Bryant v Parkland School Division, 2021 ABQB 391

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Bryant v Parkland School Division, 2021 ABQB 391 Date: 20210518 Docket: 1503 03278 Registry: Edmonton Between: Thomas Bryant, Natalie Dzioba, Silke Larison Plaintiffs - and - Parkland School Division Defendant _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Mr. Justice T.G. Rothwell _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] The Plaintiffs Thomas Bryant (Bryant) Natalie Dzioba (Dzioba) and Silkie Larison (Larison) were employed by the Parkland School Division (Parkland).

All three were given 60 days working notice on June 2, 2014. All three worked primarily in the area of information technology. [ 2 ] The Plaintiffs have brought a

summary judgment application seeking damages consistent with common law reasonable notice in excess of the 60 days notice that they were provided. Parkland has brought a

summary judgment application seeking to have the Plaintiffs’ claim dismissed on the basis that they complied with the terms of each Plaintiff’s employment contract which contemplated “60 days or more written notice”. [ 3 ] For the reasons that follow I find that the terms of the employment contract were unambiguous and the Plaintiffs’ common

law right to reasonable notice was not an implied term of their employment contract. Parkland complied with the terms of the employment contract by providing 60 days notice. Parkland’s

summary dismissal application is granted and the Plaintiffs’

summary judgment application is dismissed. II. Issues [ 4 ] This matter raises two primary issues: [ 5 ] Was Parkland entitled to terminate the Plaintiffs’ employment on 60 days written notice? [ 6 ] If Parkland was required to provide more than 60 days written notice what is reasonable notice for each Plaintiff in the circumstances? III.

Facts [ 7 ] The following facts are not disputed: • Bryant was employed by Parkland on a full-time basis from December 8, 2004 to August 2, 2014. • Dzioba was employed by Parkland on a full-time basis from December 1, 1999 to August 2, 2014. • Larison was employed by Parkland on a full-time basis from October 12, 1999 to August 2, 2014. • The Plaintiffs were not required to work during the 60-day notice period running from June 2, 2014 to August 2, 2014.

Parkland terminated the employees as part of a restructuring program and did not allege any cause for the terminations. • The Plaintiffs were paid during their 60 days of working notice. • The Plaintiffs each entered into a two-page Employment Contract (Contract) that was drafted by Parkland and was virtually identical in all material aspects. • The Contract was a standard form contract used by Parkland and names, wages and dates were completed for each employee. • The Contract does not contain an explicit reference to the Employment Standards Code , RSA 2000, c E-9 ( Code ). • Clause 2 of all the Contracts deals with termination and reads as follows: This contract may be terminated by the Employee by giving the Board thirty (30) days or more prior written notice, and by the Board upon giving the Employee sixty (60) days or more written notice.

IV. Position of the Parties Plaintiffs [ 8 ] The Plaintiffs argue that the clause “60 days or more” creates a minimum notice period of 60 days and that the Contract is not clear under what circumstances 60 days will be the minimum or maximum notice period. They further argue that this ambiguity should be resolved in their favour in accord with the contra proferentem principle. The Plaintiffs assert that 60 days is the “floor” for notice not the “ceiling” and that a ceiling clause must be clear.

Finally, the Plaintiffs argue that the Contract does not specifically limit their remedies to those found in the Code and therefore their remedies are unaffected by the Code . Parkland [ 9 ] Parkland asserts that the Contract is clear and that “60 days or more” is clear and reserves a right of discretion to Parkland: Parkland must provide 60 days notice or it can provide more. The lack of ambiguity in the Contract and the entire agreement clause (i.e. Clause 10) obviates the need for the Court to have regard to parol or extrinsic evidence or apply the contra proferentem principle.

Finally, Clause 2 rebuts the common law entitlement to reasonable notice and it provides notice that exceeds the maximum notice under the Code . V. Test for

Summary Judgment [ 10 ] Rule 7.3(1) of the Alberta Rules of Court , Alta Reg 124/2010 provides: 7.3(1) A party may apply to the Court for

summary judgment in respect of all or part of a claim on one or more of the following grounds: (

a) there is no defence to a claim or part of it;

(

b) there is no merit to a claim or part of it; (

c) the only real issue is the amount to be awarded. [ 11 ] Weir-Jones Technical Services Incorporated v Purolator Courier Ltd , 2019 ABCA 49 ( Weir-Jones) is the leading authority on

summary judgment in Alberta. The proper approach to

summary judgment is set out at para 47 of Weir-Jones : The proper approach to

summary dispositions, based on the Hryniak v Mauldin test, should follow the core principles relating to

summary dispositions, the standard of proof, the record, and fairness. The test must be predictable, consistent, and fair to both parties. The procedure and the outcome must be just, appropriate, and reasonable. The key considerations are:

a) Having regard to the state of the record and the issues, is it possible to fairly resolve the dispute on a

summary basis, or do uncertainties in the facts, the record or the law reveal a genuine issue requiring a trial?

b) Has the moving party met the burden on it to show that there is either “no merit” or “no defence” and that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial? At a threshold level the facts of the case must be proven on a balance of probabilities or the application will fail, but mere establishment of the facts to that standard is not a proxy for

summary adjudication.

c) If the moving party has met its burden, the resisting party must put its best foot forward and demonstrate from the record that there is a genuine issue requiring a trial. This can occur by challenging the moving party’s case, by identifying a positive defence, by showing that a fair and just

summary disposition is not realistic, or by otherwise demonstrating that there is a genuine issue requiring a trial. If there is a genuine issue requiring a trial,

summary disposition is not available.

d) In any event, the presiding judge must be left with sufficient confidence in the state of the record such that he or she is prepared to exercise the judicial discretion to summarily resolve the dispute. ( emphasis in original ) [ 12 ] This approach was reviewed and confirmed in Hannam v Medicine Hat School District No 76 , 2020 ABCA 343 ( Hannam) . [ 13 ] This approach will guide my determination regarding the appropriateness of the parties’

summary judgment/dismissal applications. VI. Analysis Issue 1 – Was Parkland Entitled to Terminate on 60 Days Written Notice? Contractual

Interpretation [ 14 ] The Plaintiffs noted the following passage from Professor Fridman: The golden rule is that the literal meaning must be given to the language of the contract, unless this would result in absurdity. Words of ordinary use in a contract must be construed in their ordinary and natural sense. The paramount test of the meaning of the words in a contract is the intention of the parties.

That is to be determined in the operative sense by reference to the surrounding circumstances at the time of signing the contract, other words, the content of factual mix in which the contract exists. (GHL Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada , 6 th Ed, at pp 437-438) [ 15 ] The Plaintiffs argue that the primary ambiguity flows from the uncertainty as to whether Clause 2 creates a floor (i.e. the starting point) or a ceiling (notice is fixed at 60 days). The Plaintiffs prefer the

interpretation that concludes that a floor is established. [ 16 ] The Plaintiffs note that the Clause is an indefinite term and argue that the parties intended 60 days to be the “floor” and that more notice would be provided as the length of the contract increased. [ 17 ] Later in my reasons, I review authorities in the employment law context that consider different notice periods in employment contracts.

Both parties presented a number of different clauses; however, neither could locate a case that considered the phrase “X days or more”. [ 18 ] If the contract contained only the words “60 days” it would be abundantly clear that Parkland had fixed its notice at 60 days. An employee would receive 60 days whether they had worked for six months, 60 months (five years) or 180 months (15 years). However, the words “or more” are included. Employees Will Receive 60 days [ 19 ] “Or” is disjunctive.

A plain and ordinary reading of the clause should lead to the conclusion that the employee will receive 60 days or more than 60 days. Mathematically one would express it as 60 or 60 + Y. [ 20 ] Y is unknown, but cannot be a negative number. [ 21 ] In my view, it is clear that 60 days is the floor. All employees will receive a minimum of 60 days. However, the inquiry does not end there.

“Or more” is Not Ambiguous [22] I must consider whether ambiguity is created because the contract is silent with respect to what circumstances will trigger anotice period greater than 60 days. Put another way, is the contract ambiguous because an employee is unable to ascertain how muchnotice in excess of 60 days they may receive. [23] Parkland argues that there is no ambiguity and that it provided itself with a discretion to provide notice in excess of 60 days.Shae Abba, Parkland’s Director of Human Resources, swore an affidavit in support of Parkland’s

summary judgment application. Shestated in her affidavit that after consultation with Parkland’s executive leadership, she made the decision to provide the Plaintiffs’ with 60days notice. [24] In Smith v Wawnesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2013 ABQB 369 (Smith) Justice Veit held that ambiguity arises when thelanguage in a document gives rise to two or more reasonable

interpretations. She also noted that even if the language could have beenexpressed more clearly, an alternate wording does not create an ambiguity: para 3. In Smith Veit J was interpreting a contract ofinsurance. [25] The Court of Appeal articulated the following principles regarding contractual

interpretation in the decision IFP Technologies(Canada) Inc v EnCana Midstream and Marketing, 2017 ABCA 157 (IFP). IFP considered the meaning of “working interest” inrelation to oil and gas leases in Canada. IFP canvassed a number of principles of contractual

interpretation: • A trial judge must consider the factual matrix and surrounding circumstances of a contract regardless of whether it is ambiguous:para 58. • In deciding what the parties to a contract intended, a practical, common sense approach is called for: para 65. • The goal is to determine the objective intent of the parties: para 79. • Considering the surrounding circumstances of a contract does not offend the parol evidence rule: para 81. • Surrounding circumstances consist of objective evidence of the background facts at the time the contract is executed: para 83. • Written evidence of negotiations leading up to a contract is far more objective evidence of parties’ intentions than after-the-factevidence from opposing parties about oral statements made during negotiations: para 85. • A contract is ambiguous when the words are “reasonably susceptible” of more than one meaning: para 87. [26] In this case the Contract is a two-page standard form contract that was used by Parkland to create an employment relationship. [27] I have no evidence before me regarding the standard type of form used by school districts or other public sector employers tocompare it to or have regard to “industry standards”. [28] The Contracts were not altered in any sense to reflect specific negotiations. [29] None of the Plaintiffs assert that there was a specific discussion regarding how long they would remain employed withParkland.

The Contracts were indefinite term contracts. [30] The Contract applies to a number of employees and must have the same meaning for all of them: Styles v Alberta InvestmentManagement Corporation, 2017 ABCA 1 at paras 19-20 (Styles). [31] There is very little meaningful factual matrix to consider regarding the formation of this contract because it is a standard formcontract: Ledcor Construction Ltd v Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Co, 2016 SCC 37 at paras 24-25 (Ledcor). [32] I do not find that the clause is reasonably subject to more than “one meaning”.

A plain reading yields one meaning: 60 days orsomething greater. The clause provides a fixed level of notice for all employees and allows Parkland to “give” a greater sum in itsdiscretion. [33] IFP endorses a practical and common-sense approach. Sixty days ensures compliance with the minimum notice periodrequired for employees with 10 or more years service under the Code and provides authority for Parkland to pay a greater sum dependingupon the individual circumstances of each situation.

If more than 60 days notice is provided it would likely depend upon a number offactors (e.g. seniority of employee, economic conditions, likelihood of re-employment) that would not be ascertainable at the time thecontract was entered into. [34] An employee’s inability to calculate their exact notice period does not render the clause ambiguous. While the Plaintiffs usethe analogy of a floor and ceiling they are in essence, in my view, arguing that the “or more” is equivalent to common law notice. I notethat Clause 2 has a reciprocal and symmetrical design.

Both the employer and employee are obligated to provide a minimum amount ofnotice if they wish to terminate the Contract. Both are granted a discretion to provide more. The employer’s minimum notice is twice aslong as the employee’s minimum. [35] It is important to note that an employee is also required to provide reasonable notice at common law if their indefinite termcontract is silent with respect to termination: Tree Savers International Ltd v Savoy, (ABQB), aff’d 1992 ABCA 34.While it is rare for an employer to sue an employee for failure to provide reasonable notice the obligation does exist.

Clause 2 also makesit clear that it is the “Employee” determining its notice period and the “Board giving the employee 60 days or more”. [36] When considering the Plaintiff’s argument that the contract contemplated that the “or more” means, in essence, common law

reasonable notice, that

interpretation would apply to the “Employee” as well given the reciprocal obligations in Clause 2. [ 37 ] When applying an ordinary and natural meaning to “or more” I do not conclude that it means “reasonable notice”. I do not find it plausible that the parties would have intended that they would have had to determine whether the common law reasonable notice exceeded the minimum notice and then to provide common law reasonable notice.

Instead, I conclude that it confers a discretion on either party to provide greater than the minimum if they wish. [ 38 ] In Styles the Court considered a complex employment contract in order to determine whether an employee who had been dismissed was entitled to bonuses under the contract’s long-term incentive plan. The Court, in discussing the exercise of discretion, held at para 60: When a contract gives one party a discretion on how to perform, that is a method of risk allocation between the parties to the contract.

They have contracted and agreed that the party with the discretion will have an element of power over how performance is to be accomplished. This may be because all of the possible situations surrounding performance are impossible to predict, meaning that one party or the other has to have some flexibility at the time of performance. Alternatively, it may simply be part of the bargain: one party was only prepared to enter into the contract on the basis that it was given an element of discretion as to how it will actually perform.

Whatever the reasons, if one party is given a discretion it should be allowed to exercise that discretion without being second- guessed by the courts with the benefit of hindsight. ( emphasis added ) [ 39 ] Clause 2 could have been drafted differently; however, the existence of an alternate wording does not create an ambiguity: Smith at para 3 . [ 40 ] If an employee is not comfortable having the Employer determine their “Y factor” they should not accept the contract as presented. While this is a standard form contract a potential employee is not required to accept it.

It is not the role of this Court to opine upon the fairness of terms of the contract: Styles at para 63 . [ 41 ] Similarly, if a key long-term employee wishes to leave by only giving 30 days notice Parkland would be precluded from seeking damages from such an employee. [ 42 ] The contract was a standard form and would be used to employ a variety of employees.

If a “one size fits all contract” is used it would be logical for the employer to reserve a degree of discretion to itself. [ 43 ] The contract makes is clear that at least 60 days notice will be provided. [ 44 ] I do not find the contract ambiguous and find no need to consider extrinsic or parol evidence; however, the Plaintiffs argue that the following evidence should be considered: • Bryant swore in his affidavit that there was no specific discussion regarding Clause 2 and that he assumed that the longer he was employed the more notice he would receive. • Dzioba swore in her affidavit that she understood that the “or more” meant that the notice period would increase depending on the length of time that she was employed by Parkland. • Larison swore in her affidavit that she questioned what was meant by “60 days or more” and that she inquired with Barb Williams who advised she was pretty sure it was meant to set a minimum and that as the length of service increased so would the notice.

Furthermore, Barb Williams confirmed same with Jim Rigby, the Associate/Deputy Superintendent for Parkland. Larison believed that as her length of service increased so would the amount of notice she would receive. [ 45 ] The Plaintiffs also provided an affidavit from Jim Rigby. Rigby swore that he was involved in drafting the Contract and that the intent of Clause 2 was that as an employee’s employment continued that they would receive more notice.

Rigby ceased employment with Parkland in 2005. [ 46 ] I will deal with this evidence for completeness sake. [ 47 ] I find that Bryant and Dzioba’s assumption/understanding evidence is subjective and in my view not part of the factual objective matrix that existed at the time the contract was entered into.

If a contract’s meaning was divined by individuals’ subjective understanding there would be little certainty in contracts and standard form contracts would not be “standard”. [ 48 ] I accept Larison’s evidence that she questioned what was meant by Clause 2 and Barb Williams answer that it set a minimum is accurate. Williams’ report that it was intended that as service lengthened the notice would lengthen is consistent with Rigby’s affidavit. [ 49 ] Rigby’s evidence is partially consistent with the wording of Clause 2.

Clause 2 does allow Parkland to provide more than 60 days notice; however, it is silent on the circumstances under which it will be paid. Rigby’s evidence that increased notice would follow increased service is permitted by the Contract and may have been his intention; however, the contract merely states “or more”. [ 50 ] The Contract contained an entire agreement clause.

Clause 10 reads: This contract contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto and there are no representations, warranties or collateral agreements other than those expressed herein. [ 51 ] Parkland also argues that effect must be given to this clause and that no regard should be had to negotiations or discussions that are not found within the contract. [ 52 ] I accept the submission that the entire agreement clause should be given meaning and note that the purpose of an entire

agreement clause is to ensure that the obligations of the parties will be determined by the words of the contract: Houle v Knelsen Sand&Gravel Ltd, 2016 ABCA 247 at para 23 (Houle). [53] In conclusion, I do not find Clause 2 ambiguous and therefore will have no regard to extrinsic or parol evidence. Further, andin the alternative, Clause 10 should be given meaning and precludes reference to any representations that are not contained in thecontract.

Clause 2 Displaces the Common Law Notice Period [54] An employee who is party to an indefinite term employment contract, absent express contractual language to the contrary, isentitled to reasonable notice if the employer terminates the contract without cause: Machtinger v HOJ Industries Ltd, (SCC), [1992] 1 SCR 986 (Machtinger). [55] The obligation to provide common law reasonable notice is operative if the employment contract is either silent on the issueof termination or the language concerning the terms upon which notice can be provided are not clear. [56] In Holm v AGAT Laboratories Ltd, 2018 ABCA 23 (Holm) the Court of Appeal had to determine whether the noticeprovision in Mr.

Holm’s employment contract limited his notice to the statutory provisions of the Employment Standards Code orwhether he retained his common law rights. [57] Holm considers a number of other cases where employers seek to “piggy back” on the notice provisions contained in the Codeand use those provisions in an effort to set a fixed notice period for termination. [58] The Court of Appeal at paragraph 35 stated: At its essence, an enforceable employment contract must contain clear and unequivocal language to extinguish, or limit, an employee’scommon law rights... [59] In Holm the clause that was held to be ambiguous read: 2(2) In the event we wish to terminate your employment without just cause, we agree that we will give you notice of the terminationof your employment, or at our absolute discretion, we will pay you, in lieu of such notice, a severance payment equal to the wages onlythat you would have received during the applicable notice period.

This will be in accordance with the provincial legislation for theprovince of employment. [60] In Stangenberg v Bellamy Software, 2016 ABQB 160 (Stangenberg) Justice Graesser held that this clause was sufficientlyexpress to extinguish the employee’s common law rights: In the event that Sylogist terminates your employment without cause, Sylogist will provide the notice or pay in lieu of notice required bythe Alberta Employments Standard Code or other applicable legislation.

You are not entitled to any other termination notice, pay in lieuof notice, or other benefits. [61] The wording in Stangenberg is simpler and the last sentence provides express notice that the employee’s entitlement will belimited to the Code’s entitlement. [62]

Section 3 of the Code clarifies that the Code does not affect an employee’s common law rights.

Therefore, if employersreference the Code they need to be clear in rebutting the common law presumption if they wish to extinguish it: Kosowan v ConceptElectric Ltd, 2007 ABCA 85 (Kosowan) at para 4; Gillespie v 1200333 Alberta Ltd, 2012 ABQB 105 (Gillespie). [63] Clause 9 of the Contract reads: This employment contract shall be subject to the provisions of all applicable statutes of the Province of Alberta and regulationspassed thereunder, as well as being governed generally by the applicable policies and procedures as established and amended from timeto time by the Board of Trustees of Parkland School Division No. 70. (emphasis added) [64] The Plaintiffs argue that this clause incorporates the provisions of the Code into the Contract and therefore in the absence ofexpress language the Plaintiffs’ common law rights subsist. [65] The Plaintiffs’ argument would have more merit if the Contract explicitly referenced the Code and Parkland sought to relyupon the notice provisions in the Code. [66] The Contract does not seek to rely upon the Code’s framework.

In any event, I do not find that Clause 9 assists the Plaintiffsas the common law right to reasonable notice exists independent of the Code. Clause 2 either addresses termination or it does not.

Thecommon law right to reasonable notice is only implied into an indefinite employment contract if the contract is silent or it is ambiguous.Furthermore, even in the absence of Clause 9 Parkland must comply with the minimum notice provisions of the Code. [67] Additionally, unlike in Kosowan, the Contract did not employ language indicating that notice must be provided “inaccordance with the Code”. [68] Nemeth v Hatch Ltd, 2018 ONCA 7 (Nemeth) is cited by both the Plaintiffs and the Defendant and stands for the followingpropositions: • the parties are not required to use a specific phrase or formula or state literally that “the parties have agreed to limit an employee’scommon law rights on termination: para 9.

• if employers do not make clear the parties’ intention to displace common law notice, they cannot complain if the fruits of theirdrafting are found to be ambiguous and unenforceable: para 13. [69] In Nemeth the following clause was held to be sufficient to displace the employee’s common law rights: The Company’s policy with respect to termination is that employment may be terminated by either party with notice in writing.

Thenotice period shall amount to one week per year of service with a minimum of four weeks or the notice required by the applicable labourlegislation. [70] Parkland cited two additional cases in support of its position that Clause 2 is sufficiently clear to extinguish the Plaintiff’scommon law rights: Jobber v Addressograph Multigraph of Canada Ltd, [1980] OJ No 1598 (CA) (Jobber); and Aldo Ippolito & Co v Canada Packers Inc, (ON CA), [1986] OJ No 996 (CA) (Aldo). [71] In Jobber the written employment contract allowed the employer to terminate without cause with “at least 30 days of notice”plus the employment standards minimum requirement.

The contract required Jobber to provide a minimum of 30 days notice as well. [72] On appeal, Jobber argued that clause was ambiguous for a number of reasons and focused on the words “at least” and arguedthat they leave the matter of notice at large.

The Court held at para 13: We cannot accept this submission but can only repeat our view that the clause is perfectly clear and that if either party gives theminimum amount of notice required by the clause the obligation of that party under the agreement is satisfied. [73] In Aldo the termination clause stated: This agreement shall remain in effect until terminated by either party, upon no less than thirty days’ notice of termination by registeredmail to the other party. [74] The Court in Aldo held that the words “no less than” were included to avoid any suggestion that anything less than 30 daysnotice would not be sufficient. [75] The Plaintiffs caution that both of these cases pre-date Machtinger and are dated cases. [76] The Plaintiffs are correct that they are dated cases that are not binding upon this Court.

I have noted the cases because theDefendant specifically relied upon them; however, the cases, while dated, demonstrate that language such as “at least” or “no less than”type clauses are contained in employment contracts and were not found to be ambiguous. [77] Following Nemeth there is no requirement that specific wording needs to be used to rebut the common law presumption; seealso Holm at paras 21 and 35.

The common law presumption exists if a contract is silent or not express. [78] In my view, if the Code is referenced more explicit language is likely required for the reasons set out above. [79] In the present case, Clause 2 of the Contract is clearly addressing the manner in which the Contract can be terminated byeither party. It specifies a minimum notice period (i.e. 60 days) upon which Parkland can terminate the Contract. The language used isclear and express.

Based upon my review of the authorities it is not necessary for the clause to contain “release or waiver” type language. [80] For the above reasons, I conclude that Clause 2 clearly and unequivocally sets a notice period for termination. The commonlaw does not imply a right to reasonable notice when a contract addresses termination. The Plaintiffs are entitled to notice in accordancewith the Contract.

Unconscionability [81] An employer is not permitted to set a notice provision that is less than the requirements of relevant employment standardslegislation and must not act unconscionably: Machtinger at paras 33-35 [82] The maximum notice period an employee can receive under the Code is 8 weeks (i.e. 56 days) after 10 years of service.Parkland’s 60 days of notice for any period of service exceeds the Code. [83] There is no suggestion that any of the Plaintiffs were forced to enter into their Contract or that there was any undue influenceapplied. [84] The law is clear that parties are entitled to contract out of the common law.

As long the statutory minimums are not breached,it is not this Court’s role to second guess notice provisions that are found in employment contracts. [85] Finally, there is no evidence or argument that the terminations were carried out in a bad faith or high-handed manner. [86] I find no basis upon which to conclude that Parkland acted unconscionably. Appropriate for

Summary Judgment? [87] Having regard to the Weir-Jones test I must consider whether I am left with sufficient confidence in the state of the record to

exercise my discretion to summarily resolve this dispute. [ 88 ] Parkland seeks to have the matter dismissed on the basis that it complied with the Contract and accordingly the Plaintiffs’ claim has no merit. The first issue involves interpreting the Contract. The parties have disclosed the relevant records, sworn affidavits and been examined on same. I do not anticipate that there would be any additional evidence that could be proffered that would assist the Court with its

interpretation of the Contract. There are no material facts in dispute and I do not anticipate that I would be assisted by hearing viva voce evidence from the parties because credibility would not be an issue. [ 89 ] The

interpretation of the Contract in this matter is well suited to a

summary judgment/dismissal application. This matter can be justly, fairly, and appropriately determined on the record before me. Parkland has satisfied me on a balance of probabilities that the Plaintiffs’ claim has no merit and there is no genuine issue for trial. The Plaintiffs’ claim should be dismissed. Issue 2 - If Parkland was required to provide more than 60 days written notice what is reasonable notice for each Plaintiff in the circumstances? [ 90 ] In light of my conclusion regarding issue one, it is not necessary for me to deal with issue two. VII. Conclusion [ 91 ] For the reasons set out above I grant Parkland’s application for

summary dismissal and dismiss the Plaintiffs’ application for

summary judgment. I wish to thank counsel for their capable submissions. [ 92 ] If the parties are unable to agree on costs they may speak to me within 30 days of the release of this judgment. Heard on the 19 th day of February, 2021. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 18 th day of May, 2021. T.G. Rothwell J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Patricia C.Tiffen Tiffen Law Office for the Plaintiffs F. Albert X. Lavergne Reynolds Mirth Richards & Farmer LLP for the Defendant