Steele v Craig, 2021 ABQB 825

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Steele v Craig, 2021 ABQB 825 Date: 20211019 Docket: 2001 10234 Registry: Calgary Between: Peter Alan Steele Plaintiff - and - Christine J. Craig and Matthew Craig Defendants _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice G.H. Poelman _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] Mr. Steele, his daughter Ms. Craig and her husband Mr. Craig, are registered as owners in joint tenancy of a quarter

section of rural property near Airdrie, Alberta. Mr. Steele has been a co-owner of the property since 1998: first with his parents and then with a former wife. The property was transferred into joint tenancy with the Craigs by transfer of land registered on January 28, 2016. (The original style of cause, not yet amended, misspells Ms. Craig’s first name as “Christine,” rather than “Kristine.”)

[ 2 ] The parties dispute whether the Craigs are entitled to a two-thirds beneficial interest in the land, corresponding with their registered legal interest. A related issue is ownership of the non-land assets on the property, comprising mainly farm equipment and a modest amount of livestock. II. Procedural History [ 3 ] The action began when Mr.

Steele filed an originating application on September 3, 2020, seeking an order severing the joint tenancy, declaring that the Craigs held their interest in trust for him, and alternatively seeking a valuation and an order permitting him to buy the Craigs’ ownership interests. The application was supported by his affidavit, sworn on July 30, 2020. By cross-application, the Craigs sought an order severing the joint tenancy, sale of the land and distribution of its proceeds. Ms.

Craig supported the application with her affidavit, sworn February 25, 2021. [ 4 ] After questioning on the affidavits, the parties arranged to have their applications determined at an afternoon special chambers hearing. Because there were conflicting affidavits on material points, I directed (with consent of the parties) a one-day

summary trial pursuant to Division 3,

Part 7 of the Alberta Rules of Court . These reasons contain my judgment arising from that

summary trial. III. Evidence A. Introduction [ 5 ] The evidence adduced at the

summary trial comprises one affidavit from each of Mr. Steele and Ms. Craig, questioning thereon, and responses to undertakings; and brief viva voce testimony from each of them at trial. [ 6 ] The following is a brief

summary of the evidence from each of these witnesses on points most germane to the issues in dispute. My summaries mainly are without comment on what points are disputed. I then provide brief comments on my assessment of the testimony. B. Peter Alan Steele [ 7 ] Mr. Steele’s affidavit sets out the ownership history of the quarter

section of land near Airdrie. It was purchased by Mr. Steele and his parents as joint tenants in 1997 and since then has been used as a residence and a cattle, horse and llama farming operation. In January 2003, Heather Steele, then Mr. Steele’s wife, was added as another joint tenant. After Mr. Steele’s parents died in 2012 and 2016, he and his wife continued as the surviving joint tenants. [ 8 ] As part of a divorce settlement, in December 2015 the property was transferred from Mr.

Steele and his former wife to himself and the two Craigs as joint tenants (although the transfer was not registered until January 28, 2016). Mr. Steele deposes that the Craigs “agreed to be put on title so they could co-sign a mortgage, the proceeds of which were used to buy out Heather’s interest,” and that the suggestion was made by the Craigs. According to him, neither of the Craigs “paid any money or provided any consideration in exchange for any beneficial interest.” [ 9 ] In questioning on his affidavit and his trial testimony, Mr. Steele said Ms.

Craig offered to help because she did not want to lose her inheritance. She used a broker whom she referred to as a “money man” to make all of the arrangements for the refinancing. Mr. Steele acknowledged that, without his daughter’s help, there was a possibility he would lose the farm. [ 10 ] Mr. Steele testified, in his questioning and at trial, that the only beneficial interest intended for the Craigs was to be joint tenancy survivors upon his death.

Part of his intention in making the arrangements was that on his passing, the Craigs would get the farm and there was no way anyone could contest their ownership. [ 11 ] He also acknowledged, however, that they had the same obligations as he did with respect to liability under the terms of the mortgage. At trial, after some initial reluctance, he also agreed that he understood that the Craigs were gaining rights to the property when they became joint tenants. That was the basis upon which in spring of 2017, Mr. Craig asked Mr. Steele for permission to move his automotive repair business to the property. Mr.

Steele agreed, and since then Mr. Craig has run the business from the garage on the property, without paying rent or compensation to Mr. Steele. Likewise, Mr. Steele acknowledged that it was the basis for the Craig family, with children, moving to the farm as a residence in August 2019. [ 12 ] Around the same time as the Craigs moved to the farm, Mr. Steele began cohabiting with Lisa Johnson in a mobile home on the property. In a cohabitation agreement made in July 2019, Mr. Steele and Ms. Johnson confirmed that Mr. Steele was “one of the joint owners” of the property and that Ms.

Johnson would “lease the mobile home site from Peter and his co-owners of the Airdrie Lands and pay her share rent and utilities.” [ 13 ] Another daughter of Mr. Steele, Jennifer, was not included in the arrangements by which the Craigs became joint tenants. Mr. Steele said this was because Ms. Craig told him that her sister would not be able to make any contribution to the financing arrangements. [ 14 ] Mr.

Steele testified in his affidavit that the Craigs “did not contribute to the acquisition of the property or its maintenance at the time that they were put on title and have not done so since.” In questioning and at trial, he acknowledged that they paid for the installation of a well on the property, from net proceeds Mr. Steele gave to them from the refinancing; that they helped with landscaping improvements, including financial contributions; and that, at various times, they assisted in clean-up operations to raise funds to help retire Mr.

Steele’s debts and, later, as preparation for a cannabis business on the farm (which was never finalized). He acknowledged as

well that, from the time they moved onto the property, the Craigs contributed $1,500 per month towards expenses such as mortgage, utilities and property taxes (another $1,500 per month being contributed by each of Mr. Steele and Ms. Johnson). They also made significant renovations and improvements to the house which, he said, was up to them and motivated by them viewing it as their “dream home.” [ 15 ] Mr. Steele never told Mr. Craig that he had a problem with running his business from the property, and never told the Craigs that he had objections to their taking up residence at the farm.

In fact, he said he was glad to have the family move to the property. [ 16 ] However, problems developed in 2020. One confrontation occurred on May 16, 2020 when Mr. Craig borrowed Mr. Steele’s bobcat without seeking his consent. Mr. Steele told him he was welcome to use it, but should ask permission first; to which Mr. Craig responded by saying “that the bobcat was part of the farm and that [the Craigs] own the farm.” Around the same time, confrontations began to occur between Ms. Craig and Ms. Johnson. The parties began to argue over ownership issues. [ 17 ] When Mr.

Steele swore his affidavit on July 30, 2020, he took the position that the Craigs “do not own any beneficial interest in the property at all but have a legal interest only which they hold in trust for me and which has no monetary value.” At trial, he acknowledged that in taking this position he had changed his mind; earlier, he was fine with them moving onto the property as a right associated with their joint tenancy. C. Kristine J. Craig [ 18 ] Ms. Craig and her husband, Matthew, were married in August 2006 and have three children. They have lived in the main house on the farm since August 19, 2019. Mr.

Craig, a licensed mechanic, owns and operates an automobile repair business out of the three-car garage on the property. [ 19 ] Ms. Craig and her sister Jennifer are children of Mr. Steele and his first wife, Angelina. Ms. Craig lived on the farm with her father from age thirteen until seventeen. [ 20 ] Before becoming co-owners of the property, Ms. and Mr. Craig lived in Calgary, where they owned their own home (which they built) and a rental house property nearby. Ms. Craig worked as a paramedic for Alberta Health Services and Mr. Craig was the service manager at an automobile repair business. [ 21 ] Ms.

Craig deposed and testified to Mr. Steele’s history of marital and domestic problems, which affected him financially. While he was a long-term employee at the City of Calgary, he found it necessary to refinance with mortgages against the farm on three occasions before the transaction in 2015. His contribution to acquisition of the farm in 1998 was only $20,000, part of a total purchase price of $380,000. [ 22 ] As part of the divorce proceedings involving his former wife Heather, in a decision on a binding judicial dispute resolution process on August 28, 2015, Mr.

Steele was required to give one half of his pension to his former wife, pay her $338,000 and take responsibility for all of the farm mortgage debt of approximately $528,000. Following the decision, he sent Ms. Craig a text saying “I am going to need your help big time if I am able to keep the farm. If you are still interested.” [ 23 ] In her affidavit, Ms. Craig deposed to an agreement she and her husband made with Mr. Steele, which involved the following terms worked out through many conversations over several weeks: a. The Craigs and Mr. Steele would be on title together as joint tenants; b.

The Craigs would use their credit and incomes to apply to Alberta Treasury Branch for financing; c. Mr. Steele would continue to reside in the main house, make the mortgage payments and be responsible for all of the utility charges; d. The Craigs would assist in cleaning up and improving the property; e. The Craigs would assist Mr. Steele with the livestock (then approximately thirty cattle, forty ducks, two horses and three llamas); f. The Craigs would enjoy the farm with their children on weekends and otherwise as they wished; g. Mr.

Steele would live on the farm until he died, at which point the Craigs would take the property as surviving joint tenants; h. The Craigs would also share ownership in the livestock, equipment and chattels on the farm – as they were required to operate the farm. [ 24 ] The refinancing and transfer of title into joint tenancy occurred in late 2015 and January 2016. Ms.

Craig took responsibility for making the arrangements, through a mortgage broker she had known from previous dealings. (She denied referring to him as her “money man.”) All three parties met with this broker, and it was a challenge to make the arrangements necessary for the farm to be kept. All of Ms. and Mr. Craig’s incomes (including rental income), equity and credit limits were required – and Ms. Craig had to cut short a maternity leave because employment income was required for financing approval. [ 25 ] Ms.

Craig deposed that her father encouraged her family to move out to the farm, which created logistical challenges because the children would have to attend a nearby school, requiring transportation and childcare if Ms. and Mr. Craig were to continue their employment in Calgary. Part of the solution was for Mr. Craig to open his own business on the farm, something Mr. Steele supported because it also facilitated maintenance of farm machinery. [ 26 ] Mr. Craig’s new business, Rescued Wrecks Inc., was incorporated in spring 2017. Initially, Mr. Craig continued his Calgary

employment while working at his new business on weekends and evenings. The Craigs’ rental property was sold in June 2017 to finance the new business. He quit his Calgary employment and moved to the farm to work full time in his new business in November 2017. These arrangements were supported and encouraged by Mr. Steele. [ 27 ] The final stage of the Craig’s move to the farm was the sale of their home in August 2019 (after initially being listed for sale in 2018). For several weeks, the Craigs, Mr. Steele and Ms. Johnson lived together in the main house. Mr. Steele and Ms.

Johnson moved into a new modular home on the property on August 31, 2019. [ 28 ] Ms. Craig described, in her affidavit, questioning and trial testimony, the variety of contributions she and her husband made to the property since 2015. Initially, this included assuming financial and credit risk for the mortgage on the property. Mr. Craig maintained and repaired farm equipment. Both of them helped with livestock, fencing, and basic maintenance – which included operating the farm equipment on a regular basis.

They made extensive renovations and upgrades to the main house, incurring all of the financial cost and performing much of the labour themselves. Ms. Craig gave her father cash amounts of approximately $1,000 on three or four occasions, and gave him the $3,000 necessary to purchase a bull for the cattle operation. [ 29 ] Ms. Craig’s estimate of the financial value of some of these contributions was as follows: a. Capital and other expenditures amounting to $239,892.50 (detailed in an exhibit); b. Mechanical services provided by Mr.

Craig at $9,780.64. [ 30 ] Harvest Operations Corp. holds a mineral lease on the property that generates payments of approximately $6,250 per year. As of the date of her affidavit, Ms. Craig estimated the share of these payments that she and her husband should have received at $22,500 (two thirds of the total). Mr. Steele has not shared any of these revenues with them. [ 31 ] Ms. Craig’s evidence, much like her father’s, is that the relationship between the parties deteriorated quickly in spring 2020. Her explanation of the details of some of the conflicts (such as the argument precipitated by Mr.

Craig using the bobcat and disputes between Ms. Johnson and Ms. Craig) differ, but the broad outlines are the same. [ 32 ] Ms. Craig emphasized that she and her husband paid a significant price, personally and financially, in becoming involved in helping Mr. Steele save the farm in 2015. They had two good properties in Calgary, each had secure employment, and Ms. Craig was enjoying a year’s maternity leave. Her maternity leave was cut short, they put their finances at risk, gave up Mr. Craig’s employment in favour of investing in a new business, and sold their two houses.

They calculate that the move to the farm resulted in a decline of their joint net worth in the amount of $456,962.41. (Some of the assumptions underlying that calculation may be doubtful.) [ 33 ] Ms. Craig confirmed in her trial testimony that ATB’s valuation of the property for financing purposes was $1,180,000 as of October 2015. A real estate market valuation done in 2021 estimated the value at $1,250,000. D. Assessment [ 34 ] In his trial evidence, Mr. Steele resiled from the position he took in his affidavit that the Craigs acquired no beneficial interest in the property when they became joint tenants.

His attempt in his sworn affidavit of July 30, 2020 to portray the Craigs as bare trustees for his one hundred percent beneficial interest is clearly at odds with all of the evidence and could not be maintained by him in his testimony at trial. Indeed, he gave way on significant points even in his pre-trial questioning. Yet it was only in final argument that he formally conceded that the Craigs probably had a beneficial interest. This reflects poorly on his overall credibility because it shows he tended to tailor his evidence according to his legal arguments. [ 35 ] There are no such inconsistencies in Ms.

Craig’s testimony. Some of her evidence, however, was not entirely forthright. For example, despite her extensive involvement in Mr. Steele’s financial affairs and her quarterbacking of the entire financing arrangement, she was evasive at trial about her understanding of joint tenancy and the nature of the interest that she understood the Craigs were getting. Further, she initially suggested that most, if not all, of the $42,000 paid to her by Mr. Steele shortly after refinancing was used to pay for completion of a well.

She then conceded that only $14,000 was paid for the well – and then, about $4,000 of that was recovered from a government grant, so that $10,000 was paid for the well and the balance used to retire the Craigs’ personal debt. Finally, I do not accept her precise recitation of the terms of an agreement as amounting to express terms, as her affidavit seems to suggest. I do, however, accept her

summary of the terms as a reasonable inference of the terms from the overall conversations that occurred between the parties over the relevant time leading up to the transaction and then their subsequent conduct. [ 36 ] Ms. Craig was, I find, a truthful witness but had the weakness of someone who also was prone advocate her position rather than testify to facts, although not to the extent of her father. [ 37 ] Mr. Steele testified that Ms. Craig became involved because she did not want to lose her inheritance. That statement was not denied by Ms.

Craig, although she testified convincingly that the main initiative for her involvement was Mr. Steele’s begging for help. Perhaps preserving “her inheritance” was part of her motivation, understandable given her attachment to the property from the time she spent there as a youth. That does not, however, negate a mutual intention to make a joint tenancy contract. The Craigs’ involvement in saving the property and then participating in its maintenance, improvement and operation went far beyond a nominal desire to preserve a possible post-mortem gift. [ 38 ] Mr.

Steele asserted in his affidavit and, to a lesser extent in his trial testimony, that the Craigs’ assistance was unnecessary to preserve his ownership in the farm – that he could have gone to many people for assistance. I find otherwise. Ms. Craig provided detailed evidence on the precarious financial position of Mr. Steele in the fall of 2015, such as being unable to pay his own lawyers and the money he owed in the divorce settlement, unable to continue financing his two vehicles and retire his large credit card balances, unable to qualify for a mortgage, and unable to pay his debt to Canada Revenue Agency. Ms.

Craig’s evidence also indicates that Mr. Steele was desperate for the Craigs’ assistance and that it was a near thing for the necessary financing to be obtained. On these points, I

accept Ms. Craig’s evidence and reject that of Mr. Steele. [ 39 ] Further, I accept Ms. Craig’s evidence that the parties intended the joint tenancy on title to be a true representation of their agreement. The whole course of conduct from fall 2015 through to completion of the transaction in early 2016 allows no other reasonable finding. Further, the collective conduct of the parties through to at least spring 2020 support that intention. [ 40 ] Contrary arguments were made by Mr. Steele only, to some degree, in 2020 interactions with the Craigs and more completely in his July 30, 2020 affidavit.

By this time, I find, he was attempting to resile from the agreement for reasons precipitated by his new relationship with Ms. Johnson and the friction caused by two couples living in close quarters on the farm. IV. Legal Principles and Application: Land A. Post-Transaction Conduct [ 41 ] The relevant time for determining intention is the time of the transaction (late 2015 and early 2016). There is a need for caution in using post-transaction conduct to help determine intention.

However, such evidence should not be excluded automatically if it is relevant to determining intention at the time of the transfer, if the trial judge assesses its reliability and determines what weight it should be given, guarding against evidence that is self-serving or tends to reflect a change in intention: Pecore v Pecore , 2007 SCC 17 , para 59 . I have considered evidence of post-transaction conduct in light of this caution. I consider it reliable and worthy of considerable weight. B. Resulting Trusts [ 42 ] Mr.

Steele’s originating application sought an order declaring that the Craigs hold their legal interest in the property in trust for him, in the alternative allowing him to buy out the Craigs. As indicated above, Mr. Steele’s affidavit sought to make the case that the Craigs made no contribution to acquiring or maintaining the property and the help he received from them could have been obtained from others. [ 43 ] All of this was in aid of an argument that, as a gratuitous transfer to the Craigs of interests in joint tenancy, there was a presumption of resulting trust in favour of Mr. Steele.

The presumption of resulting trust is a rebuttable presumption that applies to gratuitous transfers (with some exceptions that do not include transfers to an independent adult child): Pecore , paras 24 and 40-41 . Even where there is a presumption of rebuttable trust, it can be rebutted by donative intention, proved on a balance of probabilities: Pecore , para 43 . [ 44 ] Mr. Steele’s trust argument fails, for reasons that can be given briefly given the acknowledgment that he no longer seriously pursues it. The Craigs made material contributions to Mr.

Steele when he was in desperate financial circumstances, to enable him to remain on the property. They contributed their creditworthiness, accepted liability for the mortgage debt, in Ms. Craig’s case gave up much of her maternity leave, and worked closely with Mr. Steele in collecting and liquidating assets to retire some of his debt. Further, they agreed to contribute to the responsibilities of operating the farm. These facts (part of the factual matrix surrounding the transaction, admissible in any contract case) establish that Mr. Steele did not make a gratuitous transfer.

Rather, he received material consideration in exchange. [ 45 ] Even if that were not the case – that is, if there were no evidence of consideration – the presumption of resulting trust would be overcome by Mr. Steele’s own acknowledgment that he intended to grant property rights which included some use of the land and a right of survivorship, thus showing a donative intent. C. Joint Tenancy 1. Nature [ 46 ] One of the modern forms of concurrent ownership of property is joint tenancy. It requires the “four unities” of title, time, possession and interest: Pohl v Midtal , 2017 ABQB 711 , para 27 .

These support the legal fiction that there is only one tenant in land and no one holds distinct shares: Ziff, Principles of Property Law , 7th ed. (Thomson Reuters, 2018), at 376. A significant characteristic of joint tenancy is the right of survivorship, which Ms. Craig understood as “the last man standing.” [ 47 ] Despite some initial suggestion on behalf of Mr. Steele in his first brief that there was no joint tenancy because of the absence of one of the unities, neither party now disputes that a valid joint tenancy was created by the transfer of land.

Further, on the evidence I conclude that the legal requirements of a joint tenancy are satisfied. 2. Termination of Joint Tenancy [ 48 ] For land, there is a right to partition and sale of joint tenancy under the Law of Property Act , RSA 2000, c. L-7 , where

section 15 provides that co-owner may apply for an order terminating co-ownership of the interest in land, and the court “shall” then make an order directing a physical division or sale of all or part of the interest: sections 15(1) and (2). [ 49 ] Section 17(1) provides that in making an order, the court may direct “an accounting, contribution and adjustment” and compensation for an unequal division; and in subsection (2), sets out some factors that may be considered.

The cases hold that the concept of joint tenancy and the statutory provisions presume an equal share in the joint tenancy: Gonzalez v Soto , 2009 ABQB 454 , paras 30 and 31 ; Herunter v Kostiuk , 2011 ABQB 452 , para 149 . Thus, a co-owner who requests an unequal distribution of proceeds

bears the burden of establishing entitlement to a greater than equal share: Gonzalez , para 33 . [ 50 ] The non-exhaustive factors listed in section 17(2) are not determinative but must be considered, along with all relevant factors and equitable principles, to achieve fairness: Gonzalez , para 44 . From this perspective, the statutory factors relevant to this case are now considered. [ 51 ] Section 17(2)(

a) addresses whether one co-owner has excluded another co-owner. In this case, all parties have had access to the property since the joint tenancy was created. It was mainly occupied by Mr. Steele until mid-2019, a factor tending against his claim for entitlement to an additional share. [ 52 ] Section 17(2)(

c) addresses whether a co-owner has received more than its share of proceeds from a third party. This factor, again, tends against Mr. Steele’s argument to a greater share, as he has kept to himself all revenues from the Harvest Energy lease. [ 53 ] Section 17(2)(

e) addresses whether a co-owner has made improvements or capital payments that have increased the land’s value. This factor again, does not support Mr. Steele’s claim to an unequal share. There is undisputed evidence that the Craigs made financial contributions directly related to the value of land, including approximately $200,000 in renovations to the main house; approximately $10,000 for a new well; and expenses of maintaining the farm.

As in Gonzalez (para 38 ), once the link between the property and contributions have been made, a family situation calls for “a fair approximation of contributions, rather than a commercial accounting”; and “it is inappropriate to engage in an audit of the parties’ respective financial contributions to the property; it is sufficient to note that the financial contribution of each of the parties to the property was substantial.” [ 54 ] Section 17(2)(

g) addresses whether an occupying co-owner claiming non-capital expenses in respect to the land should be required to pay a fair occupational rent. This is a relevant, but neutral factor, because each of the parties has contributed to the ongoing, monthly expenses of the farm during the times of their occupancy. [ 55 ] Gonzalez (paras 55-64 ) uses the principles of unjust enrichment to balance out these statutory factors, an approach endorsed in Herunter , para 105 . There may be a literal enrichment by a party such as the Craigs and a corresponding deprivation of a party such as Mr.

Steele where the former did not pay as much in direct financial costs, such as purchase price, as they received in monetary value for their share: Gonzalez , para 56 . However, where one party made less direct financial contributions than another but did make material direct and indirect financial contributions and also non-financial contributions such as maintenance and the pledging of credit, these may be a juristic reason for an equal share: Gonzalez , paras 59-64 .

That is because such a party has also contributed to the maintenance and possible improvement in market value of the property. [ 56 ] This analysis is apt to the present case. First, it is not at all clear that even in a literal sense Mr. Steele suffered a deprivation, because without the Craigs’ involvement it is probable that he would have lost the farm.

But even if, in a literal sense, the Craigs were enriched by receiving more monetary value than they contributed in direct financial input, their overall direct and non-direct contributions provide ample juristic reason to support a finding that they are not unjustly enriched by an equal share joint tenancy. [ 57 ] I conclude, for these reasons, that Mr. Steele has not met his onus of establishing that he is entitled to greater than a one-third joint tenancy interest. V.

Legal Principles and Application: Non-Land [ 58 ] Joint tenancy principles, with some distinctions, apply equally to personalty as to land: Ziff, at 398. [ 59 ] The parties dispute ownership in the non-land assets on the farm, mainly equipment and livestock. They spent little time addressing these assets in evidence and argument, presumably because the value is minor compared with the land. [ 60 ] There is no express joint tenancy with respect to non-land assets, unlike the transfer of land establishing express joint tenancy in the land.

The Craigs, however, argue that the evidence establishes that the agreement for joint tenancy applies also to the equipment and livestock. Ms. Craig’s affidavit states that “the agreement with my father not only covered the Farm but also the livestock and equipment on the farm,” which she describes at various places in her affidavit. There is circumstantial evidence to support this statement, in that the Craigs shared farm duties with Mr. Steele and made direct financial expenditures, including the purchase of a bull to perpetuate the cattle herd.

They also used the equipment without protest (until May 2020) and it was maintained and repaired by Mr. Craig as necessary. [ 61 ] From Ms. Craig’s evidence and the parties’ conduct from the fall of 2015 until at least spring 2020 (and recognizing the caution that applies to post-transaction conduct), I conclude that the parties intended ownership of the non-land assets to be in joint tenancy among the three of them. They viewed the land, equipment and livestock as a combined unit and treated them as such. Mr.

Steele put forward no evidence to suggest separate results were intended for the personalty as compared to the land; and, in the factual matrix of this transaction, it would be surprising if that had been intended. VI. Conclusion [ 62 ] For the reasons given above, I find that there is a joint tenancy in the farm and its personalty (not including personal possessions of each of the parties) and that the joint tenancy among the three parties provides them with three equal legal and equitable shares. [ 63 ] There is no reliable recent appraisal of the land.

Thus, the first step in implementing this judgment will be an appraisal performed by a duly qualified real estate appraiser, the cost of which will be borne by the parties equally. If they are unable to agree upon an appraiser, they may apply for my direction.

[ 64 ] The parties agree that, once the value of the land has been determined, Mr. Steele should have an opportunity to purchase the shares of the Craigs and, if that does not occur within a reasonable time, the property will be sold and the net proceeds distributed according to the parties’ respective interests. [ 65 ] Unlike joint tenancy in land, there is no statutory provision for partition and sale of personalty nor does the common law provide such a procedure: Ziff, at 398.

The practical solution, which I recommend to the parties, is to consent to having the personalty follow the land in whatever process is ultimately employed. [ 66 ] Some adjustments will be required: Mr. Steele must account to the Craigs for their share of the Harvest Energy payments and for the $12,000 for unpaid monthly expenses I ordered to be paid on July 30, 2021. [ 67 ] Given counsel who have appeared on this matter, I expect many of the procedural details to implement this judgment can be worked out between the parties. Counsel may speak to me as necessary for directions and, if they cannot agree, on costs.

Heard on the 5 th day of October, 2021. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 19 th day of October, 2021. G.H. Poelman J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Kenneth W. Sparks for the Plaintiff Peter W.K. Ridout for the Defendants