Carvalho v Carvalho, 2021 ABQB 922

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Carvalho v Carvalho, 2021 ABQB 922 Date: 20211117 Docket: 2113 00184, FL13 01743 Registry: Ft. McMurray Between: 2112 00184 Belarmino Lopes Carvalho and Power Sparks Electric Ltd. Applicant - and - Tanya Lynn Shelley-Carvalho Respondent Between: FL13 01743 Tanya Shelley-Carvalho Applicant - and - Belarmino Carvalho Respondent

_______________________________________________________ Decision of the Honourable Mr. Justice Douglas R. Mah _______________________________________________________ A. How I came to hear these matters [ 1 ] The first application before me is concerned with whether and how a matrimonial property agreement should be enforced, including whether a builders’ lien holdback can be applied for that purpose. In the second application, the builder seeks release of the holdback. The applications are related because one party to the matrimonial property agreement (Mr.

Carvalho) is also the sole principal of the builder claiming the holdback. The holdback relates to the rebuilding of the matrimonial home, which was an integral part of the settlement contained in the agreement. [ 2 ] The two matters were scheduled to be heard by me as concurrent special applications on November 2, 2021. I went into the hearing thinking that I was adjourning both applications because neither counsel for Ms. Shelley-Carvalho nor Mr. Carvalho had filed concise letters or briefs in accordance with either Family Practice Note 2 or Civil Practice Note 2.

However, both sides were keen to proceed on that afternoon. Mr. Corbin, counsel for Ms. Shelley-Carvalho, stated that the matter was simply one of contractual

interpretation which could be easily addressed only with oral argument. [ 3 ] Mr. Carvalho, as a self-represented litigant, was also eager to proceed even though he was not expecting to do so. He said that, as an SRL, he did not realize that he was required to file both the concise letter in the family matter and a brief in the civil matter, and that is why he did not file anything further. Apparently, he had been previously advised by the court coordinator that the judge was likely to adjourn or strike the matters, because of a lack of concise letters and briefs. However, Mr.

Carvalho remarked that the affidavits he filed were comprehensive and set out his entire case for the court. Mr. Carvalho asked only for a few moments to get organized and said that he was prepared to argue that afternoon. [ 4 ] I told Mr. Carvalho that I would hear from Mr. Corbin, and that if he (Mr. Carvalho) did not feel comfortable proceeding at that point, then I was prepared to grant him an adjournment so that he could do further preparation. After Mr. Corbin completed his submissions, I asked Mr. Carvalho again whether he was in a position to proceed and Mr.

Carvalho confirmed that he was. [ 5 ] I had noted from reviewing the files and our discussion that the holdback funds had been languishing in Mr. Corbin’s trust account for almost a year and that the parties were hoping to get their financial issues resolved one way or another, so that they could move forward with their lives. In the result, I exercised discretion to hear the matters, even in the face of non-compliance with the Practice Notes. [ 6 ] Following the hearing, Mr.

Carvalho contacted the court coordinator to confirm that the civil matter (relating to the release of the holdback funds) would also be dealt with in my decision. I responded to the court coordinator that indeed I intended to deal with both matters, since both relied on the same evidence and both files had been uploaded for my review for that day. Further, Mr. Carvalho had addressed both matters during his submissions. [ 7 ] There was also an aspect of parenting contained in Ms. Shelley-Carvalho’s notice of application and a cross-application concerning parenting brought by Mr. Carvalho in the family matter.

However, neither side addressed parenting in the hearing before me and thus I decline to make any ruling in that regard. B. Background [ 8 ] The family previously lived at 128 Piven Place in Fort McMurray, Alberta. The home was mostly destroyed in the 2016 wildfire but the foundation and part of the structure were still usable. The couple separated in February 2018. [ 9 ] There is controversy about what happened to some of the insurance proceeds. Ms. Shelley-Carvalho suggested in her affidavit that Mr.

Carvalho had made off with some $60,000-$70,000 from their joint account, which she says he used for his own purposes. She complains about but does not seek recovery of her portion of those funds. [ 10 ] Mr. Carvalho operates a construction company called Power Sparks Electric Ltd. Ms. Shelley-Carvalho, until January 2020, had been an equal shareholder in Power Sparks along with Mr. Carvalho. By written agreement, the parties divided a sum of cash in the company between them and Ms. Shelley-Carvalho relinquished her share ownership to Mr. Carvalho. The only remaining matrimonial

asset was the fire-damaged home. [ 11 ] Late in 2018, although the couple was separated, Mr. Carvalho hit upon the idea of the parties jointly taking out a construction mortgage to rebuild the home, with Power Sparks acting as general contractor. This would give Power Sparks work to do and generate income for Mr. Carvalho. Following reconstruction, the net equity would be divided equally between the two of them in settlement of their matrimonial property issues, and Mr.

Carvalho would take over the home and the mortgage in his sole name. [ 12 ] This plan was documented in a comprehensive separation and property agreement dated effective October 23, 2020. However, Mr. Carvalho and Power Sparks had begun the work earlier. A mortgage in the sum of $483,116.00 for the rebuild was approved by the Royal Bank of Canada on February 3, 2020. The mortgage amount was based on a construction quote submitted by Power Sparks in the identical amount of $483,116.00. The quote was in turn based on a

summary of renovation estimates prepared by professional third parties. The quote document from Power Sparks is addressed to both Belar Carvalho and Tanya Shelley-Carvalho as customers but is accepted by Belar Carvalho only as customer. Of course, Power Sparks is also the alter ego of Mr. Carvalho. [ 13 ] Mr. Carvalho did the work himself. He hired subcontractors when needed. He said his 71-year-old father pitched in with labour sometimes. The mortgage funds had been deposited with Mr. Corbin. Between April 20, 2020 and October 26, 2020, there were 5 draws totaling $427,676.80, leaving $55,439.00 unpaid. Mr.

Carvalho signed and swore a Certificate of Substantial Completion as of October 20, 2020. [ 14 ] At the hearing, I was advised that the amount remaining in trust as holdback is now $48,331.14, which is 10% or so of the mortgage amount. I did not hear an explanation as to what happened to the difference. [ 15 ] Despite demand, Mr. Corbin has not released the holdback to Mr. Carvalho or Power Sparks. At the hearing before me, Mr. Corbin took the position that the funds remaining in trust (as mortgage proceeds advanced for the benefit of both parties) constitute matrimonial property and should be applied toward Ms.

Shelley-Carvalho’s entitlement under the settlement agreement. [ 16 ] In addition to saying that the money in trust is payable to him as the balance of the contract price, Mr. Carvalho argues that Ms. Shelley-Carvalho still owes him (or Power Sparks) or that she and/or Mr.

Corbin are liable to him (or Power Sparks) for the following reasons: • there is a penalty provision for late payment of any invoice of Power Sparks of $500 per day, found in an earlier settlement agreement of January 13, 2020, that seems to have been entered into without the benefit of lawyers; • the actual cost to Power Sparks of reconstructing the home is $586,893.43, meaning that the builder is owed an additional $103,777.34; • in order to finance Power Sparks’ project costs, Mr.

Carvalho had to borrow money from friends and family and therefore there are interest costs; • Power Sparks severely discounted the costs of its services, resulting in significant business loss; • the state of deterioration was worse than originally thought because the home had been left vacant for year and a half and exposed to the elements, and thus the cost of restoration was that much more; • the quote provides that any extras and enhancements over and above the specifications would be charged separately, and there are many such extras and enhancements; for example, the new home is equipped as a “smart home” with all kinds of electronic gadgetry that was not included in the scope of work on which the quote was based; in effect, the home that now exists is a far superior home to the one that it replaces; and • Mr.

Corbin has unlawfully retained the holdback, which has been releasable since October 2020 under the Builders’ Lien Act . • Finally, the real estate market is in decline and the house is not worth what it once was. [ 17 ] I understood from listening to Mr. Carvalho that he is very proud of the home that he has built and now occupies, and the workmanship that went into it. C. The Separation and Property Agreement [ 18 ] I note first of all that in all respects the agreement conforms with s 37 of the Matrimonial Property Act and that each party had the benefit of their own legal advice.

I also note that the agreement was signed by Mr. Carvalho on October 23, 2020, some three days after he furnished the Certificate of Substantial Completion on the home. From that, I can only infer that he was well aware of all of his costs on the project (including any borrowing costs) when he signed the agreement. [ 19 ] The agreement at para 5.2 provides a formula for disposing of the home as a matrimonial asset in the following way: • First, the agreement acknowledges that it is Mr.

Carvalho who is the person building a new house on the site to replace a former home destroyed by fire, and that to this end the parties have caused a mortgage in the sum of $483,000.00 to be placed on title in order to finance the construction. • Second, upon completion of the new home, the parties will determine the equity and each realize upon half of that equity. • The equity will be determined by each party retaining a professional appraiser to provide a market appraisal of the finished home. The two appraisal values will then be added together and divided by 2 to arrive at a definitive appraised value.

• Thereafter, the amount of the mortgage ($483,000.00) will be deducted from this final appraised value to determine the equity in the property. Mr. Carvalho is then required to pay Ms. Shelley-Carvalho a cash amount equal to one half of that equity. • Upon such payment, title will be conveyed solely into Mr. Carvalho’s name and he will assume sole responsibility for payment of the mortgage. • Also included is a specific provision that Mr. Carvalho will keep an accounting of the cost of any extras over and above the specifications that formed the basis of the mortgage.

The addition of so-called “smart” features is cited as an example. This provision recognizes that the upgrades will turn the home into a custom home that will be more valuable than the home contemplated in the specifications on which the mortgage was based. • Finally, it is agreed that Mr.

Carvalho shall be solely responsible for all debts in relation to the house, including but not limited to taxes, mortgage payments and utilities, as well as any maintenance and upkeep costs from the date of execution of the agreement. [ 20 ] From the foregoing, it is clear that the circumstances surrounding the formation of the settlement agreement are: • the house was being built for Mr. Carvalho to occupy as his home, by himself, to the exclusion of Ms. Shelley-Carvalho; • while Ms. Shelley-Carvalho stood to gain financially from any increase in value, it was Mr.

Carvalho who would experience the enjoyment of the upgrades and retain their value as sole owner; • Mr. Carvalho had exclusive control over the installation and cost of any upgrades; and • the upgrades were not only contemplated at the time the agreement was signed, they had already been incorporated into the house and the cost incurred; Mr. Carvalho acknowledged that the upgrades would improve the value of the house, and notwithstanding, he still agreed to the formula. [ 21 ] Under the agreement, the provision that Mr. Carvalho keep an accounting of the cost of the upgrades does not create any liability on Ms.

Shelley-Carvalho’s part, nor does it function to change the agreed-upon formula or Mr. Carvalho’s payment obligation in any respect. It is merely an acknowledgement that such upgrades will occur and that they have a value. [ 22 ] In so interpreting the agreement, I apply the modern approach to contract

interpretation set out in by the Supreme Court of Canada in Creston Moly Corp v Sattva Capital Corp , 2014 SCC 53 at para 47 : … the

interpretation of contracts has evolved towards a practical, common-sense approach not dominated by technical rules of construction. The overriding concern is to determine "the intent of the parties and the scope of their understanding" ( Jesuit Fathers of Upper Canada v Guardian Insurance Co of Canada , 2006 SCC 21 , [2006] 1 SCR 744 (SCC), at para. 27 per LeBel J.; see also Tercon Contractors Lt. v British Columbia (Minister of Transportation & Highways) , 2010 SCC 4 , [2010] 1 SCR 69 (SCC), at paras 64-65 per Cromwell J.).

To do so, a decision-maker must read the contract as a whole, giving the words used their ordinary and grammatical meaning, consistent with the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of formation of the contract.

Consideration of the surrounding circumstances recognizes that ascertaining contractual intention can be difficult when looking at words on their own, because words alone do not have an immutable or absolute meaning. [ 23 ] Using this approach, the expectations and obligations of the parties are set out in crystal-clear language in para 5.2, and the surrounding circumstances shown in the bullet points in para 20 above were more than obvious. Mr. Carvalho cannot now complain about either. D.

The Appraisals [ 24 ] In all of this, there is a slight factual complication in that each of the parties secured two appraisals each, not one as called for in the agreement. Ms. Shelley-Carvalho retained Chalifour Denis and Associates to prepare her two appraisals. The valuation in the first appraisal was at $725,000, and included value for a finished basement.

However, at the time of this appraisal (November 4, 2020) the basement was not yet finished so an estimate of value was given based on the appraiser’s understanding as to what the basement was like in the previous home. [ 25 ] The same appraiser produced a second report for Ms. Shelley-Carvalho dated December 1, 2020, which did not include an assumed value for a finished basement. The report noted that at the time of inspection the basement was still undergoing renovation.

The basement development at the time included framed and drywalled rooms but no flooring or ceiling finishes, colonial doors installed to most rooms, and two bathrooms with a tub/shower and a jet tub in place. This second valuation came in at $650,000. [ 26 ] I assume that the second appraisal was commissioned as a correction to the first, which had included an assumption about a state of affairs that did not exist at the time. [ 27 ] Mr. Carvalho also ordered iterative appraisals, although performed by different appraisal companies.

In his case, the first appraisal was performed by Kerrigan Appraisals Ltd with a report dated November 2, 2020. The appraiser noted that the full basement was being redeveloped and contained 3 bedrooms, a family room, full bathroom, laundry area and mechanical room. It was estimated to be 60% complete. The property was appraised at $559,000. [ 28 ] For some reason, not explained, Mr. Carvalho secured a second appraisal from Quinn & Company Appraisals Ltd dated as of November 10, 2020.

This report also noted a full basement that is partially finished, consisting of a recreation room and kitchen area, 3 average size bedrooms, a laundry area, a functioning two-piece (soon to be four-piece) bathroom and an additional full bathroom with tile and a utility room, 2 new furnaces and an on-demand water tank.

[ 29 ] In order for there to be an apples-to-apples equivalency, I consider Ms. Shelley-Carvalho’s second appraisal for $650,000 to be the appraisal for the purposes of the agreement. Both of Mr. Carvalho’s two appraisals also addressed a partially developed basement as opposed to an assumed fully developed basement, but I have no reason to choose between the two of them. While I can say that the second of Ms. Shelley-Carvalho’s appraisals was a correction of the first, I cannot say the same of Mr. Carvalho’s two appraisals. In the end, to be fair to both parties, I will treat Mr.

Carvalho’s two appraisal reports as one and average the valuations so as to arrive at a figure of $589,500 as his valuation for the purposes of the agreement. [ 30 ] I apply the formula in para 5.2 as follows: $650,000 (Ms. Shelley-Carvalho’s appraised value) + $589,500 (Mr. Carvalho’s appraised value) = $1,235,500 (combined appraised values) ÷ 2 = $617,750 (final appraised value) - $483,000.00 (mortgage amount) = $134,750.00 (equity) ÷ 2 = $67,375 (payout amount). [ 31 ] By the agreement, Mr. Carvalho was to pay this amount by installment with the last payment no later than November 30, 2020.

Almost a year later, he has not paid any amount. Thus, Ms. Shelley-Carvalho seeks enforcement of payment. E. A deal is a deal [ 32 ] Mr. Carvalho essentially asks the court to relieve him of his obligation to make the payment required by the agreement, and rather require Ms. Shelley-Carvalho to pay him instead. He seeks to do so by asking the court to ignore the formula that was arrived at and documented in the settlement agreement and to rewrite the formula. The formula proposed by Mr.

Carvalho, in effect, requires the court to disregard the mortgage amount of $483,000.00 as the debt owing on the house and replace it with a higher figure calculated by him. As Mr. Carvalho would still have the parties split the equity, the higher figure he proposes results in negative equity. In consequence, under his rewritten formula, it is Ms.

Shelley-Carvalho who owes him money, rather than the other way around. [ 33 ] His reason for asking this is because he says the building of the house cost him (or Power Sparks) more than he thought it would and, in retrospect, the deal as negotiated and memorialized in the agreement is not so good for him. [ 34 ] I find that Mr. Carvalho’s reasons ring hollow. First of all, he knew exactly how much the house was costing him because he signed the Certificate of Substantial Completion 3 days before he signed the settlement agreement. He chose to make the upgrades that he did, knowing what they would cost. Ms.

Shelley-Carvalho had no input into the upgrades. There is no evidence before me that she approved any change orders or extras. Mr. Carvalho alone, and not Ms. Shelley-Carvalho, now enjoys the benefit of those upgrades. Mr. Carvalho was independently advised and had full knowledge of all the circumstances when he signed the agreement. [ 35 ] The separation and property agreement as constituted cannot in any way be said to be unfair, even in retrospect, to Mr.

Carvalho and certainly there are no grounds on which the court can void or vary the agreement such that he should not make the payment he is required to make. In this regard, these comments by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hartshorne v. Hartshorne , 2004 SCC 22 at para 67 apply: Once an agreement has been reached, albeit a marriage agreement, the parties thereto are expected to fulfill the obligations that they have undertaken. A party cannot simply later state that he or she did not intend to live up to his or her end of the bargain.

It is true that, in some cases, agreements that appear to be fair at the time of execution may become unfair at the time of the triggering event, depending on how the lives of the parties have unfolded. It is also clear that the FRA permits a court, upon application, to find that an agreement or the statutory regime is unfair and to reapportion the assets.

However, in a framework within which private parties are permitted to take personal responsibility for their financial well-being upon the dissolution of marriage, courts should be reluctant to second-guess their initiative and arrangement, particularly where independent legal advice has been obtained. They should not conclude that unfairness is proven simply by demonstrating that the marriage agreement deviates from the statutory matrimonial property regime.

Fairness must first take into account what was within the realistic contemplation of the parties, what attention they gave to changes in circumstances or unrealized implications, then what are their true circumstances, and whether the discrepancy is such, given the s. 65 factors, that a different apportionment should be made. [ 36 ] In point of fact, para 5.2 is nothing more than one form of a common occurrence in marriage dissolution: one spouse buying out the other’s equity in the former matrimonial home. The scenario here was only slightly complicated by the fact that Mr.

Carvalho wanted to replace the house that burned down with a really nice new house, the cost and construction of which was within his exclusive control and of which he would ultimately have sole ownership. [ 37 ] The decline in the Fort McMurray real estate market is not a factor. Fluctuation in real estate prices is a reality that all homeowners face, and was reasonably in Mr. Carvalho’s contemplation at the time the agreement was signed. Ms. Shelley-Carvalho is not responsible for economic conditions. Under different economic conditions, price fluctuation could have worked out in Mr.

Carvalho’s favour. [ 38 ] I find that Mr. Carvalho is bound by the agreement and must perform his end. F. Who gets the holdback? [ 39 ] Ms. Shelley-Carvalho resists release of the holdback funds to Power Sparks because she says that Mr. Carvalho has not satisfied her with production of appropriate documentation proving that the whole of the $483,116.00 advanced has actually been spent on the project. Mr. Carvalho, for his part, has deposed that he has spent that amount, plus another $103,777.34 as well. He says there are various creditors yet to be paid. [ 40 ] I note that Mr.

Carvalho did not include in his affidavit material any documentary evidence of outstanding costs to be paid by Power Sparks on the project. Such evidence would include invoices from suppliers, demands from unpaid creditors, promissory notes or loan agreements evidencing loans, and bank records and cancelled cheques evidencing transactions. I assume that no liens are filed

because Mr. Carvalho is asking for release of the builders’ lien holdback. Mr. Carvalho did provide a narrative describing how the costoverrun of $103,777.34 came to be. [41] Mr. Corbin submits that the holdback should be treated as matrimonial property, that is, funds belonging to Mr. Carvalho andMs. Shelley-Carvalho. It is not disputed that the mortgagee bank advanced the funds for the specific purpose of funding the constructionof Mr. Carvalho’s new house. Although from a privity standpoint, it is questionable whether Ms. Shelley-Carvalho is bound by thePower Sparks quote (since only Mr.

Carvalho countersigned it), it is quite clear from para 5.2 of the settlement agreement that, asbetween herself and Mr. Carvalho, she agreed and expected the mortgage funds to be spent on the construction. [42] If the holdback is payable on account of the project, the funds belong to Power Sparks, not Mr. Carvalho personally, underthe principle that a corporation has separate legal existence from its shareholders: Mcclurg v Canada, (SCC), [1990] 3SCR 1020 at pp1056-1057, and SG v KG, 1980 ABCA 10 at paras 4-8. No argument was made about piercing the corporate veil anddiverting the funds to Ms.

Shelley-Carvalho and whether such a claim, if made, would satisfy the test established by the Court of Appealin Aubin v Petrone, 2020 ABCA 13 at paras 71-74. [43] The funds would only become personal funds of the parties if they are not owed to Power Sparks. [44] Therefore, provided that Mr. Carvalho can prove to Ms. Shelley-Carvalho that Power Sparks still owes money on the project,the holdback is releasable to Power Sparks. I direct that Mr. Carvalho provide Ms.

Shelley-Carvalho, within 30 days hereof, with astatutory declaration attesting to the amount still owing on the project, and attaching a reconciliation and all documentation supportingthe amount still claimed to be owed. [45] If Mr. Carvalho fails to provide the statutory declaration or is unable to demonstrate that an amount equal to at least$48,331.14 is still owing, then the holdback or any unexpended portion of it, is declared to be matrimonial property and is to be appliedto the equity payout owed by Mr. Carvalho to Ms. Shelley-Carvalho as a consequence of the settlement agreement. G. Civil Claims [46] Mr.

Carvalho has advanced civil claims against Ms. Shelley-Carvalho and her lawyer, Mr. Corbin, for payment or damagesfor the reasons enumerated in para 16 above. I will now deal with these claims: • Penalty of $500 per day – This provision is found in the January 13, 2020 written agreement between Mr. Carvalho and Ms.Shelley-Carvalho. Power Sparks is not a party to this agreement. Therefore, there is no enforceable covenant between Power Sparks andMs. Shelley-Carvalho in this regard. Further, this penalty seems to come into effect only upon a lien being filed.

I have no informationbefore me about a lien. • Extras and enhancements to be charged separately – First of all, while the statement does appear in the Power Sparks quote,Ms. Shelley-Carvalho was not a counter-signatory to the quote and therefore not privy to it. Second, the fact that the quote was presentedby Mr. Carvalho in his capacity as the principal of Power Sparks, and then accepted by Mr. Carvalho, without Ms. Shelley-Carvalho’ssignature, in his capacity as homeowner is entirely self-serving.

Third, this extraneous document cannot be used to override the clear andunambiguous language and clear intent of para 5.2 of the settlement agreement: Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd, (SCC), [1998] 2 SCR 129 at paras 55-57. • Construction costs exceeding $483,116.00, Power Sparks discounts, extras and upgrades added, deterioration worse thanoriginally thought – Even if true, these were all matters well known to Mr. Carvalho at the time he signed the settlement agreement andit must be inferred that he took these into consideration.

In addition to being known before the agreement was signed, the costsexceeding the estimate, the extras and upgrades that were added and the discounts applied by Power Sparks were all within the exclusivecontrol of Mr. Carvalho. Ms. Shelley-Carvalho had no hand in it. It is not her fault that he deliberately exceeded his budget. Moreover, itis Mr. Carvalho, not Ms. Shelley-Carvalho, who will have enduring ownership and has had and will continue to have physical enjoymentof this new home with all of its enhancements. • Liability of Mr. Corbin for withholding the builders lien holdback – Mr.

Corbin is not named as a party in Mr. Carvalho’scivil action. I am not going to grant judgment against a non-party who has not even had an opportunity to file a statement of defence.Further, as noted above, there is factual ambiguity as to whether the holdback funds are payable to Power Sparks or constitute amatrimonial asset. I have given direction above as to how that factual issue is to be resolved. [47] Without saying as much, Mr. Carvalho requested

summary disposition of the civil matter, at least as it concerns Ms. Shelley-Carvalho. Based on the record, it is fair, appropriate and expeditious to deal with the civil matter summarily: Weir-Jones TechnicalServices Incorporated v Purolator Courier, 2019 ABCA 49 at para 47. I find that Mr. Carvalho does not succeed, on this motion, on anyof these claims, all of which are hereby summarily dismissed: Rules 1.3(1)(

b) and (2). H.

Summary [48] I note that para 5.10 of the settlement agreement preserves the jurisdiction of this court to make an order under theMatrimonial Property Act which incorporates the provisions of the settlement agreement as related to, among other things, thematrimonial home. [49] Therefore, in

summary and to be clear, I grant the following relief: • Ms. Shelley-Carvalho has judgment against Mr. Carvalho in the sum of $67,375. This judgment is secured against the parties’equity in the home as defined in the settlement agreement.

• Mr. Carvalho must pay the judgment within 45 days of the date of this decision, or such extension as may be agreed between the parties. • Upon payment of the judgment, Ms. Shelley-Carvalho will do what is necessary to convey title to the property into Mr. Carvalho’s sole name, and Mr. Carvalho shall take such steps as necessary to remove Ms. Shelley-Carvalho’s name from the mortgage, as required by settlement agreement. • In the event that Mr. Carvalho fails to pay the judgment as directed, Ms. Shelley-Carvalho is at liberty to enforce the judgment by way of an application for partition and sale under

section 15 of the Law of Property Act . • Within 30 days of this decision, Power Sparks or Mr. Carvalho will provide Ms. Shelley-Carvalho with a statutory declaration attesting to the amount still owing on the project by Power Sparks, attaching a reconciliation of receipts and expenses on the project, and supporting documentation for any outstanding amount. • In the event that Power Sparks or Mr. Carvalho proves by way of the statutory declaration that at least the sum of $48,331.14 is still owed on the project, Mr.

Corbin will release the holdback of $48,331.14 to Power Sparks. • In the event that Power Sparks or Mr. Carvalho is only able to prove by way of the statutory declaration that a sum less than $48,331.14 is still owed on the project, Mr. Corbin will release the amount owed to Power Sparks. In this event, the remaining balance is declared to be matrimonial property and will be paid by Mr. Corbin to Ms. Shelley-Carvalho on account of the judgment above. • Mr. Corbin will prepare the court order for my signature, to be submitted under the Queen’s Bench electronic filing protocol, and I dispense with Mr.

Carvalho’s approval of the order under Rule 9.4(2)(c). I. Costs [ 50 ] Ms. Shelley-Carvalho was almost entirely successful on her application as it pertains to enforcement of the settlement agreement. Mr. Carvalho was somewhat successful on his application for payment of the holdback to Power Sparks. There were no concise letters or briefs filed for the 2 applications. In consequence, I fix costs in favour of Ms. Shelley-Carvalho in the sum of $250, which is added to the judgment above. Heard on the 16 th day of November, 2021. Dated at the City of Ft. McMurray, Alberta this 14 th day of November, 2021.

Douglas R. Mah J.C.Q.B.A. Appearances: Brent Corbin, Corbin Law for Ms. Shelley-Carvalho Belarmino Carvalho Self-Represented Litigant