Rana v Rana, 2021 ABQB 630

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Rana v Rana, 2021 ABQB 630 Date: 20210810 Docket: 2101 07841 Registry: Calgary Between: Salim Rana Plaintiff - and - Allisun Rana, Julie Tannahill, and Rana Law Defendants _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Associate Chief Justice J.D. Rooke _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] On June 17, 2021, Salim Rana [Mr. Rana] filed a Statement of Claim with the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, naming Allisun Rana [Ms. Rana], Julie Tannahill [Ms.

Tannahill], and Rana Law as Defendants [Tannahill Action]. The Tannahill Action is related to other litigation being conducted by Mr. Rana, in particularly Rana v Rana , Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket 1501

02379, where Mr. Rana is disputing management of the affairs and assets of Mr. Rana’s mother, Gulzar Rana [Mother Action]. The defending party in the Mother Action is Mr. Rana’s brother, Zahir Rana, who is the Attorney for Gulzar Rana, pursuant to an Enduring Power of Attorney. [ 2 ] The Tannahill Action Statement of Claim states that Gulzar Rana on July 28, 2013 executed an Enduring Power of Attorney and Personal Directive that granted Zahir Rana authority to conduct Gulzar Rana’s affairs. The Tannahill Statement of Claim claims that Ms. Rana drafted those documents, and that Ms.

Tannahill then witnessed the execution of those documents as a notary. Ms. Rana and Ms. Tannahill were lawyers at Rana Law at that date. [ 3 ] Mr. Rana’s Tannahill Action Statement of Claim say that the preparation of the July 28, 2013 documents was improper, and alleges a conspiracy between Ms. Rana and Zahir Rana to, at a minimum, take advantage of Gulzar Rana. Mr. Rana alleges that Gulzar Rana was a client of Ms. Rana, or, otherwise, Ms. Rana owed Gulzar Rana “special responsibilities”. The Tannahill Action alleges Ms.

Rana breached a “professional duty”, a duty of care to Gulzar Rana to “... [assure] that the paramount interest of Gulzar was prioritized. ...”, and that Ms. Rana has “... knowingly and willing made false representations in the execution of the Personal Directive to the prejudice of [Mr. Rana]. ...”. [ 4 ] Mr. Rana says Ms. Tannahill “... notarized the said documents without the presence of Gulzar, or as represented by Allisun.” and “... without any proof that the statements contained in both documents were truthful and accurate ...”. That allegedly means Ms.

Tannahill “... willfully participated in this scheme ...”. [ 5 ] Mr. Rana also alleges misconduct in the Mother Action by Zahir Rana and his lawyer. Mr. Rana concludes: Rana Law’s services extended to Gulzar were fraudulent, substandard, legal, inhumane, immoral, and in contravention to their respective duties as lawyers from Alberta. Such behaviours were demeaning to other honest and ethical lawyers. [ 6 ] On this basis Mr. Rana seeks remedies that include: 1. Ms. Tannahill be “decommissioned as Notary Public”; 2. Ms.

Rana’s “legal licence be revoked”; 3. “The revocation of the license of Rana Law in conducting business in the Province of Alberta”; 4. “The Plaintiff seeks the recovery of the cost of legal fees borne by Gulzar Rana as consequence of the Personal Directive amounting to $104,000 as facilitated by [Ms.

Rana] and [Zahir Rana]” [sic]; 5. $100,000 in damages from the Defendants for “... fraudulent misrepresentations and conspiracy”; and 6. $500,000 in damages from the Defendants in “Moral, Punitive, Aggravated, General, and Restitutionary Damages ...”. [ 7 ] On July 12, 2021, Counsel for the Defendants, by letter, referred the Statement of Claim as a candidate Apparently Vexatious Application or Proceeding [AVAP] pursuant to Civil Practice Note No. 7 [CPN7] paragraph 6.

The Defendants take the position that the Tannahill Action Statement of Claim is vexatious, a collateral attack on previous findings of this Court, litigation for a wrongful purpose, seeks impossible remedies, and makes allegations that are hopeless. Counsel for the Defendants also included a transcript of October 24, 2017 proceedings in the Mother Action. [ 8 ] I am designated to receive and review potential CPN7 processes in Southern Alberta.

After review of the Tannahill Action Statement of Claim, I concluded in a decision reported as Rana v Rana , 2021 ABQB 580 [ Tannahill #1 ], that the Tannahill Statement of Claim is an AVAP, and should be subject be subject to a CPN7 “show cause” document-based review. Mr. Rana was asked to prepare a Written Submission of up to ten pages that responded to five questions: 1. Why is the Tannahill Action not a collateral attack on the October 24, 2017 findings and decision of Romaine J in the Mother Action? 2.

How does the Tannahill Action Statement of Claim provide an adequate basis for the Court and Defendants to make a meaningful response? 3. Why are the authorities that conclude lawyers have no duty of care to adverse parties incorrect? 4. Why is Mr. Rana not an abusive litigant:

a) for attempting to assert alleged “busybody” rights that belong to a third-party non-litigant,

b) by him seeking remedies with this Court prior to exhausting his alternative administrative processes, and

c) by Mr. Rana making ungrounded allegations of lawyer conspiracy, fraud, and misconduct? 5. How are the damages sought by Mr. Rana not excessive and/or impossible? [ Tannahill #1 at para 43 .] [ 9 ] On August 4, 2021, my office received a ten-page Written Submission from Mr. Rana. A Written Response was subsequently received from Counsel for the Defendants on August 6, 2021.

II CPN7 Analysis [ 10 ] Mr. Rana’s Tannahill Action Statement of Claim exhibits a number of prima facie fatal defects. A. Preliminary Issue: Alleged Evidence in Mr. Rana’s Written Submissions [ 11 ] Prior to review of those defects, I will, as a preliminary point, address an issue that applies to much of Mr. Rana’s Written Submission. Mr. Rana has continued his pattern of attempting to introduce alleged facts during a CPN7 process: Rana v Baker , 2021 ABQB 352 at paras 9-11 ; Rana v Baker , 2021 ABQB 571 at paras 10-15 . [ 12 ] For example, on page one of the Written Submission, Mr.

Rana writes: On April 15, 2014 (nine months later), the Plaintiff was assured that there will be no [Personal Directive] that would be executed as provided in the email of Zahir Rana (Zahir) which stated “…the decision [concerning Gulzar] will be made unanimously. . .” Thus, the production of this [Personal Directive] did not only caught Plaintiff by surprise but also violated the terms of their earlier agreement. [Sic, emphasis in original.] [ 13 ] The Tannahill Action Statement of Claim makes no mention of an April 15, 2014 email or that Mr. Rana was relying on some communication(

s) about a “unanimous decision”. The allegation concerning the April 15, 2014 email is a further prohibited instance of Mr. Rana attempting to expand on his pleadings during a CPN7 procedure. [ 14 ] Similarly, the next paragraph in Mr. Rana’s Written Submission alleges that Ms. Rana has stated in court that she has no training to prepare the July 28, 2013 materials.

Again, that allegation is nowhere to be found in the Tannahill Action Statement of Claim. [ 15 ] The scope of a CPN7 review is limited by Rule 3.68(3), which states: “No evidence may be submitted on an application made on the basis ... [a commencement document or pleading is frivolous, irrelevant or improper]”. This means that a CPN7 process is focused on the impugned pleading document.

Other materials are only considered in limited circumstances: Ubah v Canadian Natural Resources Limited , 2019 ABQB 347 at paras 24-48 . [ 16 ] Tannahill #1 includes one of those exceptional instances where other external evidence is relevant. Counsel for the Defendants introduced an October 24, 2017 transcript of a court proceeding before Justice Romaine in the Mother Action, where Justice Romaine considered, and rejected, allegations by Mr. Rana. She found that there was “... no evidence of actual impropriety, coercion, undue influence, or fraud ...” in the execution of documents on July 28, 2013.

As that conclusion is contrary to Mr. Rana’s allegations in the Tannahill Action Statement of Claim, the transcript is admissible as evidence that Mr. Rana’s Tannahill Action Statement of Claim is a collateral attack. B. Collateral Attack [ 17 ] Tannahill #1 , at paras 16-17 , reviews the characteristics of a collateral attack and why that type of litigation abuse is prohibited by Canadian Courts. I, at para 14, reproduced the critical passage in Justice Romaine’s decision that overlaps with Mr. Rana’s Tannahill Action Statement of Claim allegations. [ 18 ] Mr.

Rana, in his Written Submission, takes two contradictory positions. First, he simply denies that the decision of Justice Romaine applies, because Mr. Rana says he had “no practical remedy” when he challenged the Enduring Power of Attorney in the Mother Action. Then Mr. Rana shifts his focus, and says that only in 2021 did he learn about a Personal Directive endorsed on the same date as the Enduring Power of Attorney, and that Justice Romaine did not address whether the Personal Directive was the product of the alleged illegal conspiracy against him and his mother. [ 19 ] I reject Mr.

Rana’s argument, and conclude that the Tannahill Action is a collateral attack on Justice Romaine’s October 24, 2017 oral decision. Mr. Rana’s Tannahill Action Statement of Claim is quite plain that it alleges both the Enduring Power of Attorney and Personal Directive were prepared and executed in an improper manner. For example, at paragraph 36, the Tannahill Action Statement of Claim states: “... Defendant [Ms. Rana] abused the trust reposed in her in preparing and executing the [Enduring Power of Attorney] and Personal Directive.” [ 20 ] That means Mr.

Rana is seeking to bring proceedings to determine an issue that has already been evaluated by a court of competent jurisdiction; Mr. Rana is using previously raised grounds and issues improperly in a subsequent decision: Unrau v National Dental Examining Board , 2019 ABQB 283 at para 619 [ Unrau #2 ]. That makes the Tannahill Action Statement of Claim a collateral attack, and an abuse of the Court. [ 21 ] But, here there is a further, broader basis, on which Mr. Rana’s Tannahill Action is a collateral attack.

Upstream of the question of the validity of the Enduring Power of Attorney and/or Personal Directive, that were prepared at the same time and then endorsed on the same day, is the precursor question of the Gulzar Rana’s competence to endorse those documents. Justice Romaine made this conclusion: ... I am satisfied that, through her affidavit evidence and cross-examination, Ms. Rana has established that she knew [Gulzar Rana] well and despite the October 12th diagnosis, [Ms.

Rana] took care to ensure that [Gulzar Rana] was alert, aware of what she was doing and capable of giving instructions at the July, 2013, meeting and that she clearly and carefully communicated the legal effect of the power of attorney, both when receiving instructions and when attending at the execution of the instrument. [ 22 ] This, ultimately, is what Mr. Rana now seeks to subvert in the Tannahill Action Statement of Claim. His attempt to distinguish the Enduring Power of Attorney and Personal Directive ultimately attacks a more basic issue determined by Justice Romaine:

whether on July 28, 2013, Gulzar Rana had capacity to understand and execute legal documents relating to Gulzar Rana’s affairs and care. [ 23 ] This is a first independent basis on which I reject Mr. Rana’s arguments. He did not rebut the analysis and conclusion in Tannahill #1 that the Tannahill Action Statement of Claim is a collateral attack, an abuse of the Court, and should be struck out on that basis. C.

Inadequate Pleadings [ 24 ] In Tannahill #1 , at paras 20-25 , I reviewed how the Tannahill Action Statement of Claim did not provide adequate particulars in relation to the alleged wrongdoing by the Defendants. At best, Mr. Rana made bald allegations that the Defendants had acted illegally. [ 25 ] Mr. Rana’s Written Submissions are either non-responsive to this issue, or attempt to introduce inadmissible evidence as argument. I conclude Mr. Rana has not rebutted the conclusion in Tannahill #1 that Mr. Rana’s Statement of Claim failed to provide a basis for a meaningful response by the Court and Parties.

I also note, that, if I was incorrect in my analysis in relation to collateral attack, and that Mr. Rana’s lawsuit was valid for having a focus only on the Personal Directive, then the Tannahill Action Statement of Claim would nevertheless still be an abuse of process for its failure to provide adequate pleadings. Mr. Rana makes nothing but bald allegations of purported misconduct by the Defendants in relation to the Personal Directive. This is a further, separate, basis to terminate the Tannahill Action as an abusive proceeding. D.

Hopeless Litigation [ 26 ] In Tannahill #1 , at paras 32-34 , I observed that the underlying basis of Mr. Rana’s lawsuit was that lawyers and a law firm involved with his mother’s affairs owe Mr. Rana some kind of legal obligation. I then observed that Canadian courts have repeatedly ruled that lawyers have no duty of care to opposing or adverse parties: e.g.

Templanza v Ford , 2018 ABQB 168 at paras 69-72 , appeal abandoned 2019 ABCA 309 , reinstatement denied 2019 ABCA 345 , leave to appeal to SCC refused, 39034 (30 April 2020); Kumar v Korpan , 2020 SKQB 256 at paras 46-49 ; 9383859 Canada Ltd v Saeed , 2020 ONSC 4883 ; Sewak v Killips , 2021 ABQB 64 at paras 22- 23 ; Rana v Baker , 2021 ABQB 277 at para 16-20 , lawsuit struck out as an abuse of the Court, 2021 ABQB 352 at para 21 ; Wong v Leung , 2011 ABQB 688 at paras 23-24 Given these authorities, I requested that Mr.

Rana indicate why him suffering injuries that allegedly flow from the Defendants’ actions in the Mother Lawsuit provides a basis for Mr. Rana to claim damages. [ 27 ] Mr. Rana in his Written Submission claims he is owed a duty of care by the Defendants in relation to the July 28, 2013 documents because those documents affected Mr. Rana’s potential inheritance and his access to his mother. Mr. Rana states: “... [Ms. Rana], as a lawyer, cannot sever the ties between blood relatives by facilitating the execution of the [Personal Directive].” Mr.

Rana says he and his mother are aligned against a common group of wrongdoers and conspirators: his brother and his brother’s allies. [ 28 ] Mr. Rana cites Anns v Morton London Borough Council [1978], AC 728 (HL) , and argues that, given the common law test defined in that case, his degree of relation to his mother and his potential inheritance of her estate means a duty of care exists between Mr. Rana and the Defendant lawyers and law firm. [ 29 ] Mr. Rana has provided no case law to rebut the Canadian jurisprudence I cited in Tannahill #1 . I reject that Mr. Rana has refuted that Canadian case law.

As for the Anns test, even if Mr. Rana had established proximity, which I reject, I conclude the law in Canada recognizes powerful policy reasons why lawyer(

s) representing Gulzar Rana should not have a duty of care to a third party, let alone a third party who is in an adversarial relationship and litigation with Gulzar Rana’s designated Attorney. Mr. Rana’s claim is simply illogical. How would a lawyer addressing inheritances discharge simultaneous and inherently conflicting interests of inheritors (and potential inheritors) of a person’s estate? [ 30 ] Again, I note that Justice Romaine has concluded that Mr. Rana’s brother was properly and lawfully designated by Gulzar Rana to represent and manage her affairs. Put another way, Mr.

Rana’s interests and litigation are not aligned with his mother. Instead, Mr. Rana and his mother are litigation opponents in the Mother Action. [ 31 ] This is a third independent basis by which I conclude the Tannahill Action Statement of Claim is an abuse of the Court and Defendants. E. Abusive Litigation [ 32 ] In Tannahill #1 , I identified three separate bases why the Tannahill Action Statement of Claim was prima facie an abuse of the Court: 1. Mr. Rana is engaged in busybody litigation on behalf of third parties ( Tannahill #1 at paras 29-31 ); 2. Mr.

Rana sought remedies provided by other administrative procedures, making his lawsuit, at best, premature ( Tannahill #1 at paras 32-34 ); and 3. the Statement of Claim is based on ungrounded allegations of lawyer misconduct, a commonly recognized category of abusive litigation that warrants court intervention ( Tannahill #1 at paras 35-37 ). [ 33 ] In his Written Submissions, Mr. Rana denies he is engaged in abusive litigation. He again attempts to introduce new evidence to bolster those claims. Mr. Rana says he has no reason to make false claims; instead, it is he who is telling the truth.

He calls his mother “a necessary party to this action” because of the misconduct of his brother and the Defendants. Mr. Rana asks how else he can challenge the July 28, 2013 documents, given his brother has “consented or colluded” to the commission of illegal acts? Mr. Rana states that he has

“... the legal and moral obligation to defend his mother from the acts of the Defendants ...”, and, again, Mr. Rana collaterally attacks the findings and conclusion of Justice Romaine. [ 34 ] I conclude that Mr. Rana’s Written Submission is non-responsive to the three issues I have identified that make the Tannahill Action Statement of Claim an abuse of process. These are further independent bases on which I conclude that this lawsuit should be struck out. F.

Excessive and Impossible Remedies [ 35 ] Excessive or impossible remedies make litigation a hopeless proceeding that is an abuse of the Court: Unrau #2 at paras 620- 625 . In Tannahill #1 , at paras 29-34 and 38-42 , I reviewed how Mr. Rana’s Tannahill Action Statement of Claim prima facie sought excessive and impossible remedies. I noted that Mr. Rana had not particularized the basis for $600,000 in damages, and that Mr. Rana sought “busybody” remedies, and remedies not available from this Court. [ 36 ] Mr. Rana’s Written Submission again attempts to allege facts that were not pled in the Statement of Claim.

Further, Mr. Rana confirms he intends to enforce rights and claims on behalf of his Mother. To the extent Mr. Rana even attempts to substantiate his claims, those are claims flow from unspecified commitments of time and resources, and emotional suffering. Mr. Rana concludes: There is no other way, on the part of the Plaintiff, to seek redress on behalf of his mother than to initiate legal action. Also, the Plaintiff has offered conciliation with the adverse parties in his effort to end this conflict. However, they were not amenable to such as it would not benefit them personally.

It is only a manifestation that the Defendants, together with Zahir Rana, were suppressing to unveil their schemes prejudicial to the Plaintiff and his mother, Gulzar Rana. [ 37 ] I conclude that Mr. Rana has not rebutted the prima facie deficiencies identified in Tannahill #1 . That makes Mr. Rana seeking excessive and impossible remedies a further independent basis to strike out the Tannahill Action Statement of Claim as an abuse of Court. III. Conclusion [ 38 ] Mr. Rana’s Docket 2101 07841 Statement of Claim is struck out in toto on multiple, independent, bases, pursuant to CPN7 para 3(c), and Rule 3.68. Mr.

Rana’s action against the Defendants was a hopeless proceeding that abused the Court, its processes, and the Defendants. [ 39 ] Mr. Rana is currently the subject of a Judicature Act , RSA 2000, c J-2 , ss 23-23.1 application by Zahir Rana: Rana v Rana , 2021 ABQB 610 . I make the following findings of fact concerning the Tannahill Action - it is: 1. an additional lawsuit by Mr. Rana that has abused the Court and its processes; 2. a further example of Mr.

Rana repeatedly and persistently engaging in collateral attacks on prior decisions of this Court, 3. a hopeless action, and sought excessive and impossible remedies, and 4. a demonstration that Mr. Rana has engaged in a pattern of expanding litigation where Mr. Rana targets new Defendants as a method to continue his lawsuit(

s) and re-litigate issues already considered and rejected by this Court; that is mechanism to evade meaningful Court management of Mr. Rana and his litigation misconduct. [ 40 ] When an action, application, or claim is terminated via the CPN7 process, the usual practice of this Court is to award costs in favour of the litigant(

s) who referred the matter to the Court: e.g. Ahad v Calgary Housing Company , 2020 ABQB 450 at para 9 ; Phillips v Kenney , 2020 ABQB 452 at para 9 ; Skrypichayko v Law Society of Alberta , 2020 ABQB 604 at para 43 ; Feeney v Alberta , 2020 ABQB 633 at para 6 . I see no reason to depart from that approach in this instance. Given the quantum of damages sought by Mr. Rana, and

Schedule C of the Alberta Rules of Court , I order Mr. Rana pay each of the Defendants a separate costs award of $1,700, forthwith. [ 41 ] Counsel for the Defendants will prepare and serve the Order giving effect to this Decision. Mr. Rana’s approval of that Order is dispensed with, pursuant to Rule 9.4(2)(c). Mr. Rana may be served this Decision and the corresponding Order by email to: salimrana@icloud.com. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 10 th day of August, 2021. J.D. Rooke A.C.J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances:

Salim Rana Self-represented Litigant Stuart J. Weatherill Emery Jamieson LLP for the Defendants