Kirkland v Alberta (Attorney General), 2021 ABQB 746

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Kirkland v Alberta (Attorney General), 2021 ABQB 746 Date: 20210917 Docket: 2003 07603 Registry: Edmonton Between: Kyle W. Kirkland Plaintiff - and - Attorney General of Alberta Defendant _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice B.R. Burrows _______________________________________________________ [ 1 ] There are two applications. [ 2 ] In the first, Kyle Kirkland seeks an order requiring the Alberta Attorney General to produce certain records.

Alberta resists production of some of the records sought on the basis that their contents are not relevant. And Alberta resists production of other records sought on the basis that they are subject to privilege. [ 3 ] In the second application, the Attorney General seeks an order requiring Mr. Kirkland to produce certain records. Mr. Kirkland resists production on the basis that the records sought are not relevant. [ 4 ] In this action, Mr. Kirkland, a member of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, challenges the constitutionality of several sections of the Gaming, Liquor and Cannabis Act , RSA 2000, c G-1 .

The impugned sections provide, amongst other things, that a police officer may exclude or remove from licensed premises any person whom the police officer believes to be associated with a gang. “Gang” is a defined as “a group of people engaged in a pattern of unlawful behaviour or in creating an atmosphere of fear or intimidation in a community.” “Unlawful behaviour” is also defined in the impugned legislation.

I have attached the entirety of the impugned provisions as an appendix to these Reasons. [ 5 ] The impugned legislation received Royal Assent on June 4, 2009 and came into force when proclaimed on October 1, 2009.

[ 6 ] In the Statement of Claim, Mr. Kirkland states that he is a member of the Hells Angels. He does not acknowledge that the Hells Angels is a “gang” as defined in the impugned provisions. He alleges that in 2017, when at licensed premises wearing “accessories” associated with the Hells Angels, he was ejected by police officers acting pursuant to the impugned provisions. When, an hour later, he re-entered the licensed premises he was arrested and charged under the impugned legislation. I understand the charge was later stayed. [ 7 ] Mr.

Kirkland challenges the legislation on two constitutional bases: 1. that the impugned provisions are ultra vires Alberta as being in relation to criminal law and criminal procedure, matters in the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of Parliament, 2. that the impugned provisions are violations of several Charter rights and freedoms: - s 2(b) – freedom of expression; - s 2(c) – freedom of assembly; - s 2(d) – freedom of association; - s 7 – right to liberty; - s 8 – right not to be subjected to unreasonable search and seizure; - s 9 – right not to be arbitrarily detained; and that these Charter violations are not saved by Charter s 1. [ 8 ] Alberta, in its Statement of Defence, pleads, among other things, that the impugned provisions: - represent a legitimate exercise of Alberta’s legislative authority to suppress conditions leading to criminal, unlawful or unsafe activities in licensed premises; - do not infringe any rights or freedoms of the Plaintiff or other gang members or associates of gang members as protected by the . . .

Charter . . . . Rather, the impugned provisions are an appropriate response to the challenge posed by gang presence in licensed premises; - in the alternative, if the provisions limit any Charter rights or freedoms, they represent reasonable limits that are demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s 1 of the Charter. [ 9 ] This litigation has considerable procedural history. There was a previous action, Action 1503 08058, commenced by Jeffrey David Barr and Mr. Kirkland seeking essentially the same relief as Mr. Kirkland now seeks in this action.

Some of the history of that action is traced in my decision Barr v Alberta (Attorney General) 2016 ABQB 671 beginning at paragraph 4 . I understand that action was dismissed by consent for long delay. Thereafter Mr. Kirkland commenced this action. I was assigned to case manage the earlier action and that assignment has carried over to this action. Mr. Kirkland’s Application [ 10 ] There are four groups of specific documents which are the subject of Mr. Kirkland’s application.

The original application sought production of many more specific documents but Counsel advised at the hearing of this application that only the four groups described below remain in issue. 1. Documents relating to Alberta’s attempt to have the federal government enact legislation, and materials in relation to a federal/provincial/territorial conference hosted by Alberta [ 11 ] First, Mr.

Kirkland seeks production of certain documents which, he submits, may be relevant and material to his submission that the impugned legislation is beyond Alberta’s legislative competence, that is, that it is in relation to criminal law. [ 12 ] These documents are described in the Application as: Relevant and material records relating to: 1. Alberta’s intention or attempt to have the Federal Government consider “outlawing” display of gang colours or symbols, as reported by CTV on December 7, 2008; and 2.

The Federal-Provincial-Territorial Justice Ministers’ conference on organized crime, hosted by Alberta in February 2009, as reported by CTV on December 7, 2008. [ 13 ] The CTV news report of December 7, 2008 appears to have followed an interview with Alberta Justice Minister, Ms. Alison Redford. The news report stated: Alberta wants the federal government to amend the Criminal Code to make it easier to crack down on organized crime, to impose harsher sentences for gang-related violence and to make it tougher for dangerous people to get bail. The report indicated these were “just some of the messages” that Ms.

Alison Redford intended to take to her federal counterpart, Mr. Rob Nicholson, when they met that week.

[ 14 ] The same report stated that Alberta would host a federal/provincial/territorial justice ministers conference on organized crime in February 2009, and that: Alberta wants the federal government to look at outlawing the display of gang colours or symbols. [ 15 ] From the context, it appears that the subject of the justice ministers’ conference was to be possible amendments to the Criminal Code to address aspects organized crime. [ 16 ] Mr.

Kirkland’s position is that the documents sought may show that Alberta, prior to enacting the impugned legislation, considered the subject later addressed in the impugned legislation, to be, in pith and substance, in relation to the criminal law and therefore not a matter within provincial legislative competence. The documents might also be relevant to the question of the purpose of the impugned legislation for purposes of the possible Charter s 1 analysis. [ 17 ] Alberta’s position is that the records in question relate to matters of federal legislative competence.

There is no suggestion in the CTV news report that the subject of safety in licensed premises, the subject addressed in the impugned legislation, was a planned topic of discussion in either the meeting of the Alberta Justice Minister and the Federal Justice Minister or at the federal/provincial/territorial Justice Ministers’ Conference.

Further, records of the type sought are far removed from the types of extrinsic evidence which case authority has recognized as relevant to the determination of the pith and substance of legislation. [ 18 ] The issue to be decided here seems to me to be very close to the issue I addressed in Barr beginning at para 28 . Then, Mr. Barr and Mr. Kirkland challenged the relevance, and therefore the admissibility, of certain evidence which Alberta proposed to adduce at trial.

Generally, it was evidence from police services and owners of licensed premises about the need for the impugned legislation, as well as evidence about the public safety implications of the practices of the Hells Angels and its members, and the efforts taken in British Columbia to address those concerns. [ 19 ] In that context Alberta submitted that this evidence was relevant to the determination of the pith and substance of the impugned legislation and to the issues that would arise in the context of Charter s 1. [ 20 ] In Barr , Mr. Barr and Mr.

Kirkland took the position that this evidence would not be relevant to the determination of the pith and substance of the impugned legislation. I summarized their position in para 31: The Plaintiffs submit that the questioned evidence is irrelevant to the issues which arise in this action. They submit that it is a type of extrinsic evidence, that is, evidence which is outside or extraneous to the impugned provision itself, which is not admissible.

They submit that in constitutional challenges to legislation, the only extrinsic evidence that is permitted is evidence that has an “institutional quality” – materials that were before the legislature such as reports on the subject matter of the legislation tabled in the legislature, and the record of the legislative debate, Hansard. Even then, the extrinsic evidence, though admissible, is often of minimal assistance to the court in determining the legislature’s purpose.

The legislative provision itself is the only entirely reliable statement of the legislature’s purpose. [ 21 ] I agreed with that submission ( Barr para 32 ) so far as it related to the pith and substance issue.

But I held that the proposed evidence was relevant to the Charter s 1 issue ( Barr paras 33 to 39 ). [ 22 ] In the present context, the parties have advanced positions which appear to me to be the opposite of those which they each advanced in Barr . [ 23 ] In my view, the same conclusion as I reached in Barr flows in relation to the question of whether the records sought are relevant to the pith and substance issue.

Records in relation to the Alberta Justice Minister’s lobbying of the Federal Justice Minister as to the exercise of federal legislative power, and records in relation to a Federal/Provincial/Territorial Justice Ministers Conference on the same subject, are not within the limited scope of extrinsic evidence which may be adduced before a court charged with determining the pith and substance of legislation. In my view, they are not relevant to that inquiry. [ 24 ] I am of the same view as to their relevance in the possible Charter s 1 inquiry.

I described my understanding of the Charter s 1 inquiry in Barr at para 34 and 35 : The analysis in the context [ Charter s 1] will start with the identification of the purpose or object of the impugned provisions, the question in respect of which only the words of the impugned provision and extrinsic evidence having an institutional quality, will be relevant. But once that question is answered, the Charter s 1 analysis will move on to the following matters:

a) whether the purpose or object of the legislation is of sufficient importance to justify limiting the Charter freedom or right that has been limited;

b) whether the provision is rationally connected to the object;

c) whether the impugned provision impairs the Charter right or freedom only to the extent necessary to achieve the object, and

d) whether the Charter infringement resulting from the impugned provision outweighs the provision’s objective. [ 25 ] In Barr I held that the evidence then in question was relevant to the Charter s 1 inquiry. However, in the present context, I cannot see that records relating to the possible exercise by Parliament of its criminal law power, which was the subject of both the categories of records sought here, would have any relevance to the questions that will arise should there be a Charter s 1 inquiry in this action.

[ 26 ] I dismiss Mr. Kirkland’s application in relation to the first group of documents. 2. The redacted documents [ 27 ] Second, Mr. Kirkland seeks production of unredacted versions of three documents listed by Alberta in its Affidavit of Records. The copies of these documents produced for inspection by Mr. Kirkland have been heavily redacted. [ 28 ] Alberta takes the position that the redacted portions of these documents are not relevant to the issues in this action. They do not discuss alternatives to the impugned legislation considered by Alberta prior to enacting the impugned legislation.

They do not discuss alternative legislative mechanisms for addressing “gang related risk to public safety in licensed premises.” [ 29 ] Counsel agreed that the most efficient way to resolve this aspect of the application was for Alberta to provide me with unredacted copies of the documents in question. Alberta has done so. I have reviewed the documents. [ 30 ] Having reviewed the unredacted documents, I am satisfied that the position taken by Alberta is clearly correct. The redacted portions of the documents in question are clearly of no relevance to the issues in this action. [ 31 ] I dismiss Mr.

Kirkland’s application in relation to the second group of documents. 3. Minutes of certain meetings for which the agendas have been produced. [ 32 ] Alberta has produced the agendas for two meetings between government and police officials on the subject of “Safety in Alberta’s licensed establishments”. Mr. Kirkland seeks production of the minutes of those meetings. Alberta resists on the basis that those minutes are subject to privilege. [ 33 ] More specifically, the documents sought are: 1.

Minutes of a December 19, 2008 meeting, the disclosed Agenda for which indicates that the invitees for the meeting were a representative of each of the Edmonton Police Service, the Calgary Police Service, RCMP K Division and four representatives of Alberta Justice. The Agenda indicates that the subject to be discussed at the meeting was “Safety in Alberta’s licensed establishments”.

Specific topics to be discussed, according to the Agenda, were: - an Alberta Association of Chiefs of Police resolution, - input from policing agencies, - the “BarWatch” program, which was a British Columbia program with goals similar to those similar of the impugned legislation, - implementation of the BarWatch program in Alberta, and constitutional limitations. 2.

Minutes of a January 7, 2009 meeting, the disclosed Agenda for which indicates that the invitees were same eight persons as were listed as invitees on the Agenda for the December 19, 2008 meeting and, in addition, a representative of the Alberta Liquor and Gaming Commission and a representative of the Alberta Solicitor General. The Agenda for this second meeting indicates that the subject of the meeting was “Safety in Alberta’s licensed establishments” and that the attendees would continue discussion of the BarWatch program and “possible changes to the Gaming and Liquor Act.” [ 34 ] In Barr Mr. Barr and Mr.

Kirkland took the position that Alberta had waived solicitor-client privilege in respect of legal advice obtained in the course of the development of the impugned legislation because of the contents of an affidavit of one of the police attendees at these meetings which Alberta had filed in the course of that action. I held that there had been no waiver of solicitor-client privilege. ( Barr para 52 – 63 ) That there was solicitor-client privilege in respect of the discussion at the two meetings which are the focus of the present application appears to have been assumed.

There would have been no point in addressing waiver of a privilege that did not exist. [ 35 ] Alberta takes the position that the minutes are privileged even though the meeting was attended by third parties who were neither the solicitor nor the client. Alberta cites authority for the proposition that participation of third parties in the solicitor-client communications does not necessarily render those communications not privileged: Hoy v. Medtronic , 2001 BCSC 944 ; LTS Infrastructure v. Rohl et al , 2021 NWTSC 9 ; Belgravia Investments Ltd. v. Canada , 2002 FCT 649 .

Alberta submits that it did not affect the solicitor client privilege attaching to the minutes that parties that were neither the solicitor nor the client, in particular the police representatives, were present at the meetings, for the purpose of providing information relevant to the issue upon which legal advice was being sought and given. [ 36 ] Mr. Kirkland’s position is that the purpose of the meetings was “policy development” – not the provision of legal advice. Mr.

Kirkland submits that the minutes should be produced subject to redaction of any portion of them that are legal advice. [ 37 ] Again, by agreement of the parties, Alberta has provided me with a copy of the minutes in question and I have reviewed them. [ 38 ] In my view, the dispute over the production of the minutes is largely unnecessary. A very significant portion of the minutes record what was said by the police service representatives most of whom swore affidavits in the previous action the contents of which are very similar to the record of their contribution to the meetings as recorded in the minutes.

The minutes also contain very brief notes of the legal opinion expressed by one of the Alberta Justice lawyers who attended the meeting.

[ 39 ] In my view, there is no practical reason for Alberta not to disclose the minutes, with the notes of that legal opinion redacted, given that Alberta filed affidavits sworn by several of the meeting participants containing essentially the same information that the minutes record them having provided at the meeting. [ 40 ] I will provide a copy of the minutes to Alberta’s counsel, indicating the passages that I rule should be redacted. I order that the minutes, with those redactions, be disclosed to Mr. Kirkland. 4.

Deadline for Alberta to provide better particularization of documents upon which privilege is claimed. [ 41 ] Fourth, in his application Mr. Kirkland sought further and better particularization of certain documents upon which the Alberta has claimed privilege. [ 42 ] I was advised that the issue raised by Mr. Kirkland in this respect has been resolved except for the setting of a deadline by which Alberta shall do what the parties have agreed Alberta will do. The only point upon which I was asked to rule was as to the setting of that deadline. [ 43 ] Mr. Kirkland sought a deadline of September 30, 2021.

Alberta sought more time than that. [ 44 ] After hearing both sides I ruled, in the course of the application, that Alberta shall comply with the parties’ agreement as to what Alberta will do as soon as possible. I declined to set a deadline. Alberta’s Application [ 45 ] The second application is Alberta’s application to require Mr. Kirkland to produce records in his power or possession as follows: a. Records relating to criminal charges or convictions as against Mr. Kirkland; b.

Up to date Criminal Record Checks from both the RCMP Canadian Police Information Centre and the National Repository of Criminal Records; c. Records relating to Mr. Kirkland’s membership or affiliation with the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club (“HAMC”), the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club Calgary (“HAMCC”), and any other affiliated club, and records concerning the activities of the HAMC and the HAMCC. [ 46 ] Mr. Kirkland’s Affidavit of Records includes documents relating to his having been charged pursuant to the impugned legislation. Those records are relevant to Mr.

Kirkland’s standing to challenge the impugned legislation – a point which, so far as I am aware, Alberta does not dispute. [ 47 ] The materials filed on this application also indicate that Mr. Kirkland accepts that the police officer who used the authority of the impugned legislation to eject him from licensed premises and later arrest him and charge him under the impugned legislation, was acting within the limits of the authority given to the police officer by the impugned legislation.

His position in this litigation is that the authority given to the police office was unconstitutional. [ 48 ] Alberta submits that the records sought in its application are relevant. Alberta argues: - In Barr I held that the evidence of several police officers as to the practices of the Hells Angels and its members and their implications for public safety was relevant to the Charter s 1 inquiry. Accordingly, Mr. Kirkland’s records on the same subject must be relevant and therefore producible. - Alberta has pleaded that the Hells Angels is a “gang” within in the meaning of the impugned legislation. Mr.

Kirkland has not admitted that allegation. Alberta argues, “The activities of the Plaintiff as a member of the [Hells Angels], and of the [Hells Angels] and its members in Alberta, are relevant to the determination of this issue raised in the pleadings.” - The purpose of the impugned legislation is to address public safety issues arising from the presence of gang members in licensed premises. The records sought pertain to that risk to public safety. They are therefore relevant. - Those who challenged the constitutionality of legislation in Bedford v. Canada 2010 O.R. (3d) 321 and Canada (Attorney General) v.

Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society 2012 SCC 45 were “forthright in their evidence concerning their activities in relation to the evidence they challenged. [Mr. Kirkland] should be required to do likewise . . .” [ 49 ] Mr. Kirkland responds to these submissions: - Barr is distinguishable. It was about the admissibility of evidence regarding the development of the impugned legislation, the harm Alberta sought to address by the legislation, and its enforcement. Mr.

Kirkland’s criminal record, if he has one, and materials he may have concerning the activities of the Hells Angels do not have anything to do with those subjects. Alberta did not have regard to them in concluding that there was a harm it needed to address by enacting the impugned legislation. The ruling in Barr does not require that they be held relevant for the purposes of this application. - Mr. Kirkland’s criminal record, if he has one, and records he may have about the activities of the Hells Angels, are not relevant to any issue arising on the pleadings.

There can be no dispute that the police officer used the authority given him by the impugned legislation to eject Mr. Kirkland from licensed premises and to later arrest and charge him. There is no dispute that Mr. Kirkland therefore has standing to challenged the constitutionality of the impugned legislation. Neither is there any issue as to whether the state action which Mr. Kirkland alleges was a breach of his various Charter rights, occurred.

The issue in this action, in the Charter context, is whether that state action did in fact limit those Charter rights and freedoms and if it did, whether the legislation which authorised that

state action was a reasonable limit of those rights and freedoms. Neither Mr. Kirkland’s criminal record, if he has one, nor his membership in the Hells Angels (which he acknowledges) are relevant to those issues. - To be producible the records sought must be relevant and material. To establish that the records sought are material, there must be a “rational strategy in which the disputed document plays a material part.” Weatherill (Estate of) v. Weatherill , 2003 ABQB 69 para 16 . Alberta submits that the records sought are material to the Charter s 1 inquiry. In that inquiry the issues will be whether the impugned law

a) relates to a pressing and substantial concern,

b) is rationally connected to that concern,

c) impairs the Charter right or freedom infringed as little as possible, and

d) has salutary effects which outweigh its deleterious effects. In this application Alberta has not disclosed how the records sought could assist Alberta in meeting its burden in relation to any of those points. It has not disclosed a rational strategy. - The information about the private lives of those who challenged the constitutionality of legislation in Bedford and Downtown Eastside Sex Workers was before the court to establish the standing of those persons.

Even so, in Downtown Eastside Sex Workers , Cromwell J. commented on the unique consequences parties who challenge legislation which they allege violates rights and freedoms guaranteed to them by the Charter, may face (para 71). To require Mr.

Kirkland to produce the records sought would “have the effect of erecting a very real barrier in Charter litigation going forward.” [ 50 ] In my view, Alberta’s submissions concerning the relevance of the records sought in its application (the second and third bullet points in para [48] above) are correct and I rely on them. [ 51 ] In the Charter s 1 context in this action, the burden will be on Alberta to show that when members of gangs as defined in the impugned legislation are in licensed premises, a pressing and substantial concern for the safety of the public arises and that Alberta’s response to that concern in the impugned legislation meets the Charter s 1 standard. [ 52 ] The impugned legislation defines “gang” as “a group of people engaged in a pattern of unlawful behaviour or in creating an atmosphere of fear or intimidation in the community.” It defines “unlawful behaviour” by reference to four categories of criminal offence. [ 53 ] Mr.

Kirkland has pleaded that he is a member of the Hells Angels. Records that might tend to show that members of the Hells Angels engage in a pattern of “unlawful behaviour” are relevant to the issue of whether or not the impugned legislation addresses a pressing and substantial concern. In my view, if Mr. Kirkland has engaged in “unlawful behaviour” – that is, in any of the categories of offence listed in the definition of “unlawful behaviour” – it is relevant.

Such records would relate to whether or not the concern to which Alberta was responding by enacting the legislation exists and, if so, whether or not it is a pressing and substantial concern. [ 54 ] Similarly, information in Mr. Kirkland’s power or possession concerning the activities of the Hells Angels is relevant. It will speak to the issue of whether the group of people directly affected by the impugned legislation engage in the type of activity which caused Alberta to enact the impugned legislation and whether or not that activity puts public safety at risk. [ 55 ] In my view, Mr.

Kirkland’s concern that requiring him to produce such records in the action he has commenced would have a chilling effect on constitutional litigation is somewhat exaggerated. This action is at the “discovery stage”. The parties are required to provide relevant records and information to each other. They have the protection of a qualified privilege against the use of those materials in any other context. They are not, at least at this stage of the proceedings, being required to expose the information to the public. [ 56 ] But beyond that observation, I note that Mr.

Kirkland has pleaded that he is a member of the Hells Angels and that he was in licensed premises wearing Hells Angels “accessories”. He has initiated this litigation knowing that Alberta took the position in the previous action, Barr and Kirkland v. Alberta, that members of the Hells Angels create a public safety risk when they are in licensed premises because of their participation in “unlawful behaviour”. In my view, it is disingenuous of Mr.

Kirkland to now oppose production of records in his possession relevant to his own participation in “unlawful behaviour”, if there are such records, and records regarding the activities of the group of persons his association with which he public announced by wearing Hells Angels accessories in licensed premises, on the basis that production of such records will discourage citizens in positions similar to his from challenging legislation they believe to be unconstitutional in the future. [ 57 ] Therefore, in my view, Mr.

Kirkland should be required to produce records of the type sought by Alberta in its application. However, in my view, the description of those records in Alberta’s application is inappropriately broad. [ 58 ] I order Mr. Kirkland to file a further Affidavit of Records listing: - Records relating to his criminal record, if he has one, which are in his power or possession, but only the parts of those records which show that he has been convicted of any of the offences listed in the definition of “unlawful behaviour” in the impugned legislation, if he has been convicted of such offences.

In effect I order that any reference to offences other than those listed in the definition of “unlawful behaviour” in the impugned legislation be redacted. - Any records he has as to the activities of the Hells Angels and the branch of it of which he is a member. Costs [ 59 ] If the parties cannot agree on costs they may arrange to address costs in a further appearance. I would note that neither party was wholly successful in their application. Heard on the 30 th day of August, 2021.

Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 17 th day of September, 2021. B.R. Burrows J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: M. Underhill, C. Kanigan for the Plaintiff D. Carroll, Q.C., P. J. Faulds, Q.C. and D. Mousseau for the Defendant APPENDIX Gaming, Liquor and Cannabis Act, RSA 2000, c G-1 Maintaining public order and safety in licensed premises — gangs 69.1(1) In this section, (a) “gang” means a group of people engaged in a pattern of unlawful behaviour or in creating an atmosphere of fear or intimidation in a community; (b) “unlawful behaviour” means (

i) production, sale, importation, exportation or trafficking of a controlled substance within the meaning of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (Canada) (ii) prostitution or living on the avails of prostitution (iii) unlawful possession or transfer of firearms, or (iv) violence, threats, extortion or intimidation.

(2) For the purposes of this section, a person is associated with a gang if the person (

a) is a member of the gang, (

b) supports, facilitates or participates in the gang’s activities, or (

c) is in the company of a person described in clause (

a) or (b).

(3) A police officer may exclude or remove from licensed premises any person the police officer believes to be associated with a gang.

(4) A police officer need not rely on personal knowledge in concluding that a person is associated with a gang but may rely on information from others, including but not limited to (

a) information regarding (

i) any admission of association with a gang, (ii) use of names, signs, symbols or other representations used by a gang, (iii) a person’s presence at the scene of unlawful behaviour by a gang, regardless of whether the person participated in the unlawful behaviour, (iv) receipt of benefits from a gang, and (

v) frequent association with persons associated with a gang, and (

b) any other categories of information set out in the regulations.

(5) For greater certainty, a police officer’s good faith belief that a person is associated with a gang is itself sufficient grounds for the exclusion or removal of the person from licensed premises under this section.

(6) Every person who is directed to leave licensed premises by a police officer acting under subsection (3) shall comply with the direction.

(7) A person who contravenes subsection (6) is a trespasser on the licensed premises. Collection of personal information by licensee 69.2(1) A licensee may, before allowing a person to enter licensed premises, collect the person’s name, age and photograph.

(2) If a licensee has personal knowledge or reasonably believes that a person referred to in subsection (1) has, at any time within the preceding year, engaged in an activity referred to in section 69(1) or (2), the licensee may, in good faith, disclose the person’s name, age and photograph to other licensees for the purpose of allowing them to determine whether they wish to allow the person to enter licensed premises.

(3) A licensee must, as soon as possible after a request is made by a police officer, disclose to the police officer any information collected under subsection (1). Leaving licensed premises when requested 70 No person may (

a) remain in licensed premises after having been requested to leave the premises by the liquor licensee or an employee or agent of the liquor licensee, or (

b) enter licensed premises after having been forbidden to enter the premises by the liquor licensee or an employee or agent of the liquor licensee.

General offence 116 A person who contravenes

section 36 , 37.1 , 37.2 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 45 , 46 , 50 , 64 , 65(1) , 66 , 68 , 69 , 69.1(6) , 70 , 71 , 72 , 73 , 74 , 75 , 75.1 , 77 , 79 , 81 , 84 , 86(2) , 87 , 89 , 90 , 90.03 , 90.04 , 90.05 , 90.06 , 90.08 , 90.14 , 90.15 , 90.16 , 90.18 , 90.19 , 90.2 , 90.21 , 90.22 , 90.23 , 90.24 , 90.25 , 90.26 , 90.27 , 90.28 , 90.29 , 99 , 100 , 101 , 101.1 or 115(1) or a

section in the regulations the contravention of which is designated by the regulations to be an offence is guilty of an offence. General penalty 117(1) An individual who is convicted of an offence for which no specific penalty has been provided is liable to a fine of not more than $10 000 or to imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or to both the fine and imprisonment.

(2) A corporation convicted of an offence for which no specific penalty has been provided is liable to a fine of not more than $50 000.