Stratkotter v Canada, 2021 ABQB 45

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Stratkotter v Canada, 2021 ABQB 45 Date: 20210118 Docket: 2001 14028 Registry: Calgary Between: Lorraine Annette Stratkotter Plaintiff - and - Her Majesty the Queen in the Right of Canada, Her Majesty the Queen in the Right of Alberta, Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Justine Trudeau, Mr. Andrew Scheer, Mr. Erin O’Toole, Office of the Federal Minister of Health of Canada, Ms. Petitpas Taylor, Office of the Federal Justice Minister and Attorney General of Canada, Mr. David Lametti, Ms.

Jody Wilson- Raybould, Office of the Federal Finance Minister of Canada, Ms. Chrystia Freeland, Mr. Bill Morneau, Health Canada, Office of the Premier of Alberta, Mr. Jason Kenney, Ms. Rachel Notley, Office of the Minister of Health of Alberta, Mr. Tyler Shandro, Ms. Sarah Hoffman, Office of the Minister of Justice and Solicitor General of Alberta, Ms. Kathleen Ganley, Mr. Doug Schweitzer, Mr. Kaycee Madu, Office of the Minister of Treasury Board and Finance of Alberta, Mr. Travis Toews, Mr.

Joe Ceci, Alberta Health Care, Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons, College of Physicians and Surgeons of Alberta, Law Society of Alberta, Office of the Alberta Out-Of Country Health Services, Ms. Marjorie Hibbert, Dr. N. Hagen, Doctor P. Jamieson, Doctor N. Kassen, Doctor S. Patel, Ms. Janelle Gehring, Alberta Out-of Country Health Services Appeal Panel, Ms. Cheryl Middleton, Ms. Jamie Pytel, Doctor Pavanjit Ahluwalia, Doctor Danielle Michaels, Ms. Evangeline Caoile, Mr.

Blair Maxton, Doctor David Hanley, Doctor Caitlin Sinclair, Doctor Adrian Harvey, Doctor Lois Donovan, Doctor Ralf Paschke, Alberta Office of the Advocate for Persons with Disabilities, Mr. Tony Flores, John Doe(s), and Jane Doe(s). Defendants _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Associate Chief Justice J.D. Rooke _______________________________________________________

I. Introduction [ 1 ] On November 17, 2020, Lorraine Annette Stratkotter [Ms. Stratkotter] filed a Statement of Claim that named 54 Defendants as well as “John Doe(s), and Jane Doe(s)”. The names of those Defendants in the style of cause above are reproduced exactly as listed on Ms. Stratkotter’s Statement of Claim. On December 7, 2020, Counsel for the Law Society of Alberta [LSA], by letter, referred Ms. Stratkotter’s Statement of Claim to the Court as a candidate Apparently Vexatious Application or Proceeding [AVAP] pursuant to Civil Practice Note No. 7 [CPN7].

I am designated to receive and review potential CPN7 processes in southern Alberta. [ 2 ] In brief, Ms. Stratkotter’s Statement of Claim alleges that the Alberta Out-of-Country Health Services Committee and Out- of-Country Health Services Appeal Panel incorrectly denied Ms. Stratkotter financial support to pay for medical steps that relate to Ms. Stratkotter’s thyroid gland. Ultimately Ms. Stratkotter’s thyroid gland was removed “[u]nder duress” in 2019. [ 3 ] The Statement of Claim concludes at paras 34-38: ...

The “discretionary power” actions of the Defendants, is in fact a direct violation of the Plaintiff’s guaranteed Rights and Freedoms of the Canadian Constitution, Health Acts, Criminal Code and all other related legislation, including, but not limited to, right to the best individual medical care, right to quality of life, and right to judicial fairness. ... The Defendants’ abuse of power and negligence is clearly pre-meditated cruel and unusual physical and mental abusive punishment resulting in devaluation and safety of life. ...

No one deserves to be treated like this, especially to be intentionally marginalized in a society that purports the equal safety and support of all its citizens in a free and democratic society where the government is responsible to and representative of all its individual people. ... My life has value. ... This was inhuman. [ 4 ] Ms. Stratkotter seeks, as remedies, a “written apology from all parties involved”, and lump sum payment in the amount of a minimum of $10,500,00 Canadian (10.5 million dollars Canadian), that being at least equivalent to the amount that Mr.

Omar Kandar received. [Sic.] [ 5 ] In a decision reported as Stratkotter v Canada , 2020 ABQB 768 [ Stratkotter #1 ] , I concluded that Ms. Stratkotter’s Statement of Claim exhibited prima facie defects that could merit her action being struck out per Rule 3.68. I therefore initiated a CPN7 document-based “show cause” procedure, and requested Ms. Stratkotter submit an up to ten-page Written Submission that responded to four questions: 1.

Why should the Defendants, other than the Out-of-Country Health Service Committee, and Out-of-Country Health Services Appeal Panel, be parties to the November 17, 2020 Statement of Claim? 2. Why should the Out-of-Country Health Service Committee and Out-of-Country Health Services Appeal Panel be potentially liable when Ms. Stratkotter did not exhaust her judicial mechanisms to obtain the medical care she claims she required? 3. How does the November 17, 2020 Statement of Claim provide a basis for a meaningful response by the Court and the Defendants? 4.

Why is the $10.5 million damages claim not impossible or excessive? [ 6 ] Ms. Stratkotter’s Written Submission was received on January 4, 2021. A Written Reply was received from the LSA on January 11, 2021. The CPN7 process now advances to its final stage as I evaluate whether or not Ms. Stratkotter has established a valid basis for her litigation. II. CPN7 Analysis [ 7 ] Stratkotter #1 identified four apparent defects with Ms. Stratkotter’s Statement of Claim. Prior to evaluating those four defectst5, I will first discuss an underlying problem with Ms.

Stratkotter’s Statement of Claim and her Written Submission. [ 8 ] Rule 3.68 and CPN7 are document-centered processes. They evaluate a filing on its own. As a general principle, for the purposes of Rule 3.68, whatever is stated in a statement of claim or other pleadings is presumed to be true.

Exceptions to that rule are that allegations in pleadings: 1. must be more than “bald allegations” ( GH v Alcock , 2013 ABCA 24 at para 58 ) and instead should provide the “... who, when, where, how and what gave rise to its liability” ( Mancuso v Canada (National Health and Welfare) , 2015 FCA 227 at paras 16-20 ); 2. may be rejected where those claims are absurd and highly implausible since “[a]n extraordinary claim requires extraordinary proof” ( Arabi v Alberta , 2014 ABQB 295 at paras 74-77 ); and 3. cannot be illogical, incomplete, impenetrable, or gibberish, since that means the opposing parties and Court cannot make a meaningful response ( kisikawpimootewin v Canada , 2004 FC 1426 at para 9 ; Arabi v Alberta at paras 82-85 ; Unrau v National Dental Examining Board , 2019 ABQB 283 at para 629 [ Unrau #2 ]).

[9] Rule 3.68(3) prohibits new evidence to support the validity of pleadings subject to a CPN7 process. In short, the Court takesMs. Stratkotter’s Statement of Claim as it is written. Ms. Stratkotter cannot file inadequate pleadings and then either supplement thoseclaims, or expect the Defendants to “fill in the blanks”: Mancuso v Canada (National Health and Welfare) at para 20.

A lack ofspecificity is not merely a technical defect, but goes to the core of the claim: GH v Alcock at para 58, citing AL v Ontario (Minister ofCommunity and Social Services) (2006) (ON CA), 274 DLR (4th) 431, 218 OAC 150 (Ont CA). [10] These principles will repeatedly factor into my analysis of Ms. Stratkotter’s Written Submission and the legal validity of herStatement of Claim. A. No Allegations Against Parties [11] Ms. Stratkotter names 54 parties in her lawsuit and “Jane Doe(s)” and “John Doe(s)”. In Stratkotter #1 I observed at paras 12-16 that the body of Ms.

Stratkotter’s Statement of Claim makes no mention of 51 of the named Defendants. Her lawsuit literally hasnothing to say about them. [12] One of the three remaining Defendants is mentioned in this context: The Thyroid Surgeon, Doctor Adrian Harvey in Calgary, Alberta, that could drain the thyroid and perform Thyroid RadiofrequencyAblation. He began subsequently on May 17th, 2019. [Sic.] Ms. Stratkotter makes no allegations that Dr. Harvey was negligent in his conducting this treatment, or otherwise did anything wrong.She does not allege she was harmed by Dr. Harvey. [13] I requested Ms.

Stratkotter explain how her Statement of Claim establishes a basis for her to have a potentially valid lawsuitagainst these individuals. [14] Ms. Stratkotter in her Written Submissions reproduces several emails that she sent to a number of federal and Albertagovernment officials, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Alberta, and the Royal College regarding her attempts to obtain out ofcountry health care funding. She says the recipients of that email and other Defendants were involved in her health care, including bypassing legislation and exercising “discretionary power”.

She says other Defendants were implicated because they operate asprofessional supervisory authorities or insurers of legal and medical professionals. Ms. Stratkotter provides a kind of “table oforganization” illustrating responsibility and authority among the Defendants. [15] The LSA in its reply observes that Ms. Stratkotter does not identify any wrongdoing by the LSA, or even that any of theDefendants were lawyers involved in litigation that somehow involved Ms. Stratkotter. The lawyer Defendants are instead governmentmembers or officials.

The LSA also notes that Legal Profession Act, RSA 2000, c L-8, s 115 would, in any case, block liability. [16] I conclude that Ms. Stratkotter has not demonstrated that her Statement of Claim advances any possible claims against theDefendants, except for the Out-of-Country Health Service Committee and Out-of-Country Health Services Appeal Panel. Ms. Stratkottercannot supplement her allegations or introduce evidence during a CPN7 process: Rule 3.68(3); Mancuso v Canada (National Healthand Welfare); GH v Alcock. Ms. Stratkotter named parties to her litigation against whom she made no claim.

That is an abuse of theCourt, and an abuse of those Defendants. I therefore strike all Defendants, other than the Out-of-Country Health Service Committee andOut-of-Country Health Services Appeal Panel, from Ms. Stratkotter’s Statement of Claim. B. Failure to Exhaust Alternative Remedies [17] The second apparent defect that I requested Ms.

Stratkotter to address was why she should be able to sue the Out-of-CountryHealth Service Committee and Out-of-Country Health Services Appeal Panel when she had not exhausted her potential alternativeremedies to obtain state funded medical assistance: Stratkotter #1 at paras 17-19. Ms. Stratkotter could have initiated a judicial review ofthe February 13, 2019 decision by the Out-of-Country Health Services Appeal Panel that denied Ms. Stratkotter’s appeal, as occurred inBlack v Alberta (Out-of-Country Health Services Appeal Panel), 2017 ABQB 80. Ms.

Stratkotter had a court mechanism to obtainedthe care she claims to have required, but Ms. Stratkotter did not take advantage of that process. [18] Ms. Stratkotter in response makes two points. First, she says her lawsuit is the appropriate mechanism to challenge thedecisions of the Out-of-Country Health Service Committee and Out-of-Country Health Services Appeal Panel, that these Defendantsbreached Administrative Procedures and Jurisdiction Act, RSA 2000, c A-3, s 4, and that provides her with a Charter s 24(1) remedy. [19] Second, Ms.

Stratkotter describes how she experienced medical, dental, and home-related issues from May 19, 2019 onward.She says she did her best to reply within the two-year Statement of Claim limitations period. [20] Ms. Stratkotter’s reply is non-responsive to the question of why she did not exercise her right to conduct a judicial review ofthe February 13, 2019 decision by the Out-of-Country Health Services Appeal Panel decision.

Her complaint, that that decision was inbreach of Administrative Procedures and Jurisdiction Act, s 4, is precisely the kind of legal question that would be a basis for a judicialreview pursuant to Alberta Rules of Court, Rule 3.15. However, I also note that a breach of Administrative Procedures and JurisdictionAct, s 4 is not a basis for a Charter remedy - those are two different things. [21] Ms. Stratkotter did not exercise her right to obtain a court order to provide her out-of-country medical attention.

The six-month limitation period set by Rule 3.15(2) is strictly construed (Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation, 2011 ABCA 29 at para 27),though I note that Veit J in Ruhl v Alberta (Human Rights Commission), 2015 ABQB 513 at paras 22-24 observed that real incapacityto initiate judicial review proceedings (for which there is not evidence here) might be a basis to extend the Rule 3.15(2) limitations periodin a manner analogous to Limitations Act, RSA 2000, c L-12, s 5.

[22] None of that assists Ms. Stratkotter. I conclude that her claims against the Out-of-Country Health Service Committee and Out-of-Country Health Services Appeal Panel should be struck out because Ms. Stratkotter did not exercise her rights to an alternative judicialremedy to obtain the treatment she sought, prior to filing her Statement of Claim. C. Bald and Unparticularized Pleadings [23] The third apparent defect is that Ms.

Stratkotter’s Statement of Claim only provides bald allegations that did not provide ameaningful basis on which the Court and Defendants could respond: Stratkotter #1 at paras 20-23. [24] Ms. Stratkotter describes the effects of her not having a thyroid gland on her health, ability to work, her career goals, and onher physical appearance. She references the

preamble and

section 9 of the Canada Health Act, RSC 1985, c C-6, and the

preamble of theAlberta Health Act, SA 2010, c A-19.5. [25] Counsel for the LSA argues that Ms. Stratkotter’s argument is non-responsive to this issue. I agree. As I concluded in

Part IIA,Ms. Stratkotter has provided no link at all between most of the Defendants and the injuries that she reports. As for her allegations, such asbreaches of legislation, the Charter, criminal offenses, abuse of power, negligence, Ms. Stratkotter should have provided sufficient detailin her Statement of Claim so that the Court and Defendants could respond to her litigation. As she did not do so, her Statement of Claimis an abuse of the Court (Unrau #2 at para 629), and I therefore strike it out on that basis. D. Impossible or Excessive Remedies [26] Ms.

Stratkotter sought damages of $10.5 million as “a minimum”. In Stratkotter #1 at paras 24-26, I noted this amount was 29times (with inflation) the maximum general “pain and suffering” damages permitted by Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd, (SCC), [1978] 2 SCR 229, 83 DLR (3d) 452. I asked Ms. Stratkotter to explain the legal basis for her “minimum” damagesquantum. [27] Ms. Stratkotter advances three points. First, she says the Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd is not the law because therehave been “settlements and Court awards” that exceed the Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd maximum. I note that Ms.

Stratkotterdoes not provide any “Court awards” examples. Instead, she points to Omar Khadr receiving a $10 million settlement, and DavidMilgaard receiving $6 million. [28] The LSA in its Written Reply notes that out-of-court settlements are not court decisions, and even if out-of-court settlementswere somehow relevant, those settlements generally do not break out the general damages “pain and suffering” quantum of thesettlement that is impacted by Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd. [29] Ms.

Stratkotter’s second point is that her claim is based on alleged breaches of Charter ss 7, 12, and 15 that she says resultedfrom her medical care, and those warrant multimillion dollar Charter, s 24(1) remedies. [30] Third, Mr. Stratkotter says she has been the victim of multiple Criminal Code offenses. [31] I reject Ms. Stratkotter’s arguments. First, Ms.

Stratkotter’s claims encounter the defective pleadings issue reviewed earlier.She never pled the Charter breaches advanced in the Written Submission. [32] Second, I agree with the LSA that Khadr and Milgaard settlements do not set precedents that determine the damages aninjured person may obtain through a lawsuit. Those settlements were the result of negotiations, rather than a legal process. [33] Third, Ms. Stratkotter is incorrect when she claims that general damages are different when pain and suffering is the result ofa Charter breach.

The Supreme Court of Canada in Vancouver (City) v Ward, 2010 SCC 27 defined how Charter, s 24(1) monetaryawards are determined. Tort law provides the template to quantify damages. At para 50 Chief Justice McLachlin states: ... tort law provides assistance. Pain and suffering are compensable. Absent exceptional circumstances, compensation is fixed at a fairlymodest conventional rate, subject to variation for the degree of suffering in the particular case.

In extreme cases of catastrophic injury, ahigher but still conventionally determined award is given on the basis that it serves the function purpose of providing substitute comfortsand pleasures: Andrews v. Grand & Toy. [34] I therefore conclude that Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd remains a binding authority when evaluating general damages,no matter the legal basis for that general damages claim. Ms. Stratkotter’s claim for damages is hopeless, excessive, and impossible.Advancing damages claim of that amount is an abuse of the Court, and an independent basis to strike out Ms.

Stratkotter’s Statement ofClaim: Unrau #2 at paras 620-625. III. Conclusion [35] Mr. Stratkotter’s November 17, 2020 Statement of Claim is struck out, in toto, on multiple bases. [36] When an action is terminated via the CPN7 process, the usual practice of this Court is to award costs in favour of the litigantswho referred the matter to the Court: e.g.

Ahad v Calgary Housing Company, 2020 ABQB 450 at para 9; Phillips v Kenney, 2020ABQB 452 at para 9; Skrypichayko v Law Society of Alberta, 2020 ABQB 604 at para 43; Feeney v Alberta, 2020 ABQB 633 at para 6.I see no reason to depart from that approach in this instance. [37] Ms. Stratkotter sought $10.5 million in damages. Given that quantum, and Alberta Rules of Court

Schedule C, I order Ms.Stratkotter pay the LSA $2,000 in costs, forthwith. No costs will be ordered in relation to the other Defendants since they did not

participate in the CPN7 process. [ 38 ] Counsel for the LSA shall prepare and serve the court Order giving effect to this decision. Ms. Stratkotter’s approval of that Order is not required, pursuant to Rule 9.4(2)(

c) of the Alberta Rules of Court . Ms. Stratkotter may be served these Reasons and the corresponding court Order via the email address listed on Ms. Stratkotter’s Statement of Claim: familyfirst@live.ca. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 18 th day of January, 2021. J.D. Rooke A.C.J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Lorraine Annette Stratkotter Self-represented Litigant Joe D. Spelliscy Duncan Craig LLP for the Defendant Law Society of Alberta