Century Hospitality Group Ltd v Alberta (Appeals), 2021 ABQB 767
Opinion
Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Century Hospitality Group Ltd v Alberta (Appeals), 2021 ABQB 767 Date: 20210922 Docket: 2103 04654 Registry: Edmonton Between: Century Hospitality Group Ltd. Applicant - and - Registrar of Appeals Respondent _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Mr. Justice Robert A.
Graesser _______________________________________________________ Introduction [ 1 ] This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Registrar of Appeals denying the Applicant Century Hospitality Group Ltd.’s (“Century”) application for an extension of time in which to file a Notice of Appeal from a decision of an Employment Standards Officer. [ 2 ] The matter came to me by way of a desk application following an order from Burns J dated May 18, 2021 directing that the application be heard in this manner.
I have received and reviewed the Record, filed by the Registrar, briefs from both sides, and affidavits
from Chris Lachance, Century’s owner, and Allison Siddorn, Century’s payroll manager. Background [ 3 ] Century owns and operates a number of restaurants in the Edmonton area. One of Century’s former employees was laid off due to Covid closures, and brought a complaint to Employment Standards. An Employment Standards Officer, Malcolm Sniher, investigated the complaint and corresponded with Chris Lachance, Century’s owner, about the complaint. All communications between Employment Standards and Century appear to have been conducted by email. [ 4 ] On November 16, 2020, Mr.
Sniher issued a decision (the “Order”) in favour of the former employee. The Order was emailed to Mr. Lachance at the email address used in the various communications between Mr. Sniher and Mr. Lachance. The email in the Record shows it being sent at 3:08 PM. The covering note states: Dear Chris Lachance, An order of officer and relevant letter are attached. If either party submits an appeal on time the other party will be notified. Appeals do not come to me, instructions if needed are in the letter. [ 5 ] The email shows two attachments.
The first is “Notice of Order of Officer to Employer”, the second is “Appeal Fact Sheet”. [ 6 ] The Order was very clear about Century’s options: pay the amount of the Order, or file an appeal. As for appealing, the Order stated:
(2) An appeal of the Order of Officer may be submitted within twenty-one (21) days from the date of service of the Order. The Notice of Appeal must specify reasons for the appeal and be accompanied by payment of the full amount of the Order, paid by money order, certified cheque, or online by major credit card. The enclosed Fact Sheet “Filing an Employment Standards Appeal” provides the details. To make payment online within the 21 day appeal period, please contact the office of the Registrar of Appeals at (780) 643- 6727) (Dial 210-0000 for toll-free anywhere in Alberta).
The money will be held in trust pending the outcome of the appeal hearing. [ 7 ] The Appeal Fact Sheet notes “All appeals must be made in writing within 21 days after the date a party is served with a notice from Employment Standards”. [ 8 ] It has a
section “Appeals by employers” noting that an employers’ appeal of an order “must include payment of an appeal deposit of the full amount the employer is required to pay under the Employments Standards Code”. [ 9 ] Another
section in the Fact Sheet is “How to file an appeal”. It states: The fastest and easiest way to file an appeal is to use the new online application system. COVID-19 response NOTE – Due to the current high demand for MyAlberta Digital ID services, users may experience slowdowns in accessing Employment Standards complaint and appeal system. We are working to resolve this problem as quickly as possible. We apologize for any inconvenience. We are currently unable to accept hand delivered appeals.
We encourage you to use the online application system but you can also file an appeal using mail, email, or fax. [ 10 ] A mailing address for Employment Standards’ Edmonton Location is provided, as is a fax number and an email address ( lbr.esregistrar@gov.ab.ca ). [ 11 ] On November 17, 2021 at 3:05 PM, Mr. Lachance emailed Mr. Sniher complaining about the Order and noted “I have Cc’d in our HR Lead, Allison Siddorn as she will be the one filing the appeal. [ 12 ] On December 8, 2020, Allison Siddorn emailed Mr.
Sniher at 8:44 AM: Hi Malcolm, I just wanted to inform you that for over a week now I have been trying to set up a MyAlberta Digital ID account in order to file this appeal but I am not getting any response from them. It states I should receive a confirmation e-mail within a few minutes but I’ve received nothing to date. I have also emailed to see what the hold up is as to whether the Covid crisis is slowing things down.
In the respect, we would need to ask for an extension on filing this appeal so if you have any other guidance or information on getting tis handled in a more timely manner please let me know. [ 13 ] Shortly after that email, at 9:07 AM Ms. Siddorn emailed Mr. Sniher stating: Hi Malcolm, it also states we can appeal using mail, e-mail or fax but it doesn’t indicate if there are any specific forms we need to use if we do e-mail the appeal. This might be a quicker option for us so hope you can help with that. [ 14 ] Mr.
Sniher responded at 9:55 AM on December 8: I have no discretion in extending any appeal period time frames as this is a legislated matter. Instructions for an Employer to appeal the order of an officer are detailed in the order of officer letter which accompanied the order. The file currently reflects (Century) was served with the order of officer on November 16, 2020 making yesterday the last day for your 21 day appeal period.
… No appeal has been received by either party to date. [ 15 ] Mr. Sniher invited Ms. Siddorn to contact his Acting Team Lead Ms. Barr-Kryzyk, and noted that Ms. Siddorn might contact Ms. Copus at the Registrar’s office for information. Their email addresses were provided. [ 16 ] At 10:15 AM, Ms. Siddorn wrote Mr. Sniher, copying Ms. Copus and Ms. Barr-Kryzyk. She stated: Thanks so much for the information Malcolm, I appreciate it. With all due respect the instructions for appeal are, indeed, detailed in the letter and it states to appeal online at ESAppealsPortal.labour.alberta.ca.
This is the link I have been trying to get set up for over a week now as I mentioned below. I really hope that you, Laura and Kate can further assist. I don’t want this to be a further problem for me and/or my company because a link wouldn’t work. [ 17 ] It appears from subsequent emails that Ms. Siddorn had some communication with Ms. Copus in the Registrar’s office. [ 18 ] At 12:06 PM Ms. Siddorn wrote Mr. Sniher and copied Ms. Barr-Kryzyk and Ms. Copus. She said: Hi again, thank you Kate for contacting the Registrar for assistance with this, I really appreciate it.
I did actually think today was the final date so I hope that will be taken into consideration as I would like to send in the appeal today via e-mail so if someone could assist me with how I do that please as I don’t know which e-mail to send it to. I would also like to point out that the factsheet states slowdowns in accessing MYAlbertaDigital ID services, which I obviously experienced so I hope that can be taken into consideration as well. Please let me know who I can e-mail with the appeal so I can get it done today so it is at least in the system. [ 19 ] Following that, Ms. Siddorn emailed Mr.
Sniher at 1:34 PM and copied both Ms. Barr-Kryzyk and Ms. Copus, saying: Can someone PLEASE, PLEASE help me with this. I just need a contact e-mail where to send the appeal. I’m sorry for the inconvenience but I really need to get this handled today and report to my manager. [ 20 ] At 2:01 PM, Ms. Barr-Kryzyk emailed Ms. Siddorn and referenced communications earlier that day between Ms. Siddorn and Ms. Copus. Ms.
Barr-Kryzyk noted that an employer choosing to file an appeal must complete the documentation and pay the full amount indicated on the Order of Officer prior to the 21 st day of the Appeal Period. [ 21 ] She also referenced the Fact Sheet that had been attached to the email sending Mr. Lachance the Order of the Officer on November 16. [ 22 ] Ms. Siddorn replied to Ms. Barr-Kryzyk at 2:13 PM: Thank you Laura. I didn’t realize that Kate’s email was the email in question. You also mention that I must complete “documentation” so where do I find that?
I the meantime I will file the appeal via email with Kate in the hope the Registrar handling this can extend my deadline. Thank you again and sorry for any inconvenience, this is a total learning curve for me and completely stressing me out today. [ 23 ] At some time after that, a Notice of Appeal was sent to the Registrar, apparently on the website noted in Mr. Sniher’s order of November 16. [ 24 ] On December 14, 2020 at 10:16 AM, the Registrar sent Ms.
Siddorn an email with various attachments, including a letter dealing with Century’s request for an extension of time in which to appeal the Officer’s Order. [ 25 ] This letter (the “Registrar’s Decision”) states in part: While we acknowledge that you have indicated that you experienced delays in filing your appeal due to issues with obtaining a MyAlberta ID, it remains the responsibility of the appellant to ensure that their appeal is received by the deadline. Further, we note that you did not contact Employment Standards for assistance until after the appeal period had already expired, on December 8, 2020.
In addition, our records show that the Employment Standards Officer provided Century Hospitality Group Ltd. With a factsheet titled “Filing an Employment Standards appeal” at the same time as serving the Order. This factsheet clearly stated that in addition to the online application system, appeals can also be filed by mail, e-mail and fax, and provided the relevant contact information for doing so. In view of the above, the Registrar of Employment Standards has no jurisdiction to refer your appeal to an Appeal Body.
Accordingly, your request for an extension of time to file your appeal is hereby denied and your appeal is deemed invalid. [ 26 ] It is from this decision Century now seeks judicial review. Issues [ 27 ] Century argues that the Registrar’s decision to refuse to hear the appeal was incorrect, or unreasonable, and that the Court
should validate service of Century’s Notice of Appeal. [ 28 ] It argues that Century did submit a Notice of Appeal within the 21-day period under the Employment Standards Code , RSA 2000, c E-9 because Century received the Order one day after it was sent, as well as due to office closures. It relies on the
Interpretation Act , RSA 2000, c I-8 . [ 29 ] Century also argues that Mr. Lachance’s email to Mr. Sniher of November 17 gave notice of Century’s intention to appeal, and that letter should be treated as sufficient notice. Standard of Review [ 30 ] Century references Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 and argues that issues relating to the
interpretation of the Employment Standards Code should be decided on the basis of reasonableness, and issues involving the application of the
Interpretation Act should be reviewed on the basis of correctness, as that statute is not the Registrar’s “home” statute. [ 31 ] The Registrar says that the standard of review on all issues is reasonableness, noting that Vavilov rejected the “home statute” limitation on a decision-maker’s
interpretation expertise (at para 25) and that the test is now whether the application involves questions of law of “central importance to the legal system as a whole”. [ 32 ] The Registrar references the description of a reasonableness review at para 83 of Vavilov , which states: [83] It follows that the focus of reasonableness review must be on the decision actually made by the decision maker, including both the decision maker’s reasoning process and the outcome. The role of courts in these circumstances is to review , and they are, at least as a general rule, to refrain from deciding the issue themselves.
Accordingly, a court applying the reasonableness standard does not ask what decision it would have made in place of that of the administrative decision maker, attempt to ascertain the “range” of possible conclusions that would have been open to the decision maker, conduct a de novo analysis or seek to determine the “correct” solution to the problem. The Federal Court of Appeal noted in Delios v.
Canada (Attorney General) , 2015 FCA 117 , 472 N.R. 171, that, “as reviewing judges, we do not make our own yardstick and then use that yardstick to measure what the administrator did”: at para. 28; see also Ryan , at paras. 50-51 . Instead, the reviewing court must consider only whether the decision made by the administrative decision maker — including both the rationale for the decision and the outcome to which it led — was unreasonable. [ 33 ] It seems to me that
interpretations of the
Interpretation Act are very likely to be of central importance to the legal system as a whole, rather than discrete issues of relevance only to the litigating parties. That is even more the case when the main argument is that the appeal period did not expire on December 7, 2020 because the officer for serving the appeal was not open during their normal business hours due to the COVID-19 pandemic. [ 34 ] A decision on this issue may have application to many service issues under many statutes involving many administrative tribunals. [ 35 ] I am satisfied that issues involving the
interpretation or application of the
Interpretation Act should be reviewed on the basis of correctness. Preliminary Issue [ 36 ] The Registrar argues that the affidavits of Mr. Lachance and Ms. Siddorn are inadmissible, citing Alberta Liquor Store Association v Alberta (Gaming and Liquor Commission) , 2006 ABQB 904 , Sobeys West Inc v Edmonton , 2015 ABCA 32 , and Rule 3.22. In particular, the Registrar argues that evidence that was not before the decision maker at the time of the decision and which relates to the merits of the decision should not be permitted. [ 37 ] I note that Mr.
Lachance swears in his affidavit: If it was not for the Provincially mandated closures as a result of COVID-19 I would have hand delivered the appeal. However, the Respondent’s office was not open to the general public at that time. [ 38 ] The rest of his affidavit raises nothing that was not before the Registrar in December 2020. [ 39 ] I am prepared to exercise my discretion and accept Mr. Lachance’s affidavit is evidence on this application as being helpful context, although I will deal expressly with the weight to be given to the paragraph quoted above. [ 40 ] As for Ms.
Siddorn’s affidavit, there is essentially nothing significant in her affidavit that was not already before the Registrar in the form of the email exchanges. She does amplify on some of the information previously given, such as stating that she “began the online application process on November 23, 2020. Everything else is in substance contained in the Record. [ 41 ] As with Mr. Lachance’s affidavit, I am prepared to accept Ms. Siddorn’s affidavit on the same basis: for context. Statutory Provisions [ 42 ] The appeal process under the Employment Standards Code is set out at
section 95 : 95(1) A person who has a right of appeal to the appeal body may appeal by serving on the Registrar written notice of appeal specifying the reasons for the appeal and providing to the Registrar the fee, if any, and any amount referred to in subsection (3).
(2) A notice of appeal must be served on the Registrar within 21 days after the date of service on the appellant of a copy of, as the case may be,
(
b) an order under Division 3,
(3) The following must be received by the date referred to in subsection (2), in a form and manner acceptable to the Registrar: (
a) any fee payable under the regulations; (
b) any amount the employer is required to pay under an order under Division 3; [ 43 ]
Section 63.1 of the Employment Standards Regulation , AR 14/97 provides for service of documents in great detail: 63.1
(1) In this section, “recorded mail” means any form of delivery of notices or other documents by mail or courier in which receipt of the notice or other document must be acknowledged in writing by the addressee or another individual present at the addressee’s address. [ 44 ] Subsection (2) expressly deals with service of notices and other documents on the Registrar:
(2) If a notice or other document is required to be served under the Act on an officer, the Director or the Registrar, the notice or other document must be served in the manner specified in the document, or as otherwise specified by the officer, Director or Registrar. [ 45 ] The
Interpretation Act provides in
section 22 : 22
(1) If in an enactment the time limited for the doing of a thing expires or falls on a holiday, the thing may be done on the day next following that is not a holiday.
(2) If in an enactment the time limited for registration or filing of an instrument, or for the doing of anything, expires or falls on a day on which the office or place in which the instrument or thing is required to be registered, filed or done is not open during its regular hours of business, the instrument or thing may be registered, filed or done on the day next following on which the office or place is open. [ 46 ] I note that the
Interpretation Act has not expressly caught up with service by fax or internet, although it might well be affected by the Electronic Transactions Act , SA 2001, C E-5.5 . Analysis [ 47 ] The Registrar provided clear reasons for her refusal to extend the time for filing the Notice of Appeal. Sufficiency of reasons was not argued as a ground for this judicial review application. [ 48 ] Having worked through the facts and the statutory and regulatory provisions, I do not see this as a problem created by the Covid pandemic, or the Provincial Declaration of a state of public health emergency on November 24, 2020.
Covid had already been with us for some 8 months, and the Employment Standard’s office had already been closed for some purposes, including receiving “hand delivered appeals”. [ 49 ] This is really a case about leaving things to the last moment, and not reading things carefully enough. There is no doubt that Mr. Lachance formed an intention to appeal immediately on reading Mr. Sniher’s Order on November 16 or 17. Century’s intention to appeal was communicated to Mr. Sniher on November 17. One could glean the basis for the appeal from Mr.
Lachance’s comments in that email. [ 50 ] It is clear from the email that Mr. Lachance instructed his employee, Ms. Siddorn, to file the appeal. That is expressly stated in his email to Mr. Sniher and confirmed in Ms. Siddorn’s affidavit. The only evidence of any role in the appeal process by Mr. Lachance is set out in his affidavit when he says that but for the Covid closure, he would have hand delivered the Notice of Appeal. [ 51 ] There is nothing in the flurry of emails on December 8 following Mr. Sniher advising that it was too late to appeal that Mr. Lachance was involved in the email exchanges.
I note that Mr. Lachance was not cross-examined on his affidavit, but I do not think his self-serving statement helps Century’s position. [ 52 ] It is clear from the email exchange that date that Ms. Siddorn was under the mistaken view that December 8 was the last day to file the appeal. She was in error. The last date for filing the appeal was December 7, as indicated by Mr. Sniher on December 8 and as concluded by the Registrar in the Registrar’s Decision. Employment Standards Code Regulation [ 53 ]
Section 63.1 (2) makes it clear that service of a notice on the Registrar is to be effected in the manner directed by the officer, the Registrar or the Director. Here, the officer (Mr. Sniher) gave clear directions. His Order of November 16 specifies the appeal period, the need to file the security deposit, and the use of the electronic system.
The body of the letter does not discuss other methods, but it does address the appeal process and refers the reader to the attachment: Fact Sheet: “Filing an Employment Standards Appeal”. [ 54 ] The Order does not specify that the appeal can only be filed using the online portal; rather it offers that up, but notes that the use of that portal does not require payment of the appeal deposit.
That is dealt with in the preceding paragraph, specifying that “to make payment online within the 21 day appeal period, please contact the office of the Registrar of Appeals”. [ 55 ] There is no evidence that Century made any attempt to contact the Registrar of Appeals before December 8, and it is clear from Ms. Siddorn’s communications that day that she was unaware of the format for the Notice of Appeal, or any of the details. It also appears from the Record that Ms. Siddorn was unaware of the requirement to pay the security deposit within the 21-day appeal period. Nothing in the Record, or Ms.
Siddorn’s affidavit, suggests that any steps had been taken before December 8 to contact Employment Standards or the Registrar to make arrangements to pay the security deposit as required and as advised in the Order. [ 56 ] It is thus fair to infer from the Record and from Ms. Siddorn’s affidavit that until December 8, Ms. Siddorn was unaware that
she could mail, fax, or email the Notice of Appeal, and she had not yet addressed how and when the appeal deposit would be paid. [ 57 ] The Fact Sheet is an important part of the Order, and in my view satisfies the requirements of
section 63.1(2) of the Regulation, in that the “officer” had specified the manner in which a Notice of Appeal can be filed. [ 58 ] The Fact Sheet makes it clear that hand delivering is not a possibility, but offers up mail, email and fax as alternatives to hand delivery. That is essentially the answer to the application: the Officer had specified several manners of service, none of which were complied with before the appeal period expired.
Interpretation Act [ 59 ] As for the
Interpretation Act , I do not see that it helps Century here. The relevant provision is section 22(2):
(2) If in an enactment the time limited for registration or filing of an instrument, or for the doing of anything, expires or falls on a day on which the office or place in which the instrument or thing is required to be registered, filed or done is not open during its regular hours of business, the instrument or thing may be registered, filed or done on the day next following on which the office or place is open. [ 60 ] There was no requirement that the notice be “registered or filed” or that anything be “done” at the Employment Standards Office itself.
Indeed, the Order and the attached Fact Sheet advised that nothing could be registered or filed or done at the Employment Standards Office. It offered three reasonable alternatives: mail, fax, or email. [ 61 ] Had the Code specified that delivery of a Notice of Appeal could only be made by hand delivery at the Registrar’s office, or had that been specified in the Regulations, there might be merit to the argument that the time for filing should be extended. But as I have discussed above, the Notice of Appeal was not required to be hand delivered to the Registrar’s office.
It was required to be filed in the manner specified in the Order and the Fact Sheet. [ 62 ] As a result, I do not accept Century’s argument that the Notice of Appeal was filed in time. [ 63 ] In light of these findings, I find that the Registrar’s Decision was correct. Did the Registrar have a Jurisdiction to Extend the Time for Filing? [ 64 ] This was not specifically argued by Century but was raised by the Registrar in her brief.
There is nothing in the Code or the Regulation giving the Registrar (or anyone else for that matter) the power to extend the time for appeal. [ 65 ] The Registrar argues that she has no authority or discretion under the Code to hear an appeal that does not comply with the time limitation in the Code , citing Stuart Olson Construction Ltd. v Edmonton (City) , 1977 ALTASCAD 129 and Rai v Alberta (Labour Relations Board), 2019 ABCA 497 . [ 66 ] This is an issue that has also been dealt with in the context of judicial review applications to the Court of Queen’s Bench from decisions of the Alberta Human Rights Commission under the Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, c A-25.5 . [ 67 ] I dealt with late filing in Razcynska v Alberta Human Rights Commission , 2015 ABQB 494 .
While that case dealt with the application of Rule 3.14 regarding applications for judicial review, the principles are applicable here. There, the Rule expressly excluded the Court’s power to extend time under Rule 13.5. I recognize that the Rules of Court have no application to this matter. The Rules of Court apply to proceedings to which the Rules apply. An appeal to the Registrar under the Employment Standards Code is not one of those proceedings.
However, the principles expressed in cases under the Rules are, in my view, of assistance in analyzing this case. [ 68 ] I recognize that my decision in Razcynska has been criticized in the context of its somewhat harsh or inflexible treatment of a self-represented litigant.
I note that the case was not appealed and that it has been followed. [ 69 ] In particular, Gates J commented at paragraph 29 in Said v Alberta Workers’ Compensation Board , 2018 ABQB 519 : [29] While I am sympathetic to the fact that the Applicant is a self-represented litigant, I agree with the Graesser J’s conclusion in Razcynska v Alberta (Human Rights Commission) , 2015 ABQB 494 that the Rules of Court are not subject to some lesser standard of compliance when one of the parties is self-represented.
As such, the Court cannot extend the strict time limits prescribed by the Rules on the basis that the Applicant may be unfamiliar with the requirements. [ 70 ] I do not think that the Registrar has inherent jurisdiction to extend the time for filing, as the Registrar is a creation of Statute. Even a superior court judge with inherent jurisdiction does not have the power to extend statutory limitation periods. [ 71 ] As noted by the Registrar, this issue was dealt with in Stuart Olson Construction Ltd v Edmonton and in Rai v Alberta Labour Relations Board .
It was also addressed in Yuill v Alberta Worker’s Compensation Board , 2016 ABQB 369 where Justice Sheila Martin (as she then was) quoted from Simpson J’s decision in Zimmer v. Alberta (Workers’ Compensation Board, Appeals Commission ) (October 7, 2015), Edmonton 140300907 (ABQB) and held at paras 77 and 78: [77] Simpson J concluded as follows at page 6, lines 8-17: For the reasons set out, this Court has no jurisdiction to provide relief by way of extending the Applicant time for naming and serving under the Workers’ Compensation Act or the Alberta Rules of Court .
I agree with Graesser J's comment in Razcynska that this is a harsh position. However, until the legislature amends the legislation or our Court of Appeal provides authority to this Court by reference to the Judicature Act or otherwise it is not open for this Court to apply the Judicature Act and provide any relief regarding the requirements in the statute or the rules. Accordingly, the Applicant's claim by way of Originating Application for statutory appeal and judicial review cannot proceed and must
be dismissed. [78] Following this reasoning, the failure by the applicant to serve the employer within six months after the date of the decision being appealed means that the appellant is time-barred both with respect to s. 13.4(5) of the Act and r. 13.5(2) . The Court is without discretion to permit the matter to proceed because the provisions of the Act and the Rules do not permit the extension of time for service in this instance. A judge cannot amend a time limit in a statute by shortening or extending unless a statute gives that power: see, Kehewin Cree Nation v.
Mulvey , 2013 ABCA 294 , at paras 10-11 , 556 A.R. 282. [ 72 ] The Registrar’s pronouncement that she did not have jurisdiction to extend the time for filing the Notice of Appeal may well attract the reasonableness standard of review and not correctness as she was interpreting her home statute and regulation. However, it is arguable that a decision on this issue may have ramifications beyond the Employment Standards Code and its regulations such that a correctness standard should apply. It is unnecessary for me to weigh in on the standard of review here, as the Registrar’s Decision was reasonable and correct.
Deemed Service by Notice to Mr. Sniher [ 73 ] As for the argument that the Registrar should be deemed to have been served on November 17, 2020 when Mr. Lachance emailed Mr. Sniher complaining about the Order and advising of his intention to appeal the Order, I note that a somewhat similar argument was raised in ENMAX Corporation v Alberta (Labour Relations Board) , 2018 ABQB 431 : [19] Knowledge of an application is not equivalent to service, even if there is knowledge of the general nature of the application.
Furthermore, this court has previously found that a courtesy copy of an originating application does not equate to service: Lynne M Miller v Chief of the Commission and Tribunals, Alberta Human Rights Commission and The Workers’ Compensation Board (27 January 2015), Calgary, 1401 045218 (ABQB). [ 74 ] Century was required to submit a Notice of Appeal to the Registrar, not Mr. Sniher. Mr. Sniher is an Employment Standards officer, not part of the Registrar’s office. I see no merit to the argument that the knowledge of Mr. Sniher should be imputed to the Registrar.
I also see no merit to the argument that an email saying “I have instructed my staff to prepare an appeal” is the same as filing an appeal. In any event, that argument even if successful does not deal with Century’s failure to pay the appeal security which by itself is fatal to Century’s applications. [ 75 ] Because I have found that sending an email to Mr. Sniher does not comply with the appeal filing requirements. He was not authorized to accept appeals, and he had no duty to pass it on to the Registrar. [ 76 ] Indeed, the email from Mr. Lachance did not purport to be a notice of appeal.
His words were “I have Cc’d out HR Lead as she will be the one filing the appeal”. It clearly contemplated further steps on Century’s behalf, including filing the appeal itself. [ 77 ] In that regard, I do not need to consider whether Mr. Lachance’s email of November 17, 2020 would have been sufficient had it purported to be a notice of appeal and had it been sent to the right place. Rose’s Well Service Ltd. v Troyer , 2006 ABQB 76 as cited by Century does not help them. No issue was raised by the Registrar as to sufficiency.
Her position was always about timeliness. [ 78 ] This ground of appeal from the Registrar’s Decision is without merit. Conclusion [ 79 ] Century’s application is dismissed. [ 80 ] I am not without sympathy for Ms. Siddorn’s situation. Appeals and service of documents are not easy tasks, even for lawyers. But there is only one set of rules for everyone to follow, regardless of their sophistication or legal training. [ 81 ] The Registrar is entitled to her costs, which I set in the amount of $1,000 as this matter was dealt with by way of a desk application.
Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 22nd day of September, 2021. Robert A. Graesser J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Christopher L. Younker, Stillman LLP
for the Applicant Peter Buijs, Alberta Justice and Solicitor General for the Respondent
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