JRL v TRL, 2021 ABQB 611

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: JRL v TRL, 2021 ABQB 611 Date: 20210804 Docket: 4803 177646 Registry: Edmonton Between: JRL Plaintiff - and - TRL Defendant Restriction on Publication Identification Ban – See the Family Law Act ,

section 100. By Court Order, no person shall publish or broadcast information that may identify the children involved in this proceeding. NOTE: Identifying information has been removed from this judgment to comply with the ban so that it may be published. _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice J.S. Little _______________________________________________________ [ 1 ] These reasons are the result of a four-day trial for divorce, parenting, child and spousal support, and division of matrimonial property. I. Background [ 2 ] In 2016, JRL (Mr.

L) filed a statement of claim seeking a divorce, joint custody of their two children, shared parenting, and an equal division of matrimonial property. Shortly before trial, he amended that claim, seeking primary care of the children, an unequal division of matrimonial property, and termination of spousal support. TRL (Ms.

L) had not defended the original claim but did file a document she called a statement of defence to the amended claim.

[ 3 ] The Ls began living together in 2000, married in 2008, and separated at the end of December, 2015 with Mr. L moving out in March, 2016. Their two children are P, 14 and A, 11. [ 4 ] At the beginning of the relationship, both parties worked full time. Ms. L worked in a home for disabled adults. Her career as a full-time caregiver ended when P was born. She later worked in a residential house cleaning business the parties purchased (On the Spot) and was a part time manicurist. [ 5 ] Mr. L at the time of the marriage was a dental technician working in private labs.

He left practice to teach in the dental technician program at NAIT for nine years and head up the program for four. In 2012 he decided to return to private practice and incorporated Cera-Tech 3D Dental Lab Inc. (Cera) to start a private dental lab serving mostly the Spruce Grove/Stony Plain area beginning in 2013. Mr. L holds 51 Class A Common Shares in Cera, and Ms. L holds 49 Class B Common Shares. Cera is the only significant asset owned by the parties. [ 6 ] On separation in 2016, Mr. L left the family home, and the parties shared parenting on a week on week off basis.

More recently, particularly during and after Ms. L’s lengthy visit to her native Newfoundland and Labrador, the children have been spending more time with their father. [ 7 ] There were no child or spousal support orders until 2018. Before then, Mr. L paid certain expenses, including private school tuition, the mortgage, and other costs of the matrimonial home, which he understood to satisfy his child and spousal support obligations. In April, 2017, the parties entered into a form of separation agreement prepared by a paralegal friend of Ms. L which obligated Mr.

L to pay $1700 monthly as combined child and spousal support. In October, 2018, on Ms. L’s application, Mr. L was ordered to pay spousal support of $1700 per month. In November, 2018, on Ms. L’s application, spousal support was reduced to $1300 per month and set off child support was ordered payable by Mr. L of $1200 per month, with

section 7 expenses to be shared 68.64% and 31.36%. Mr. L made the required payments. II. Testimony [ 8 ] Four witnesses testified. [ 9 ] Mr. L gave his testimony in a calm, business-like manner focusing on the facts, though occasionally, in direct questioning, he would lose his train of thought during an answer that might have been longer than necessary. His answers were consistent with the documentary evidence. Ms. L frequently interrupted during his direct testimony to argue that he was trying to make her out to be a bad person. I did not find that.

It was clear from his testimony in cross-examination that he had little respect for Ms. L, but it appeared the result more of frustration with the nature of her attacks than with an intention to paint her in a bad light. [ 10 ] Ms. L did not have the benefit of representation by counsel. Her testimony in direct consisted of a rambling account about herself and her strengths, and Mr. L’s faults, with little relevance to the issues. Her cross-examination of Mr. L consisted mostly of asking him to confirm that she was not a bad person and that she loved her children. It did nothing to impeach his credibility.

The inconsistencies between her answers and the documentary evidence were extensive. [ 11 ] In all cases of inconsistencies between the testimony of these two witnesses, I accept that of Mr. L. [ 12 ] Mr. L called Mr. Perhar from KBH Chartered Professional Accounts as an expert in business valuation and income calculation. I accepted his qualifications and experience as a Chartered Business Valuator, and I will deal with his expert reports on the value of Cera and the calculation of Mr. L’s guideline income in due course. [ 13 ] Ms. L called Mr. Jordan as an expert in business valuation.

He described himself as a Personal Property Appraiser, one of about 800 in Canada, most of whom were or are auctioneers who specialize in valuing tangible and intangible assets. His passion for his occupation stemmed from a concern that conventional valuation methods that focused only on accounting numbers were what led to the global financial crisis of 2008. He had developed his own system to value assets, and that system worked well if you only listened to it. He believed that he had completed Grade 10. I disqualified him as an expert witness following initial questioning on his qualifications. III.

Documentary Evidence [ 14 ] The bulk of the documentary evidence was from an Exhibit Book entered by counsel for Mr. L and marked as Exhibit 1. I will refer to documentation from Exhibit 1 by its tab numbers as necessary. [ 15 ] Ms. L did not produce documentation. IV. Parenting [ 16 ] Mr. L testified to a close relationship with both P and A. [ 17 ] He takes P to her horse back riding sessions, other extra-curricular activities, and medical appointments, including some dental surgery shortly after separation. [ 18 ] A has been diagnosed with ADHD for which he is required to take medication. Mr.

L ensures that he gets that medication. Ms. L is not particularly vigilant about ensuring that A receives his medication – she testified that she disagreed with the diagnosis. [ 19 ] Both parties testified that A needed some help getting up on school days. Ms. L explained that she was not a morning person

and that Mr. L was better at that. [ 20 ] At the start of the pandemic when A’s schooling was primarily remote, he generally ended up spending more time at Mr. L’s house since Mr. L was not working and could help him with his homework. Ms. L was not as conversant as Mr. L with A’s progress at school. [ 21 ] The testimony of both parties was to the effect that until about August, 2019 they shared parenting on an informal week on week off basis. [ 22 ] Mr. L testified that in August, 2019, Ms. L effectively kicked P out of the house. Ms.

L denied that, but agreed that in her text message to P reproduced in Exh 1, Tab 2, she told P that if she was going to spend more time at her father’s house, she would lose her room because it could be rented out for $1000 per month. [ 23 ] Ms. L travelled to Newfoundland to visit her elderly but healthy father in November, 2020, returning in March, 2021. For those five months, the children were with Mr. L exclusively. Since Ms. L’s return, the children have mostly been spending weekdays with Mr. L and weekends with Ms. L. [ 24 ] It was clear from all the evidence that Mr.

L is the primary caregiver of these children now. He offers them a structured environment but recognizes the importance of them maintaining a relationship with their mother. [ 25 ] He believes that it is in P’s best interests that her primary residence be with him but that she be able to spend alternate weekends with her mother. [ 26 ] He believes that it is in A’s best interests that shared parenting on a week on week off basis be tried again during the summer but that during the school term, A’s primary residence be with Mr.

L with alternate weekends at his mother’s. [ 27 ] I agree that those arrangements are in the best interests of the children and so order. If the parties cannot agree on when the week on week off basis begins in the summer, counsel for Mr. L shall make an application to me to make that determination. V. Matrimonial Property 1. Valuation [ 28 ] In anticipation of an argument that the value of the business be determined as at or close to the date of separation as opposed to the date of trial, counsel for Mr.

L obtained business valuation reports for Cera for the fiscal years ending December 31, 2015 (partial) and August 31, 2020. I am not prepared to use the separation date as the division date, but I will use the earlier report in my analysis of the

section 8 factors. [ 29 ] Mr. Perhar explained that there are four types of reports commonly requested: 1. Comprehensive. This is the most expensive and requires corroboration, which might consist of actually offering the shares on the open market. 2. Estimate. This requires less detailed analysis and no corroboration. 3. Calculation Value Report. This requires minimal review and no corroboration.

The minimal review as set out in the Scope of Review includes unaudited financial statements for the four years ending in 2020, the 2020 corporate tax return, property and equipment listings, and discussions with management. 4. Advisory. This is a report prepared when independence is not required, ie. management may seek a valuation for its own purposes. [ 30 ] Ms. L on cross-examination of Mr. Perhar questioned why it was appropriate to use close to the lowest standard here.

His response was that Calculation Value Reports were most commonly used on marriage breakdown and that the Comprehensive and Estimate Reports required audits, which raise the cost accordingly. [ 31 ] I find that the Calculation Value Report sought and produced was a reasonable compromise in these circumstances. [ 32 ] Mr. Perhar calculated the value of Cera on a going concern capitalized cash flow basis, which he explained to be the preferred method for operational businesses since it assumes that the business is being sold to a buyer/investor who seeks continued cash flow.

I find that assumption to be appropriate given the nature of this small business. [ 33 ] His

summary is that the fair market value as at August 31, 2020 ranged from a low of $300,000 to a high of $390,000. Both values would be dependent on Mr. L remaining as an employee of the business during a transition period, since much of the value of the business and its future success is dependent on the non-tangible contributions he brings to the business. The same valuation method led to a low of $46,000 and a high of $75,000 as at December 31, 2015. [ 34 ] I note that in his two reports, Mr. Perhar used different multipliers of cash flow. For 2015, he used 4.75 for the low and 4.98 for the high.

For 2020, he used 4.01 and 4.38. He explained the difference as being the uncertainty that the pandemic brought to businesses like this in 2020. [ 35 ] No evidence was tendered respecting how the value of the business might have changed since August 31, 2020, in particular whether what is now known about the effects of the pandemic on businesses might again change the multiplier. But I note that Mr.

Perhar’s Calculation Value Report itself is dated March 26, 2021, which is the date on which Mr. Perhar completed his work on the valuation, and is only three months before the trial. Any assumptions that I might make about whether that multiplier should go up or down would be without evidentiary foundation, so I accept the March 26, 2021 Calculation Value Report as the best evidence that the value of the business as at the date of trial is between $300,000 and $390,000. 2.

Matrimonial Property Act s. 8 Factors [ 36 ] By virtue of s. 39(2) of the Family Property Act , the Matrimonial Property Act ( MPA ) continues to apply in this situation because the parties were separated as at January 1, 2020. [ 37 ] Cera was incorporated while the parties were together, and therefore s. 7(4) of the MPA applies to make Cera or its value distributable to them equally unless it would not be just and equitable to do so considering the s. 8 factors.

Equality is the default position: MAK v TJK, 2020 ABCA 280 , and there must be a “real imbalance” in the parties’ respective contributions to rebut that presumption : Mazurenko v Mazurenko , 1981 ABCA 104 at para. 20 . [ 38 ]

Section 8 of the MPA sets out the matters I need to consider in determining whether to distribute Cera or its value unequally between the parties, the relevant ones of which I have reproduced below: s. 8 The relevant matters to be taken into consideration in making an unequal distribution under

section 7 are the following: (

a) the contribution made by each spouse to the marriage and to the welfare of the family, including any contribution made as a homemaker or parent. [ 39 ] The evidence from trial persuades me that the parties’ contributions to the marriage and the welfare of the family were equal up until the time of separation. That factor favours equal distribution. (

b) the contribution, whether financial or in some other form, made by a spouse directly or indirectly to the acquisition, conservation, improvement, operation or management of a business, farm, enterprise or undertaking owned or operated by one or both spouses or by one or both spouses and any other person. [ 40 ] Similarly, I find that the parties contributed equally to the acquisition of the business. While Mr. L obtained a start-up loan in his name only, in part that would have been available to him as a result of assets acquired by the parties during the marriage.

And notwithstanding that it was in his name only, it was a matrimonial debt. [ 41 ] After the initial acquisition, however, I find that all of the increase in value and the success of the business was attributable to the improvement, operation and management of Mr. L alone. The only contribution that Ms. L made was the unsuccessful venture into teeth whitening, which she thought she might be good at because of her experience with nails. [ 42 ] Particularly since the separation in 2016, the value of the business has increased from, using high values, $75,000 to $390,000. And it cannot be said that Ms.

L contributed indirectly by looking after the non-financial aspects of the family since separation. Rather, Mr. L has taken an even greater role both in child-raising and in financing the family’s requirements. (

d) the income, earning capacity, liabilities, obligations, property and other financial resources (

i) that each spouse had at the time of marriage, and (ii) that each spouse has at the time of the trial. [ 43 ] There was little evidence tendered about the financial position of the parties at the time of the marriage, though Mr. L was fairly well established in his ultimate career. At the time of trial, Mr. L clearly has the greater income and the ability to maintain a greater income. This factor then favours Ms. L who has greater need. (

e) the duration of the marriage. [ 44 ] This was a medium to long term marriage of 13 years, though they were separated for five, preceded by an 8-year cohabitation. This factor favours an equal division. (

g) the terms of an oral or written agreement between the spouses. [ 45 ] As discussed above, there was a written agreement between the parties, but it did not deal with property division. (

k) a tax liability that may be incurred by a spouse as a result of the transfer or sale of property. [ 46 ] Neither party presented any expert evidence respecting this issue. Mr. Perhar suggested three methods by which some portion of the value of Cera might be given to Ms. L. He was testifying in his capacity as a business valuator and not a tax expert. Nevertheless, I consider his testimony later in these reasons in determining how Ms.

L might realize the value of her interest in Cera. (1) that a spouse has dissipated property to the detriment of the other spouse. [ 47 ] While not easily calculable, there is evidence that Ms. L has dissipated property to the detriment of Mr. L. Ms. L appears to have taken the position since separation that Mr. L ought to be the sole source of income for the family, and we have no evidence that she prudently managed the financial support that Mr. L provided. In particular, Ms. L’s continued residence in the matrimonial home resulted in it not being sold when a higher price might have been obtained. Mr.

L made efforts to continue to finance it and then to sell it. His efforts to sell it were not reciprocated by Ms. L. As a result, the parties now face an $18,000 deficiency judgment. (

m) any fact or circumstance that is relevant.

[ 48 ] Overall, my weighing of the

section 8 factors leads me to conclude that the value of the business should be split in Mr. L’s favour. While the parties’ initial contributions should be considered to have been equal since the parties were together and

section 7 of the MPA presumes equality, its increase in value both since its inception, and particularly since separation, is attributable solely to Mr. L’s efforts without any corresponding direct or indirect contribution by Ms. L. [ 49 ] I need not dwell on the percentage ownership of the shares in Cera which, in any event, evidences only a 2% differential. That may have been done for tax or valid corporate reasons. The value of 100% of the business is what is important.

For the purpose of determining its value at separation, I will use the high value of the business in 2015 since, though the business then was still new and its future uncertain, hindsight now tells us that its future was bright. That high value was $75,000, meaning that a presumptively equal division at that time would have seen Ms. L receive $37,500. [ 50 ] For the purpose of determining its value as at the date of trial, I will use also the high value of the business in 2020. The business is now established, with a clear pattern of profitability.

It faces some challenges, such as requiring a new lease from an uncooperative landlord, but Mr. L appears to be well-positioned to meet those challenges. Given his investment of time and energy into the business, I cannot see that he would sell it for anything less than at least its highest value based on Mr. Perhar’s calculations. That high value is $390,000. The increase from the 2015 high value to the 2020 high value is $315,000. [ 51 ] Based on an application of the s. 8 factors, I will attribute 75% of the increase in value, i.e. $236,250 to Mr. L and a corresponding 25%, i.e. $78,750 to Ms. L.

Added to her presumptively equal share of $37,500 at separation, she is entitled to $116,250 as her share of the value of Cera. 3. Method of Division [ 52 ] Ms. Stokes briefly canvassed with Mr. Perhar the various mechanisms that might be used to make a payment to Ms. L and the income tax implications of each of them. Three methods he described are: 1. Cera repurchase Ms. L’s shares, resulting in a deemed dividend and immediate tax consequences to Ms. L and a devaluation of Cera equal to the dividend paid out. 2. Mr. L purchase the shares, resulting in a capital gain to Ms.

L, subject to a lifetime capital gains exemption. 3. Cera and On the Spot enter into a reorganization that would see her shares rolled into On the Spot and then redeemed. [ 53 ] Recognizing that Mr. Perhar was not testifying as an expert on how Ms. L’s interest might be transferred to her, his is the only evidence available. He concluded that option number 2 is best for Cera but has immediate adverse tax consequences for Ms. L. I note that option 3 would involve some expense and the cooperation of Ms. L, which I cannot foresee.

I therefore conclude that option 2 is the most advantageous to and workable for the parties. I will order that Mr. L purchase Ms. L’s shares in Cera for $116,250, subject to the deductions permitted in sections VI and VIII below. VI. Child and Spousal Support 1. Mr. L’s Income [ 54 ] Mr. Perhar prepared an expert report on Mr. L’s income as well, for the purpose of calculating his child support obligations. Ms. L did not challenge that report. It was prepared using

section 16 and

Schedule III of the Guidelines, included personal tax returns for 2016 through 2020, and included the unaudited financial statements of Cera for the years 2016 through 2020. [ 55 ] Mr. Perhar’s conclusions are contained at page 5 of his report summarized as follows: Year Actual Three-year average Five year average 2016 $112,830 2017 $113,820 2018 $138, 621 $121,757 2019 $174,237 $142,246 2020 $123,087 $145,315 $132,519 [ 56 ] I note that in all cases, Mr. L’s income determined by Mr.

Perhar was slightly lower than the total income reported on his tax returns, which is not generally the case when a person’s income is being determined based on draws from a privately held corporation. By way of example, his 2016 income tax income was $117,933. From that, Mr.

Perhar deducted $7,023 to account for actual dividends received as opposed to the gross up used for income tax, and then added back $1920 for discretionary expenses paid by the corporation but for his personal benefit. [ 57 ] I am satisfied that that methodology is appropriate for this corporation and that the incomes referred to in the chart above comply with the calculation required by the Guidelines. 2. Ms. L’s Income

[ 58 ] Ms. L’s income is more difficult to calculate. Her disclosure can only be described as woefully inadequate. She has not filed income tax returns for 2018, 2019, or 2020 but instead provided bank statements to Mr. L’s counsel and stated that all the information needed could be found in them. [ 59 ] Some portion of her income comes from a cleaning business incorporated as 1902734 Alberta Inc. operating as On the Spot Cleaning (On the Spot) that the parties purchased about a year before separation. By way of background, the children attended a private Christian school.

One set of parents from that school were taking a leave and looking to sell their residential house cleaning business. The Ls purchased that business for $11,000. Mr. L testified that it was intended to provide close to full time employment for Ms. L but allow flexibility while the children were in school. Ms. L testified that it was always intended only as a supplement to the family income while they established Cera. [ 60 ] Ms. L has been operating On the Spot since separation. She did not produce any kind of reconciliation of the benefits she received from it.

The financial information presented respecting her income and that of On the Spot may be summarized as follows: Ms. L NOA for 2017: Line 150 income: $29,755 On the Spot income for 2016: $223 (Revenue $45,095, salaries $31,938) On the Spot income for 2017: $28,483 (Revenue $42,156, salaries recovery ($9200) On the Spot income for 2018: ($4451) (Revenue $58,564, salaries $15,472) [ 61 ] As Ms. Stokes points out, it is of note that the 2018 income/loss calculation for On the Spot, which is not from financial statements but from its income tax return, includes meal expenses of $15,000 and vehicle expenses of $16,000.

On cross-examination, Ms. L denied she was using resources from On the Spot to cover personal expenses, but these meal and vehicle expenses clearly are out of the ordinary course for this small cleaning business. [ 62 ] Ms. L testified as well about rental income that she received, including from renting out her daughter’s former room. Those numbers, though, were not clear. And Ms.

L testified that she did not report the amounts as income because they were received to cover expenses. [ 63 ] She had also taken on some part time work as a health care aide, similar to the work she had done before the children were born, but she quit that work shortly after starting. [ 64 ] I am not persuaded that there is sufficient evidence that Ms. L is intentionally underemployed for the purpose of avoiding child support for me to attribute income to her under the current Alberta jurisprudence. [ 65 ] I am persuaded, though, that she has made no effort to provide sufficient financial disclosure.

On that basis, using the limited documentary evidence presented during this trial and the cross-examination of Ms. L, I will attribute the following modest annual incomes to her under s. 19(1)(

f) of the Child Support Guidelines: 2016 $35,000 2017 $37,000 2018 $40,000 2019 $40,000 2020 $40,000 2021 $40,000 3. Court-Ordered and Uncategorized Support [ 66 ] Although there were no court Orders until 2018, Mr. L financially supported the family from separation. That support included payment of the children’s private school tuition, matrimonial debt, Ms. L’s vehicle and moving expenses, her cell phone expenses, and mortgage, utilities, and property tax for the matrimonial home, in which Ms. L lived, until 2018.

After court Orders were in place for spousal and child support, the mortgage fell into arrears, resulting in foreclosure. [ 67 ] As part of the documentation for trial, Ms. Stokes prepared a

summary of the payments Mr. L made, from April 1, 2016 up to June 20, 2021 totaling $151,479.10. [ 68 ] At trial, Ms. Stokes put to Ms. L in cross-examination a revised

summary totaling $112,514.89 and in which Ms. L received a credit of $7882.00 for money she paid back to Mr. L: the testimony of both parties was that Ms. L frequently requested emergency payments which Mr. L made when he could and that she paid back when she could. Thus, the total payments Mr. L made for the family support net out to $104,632.89. Ms. L did not challenge those calculations except to testify that Mr. L should have been making all those payments because he had the larger income. 4. Child Support [ 69 ] Both parties have an obligation to support the children.

Despite the fact that the parties shared parenting of the children equally until recently, Ms. L has paid no child support. Mr. L has taken sole responsibility for payment of all support for the children,

including

section 7 expenses that I consider legitimate for this family. 5. Spousal Support [ 70 ]

Section 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act sets out the factors to be examined to determine the condition, means, needs, and other circumstances of each spouse including:

a) The length of cohabitation, in this case 16 years. I consider that a medium to long term relationship.

b) The functions performed by each. The evidence from this trial persuadesme that both parents were involved in raising the children. While Mr. L is the one who ultimately advanced his career, I do not find that it was at Ms. L’s expense. This is not a case of Mr. L working long stretches out of town or long shifts in town which required Ms. L to assume all domestic duties. He was actively involved in their education and athletic pursuits and in performing routine domestic duties.

c) Any order, agreement, or arrangement. As discussed earlier, the parties did enter into a written agreement prepared by a friend of Ms. L’s after separation. I do not consider it to be legally binding, and, in any event, it did not deal in any detail with how spousal support was calculated and the length of time it would be paid. All orders made were interim. [ 71 ] Counsel for Mr. L cites the objectives of a spousal support order set out in

section 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act . She acknowledges that Ms. L, on separation, was entitled to spousal support on a compensatory basis: she left the workforce for a time when the children were young. But she argues that Ms. L made no real effort to re-enter the workforce when the children were both in school and since separation has made little or no effort to become self-supporting, nor has she provided sufficient financial information to permit this court to determine what level of support might be appropriate on a non-compensatory basis. [ 72 ] The evidence satisfies me that Ms.

L has made minimal efforts to support herself and the children. She has done virtually nothing to maintain or grow the cleaning business. She testified to unsubstantiated health issues that prevented her from doing physical work. Yet the financial statements for On the Spot show that it still delivers revenue. [ 73 ] She did not produce a budget to show what her expenses were. [ 74 ] In light of these findings, I accept that any support to which she is entitled should be in the mid-range of the Guidelines as proposed by Ms. Stokes. 6.

Child and Spousal Support Calculations [ 75 ] To supplement her oral submissions, Ms. Stokes prepared a detailed table calculating the parties’ respective obligations to pay

section 3 and

section 7 child support and, in Mr. L’s case, his spousal support obligations to the date of the trial. [ 76 ] I reproduce that table in Appendix A and adopt its contents. [ 77 ] Mr. L paid “unclassified” support of $104,632 and court-ordered support of $75,312, for a total of $179,944. In addition, Ms. L should have paid $14,689 in

section 7 expenses based on the parties’ respective proportionate share of income. This results in a total payment to or to the credit of Ms. L of $194,633 ($179,944 + $14,689). [ 78 ] I note that in Harbaugh v Harbaugh , 2018 ABQB 922 (affirmed 2020 ABCA 280 ), Horner J. entertained a similar claim and found that while it was likely that the husband had overpaid, he had not proven the amount on a balance of probabilities. In this case, I am satisfied that Mr. L has proven the amount of his payments. Accordingly, Mr. L has overpaid support by $30,414 ($194,633 - $164,219) to June 30, 2021.

He is entitled to deduct this amount from the payment due to Ms. L for her interest in Cera. [ 79 ] On an ongoing basis, the parties shall pay

section 3 child support, on a set-off basis, based on shared parenting of one child, A, for July and August, 2021 and primary parenting of one child, P, by Mr. L for July and August, 2021, and thereafter based on Mr. L having primary care of both. Ms. L is ordered to pay

section 3 child support based on her imputed income of $40,000, and her 31.67% proportionate share of

section 7 expenses, until her actual 2021 income is known. [ 80 ] Neither party shall incur a

section 7 expense over $500 for either of the children without first providing 30 days notice to the other respecting the need for such expense. [ 81 ] The parties shall exchange financial information respecting their incomes not later than June 30 of each year with the corresponding adjustments to Ms. L’s

section 3 child support and the sharing of

section 7 expenses to be calculated effective July 1 of each year. 7. Continuation of Spousal Support [ 82 ] Ms. Stokes argues that spousal support should now terminate: Ms. L has been compensated to the date of trial and no longer suffers any economic disadvantage from dissolution of the marriage. Further, Mr. L has primary parenting of the children and has demonstrated that he provides generously for them. [ 83 ] What became clear to me during the trial, however, is that numbers alone do not tell the whole story. Mr. L was not just the primary income earner of this family. He was the adult in the relationship.

Because of what Ms. L called his controlling behaviour and which I would instead categorize as responsible behaviour, she was not required to and accordingly did not develop any sense of fiscal responsibility. What she has lost as a result of dissolution of this relationship is someone to rescue her from her own fiscal irresponsibility. Notwithstanding that she has no physical impairment to gainful employment, she will have difficulty in achieving self-

sufficiency in the near future, and it would be inequitable to now abruptly cut her off from the financial support she enjoyed during the marriage. She will need support while she readjusts to the reality that she needs to become independent. [ 84 ] For that reason, I will order that Mr. L continue to pay spousal support approximately at the Guidelines mid-range as at the date of the trial and continuing but reducing over a three-year period, to provide an incentive for Ms.

L to become self sufficient, as follows: July 1, 2021 to June 30, 2022: $2200 per month, July 1, 2022 to June 30, 2023: $2000 per month, and July 1, 2023 to June 30, 2024: $1700 per month. VII. Divorce [ 85 ] This Court has jurisdiction by virtue of the parties’ residence in Alberta since 2000. They disagree on when the formal separation began, but whether it was December 31, 2015 when they agreed to part ways or March, 2016 when Mr. L moved out, it has been at least a year. There is no prospect of reconciliation, nor any evidence of collusion.

Satisfactory arrangements for support of the children were in place before the trial and are confirmed in these reasons. Accordingly, the divorce is granted. VIII. Costs [ 86 ] Ms. Stokes clearly spent considerable time and effort in preparing for this trial and was largely successful on behalf of her client. He is paying more than he might have anticipated to purchase Ms. L’s shares, and he will continue to pay spousal support when he might have thought it should be at an end. But more importantly, I adopted his parenting

schedule and accepted Ms. Stokes’ calculation of uncategorized support payments he has made to date. [ 87 ] For those reasons, I order costs payable by Ms. L. Subject to application made to me by either party within 30 days of issuance of these reasons, those costs shall be calculated in Column 2 of

Schedule C, and the aggregate may be deducted from Mr. L’s payment for Ms. L’s shares in Cera. Heard on the 28 th to 30 th of June and July 2 nd , 2021. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 4 th day of August, 2021. J.S. Little J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Ms. T. Stokes for the Plaintiff Ms. L: Self-represented Defendant Appendix A

Period Mr. L Income [1] Ms. L Income S 3 payable by Mr. L S 3 payable by Ms. L Child support set off Mid- range Spousal support How much Mr.

L should have paid Court- ordered support paid Jan-Dec 2016 $112,830 $35,000 [2] $1,599 $494 $934 [3] $1,100 $24,408 Jan-Dec 2017 $113,820 $37,000 [4] $1,649 $719 $930 [5] $1,066 $23,952 Jan-Dec 2018 $138,820 $40,000 [6] $1,989 $755 $1,234 [7] $1,622 $34,272 $5,008 Jan-Aug 2019 [8] $174,237 $40,000 [9] $2,453 $752 $1,701 [10] $2,492 $33,544 $20,032 Sep-Dec 2019 [11] $174,237 $40,000 [12] $1,522 $768 $754 [13] $3,024 $15,112 $10,016 Jan-Sep 2020 [14] $123,087 $40,000 [15] $1,090 $682 $408 [16] $1,897 $20,745 $22,536 Oct -Dec 2020 [17] $123,087 $40,000 [18] $0 $671 ($671) [19] $1,325 $1,962 $6,308 [20] Jan- March 2021 [21] $132,519 [22] $40,000 [23] $0 $669 ($669) [24] $1,480 $2,433 $3,900 [25] Apr- present 2021 [26] $132,519 [27] $40,000 [28] $1,171 $681 $490 [29] $2,107 $7,791 $7,512 $164,219 $75,312 Net amount paid before orders (para.69) 104,632 Court-ordered payments 75, 312 $179, 944