McMunn v Hok, 2021 ABQB 550

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: McMunn v Hok, 2021 ABQB 550 Date: 20210716 Docket: 2104 00343 Registry: Grande Prairie Between: Dawn Michelle McMunn and Phillip Tyler Walker Respondents / Applicants - and - Shirley Anne Hok Applicant / Respondent _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Madam Justice D.L. Shelley _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] On July 6, 2021 I granted a restraining order against Shirley Anne Hok [Ms.

Hok] that had been sought by Dawn Michelle McMunn and Phillip Tyler Walker [the Neighbors]. Ms. Hok and the Neighbors live in adjacent residential properties in Grande Prairie, Alberta. [ 2 ] Ms. Hok is subject to court access restrictions as a vexatious litigant: Hok v Alberta , 2017 ABCA 63 , leave to appeal

dismissed 2017 ABCA 63, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 37624 (2 November 2017). As a consequence, Ms. Hok is prohibited frominitiating litigation processes in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, except where Ms. Hok has received permission, or “leave”, fromthe Court: Hok v Alberta at para 51. Ms.

Hok is also subject to restrictions on her communications with the Grande Prairie Alberta Courtof Queen’s Bench Clerks, and is prohibited from personal attendance at the Court’s Grande Prairie counter, as a consequence of Ms.Hok’s pattern of abusive, inappropriate, irregular, insulting, and conspiratorial allegations, communications, and actions: AlbertaTreasury Branches v Hok, 2019 ABQB 196. [3] Ms. Hok has disagreed with her being subject to the Neighbors’ restraining order. On July 12, 2021, Ms. Hok wrote to theCourt, and indicated she intended to appeal the Neighbors’ restraining order. Ms.

Hok also applied for leave to file an Alberta Rules ofCourt, Alta Reg 124/2010, Rule 14.48 Application to stay operation of the Neighbors’ restraining order. Rule 14.48 reads: 14.48 An application to stay proceedings or enforcement of a decision pending appeal may be made (

a) to the judge who made that decision, or (

b) to a single appeal judge, whether or not the application was made to the judge who made the decision, and whether or not thatapplication was granted or dismissed. Rule 14.48 means I am the justice of this Court who is required to ultimately receive Ms. Hok’s Rule 14.48(

a) stay pending appealapplication, if that application was granted leave. [4] The extensive materials submitted by Ms. Hok in relation to her leave to file application, among other things, allege that I ambiased against Ms. Hok and therefore am not an appropriate adjudicator of Ms. Hok’s candidate Rule 14.48(

a) application. Bias is alsoone basis for why Ms. Hok says my imposing a restraining order was wrong. [5] Ms. Hok’s July 12, 2021 materials were received by Chief Justice Moreau. After review of those materials, Chief JusticeMoreau has referred Ms. Hok’s leave to file application to me because: 1. I am the judge who legislation requires should receive and evaluate Ms. Hok’s Rule 14.48(

a) application, and 2. when a judge is alleged to be biased, or to have conducted him or herself in a manner that allegedly raises a reasonableapprehension of bias, then that judge personally responds to that allegation: Arsenault-Cameron v Prince Edward Island, (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 851, 201 Nfld & PEIR 1; R v JLA, 2009 ABCA 344. II.

Test for Leave to File [6] “... [A] person subject to court access control is presumed to engage in illegitimate litigation unless the Court is satisfiedotherwise. ...”: Re Thompson, 2018 ABQB 87 at para 19, aff’d 2018 ABCA 111, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38204 (14 February2019). [7] Permission to initiate litigation or continue stayed litigation both test the merit of court activities on the same standard.

Aperson subject to court access restrictions must: 1. establish reasonable grounds for the litigation, and 2. depose fully and completely as to the facts and circumstances surrounding the proposed claim or proceeding. (Re Thompson, 2018 ABQB 87 at paras 19, 27; VWW v Wasylyshen, 2013 ABQB 327 at para 42, aff’d 2014 ABCA 121). [8] This threshold, which must be established on a balance of probabilities, is not a high one, and in many ways parallels the testfor

summary judgment: Re Thompson, 2018 ABQB 87 at paras 19, 26.

The person subject to court access leave restrictions is expectedto put his or her “best foot forward” to establish the basis to initiate or continue an action: Re Thompson, 2018 ABQB 87 at paras 26-27. [9] The documents necessary to seek leave are an affidavit to provide evidence, and, in the case of a new action, application, orother litigation step, a copy of the proposed filing: e.g., Re Moore, 2018 ABQB 261; Latham (Re), 2018 ABQB 906. [10] Leave may be granted in part: Latham (Re), 2018 ABQB 906; Belway v Lalande-Weber, 2017 ABCA 108 at para 10, leaveto appeal to SCC refused, 37708 (21 December 2017). [11] Leave submissions to initiate or continue litigation may also be rejected: 1. where the materials do not satisfy the criteria set out in the court access restriction order (Re Gauthier, 2018 ABQB 99; ReBotar, 2018 ABQB 193; Thompson v Alberta Labour Relations Board, 2018 ABQB 220, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38267 (31January 2019); Re Thompson, 2018 ABQB 355, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38266 (31 January 2019); Association of ProfessionalEngineers and Geoscientists of Alberta v Drover, 2021 ABQB 511); 2. if the submissions exhibit indicia of abusive litigation (ET v Calgary Catholic School District No 1, 2017 ABCA 349 at para 12,leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38081 (8 November 2018); Alberta Treasury Branches v Hok, 2018 ABQB 316; Thompson v AlbertaLabour Relations Board, 2018 ABQB 220; Re Botar, 2018 ABQB 193; Trinity Place Foundation of Alberta v Templanza, 2019 ABQB45; Onischuk (Re), 2019 ABQB 229; Fletcher v Davidson & Williams LLP, 2019 ABQB 396; Ubah v Canadian Natural ResourcesLimited, 2021 ABQB 208; Knutson (Re), 2021 ABQB 367); 3. where the abusive litigant refuses to provide the proposed filing (Re Thompson, 2018 ABQB 355; Onischuk (Re), 2019 ABQB

229); 4. where the abusive litigant provides false information (Re Gauthier, 2018 ABQB 99); and 5. where the abusive litigant fails to provide materials that are required to evaluate the proposed litigation step, such as an appealtranscript (Alberta Treasury Branches v Hok, 2018 ABQB 316). III. Analysis A. Preliminary Analysis - Bias or a Reasonable Apprehension of Bias [12] As a preliminary step I will evaluate whether I should recuse myself from considering the merit of Ms. Hok’s Rule 14.48(a)application because of bias, or having created a reasonable apprehension of bias. The merit of Ms.

Hok’s claims that the July 6, 2021restraining order was incorrect is both an aspect of the leave to file process, and the possible subsequent application under Rule 14.48(a). [13] The law in Canada on judicial bias, or apprehended bias, is well developed. A simple allegation of bias or misconduct is not abasis for judges to remove themselves from a matter: Bizon v Bizon, 2014 ABCA 174 at paras 61-62.

Canadian Judicial Council, EthicalPrinciples for Judges (2004) instructs that I ought to recuse myself only where necessary since: “the judge should not withdrawunnecessarily as to do so adds to the burden of his or her colleagues and contributes to delay in the court”. [14] The test for judicial bias is well established: ... what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically - and having thought the matter through - conclude.Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly. (Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25 at para 20). [15] The strong presumption of judicial impartiality is not easily displaced: Cojocaru v British Columbia Women’s Hospital andHealth Centre, 2013 SCC 30 at para 22.

The person who alleges bias has a high burden to prove that claim, and a proceeding orproceedings are viewed in its entirety and overall context: R v S (RD), (SCC), [1997] 3 SCR 484 at para 141, 151 DLR(4th) 193. [16] Appeal courts do not impute bias lightly. “It is exceedingly difficult to convince an appeal court that a chambers judge wasbiased.

Judges are presumed to act impartially”: Wass v Wass, 2020 ABCA 180 at para 37; BC and Others v Alberta (Director ofChildren’s Services) and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2020 ABCA 296 at para 14. [17] An unfavourable result or conclusion by a judge in relation to a party is not in itself a basis to conclude there has been bias orprejudice. As L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ (as the latter then was) concluded in R v S (RD) at para 105 (citing Scalia J in Liteky vUS, 114 S Ct 1147 (1994) at 1155): ... not every favourable or unfavourable disposition attracts the label of bias or prejudice.

For example, it cannot be said that those whocondemn Hitler are biased or prejudiced. This unfavourable disposition is objectively justifiable -- in other words, it is not “wrongful orinappropriate” ... [Citation omitted.] [18] Slatter JA in Alberta Health Services v Wang, 2018 ABCA 104 at para 9 observed that repeated unfavourable results are notevidence of bias, particularly in the context of case management.

That Court has also concluded in difficult and high-conflict litigation,the conduct of proceedings must be evaluated in light of “realities on the ground”: Crawford v Crawford, 2015 ABCA 376 at para 12. [19] In Bossé v Lavigne, 2015 NBCA 54 at para 7, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal provided a useful digest of relevantprinciples that guide how a court evaluates allegations of judicial bias.

This includes a helpful restatement of the perspective or point ofview from which those allegations are evaluated: The elements of this objective test are that (1) the person considering the alleged bias must be a reasonable person, not one who is verysensitive or scrupulous, but rather one who is right-minded; (2) the person be a well informed person, with knowledge of all the relevantcircumstances; (3) the apprehension of bias itself must be reasonable in the circumstances of the case; (4) the situation must be fullyexamined, not just the face of it; and, the examination must be one that is both realistic and practical; (5) the inquiry begins with a strongpresumption of judicial impartiality and looks to determine whether it has been displaced such that there is a real likelihood orprobability of apprehension that the judge would not decide the case fairly on the merits; ... [Emphasis in original.] [20] In the interests of judicial economy, I will not reproduce all of Ms.

Hok’s allegations concerning my misconduct. Whatfollows is a sample paragraph from Ms. Hok’s “AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT of Shirley Anne Hok” that relates to my alleged judicialbias: But then, on the date of July 6/2021, when I had seen WHO it would be as the presiding-judge at this pre-booked QB-hearing -- > I hadalmost VOMITED; etc.!!!

Be aware that I had been severely CONNED and HARMED-DAMAGED by that highly-vile, maliciously-evilQB-Shelley twice in the past ... but then I had prepared myself to request that she RECUSE / herself from hearing this matter . . . butthen when I had done just that --- > she had deliberately FLICKED-OFF my valid-want via having given it the F**K-OFF-like finger(by having blatantly IGNORED it); etc.!!!

And the rest had culminated by QB-Shelly having almost literally cut-off my head in order toGAG-up me so that I could NOT stand-up for myself in SELF DEFENCE(+) . . . all-the-while she then had proceeded to ~ URINATEall over me; etc.!!! QB-Madam-Justice/D.L. Shelley had adamantly REFUSED my VIDEO-EXHIBIT-showing --- > going to givenmerit to the criminal-offence charge of OBSTRUCTING-JUSTICE; etc.!!!

[Emphasis in original.] [ 21 ] I find that no reasonable and well-informed person would conclude that I would not make a fair, reasoned, principled, and considered decision in litigation that involves Ms. Hok. [ 22 ] First, the reasonable and well-informed person would be aware of Ms. Hok’s extensive record of abusive litigation in Alberta courts, and that Ms. Hok has continually made extraordinary and spurious allegations against judges who have made unfavourable findings against her. For example, in the proceedings that led to Ms. Hok being subject to court access restrictions, Ms.

Hok made numerous disparaging comments about judges, for example: And again - know that a judge is there in place to be a public service to that of even the lowly “little person” that is without MEGA- MONEY-BUCKS/mega-influence et al.

And, for a judge (like that of judge/Verville) to do such mal-service and mega-damage et al to me displays HIS intentional demeaning INSOLENCE ARROGANCE - up to the point one can safely assume that judge/Verville is using his PENIS-head to do the thought-processing, and/or has “itchy palms” ( jist waiting for a pay-off et al). [ Hok v Alberta , 2016 ABQB 651 at para 6 , emphasis in original.] … But – while I had clearly met the necessary criteria of the required elements of the offences (and even more)… know that process- hearing judge /Holmes (along with that demented Crown Prosecutor of Brenda Scragg) had falsely turned-down the “ issuance of process ” of my “ private information ” – while also having overtly slandered and defamed me to boot by adding insult to injury et al!

WHY!?! Was there a pay-off involved – or what / suppose you tell me. [ R v Hok , 2016 ABQB 335 at para 97 , emphasis in original.] And, after I had read judge/Shynkar’s “Decision of the Honourable Judge D.R. Shynkar” of September 18, 2015 (that was sent to me via assistant chief judge /Morris Golden’s office et al) I was absolutely LIVID! So, I compiled my 10-page fax-compliant of October 12/2015 to our Premier of Alberta /Rachel Notley! ... Know that I am of the firm belief that judge/Shynkar is a filthy liar and a disgusting psychopath and unjust and unfair et al – and a menace to me!

Know that when a judge (or anyone else for that matter) claims that a person’s reputation only matters if they are say some BIG STUPENDOUS PUBLIC NOTORIETY person et al, then that derogatory judge (to me) is a disgusting #@^&%#@# / worthy of contempt et al! [ R v Hok , 2016 ABQB 335 at para 100 , emphasis in original.] [ 23 ] Ms. Hok’s allegations of this kind extend to other neighbors, RCMP officers, Crown Prosecutors, medical personnel, government officials, other judges, and banks and other lenders. Ms. Hok’s allegations of this kind have not been successful. Ms.

Hok has been cautioned by this Court that the manner in which she communicates to this Court and other parties is not helpful to her: Alberta Treasury Branches v Hok , 2018 ABQB 316 at para 27 . [ 24 ] I conclude the reasonable and well-informed person would put little weight on how Ms. Hok characterizes those who do not agree with her. That person would also observe that Ms. Hok has appealed the issue of her being an abusive litigant and therefore subject to court access restrictions to the Supreme Court of Canada. That Court denied Ms. Hok leave.

The reasonable and well-informed person would observe that in her “AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT of Shirley Anne Hok” rejects that outcome: the “... Court of Canada's deceptively deceiving head-honchos+!!! ...”. The reasonable and well-informed person would question whether Ms. Hok’s assessment of courts and judges is accurate and based on reasonable grounds. [ 25 ] The reasonable and well-informed person would be aware of the rule that an unfavourable judicial decision is not a basis to assert bias or an apprehension of bias. That reasonable and well-informed person would observe that Ms.

Hok’s complaints against me, and other judicial decision-makers, have a common foundation: we disagreed with Ms. Hok. With those facts, the reasonable and well- informed person would conclude Ms. Hok’s characterizations of others’ conduct, including litigation activities, should be viewed with caution, if not skepticism. This pattern means Ms. Hok’s claims should be tested on a stringent basis. [ 26 ] Second, the reasonable and well-informed person, upon reviewing the materials considered in the restraining order hearing, and Ms.

Hok’s July 12, 2021 materials, would note that ultimately the question in relation to whether a restraining order should or should not issue revolved on weighing evidence and testimony, rather than questions of law. Though not legally trained, the reasonable and well-informed layperson would nevertheless understand that the conclusion of a trial judge in relation to the reliability and weight put on evidence is due deference. Findings of fact and credibility may only be challenged on appeal on limited grounds. [ 27 ] Third, the reasonable and well-informed person would, upon reading Ms.

Hok’s materials, be startled by some of what Ms. Hok points to as misconduct by the Neighbors, and how Ms. Hok says she then responded. For example, Ms. Hok attempted to launch a criminal complaint with the RMCP against the Neighbors when a fence plank in the fence between their two properties deviated so that the plank shifted and bent slightly into Ms. Hok’s back yard. Ms. Hok responded in a similar manner when a play toy of the Neighbors’ children passed over the inter-property fence, and landed in Ms. Hok’s yard. Ms. Hok’s response to these kinds of complaints did not result in criminal proceedings.

Here is how Ms. Hok described that outcome in her “Affidavit”: And while I had reported to the RCMP about the Plaintiffs many provoking, Criminal Mischief acts ... the RCMP-members had tended to do NOT a damn thing via having DECEITFULLY lied and lied and lied and lied and lied and lied; etc.!!! So then, I had been left to my own self-defence's standing-up for myself (and my property) by my then needing to logically self-defensively fight right back : etc. [ 28 ] Observations such as these would lead the reasonable and well-informed person to question whether Ms.

Hok’s responses to what she perceives as unfavourable circumstances and outcomes are reasonable. [ 29 ] Fourth, the reasonable and well-informed person would be concerned that Ms. Hok’s claims are, to be generous, hyperbole, and do not accurately represent what occurred during court proceedings. For example, the reasonable and well-informed person would question whether I had, in fact, urinated on Ms. Hok. That skepticism would be reinforced when the reasonable and well-informed

person realized that the July 6, 2021 proceeding when the alleged urination had occurred had been conducted by remote Webex videoconferencing, and not in person. [30] Fifth, the reasonable and well-informed person would recognize litigation that involves Ms. Hok is “high-conflict”, and thataffects what litigation and litigant management steps are appropriate: Crawford v Crawford, at para 12. The reasonable and well-informed person would agree that Ms.

Hok is a very difficult to manage abusive and vexatious litigant. [31] I conclude that the reasonable and well-informed person would combine a number of observations and conclusions: 1. Ms. Hok’s often extraordinary claims and the manner in which those are framed, 2. the extended and consistent pattern that Ms. Hok has engaged in abusive court and tribunal processes, 3. Ms. Hok’s record of police complaints and attempts to initiate criminal proceedings against many parties, and 4. the consistent pattern that unfavourable decisions that reject Ms.

Hok’s allegations have been confirmed on appeal and/or review,and 5. Ms. Hok’s complaints about judges are based chiefly on unfavourable results, and/or groundless allegations of conspiracy andbias. [32] The reasonable and well-informed person would be mindful of the principle that Ms. Hok’s allegations do not lightly displacethe strong presumption of judicial impartiality, and, instead, would conclude that I have conducted myself in a manner that is neitherbiased, nor that raises an apprehension of bias.

Instead, I find that the reasonable and well-informed person would determine I haveconducted myself in a fair manner when faced with a very difficult, abusive, vexatious litigant. That litigant has continued herproblematic court conduct after repeated warnings, and after the Court having been required to intervene and impose steps to structureMs. Hok’s litigation activities, and, at the same time, to respect Ms. Hok’s rights to seek remedies before the Court. B. Leave to File a Rule 14.48(

a) Interim Stay Application [33] My next step is to evaluate whether leave should be granted to Ms. Hok’s proposed Rule 14.48(

a) application for an interimstay pending appeal. [34] Ms. Hok’s July 12, 2021 materials generally appear to comply with the requirements for a valid leave to file application as setin the November 29, 2016 “Vexatious Litigant Order for Shirley Anne Hok”, issued by Verville J: Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651. Thatsaid, I conclude that Ms. Hok’s leave to file application should be rejected on multiple bases. [35] First, I conclude Ms. Hok has not rebutted the presumption that her leave to appeal application is an abusive proceeding: ReThompson, 2018 ABQB 87 at para 19. Ms. Hok has not established a reasonable basis for her proposed Rule 14.48(

a) application. As Ihave previously illustrated, Ms. Hok’s claims are extraordinary and/or hyperbole. Ultimately Ms. Hok’s complaint concerning the July 6,2021 proceeding is that I misapprehended evidence, erred in weighing conflicting evidence, and made errors in the credibility andreliability of the parties. All of those conclusions are due deference on review. I find Ms. Hok has not provided a meaningful basis tochallenge my conclusions. That makes Ms. Hok’s proposed Rule 14.48(

a) application hopeless. [36] Second, I conclude Ms. Hok’s complaints about procedural fairness issues are not reasonable. Ms. Hok’s problematiclitigation characteristics are, instead, both obvious and serious. Ms. Hok requires active management, particularly in light of the limitedresources of this Court, and Ms. Hok’s expansive record of abusive conduct. Simply put, Ms. Hok is not entitled to the exact legalproceeding she demands. I note that in that sense Ms. Hok is no different from any other Canadian.

Even criminal accused are notentitled to an “ideal” trial, only a “fair” one: R v Lyons, (SCC), [1987] 2 SCR 309 at 362, 37 CCC (3d) 1. [37] Third, Ms.

Hok’s leave to file application exhibits multiple indicia of abusive conduct: 1. scandalous and inflammatory language in pleadings or before the court; and 2. unsubstantiated allegations of conspiracy, fraud, and misconduct. (Chutskoff v Bonora, 2014 ABQB 389 at para 92; Unrau v National Dental Examining Board, 2019 ABQB 283 at para 714). [38] These are illustrated by the quoted passages reproduced above, however, those extracted passages are only characteristicexamples of Ms. Hok’s materials as a whole. Again, I note that Ms.

Hok has been cautioned against this kind of language andextraordinary and excessive claims: Alberta Treasury Branches v Hok. [39] I therefore conclude that Ms. Hok has not rebutted the presumption that her proposed Rule 14.48(

a) interim stay pending leaveapplication is an abuse of the Court. Ms. Hok’s leave to file application is dismissed. That decision is final. Ms. Hok is prohibited frommaking a further leave application on this subject: Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 at para 51(8). IV. Conclusion [40] Ms. Hok’s July 12, 2021 leave to file application is dismissed. No costs flow from this outcome. [41] Mindful of my obligations to provide information to self-represented litigants concerning their litigation options, as set inPintea v Johns, 2017 SCC 23, I point out to Ms. Hok that there is no appeal to the Alberta Court of Appeal of this decision: Rule 14.5(4).

Ms. Hok may, however, seek leave from the Supreme Court of Canada, if she disagrees with this outcome: e.g. Thompson, (SCC); Thompson v Nielsen, (SCC). Dated at the City of Grande Prairie, Alberta this 16th day of July, 2021. D.L. Shelley J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Shirley Anne Hok for the Self-Represented Litigant