause. Further, Det. Luimes employed an interviewing technique that, the Defence contended, induced Mr. Pettitt to speak. [ 54 ] The critical question respecting this interview is whether, in the circumstances, Mr.

Pettitt’s right not to speak to the police was reduced to no right at all – that is, whether despite having received a caution, the only practical option available to him was to speak to the police. 1. Pre-Interview Publicity [ 55 ] Mr. Pettitt asserted that his charges had been reported in traditional media and on social media. His personal and business reputation suffered. The reporting was not in evidence, but reporting doubtless occurred. [ 56 ] The State contribution to this publicity was that, Mr. Pettitt claimed, the police made a request through the media for others who may have been victims of Mr.

Pettitt to come forward. Again, this contribution was not in evidence, but I will assume that it occurred. [ 57 ] The relevance of the media reports of the charges and the effects of those reports on Mr. Pettitt and his business was that the adverse publicity put added psychological pressure on Mr. Pettitt, making him susceptible to police efforts to gather evidence from him.

He was disposed to say something to clear himself, to try to mitigate what he felt was persecution. [ 58 ] I recognize that many consumers of traditional and social media presume guilt and not innocence, both before trial and after acquittal. Conclusions drawn from reports of charges are not informed by a due appreciation of the presumption of innocence. Reports of charges can irreparably damage a reputation, a business, or a career, even when charges are not followed by conviction. [ 59 ] However, I do not consider adverse publicity to play any role respecting the voluntariness of Mr. Pettitt’s interviews.

Reporting and consequent adverse publicity are simply normal and predictable incidents of being charged: R v Shrivastava , 2019 ABQB 663 , Antonio J at para 63 (Publicity is an “ordinary incident of our justice system”); R v McKnight , 2018 ABQB 1011 , Sanderman J at para 25. Anyone charged with an offence may face these premature but personally damaging consequences.

Not only this, but access to and publication of information about charges is justified by the public’s right to know, the open courts principle, and freedom of the press. [ 60 ] Further, the fact that an individual is subject to adverse publicity does not impair freedom to choose to speak to police, cloud knowledge of the right not to speak to police, or transform that right into a sham. 2. Dark Room [ 61 ] In Mr. Pettitt’s account, the time he spent in the dark room was between 45 minutes to an hour. Mr.

Pettit did not specify the means by which he calculated this period. [ 62 ] He said that an officer came in and apologized for the lack of light. The officer could not identify the problem that caused the lack of light. [ 63 ] Sgt. Cech testified to putting Mr. Pettitt in a holding cell and turning over Mr. Pettitt’s custody to Det. Luimes. Sgt. Cech did not testify to any problems with the lighting in the holding cell. Nothing in his testimony concerned moving Mr. Pettitt to another cell. [ 64 ] In re-direct, Mr. Pettitt testified that another individual was in the holding cell. That may have prompted his move.

Sgt. Cech did not testify to anyone else having been in the holding cell. [ 65 ] I find that Mr. Pettitt’s recollection of being in a dark room at EPS Headquarters was mistaken. Mr. Pettitt stated he was in the room for 45 minutes to an hour. However, from lodging in the cell by Sgt. Cech to the custody turn-over to Det. Luimes, only about 40 minutes elapsed. There was little time for the claimed cell switch to occur. I also take into account that Mr. Pettitt’s description of the phone room that he used at EPS HQ, as some sort of phone in an open hallway, at best protected by some plexiglass, was mistaken.

That description was neither consistent with Sgt. Cech’s description of the phone room nor with the type of phone room constitutionally

required and likely present in the Headquarters of a major City police department. I should add that I found Sgt. Cech to be a highlyreliable witness. [66] Mr. Pettitt did concede in his testimony that his memory about the dark room “might not be 100%.” [67] But even if he were lodged in a dark room before his interview by Det. Luimes, I do not consider this to be a factor impingingon Mr. Pettitt’s voluntariness. The circumstances were far from those that might amount to oppression. The room was dark, but not pitchblack. The door to the room had a window. Light was still entering the room. Mr.

Pettitt could see his hand in front of his face. Therewas no suggestion that the room lacked a place to sit, or that it was too hot or too cold. On his own account, Mr. Pettitt was not long inthis room. An officer, never identified, explained that there was a problem with the light. That rebutted any suggestion that the lightingcondition was some sort of tactic for reducing Mr. Pettitt’s ability to resist questioning. And regardless, the apology and explanation Mr.Pettitt claimed he received would have reduced any adverse psychological impact of the lighting. 3.

Interviewing Technique [68] Defence Counsel correctly pointed out that Det. Luimes’s interview technique, as the interview record disclosed, was to speakslowly, with long pauses. When testifying, Det. Luimes did speak more quickly than in the interview. [69] As for the pauses, I accept that silence in a conversation may prompt a person to say something to fill the conversationalemptiness. When we speak to fill a conversational gap, though, it is because we choose to do so. The silence does not compel us to speak,although it may support a motivation to speak.

Speaking to break the silence is doing what the speaker wants to do. Further, silence doesnot specify a need to be filled with incriminatory content. [70] I do not consider the use of pauses in questioning to be part of an improper subtly coercive interviewing technique. [71] As for speaking slowly, Det. Luimes stated that he talks slowly in interviews to ensure that he is understood. [72] I do not consider slow speaking to be part of an improper interviewing technique. It could not be said that Det. Luimes’sphrasing and tonality somehow suborned Mr.

Pettit’s will, causing him to say what he did not wish to say. [73] By way of contrast, one might consider the interviewing technique of Sgt. Proke, described in Horvath v The Queen, (SCC), [1979] 2 SCR 376, who induced a hypnotic state in an accused interviewee. “‘[A] shot of Sergeant Proke’ wasessentially the same as a shot of the truth serum:” at 423. [74] The same could not be said respecting Det. Luimes. Det. Luimes’s interviewing technique was not successful. Det. Luimessought, using a minimization tactic, to have Mr.

Pettitt agree with a version of events involving a complainant (basically, that during thetattooing process, unintentional contact occurred beneath the complainant’s underwear). Mr. Pettitt resisted this version of eventsconsistently and consistently claimed that he had done nothing inappropriate with this complainant. Mr. Pettitt consistently claimed thatany contact that occurred with another complainant was consensual. It could not be said that Mr.

Pettitt’s will was overborne since hemaintained his positions throughout the interview. [75] Detective Luimes’s interview style did not diminish the voluntariness of Mr. Pettitt’s responses to interview questions. 4. Ignoring Invocations of the Right to Remain Silent [76] The strongest evidence of involuntariness was that Det. Luimes ignored Mr. Pettitt’s stated desire not to speak, particularlynot to speak about one of the complainants. Mr.

Pettitt repeated his desire not to respond to questions some 10 times: 6.170-172; 8.232-233; 9.250, 253; 15.430-431, 433, 437-438; 16.460, 462-463; 17.476; 22. 640, 642; 36.1047; 42.1222-1223, 1225; 45.1318, 1320-1322.In addition, at 36.1052, Mr. Pettitt said “I’m not alright.” [77] In each case, Det. Luimes essentially simply continued asking questions. [78] When asked why he kept questioning Mr. Pettitt, Det. Luimes stated “because I can;” it is “not against the law.” DetectiveLuimes was right, at least so long as the parametres of the voluntariness rule are respected.

In Singh, Justice Charron wrote as follows atpara 28: 28 What the common law recognizes is the individual’s right to remain silent. This does not mean, however, that a person has theright not to be spoken to by state authorities. The importance of police questioning in the fulfilment of their investigative role cannot bedoubted. One can readily appreciate that the police could hardly investigate crime without putting questions to persons from whom it isthought that useful information may be obtained. The person suspected of having committed the crime being investigated is noexception.

Indeed, if the suspect in fact committed the crime, he or she is likely the person who has the most information to offer aboutthe incident. Therefore, the common law also recognizes the importance of police interrogation in the investigation of crime. [79] Justice Charron went on to warn at para 53 that In some circumstances, the evidence will support a finding that continued questioning by the police in the face of the accused’s repeatedassertions of the right to silence denied the accused a meaningful choice whether to speak or to remain silent: see Otis.

The number oftimes the accused asserts his or her right to silence is part of the assessment of all of the circumstances, but is not in itself determinative. The ultimate question is whether the accused exercised free will by choosing to make a statement .... See also para 47 and Otis at paras 46 and 53. Persistent lack of recognition of an invoked right to silence may show that questioning willcontinue regardless of anything the interviewee says. Resistance is futile.

The right to silence is no exercisable right at all. [80] In this case, however, in my opinion, the number of assertions of the right to silence and the number of times those assertions

were ignored does not raise a doubt about whether Mr. Pettitt’s statements in the interview were voluntary. [ 81 ] The interview was relatively short, some 2 hours. The interview occurred early in the evening. There was no significant delay after arrest before the interview began. There was nothing oppressive in the circumstances leading up to the interview (I have dealt with the dark room matter) and nothing oppressive about the environment in which the interview took place. The interview was not hostile, aggressive, or intimidating. I saw no evidence of physical intimidation in the interview.

No falsehoods were used by Det. Luimes. [ 82 ] Mr. Pettitt did continue to speak after asserting his right to remain silent, but did not depart from his accounts of lack of criminal responsibility respecting the two complainants. His accounts did not change through any influence by Det. Luimes in the interview. [ 83 ] The “not alright” comment was not concerning in context: Question: You need more water or anything, Scott? Scott: No, I’m good, thank you. Question: Okay, can we get you anything else? You all right? Scott: No, I’m not alright but Question: Okay, all right.

When you finish tattoos, and specifically .... The evidence did not support a conclusion that Mr. Pettitt was in some form of mental distress or in a psychological condition that precluded continuing the conversation. [ 84 ] I agree with Det. Luimes’s observations that Mr. Pettitt was cooperative in the interview and that nothing about his demeanour, mood, or emotions raised concerns. [ 85 ] In Singh , it is true, the accused consulted with counsel before his interview. Mr. Pettitt did not have the opportunity to consult with counsel before the interview began.

I do not view this fact as having any bearing on the voluntariness analysis. Mr. Pettitt formally waived his right to counsel at the commencement of the interview. He had been interviewed by police only a few weeks before. He was properly cautioned before the interview began. He suffered from no knowledge deficit respecting his rights. 5. Feelings [ 86 ] Once again, I have taken into account in assessing voluntariness the emotions Mr. Pettitt testified to. He testified that he felt like he had to keep talking, the whole situation was intimidating, he was having a panic attack.

He did not want to be there. [ 87 ] The video provided no evidence that Mr. Pettitt was having a panic attack. His affect was relatively flat. He was obviously not happy and was concerned with the impact of the charges on him. He feared that his life was ruined. His emotional state was normal for a person charged with a serious offence: see, again, Otis at para 54. [ 88 ] Mr. Pettitt stated that he felt like Det. Luimes “wasn’t going to stop no matter what I said.” That feeling lacked objective support. Mr. Pettitt was well able to maintain his positions despite Det. Luimes’ efforts. Mr.

Pettitt’s will was not overborne. None of the other values protected by the voluntariness rule were offended or imperilled or undermined in the June 20 interview. [ 89 ] On the evidence, the Crown has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements Mr. Pettitt made in the June 20 Interview were voluntary. D. Conclusion [ 90 ] I find that the Crown has established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statements made by Mr. Pettitt in both the June 7 and June 20 Interviews were voluntary.

To that extent, then, both interviews are admissible. [ 91 ] The June 7 Interview contains some information relating to other sexual history of a complainant. The Crown made no application for the admission of this evidence. This information must be redacted from the June 7 Interview. I will identify the offending passages. [ 92 ] I will also ensure that no sexual history evidence is improperly imported into trial through the June 20 Interview. Heard on the 1 st day of February, 2021 to the 2 nd day of February, 2021.

Delivered on the 5 th day of February, 2021 Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 22 nd day of February, 2021.

W.N. Renke J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Jonathan Fernandes Crown Counsel for the Crown Gloria Hammermeister Hammermeister Law for the Accused