R v Cupid, 2021 ABQB 640

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v Cupid, 2021 ABQB 640 Date: 20210812 Docket: 190374868S1 Registry: Edmonton Between: Her Majesty the Queen Respondent - and - Gregory Isaac Cupid Appellant Restriction on Publication Identification Ban – See the Criminal Code ,

section 486.4 . By Court Order, information that could identify the victim must not be published, broadcast, or transmitted in any way. NOTE: Identifying information has been removed from this judgment to comply with the ban so that it may be published. _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Madam Justice S.E. Richardson _______________________________________________________ Appeal from the Conviction by The Honourable Judge T. D. DePoe Convicted on the 13 th day of February, 2020

(Docket 190374868S1) 1. Introduction [1] The Appellant was convicted after trial of sexual assault and sexual interference in relation to two acts that occurred ondifferent days in January 2019. The Court entered a judicial stay on the sexual assault conviction. The primary evidence came from theAppellant and the 12-year-old complainant. The trial Judge was faced with a classic R v WD, (SCC), [1991] 1 SCR742, situation. 2. Overview [2] The complainant was 11 years old in early 2019 when the incidents that constituted the charges occurred. She was aneighbour and friend of the Appellant’s eldest daughter.

The girls often had sleepovers at the Appellant’s home. One such sleepoveroccurred on January 3, 2019 and the other on January 19, 2019. Within a month of the latter sleepover, the complainant told twosimilarly aged friends about the incidents. These friends reported what they were told to a teacher and the authorities became involved. [3] On February 26, 2019, the complainant gave an interview at the Zebra Center. She told police that on two occasions inJanuary, the Appellant had touched her sexually. Her videotaped interview was admitted into evidence.

She also provided viva vocetestimony at the trial. [4] In both the interview and at the trial, the complainant described two distinct sleepovers out of many sleepovers at theAppellant’s home. [5] She described the first incident occurring at the sleepover with only her and the Appellant’s eldest daughter, where the girlsslept the daughter’s bedroom. [6] She described the second incident at the sleepover where she and her sister, along with two of the Appellant’s daughters,enjoyed a group evening, with all four girls sleeping in the living room on a large sofa and air mattress. [7] The trial Judge found as a fact that the complainant was mistaken as to the sequence of the two sleepovers.

He found thatthe group sleepover in the living room occurred first in time, and the sleepover with the Appellant’s eldest daughter, in her bedroom,occurred second in time. [8] Despite this inversion of the sequence of the sleepovers, the complainant was detailed, clear and consistent in her evidenceduring the trial and the videotaped interview in regard to the alleged sexual touching. [9] During the sleepover with the Appellant’s eldest daughter, where the girls slept in the daughter’s bedroom, the complainantdescribed that the Appellant entered his daughter’s bedroom during the night.

His daughter was already asleep but the complainant wasawake. The Appellant spoke to the complainant and directed her to the bathroom. She complied. Once inside the bathroom, he closedthe door and told her not to tell anyone or else she would not be allowed to play with his daughter anymore. According to thecomplainant’s evidence, he turned off the light in the bathroom, rendering the room dark. [10] The Appellant told the complainant to stand up as she was sitting on the closed toilet seat. She complied. He pulled downher pyjama shorts and underwear and touched her vagina with his hand.

He then told her to “touch this,” but it was dark and she did notknow what he was referring to. She whispered, “no, stop” and he did. She pulled up her pyjama shorts and underwear and he said “fine,go” after which she turned on the light, left the bathroom and returned to the bedroom. [11] During the group sleepover in the living room, the complainant described sleeping on a sectional sofa and waking up to theAppellant touching her vagina over her pyjamas. She immediately whispered, “don’t” and “stop”. The Appellant stopped and left theroom. [12] The Appellant testified.

He denied touching the complainant in any way and offered a myriad of reasons why there was noopportunity for him to have committed the acts alleged. 3. Issues [13] The Appellant disputes his conviction on several grounds: 1. The trial Judge erred in law in relying upon an absence of motive to fabricate, 2. The trial Judge erred in law in several respects in his assessment of the Appellant’s evidence, including the misapplication of therule in Browne and Dunn (1893), 6 R 67 (HL), 3.

The trial Judge erred in law by applying different standards of scrutiny to the evidence of the complainant and that of the Appellant,and 4. The trial Judge misapprehended material evidence.

4. Standard of Review [14] The standard of review for a finding of fact or an inference drawn from proven facts is palpable and overriding error. Wherethere is an application of a legal test to the facts, which involves a question of mixed fact and law, it is also reviewed on a standard ofpalpable and overriding error unless there is an extricable error in principle to which correctness applies: Housen v Nikolaisen, 2002SCC 33 at paras 8, 10-37. Findings of fact and credibility are entitled to deference unless they are clearly wrong, unsupported by theevidence, or otherwise unreasonable.

Any error must be plainly identified and shown to have affected the result: R v Clark, 2005 SCC2 at para 9, and R v Griffin, 2018 ABCA 277 at para 10. [15] Whether a witness is credible is a question of fact. Credibility findings are entitled to deference given that the trial judge is ina unique position as the “trier of fact”.

The standard of review of specific credibility findings is reasonableness, absent an error of law orprinciple or a clear and manifest error in the appreciation of the evidence: R v RP, 2012 SCC 22 at para 10; R v Francois, (SCC), [1994] 2 SCR 827 at 838; and R v Napope, 2015 ABCA 27 at para 22.

In this case, the claim of an error in transforming anabsence of motive to fabricate into a proven lack of motive concerns the trial Judge’s credibility findings. [16] Issues of trial fairness and the application of the rule in Browne and Dunn, are questions of law reviewable on the correctnessstandard: R v Abdulle, 2016 ABCA 5 at para 10. [17] Applying different levels of scrutiny to the evidence of key witnesses is an error of law that undermines the fairness of thetrial and therefore the standard of review is correctness: R v Wanihadie, 2019 ABCA 402 at para 22. [18] A misapprehension of evidence may refer to a mistake as to the substance of evidence, a failure to consider evidence relevantto a material issue, or failure to give proper effect to evidence.

The standard is stringent. The misapprehension must go to substancerather than detail, be material rather than peripheral, and play an essential

part in the reasoning process leading to conviction. It is notenough that there may have been a misapprehension; the error must be readily obvious: R v Lohrer, 2004 SCC 80 at paras 1-2, citing R vMorrisey, (ON CA), 97 CCC (3d) 193 at 221, 22 OR (3d) 514 (CA); R v Mohamed, 2014 ABCA 398 at paras 13-14:R v Griffin, at para 11. 5. Analysis i.

Did the trial Judge erroneously rely upon absence ofmotive to fabricate? [19] The Appellant argues that the trial Judge erred in finding that the complainant’s credibility was enhanced due to the absenceof a motive for her to fabricate. [20] The Crown argues that the impugned passage in the trial decision does not amount to the trial Judge having concluded that thecomplainant had no motive to fabricate; instead it amounts to an unproven motive to mislead, which in law is a neutral factor in thecredibility assessment.

The Crown argues that this finding was not used by the trial Judge to enhance the complainant’s credibility asthose findings had already been made. [21] The trial Judge’s comments on this issue are contained in full in the penultimate paragraph of the decision: I found her [the complainant] on the whole to be very reliable and credible. She presented as intelligent and articulate. She providedconsistent detail about the incidents themselves. She did not embellish or exaggerate in any manner what happened to her.

Her evidencedid not come across as rehearsed, scripted or concocted in any way, nor was there any suggestion anywhere in the evidence of a motive todo so. She did not herself complain to anyone in authority. [22] The absence of a motive to fabricate must not be used to suggest that the accused has an onus to demonstrate that a witness hasany such motive, that the absence of a demonstrated motive to fabricate means there was no such motive, or that the absence of a motiveto fabricate establishes that a witness is telling the truth.

However, the existence or absence of a motive to fabricate is a factor to beconsidered in assessing credibility. It is not determinative: R v Zepeda, 2018 ABCA 425 at para 10 (citations omitted). [23] The decision, read as a whole, does not establish any prohibited use of the absence of a motive to fabricate. The trial Judgedid not reverse the burden of proof by implying that the Appellant had any onus of demonstrating why the complainant made theallegations. The trial Judge did not conflate the absence of any demonstrated motive to fabricate with a finding of fact that none existed.

The trial Judge did not use the absence of a motive to fabricate to determine that the complainant was telling the truth. [24] The trial Judge commented on the absence of motive to fabricate as one of many factors that led to his conclusion that thecomplainant was a credible witness. He was entitled to do so. ii.

Did the trial Judge misapply the rule in Browne and Dunnor otherwise err in law in the assessment of the Appellant’s evidence? [25] The Appellant argues that the trial Judge erred in the application of the rule in Browne and Dunn in two respects: first, inapplying the rule to evidence that only arose in the Appellant’s cross-examination (the creaky floors in the home) and second, inapplying the rule to a matter that was the subject of the complainant’s testimony but not a matter of substance to the allegation (thelighting in the bathroom).

[ 26 ] The Appellant argues that these were not matters of substance as there was no complaint by Crown counsel in argument.

He argues as well that the trial was rendered unfair as a result of the trial Judge addressing the breach of the rule in Browne and Dunn in his decision without having raised the issue with counsel in advance. [ 27 ] The Crown agrees that while applying the rule to evidence that arose only in the cross- examination of the Appellant was troublesome, the creaky floors evidence was not central to the allegations and the trial Judge limited his remedy for this perceived breach to that part of the Appellant’s testimony.

Further, the Crown argues that the remedy for the breach of the rule was applied only after the trial Judge had made credibility findings fatal to the Appellant’s evidence. [ 28 ] The impugned part of the decision is as follows: I find that there are aspects of his evidence to which I must give reduced weight because of a breach of the rule in Brown and Dunn [sic]. Brown and Dunn , essentially is a rule of evidence that requires questions to be put to an opposing witness, if later the party questioning intends to lead evidence, bringing that evidence of the other party into question.

The accused testified about the bathroom light, and how a nightlight would automatically go on if the bathroom light was shut off, and that therefore the room could not have been in total darkness, as the complainant testified. No questions were asked of the complainant about this. She had been in this residence for sleepovers dozens of times, and had visited many times, and could reasonably be expected to have knowledge of this. The complainant was also not asked about whether the house was old and floors creaked…She was not asked about whether anyone could be heard moving around at night.

It may be that she may not have been able to address this, but the questions were not put to her. [ 29 ] And after having exhaustively explained why he did not find the Appellant to be credible, the trial Judge concluded: “There were also breaches of the rule in Brown and Dunn , as I have described.” He then began his assessment of whether the remainder of the evidence that he did accept, rose to the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [ 30 ] The rule in Browne and Dunn requires counsel to put a matter to a witness if counsel intends to present contradictory evidence on that point through a later witness.

Where the rule is breached, the trial judge may take the failure into account in assessing credibility. The failure to cross-examine must relate to matters of substance. Where the evidence is of little significance in the overall context of the case, the failure to cross-examine should have no effect on the assessment of credibility: R v Abdulle , 2016 ABCA 5 at para 11 . [ 31 ] In Abdulle , the appellant also argued that finding a breach of the rule in Browne and Dunn without providing counsel the opportunity to address the issue compromised trial fairness.

The Alberta Court of Appeal agreed that had the trial judge given defence counsel the opportunity to address the issue, counsel may have convinced the trial judge that the matter was put to the witness, even obliquely, or to argue that the matter was not a matter of substance, so the rule ought not apply (para 14 and 17). [ 32 ] It is correct that the trial Judge invoked the rule in Browne and Dunn , found a breach and applied a remedy, all in the absence of raising the issue with counsel.

However, the remedy applied for the two claimed errors in the application of the rule was not determinative of the issue of the Appellant’s credibility, nor did it play a

part in the findings of fact. The trial Judge did not completely disregard the Appellant’s evidence with respect to the creaky floors or the bathroom nightlight, he indicated that he gave “reduced weight” to those parts of his testimony.

The trial Judge did not use this perceived breach to fashion a more expansive application to the testimony of the Appellant. [ 33 ] The evidence elicited in cross-examination that the floors in the home were creaky was part of the Appellant’s narrative that he lacked any opportunity to commit the offences as it would not have been possible for him to have left the master bedroom without alerting or waking his wife, as every time he leaves the master bedroom his wife asks him where he is going.

Setting aside for a moment that his wife did not testify, the Appellant himself resiled from this narrative when he agreed that he would frequently leave the master bedroom after having consumed Metamucil and during these times his wife did not awaken or inquire about his whereabouts.

He also resiled from this part of his testimony when he agreed that on the evening of the group sleepover he left his wife in the master bedroom to check on their youngest daughter who was still being toilet trained, conceding that he could have left the master bedroom on other occasions without his wife becoming aware of his absence. [ 34 ] While the trial Judge ostensibly applied Browne and Dunn to this evidence, in reality the creaky floor evidence was but a subset of the Appellant’s narrative supporting his argument that there was no opportunity for him to have left the master bedroom, and thus to have engaged in the alleged acts against the complainant.

It was the Appellant himself who contradicted this narrative by providing testimony that was internally inconsistent on his ability to leave the master bedroom without waking his wife, and inviting her inquiries about his whereabouts.

Given this inconsistency in the Appellant’s own evidence, no trial unfairness arose as a result of the trial Judge’s articulation of this evidence being captured by the rule in Browne and Dunn . [ 35 ] In addition, no trial unfairness arose as a result of the trial Judge’s application of the rule in relation to the Appellant’s testimony about a nightlight in the bathroom, which he said was activated when the main bathroom light was turned off. The complainant did give evidence about the quality of darkness in the bathroom and described it as being so dark that she could not see what was happening to her.

In effect, the suggestion by the Appellant about the quality of luminescence in the bathroom was a component of the complainant’s evidence, even if she was not directly cross-examined on the existence of any nightlight. [ 36 ] While it is correct that the trial Judge ostensibly applied the rule in Browne and Dunn in discounting the Appellant’s evidence, it is clear that he restricted the perceived breach of the rule to the evidence of the nightlight and the creaky floors and not more generally to other aspects of the Appellant’s testimony.

No trial unfairness resulted to the Appellant as a result of the trial Judge’s comments on the breach of the rule. iii. Did the trial Judge err in law by applying different standards of scrutiny to the evidence of the Appellant and the complainant?

[ 37 ] The Appellant argues that the trial Judge used the Appellant’s detailed recollection of aspects of the sleepovers against his credibility yet used the complainant’s detailed recollection to buttress her credibility. Specifically, he points to the trial Judge’s comments about the Appellant having sex with his wife on January 3, 2019 and the Appellant’s recollection about the placement of physical items in the living room on January 19, 2019, months after that sleepover took place.

He also argues that the trial Judge did not give adequate weight to the complainant’s inaccurate recollection of the sequence of the sleepovers in question and her inability to describe the touching. [ 38 ] The Crown argues that the decision read as a whole, does not betray uneven scrutiny as between the testimony of the Appellant and the complainant and that this ground of appeal is a veiled attack on the trial Judge’s credibility findings. [ 39 ] In order to succeed on a claim of uneven scrutiny of the evidence, an Appellant must meet the threshold of demonstrating “something sufficiently significant” in the reasons or the record establishing that a trial judge employed faulty methodology in deciding credibility: R v Quartey , 2018 ABCA 12 at para 42 , aff’d 2018 SCC 59 . [ 40 ] It is well established that credibility findings are entitled to deference absent palpable and overriding error.

A trial judge is entitled to decide how much weight to give to factors such as inconsistencies, particularly where a witness provides explanations for such inconsistencies. A trial judge is uniquely positioned to rely not only on all that they see and hear relative to a witness, but also to apply contemporary common sense in the context of the trial: R v Mavros , 2020 ABCA 436 at para 43 (citations omitted). [ 41 ] The trial Judge did not apply different levels of scrutiny to the evidence of the Appellant and the complainant. [ 42 ] The trial Judge gave fulsome reasons for why he did not believe the Appellant.

The detailed recollections of the Appellant were problematic for the trial Judge not because of the level of detail, but rather because the Appellant was inflexible in his testimony. While he acknowledged conducting the living room reconstruction in May 2019, and taking photographs at that time that were offered as evidence, he also “stubbornly” refused to accept that items such as the Christmas tree and the cat tree could have been even one inch off in this reconstruction from their placement on January 3, 2019.

The Appellant also stubbornly refused to admit that the cushion he suggested would have prevented him from having the opportunity to commit the January 3, 2019 incident, could have been in even a slightly different location than that depicted in the recreated photographs.

This despite the fact the Appellant acknowledged his wife was the last person in the living room, she having put their youngest child back to bed in the living room after the Appellant had already retired to the master bedroom. [ 43 ] The trial Judge did address the Appellant’s detailed memory of having sex with his wife on the night of January 3, 2019, saying: “The distinct impression I had from this evidence was that he said it to impress upon the court that he had no sexual interest in the complainant”.

It was not the detailed nature of the Appellant’s memory that troubled the trial Judge on this point, instead it was the fact that the trial Judge found this evidence to be curated to support his testimony that he could not have and would not have committed the offence alleged. [ 44 ] The trial Judge also addressed the detailed recollection of the complainant’s testimony. The most troublesome part of her evidence was her testimony that inverted the sequence of the sleepovers. The trial Judge addressed this mistaken memory of the complainant directly.

Noting her age at the time of the incidents as well as at the trial, he referenced the direction of the Supreme Court of Canada on the application of credibility assessments to the testimony of children, and he concluded this error in her memory did not cause him any concern. He pointed to her clear and detailed testimony about the incidents themselves, the fact that her testimony about the physical circumstances of the two sleepovers were in accord with the evidence of the Appellant.

As well, she had clear memories of personal things that “a child would easily remember” and these memories were corroborated by a video clip entered into evidence by the Appellant, after she had testified. [ 45 ] The Appellant argues that the complainant was not able to describe the touching and that this lack of detail ought to have been used in assessing her credibility.

It is correct that when asked in relation to the sleepover in the Appellant’s daughter’s bedroom: “Can you describe what [the Appellant’s] hand did when he touched your vagina?” the complainant replied “No, I do not remember”, and when asked “Do you remember what it felt like?” she replied “No”. However, it is not correct to assert that she was not able to describe the touching.

In regard to this incident, she clearly set out how the incident began, what the Appellant said to her, where the incident took place, what she was wearing, how her underclothes were removed and by whom, what he touched her with, how long it lasted, what she said to the Appellant, how she felt when it started, how the incident ended, how her underclothes were put back into place and by whom, what she did next (went back to the daughter’s bedroom, pulled the blankets up, went in a ball and went back to sleep very fast) and why she did that (to feel more protected and safe). [ 46 ] Likewise, in relation to the group sleepover, the complainant was asked if she could describe how the Appellant’s hand was touching her vagina and she replied that she could not.

However, she was able to described waking up to the Appellant using one of his hands to reach under the blanket she was sleeping with to touch her vagina over top of her pyjamas, that this lasted a short time, she described her physical response of rolling over away from him, and whispering to him to stop because she was scared and didn’t want to wake the other girls sleeping in the living room. [ 47 ] The trial Judge provided numerous reasons for his conclusion that he did not believe the Appellant and why he believed the complainant. He addressed significant issues within the testimony of each witness.

The trial Judge did not apply different levels of scrutiny to the evidence. iv. Did the trial Judge err in law in misapprehending material evidence? [ 48 ] The Appellant argues that the trial Judge misapprehended his testimony in several respects. First, in deeming him less credible for his overly detailed recollection of the sleepovers in question, given that the sleepovers were routine events, when in reality,

one of the sleepovers was on a dating anniversary and the other preceded a rare outing to the waterpark. Second, in finding that it wassuspect that the Appellant was able to reconstruct what occurred “months later” when in fact the Appellant testified that he was advisedonly one month later that an allegation had been made. Third, that the trial Judge misapprehended the Appellant’s testimony in relationto the cushion in the living room presenting a barrier to any opportunity to have committed the acts alleged.

Finally, the Appellant arguesthat the trial Judge also failed to give effect to relevant evidence, that being the layout of the living room and the placement of thecushions. [49] The Crown argues that the trial Judge did not misapprehend the evidence as suggested by the Appellant. I agree. [50] A misapprehension of evidence – failure to consider evidence relevant to a material issue, a mistake as to the substance of theevidence, or a failure to give proper effect to evidence – will be made out where the plain language or thrust of the reasons reveal areadily obvious error.

The reviewing court does not “dissect, parse or microscopically examine” the trial Judge’s reasons to infer orspeculate that an error exists: Sinclair, at paras 52-54; R v Morrisey, (1995), (ON CA), 22 OR (3d) 514 (C.A.) at para83. The misapprehension will be a reviewable error of law where it goes to substance rather than detail, is material rather than peripheralto the reasoning and plays an essential

part in the reasoning process resulting in a conviction rather than only the narrative of thejudgement: Lohrer, at para 4: R v Matchatis, 2020 ABCA 435 at para 24. [51] This ground of appeal is anchored in the Appellant’s evidence, including photographs that were entered by consent.

While itis correct that the Appellant was advised of the complaint in February 2019, approximately one month after the last sleepover, hisevidence on when he and his wife reconstructed the living room to its January 3, 2019 configuration for the purpose of taking thephotographs was months later, in May 2019, as cited by the trial Judge. [52] The claim that the trial Judge failed to give effect to the relevant evidence of the testimony and photographs of the living roomlayout in relation to the January 3, 2019 sleepover is also devoid of substance. [53] The Appellant testified that after learning of the complaint, he and his wife reviewed a cell phone video created on January 3,2019 and reviewed cell phone pictures taken during the evening.

Based upon this review, and their joint memories, they set about toreconstruct how the living room was arranged that evening. They put up the Christmas tree and the cat tree, inflated the air mattress andplaced all items in the location where they recalled them to have been placed on January 3. They also positioned the cushions in thesame fashion that they recalled them being placed that evening. After this joint project, they took photographs of the reconstructed livingroom where the sleepover took place.

The Appellant argued that based upon the configuration of the living room, he would not have hadthe physical opportunity to sexually touch the complainant as she alleged. [54] The trial Judge dedicated a substantial amount of the decision to his explanation for why he did not accept the Appellant’stestimony regarding the placement of the items and furniture in the living room and why he was unable to assign any weight to thephotographs tendered by the Appellant. [55] The trial judge was troubled by the fact that the Appellant initially testified that the reconstruction was done by him from hismemory but later acknowledged that his wife was involved and further that some of the placement of the items was from her memory,not his.

He also later testified that she had taken some of the photographs. In the end, the trial Judge was unable to distinguish which ofthis evidence was from the Appellant’s memory and which was from the Appellant’s wife’s memory. This was a concern because theAppellant’s wife did not testify.

As the trial Judge correctly pointed out, “Whatever his wife did tell him, of course, is hearsay, and I findmyself as a result unable to determine just how much weight can be placed on the accused’s evidence about the configuration of theliving room, particularly the location of the cushions, yet the accused remained adamant about their placement”. [56] The Appellant argues that the trial Judge also misapprehended his evidence about the placement of the cushions presenting an“impenetrable barrier” to any opportunity to have committed the offence as alleged by the complainant.

It is correct that the descriptorof “impenetrable barrier” was that of the trial Judge and not the Appellant. However, a review of Appellant’s testimony confirms thathis evidence was that placement of the cushions between the air mattress and the sofa would have prevented any opportunity for anyoneto access the sleeping complainant.

The trial Judge reviewed all the evidence before him, including the photographs of the recreation,and concluded that the Appellant’s suggestion that the cushions would have precluded access to the complainant was not a credibleassertion, not least as a result of the fact that “there was nothing to stop him from simply moving the cushion, if he entered the room fullof four sleeping girls later on, as the complainant testified”. [57] Finally, the Appellant argues that the trial Judge misapprehended the Appellant’s detailed evidence about the events of thetwo evenings in finding that the sleepovers were routine events when in fact the one sleepover occurred on the Appellant’s datinganniversary with his wife, and the other occurred the evening before a memorable attendance at the water park. [58] The sleepovers themselves were routine.

The evidence was clear that the complainant was a frequent sleepover guest in theAppellant’s home. The trial Judge’s suspicion of the Appellant’s detailed narrative of the evenings in question was not based on thetestimony about what proceeded the sleepovers, but rather was grounded in the Appellant’s, at times, internally inconsistent testimonyabout his actions, the hearsay evidence from the Appellant’s wife about the placement of items in the living room and the Appellant’s“stubborn, inflexible, illogical and improbable” testimony about what occurred during the two evenings in question. 6.

Conclusion [59] The appeal is dismissed. Heard on the 25th day of March, 2021.

Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 12 th day of August, 2021. S.E. Richardson J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Deborah R. Hatch Deborah R. Hatch Criminal Law for the Appellant Luke Craggs Alberta Justice, Edmonton Prosecutions for the Respondent