R v Dodgson and Holloway, 2023 ABQB 106
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v Dodgson and Holloway, 2023 ABQB 106 Date: 20230224 Docket: 200638674Q1 Registry: Calgary Between: His Majesty the King Crown - and - Anthony Archie Michel Dodgson and Tommie Boris Holloway Accused _______________________________________________________ Sentencing Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice D.B. Nixon _______________________________________________________
Restriction on Publication Identification Ban – See the Criminal Code ,
section 486.5 . By Court Order, information that may identify Witness AB and Witness CD must not be published, broadcast, or transmitted in any way. There is also a ban on publishing the contents of the application for the publication ban or the evidence, information or submissions at the hearing of the application. NOTE: This judgment is intended to comply with the identification ban. Table of Contents I. Introduction . 3 II. Undisputed Evidence before the Jury . 4 III. What are the issues on sentencing? . 5 IV. Express and Implied Factual Implications . 6 A. Intent and Intoxication . 6 B.
Routes to Liability . 6 1. Mr. Dodgson . 6 2. Mr. Holloway . 7 C. Evidence of Planning/Agreement 9 V. Victim Impact Statement 10 VI. Principles of Sentencing . 11 VII. Analysis and Conclusions . 13 A. Mr. Dodgson . 13 B. Dodgson Conclusion . 27 C. Mr. Holloway . 29 D. Holloway Conclusion . 41 I. Introduction [ 1 ] Mr. Christophe Herblin was killed during the early morning hours of March 14, 2020. Following a lengthy trial in the Spring of 2022, the jury found both Mr. Anthony Dodgson and Mr. Tommie Holloway guilty of homicide. [ 2 ] Both accused had been charged with second degree murder in relation to Mr.
Herblin’s death. The Crown took the position that Mr. Dodgson was guilty as the principal offender and that Mr. Holloway was guilty as either: (
i) an aider or abettor; or (ii) by joining Mr. Dodgson in the common unlawful purpose of assaulting Mr. Herblin in order to gain access to his business. [ 3 ] After two full days of deliberations, the jury returned with a verdict of guilty of second-degree murder for Mr. Dodgson and guilty of manslaughter for Mr. Holloway. [ 4 ] Of course, in a trial by jury, deliberations occur in a black box.
No one knows the exact factual basis or whether jurors had more than one factual basis for the verdicts they reached because consensus on all evidence is not required: R v Stephens , 2021 ABQB 816 . [ 5 ] As the sentencing judge, it is incumbent upon me to determine the factual foundation for the verdicts rendered by the jury, as provided for in section 724(2) of the Criminal Code which reads that: Jury
(2) Where the court is composed of a judge and jury, the court
(
a) shall accept as proven all facts, express or implied, that are essential to the jury’s verdict of guilty; and (
b) may find any other relevant fact that was disclosed by evidence at the trial to be proven, or hear evidence presented by either partywith respect to that fact. [6] In R v Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, the Court set out the proper approach to this fact-finding exercise: at paras 17-18. Thisapproach was recently restated by our Court of Appeal: see R v Freer, 2021 ABCA 155 at para 13. The framework is as follows: i. The judge should find only those facts necessary to permit the proper sentence to be imposed. ii.
The judge should first determine what the issues on sentencing are and then find such facts as are necessary to deal with those issues. iii. This may not require the judge to arrive at a complete theory of the facts as the judge is required to make only those factualdeterminations necessary for deciding the appropriate sentence in the case at hand. iv. The judge “is bound by the express and implied factual implications of the jury’s verdict” and must not accept as fact any evidenceconsistent only with a verdict rejected by the jury. v.
When the factual implications of the jury’s verdict are ambiguous, the judge should not attempt to follow the logical process of thejury, but should come to his or her own independent determination of the relevant facts. vi. To rely upon an aggravating fact the judge must be convinced of the existence of that fact beyond a reasonable doubt; to rely uponany other relevant fact, the judge must be persuaded on a balance of probabilities. [7] As both Mr. Dodgson and Mr.
Holloway testified during the trial, I have approached this fact finding exercise, beyond thosefacts which I find are express or implied by the jury’s verdict, by using the framework suggested in R v W(D), (SCC),[1991] 1 SCR 742 and the principles espoused therein: see R v (J)M, 2020 ABQB 767 at paras 3-4. II. Undisputed Evidence before the Jury [8] The jury heard from a number of witnesses including, critically, both offenders as well as from a third party who was presentwith them on the evening before and early morning hours of the crime. The third party who was with them that evening was AB.
Thatindividual was considered a Vetrovec witness, and the jury was cautioned accordingly. [9] The jury was also provided with an agreed statement of facts. The agreed facts included exhibits containing CCTV footagefrom a number of locations. [10] Police interviews with AB as well as both offenders were also put before the jury.
Evidence was put to the jury that bothoffenders as well as AB had consumed various levels of drugs and/or alcohol on the evening in question, and that such consumption mayhave affected their recollection of events. [11] AB, as well as both offenders, provided inconsistent evidence concerning certain portions of their testimony. However, muchevidence was not really in dispute. Namely, it was acknowledged that the offenders had previously broken into Mr. Herblin’s restaurantin order to access the neighboring premises, a cannabis store.
They wanted to access the cannabis store in order to rob it. [12] On the evening in question, Mr. Dodgson intended to rob the cannabis store once again. In order to do so, he and AB droveout to Morley to pick up Mr. Holloway. [13] The offenders attempted to rob the cannabis store by breaking into Mr. Herblin’s adjacent business just before 3:00 am onMarch 14, 2020. They were interrupted by the police but were able to avoid apprehension at this time. [14] Mr. Herblin received an alarm that his business had been broken into at approximately 3:00 in the morning on March 14,2020.
Someone had thrown an object through the front glass door of his business; a restaurant premises that was under construction. Therestaurant was to be called Croque Saveurs once it opened. [15] Construction of the restaurant was ongoing and given the prior break-ins, Mr. Herblin had an alarm installed. When the alarmwent off at approximately 3:00 in the morning on March 14, 2020, Mr. Herblin got out of bed and drove his vehicle, a Mazda 3, to thescene of the break-in to investigate. Mr.
Herblin called 911 upon his arrival and reported that he had observed two individuals enter theCroque Saveurs premises, which was located in a strip mall on Bow Trail. Of note, the Croque Saveurs restaurant premises shared aninterior wall with a cannabis store called Spiritleaf. [16] Mr. Herblin met with police at the scene of the break-in, with police investigating and finding the premises empty. After thepolice departed, Mr. Herblin stayed behind, ostensibly to clean and secure his business. [17] The offenders travelled to another area of Calgary with a plan to possibly rob a different marijuana dispensary.
This plan wasnot executed, and slightly before 6:00 in the morning, they returned to the Croque Saveurs location to determine if they could now gainaccess to the adjacent Spiritleaf store. They both drove - and then walked - around the store just prior to Mr. Herblin’s death. [18] They were driving in a Black Dodge Caliber vehicle, which was depicted on various CCTV footage shown to the jury. TheCCTV footage shows Mr. Holloway exit the Dodge Caliber on Bow Trail, while carrying a pipe-like object. Mr. Holloway used theobject to smash the driver’s side window and the windshield of the Mazda 3.
He then left the scene. [19] In apparent response to his car being vandalized, Mr. Herblin exited the Croque Saveurs premises and went to check on his
vehicle. As he was doing so, Mr. Dodgson ran up to Mr. Herblin. He then committed a physical assault during which Mr. Herblin was repeatedly stabbed, following which Mr. Dodgson ran away. [ 20 ] A Shell gas station attendant heard an individual call out for help shortly after 6:00 am on March 14, 2020. She eventually discovered Mr. Herblin, who informed her that he had been stabbed with a knife. She called 911, but Mr. Herblin succumbed to his injuries. [ 21 ] Dr. Eric Bol performed the post-mortem examination and autopsy of Mr. Herblin’s body. Dr. Bol gave evidence that Mr.
Herblin had suffered from nine stab wounds which were consistent with a single-edged weapon, such as a knife. [ 22 ] Dr. Eric Bol testified that four of the stab wounds were superficial. Two of the stab wounds entered bodily cavities but did not result in any significant injuries or internal bleeding. However, three of the stab wounds were sustained to the right side of Mr. Herblin’s chest, resulting in injury to his internal organs and bleeding into the chest cavity. He further testified that all three chest wounds were serious and caused a significant accumulation of blood into Mr.
Herblin’s chest cavity. [ 23 ] Dr. Bol opined that given these wounds, Mr. Herblin died of blood loss. The three most serious stab wounds measured 9.1 cm, 8.3 cm, and 12.1 cm in depth. He also noted some superficial abrasion-type of injuries on Mr. Herblin’s body. III. What are the issues on sentencing? [ 24 ] Given the above, the jury faced only one chief issue, being whether the Crown had established that Mr. Holloway and Mr. Dodgson possessed the requisite mens rea for either: (
i) murder; or (ii) manslaughter. [ 25 ] The acts of both men were not in dispute. That is, the evidence clearly established that Mr. Holloway smashed out the windows in the Mazda 3 and that shortly thereafter, Mr. Dodgson ran up to the vehicle and stabbed Mr. Herblin, who had been drawn outdoors by the vandalism. Dr. Bol’s opinion as to cause of death was unchallenged. [ 26 ] The main issue therefore turned on whether each offender possessed the requisite intent for homicide. The jury found that Mr. Dodgson possessed the required intent for murder when he stabbed Mr. Herblin. Having found that Mr.
Holloway did not possess the intent for murder, the jury found that he committed an unlawful act in circumstances in which a reasonable person would have recognized as placing Mr. Herblin at risk for bodily harm that was neither trivial nor transitory, and that the commission of this unlawful act contributed significantly to Mr. Herblin’s death. My findings therefore relate to these chief issues before the jury. IV. Express and Implied Factual Implications [ 27 ] I am bound by the express and/or implied factual implications of the jury’s verdicts. These factual implications include the following. A.
Intent and Intoxication [ 28 ] Mr. Dodgson took the position that given his level of intoxication, he could not have formed the intent required for murder. He argued that due to his advanced state of intoxication, he could only be convicted of manslaughter. [ 29 ] Specifically, Mr. Dodgson gave evidence that given his consumption of alcohol and drugs, he was in a “blackout state”. He recalled running around the corner of the strip mall and getting into an altercation or “tussle” with an individual (Mr. Herblin). He indicated that Mr. Herblin was holding onto a bottle and attempted to restrain Mr. Dodgson. Mr.
Dodgson indicated that Mr. Herblin stated that he would hold on to Mr. Dodgson for the police. [ 30 ] Mr. Dodgson further stated that they both fell to the ground and that the next thing he recalled was running away from the area in which the altercation had occurred. [ 31 ] I find that in the hours preceding the assault, Mr. Dodgson consumed both drugs and alcohol. While this may have impaired his judgment, Mr.
Dodgson was not so intoxicated that he did not have the necessary intent to commit the offence, nor did any intoxication interfere with his ability to foresee or measure the natural consequences of his action. That is, he possessed specific intent, as opposed to general intent. This finding is consistent with the jury’s verdict. [ 32 ] While Mr. Holloway also consumed both drugs and alcohol over the relevant time period, he did not argue that his level of intoxication affected his ability to form an intent to commit murder. In any event, the jury found him guilty of manslaughter, a general intent offence.
I find Mr. Holloway’s level of intoxication did not, and could not, affect his ability to form the intent required to commit the offence of manslaughter. B. Routes to Liability 1. Mr. Dodgson [ 33 ] The jury found that Mr. Dodgson caused the death of Mr. Herblin. Mr. Dodgson committed an unlawful act in the stabbing assault upon Mr. Herblin, and that act caused Mr. Herblin’s death. [ 34 ] In examining the question of whether Mr. Dodgson possessed the intent required for murder, the jury was instructed that there
were two different ways in which this could be established. Namely, that Mr. Dodgson: (
a) actually intended to cause Mr. Herblin’sdeath; or (
b) intended to cause Mr. Herblin bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause Mr. Herblin’s death and was reckless as towhether death ensued or not. [35] It is not implicit in the verdict which of these two paths the jury chose to establish intent. Nor, in relation to Mr. Dodgson,need I attempt to do so. The jury is entitled to reach a conclusion as to guilt by different paths and on different theories of the case, asalong as their finding is unanimous. [36] In Mr. Dodgson’s case, a conviction for second degree murder carries an automatic life sentence.
Section 745(
c) of theCriminal Code provides that when imposing a sentence of imprisonment for life in cases of second-degree murder, the offender isineligible for parole for a period of at least 10 years and that such parole ineligibility may be set for a period of up to 25 years. Inproviding for a sliding scale of parole ineligibility, the legislation and the courts have recognized that a broad range of factors mayinform upon an appropriate sentence: see R v Bhullar, 2008 BCSC 1897 at para 26. [37] I accept that in this instance there is no need to determine which path to liability applies to Mr. Dodgson.
This is due to thefact that whether Mr. Dodgson actually intended to kill Mr. Herblin, or whether he intended to cause Mr. Herblin bodily harm he knewwas likely to cause death, and was reckless as to the result, Mr. Dodgson possessed subjective foresight of death. That is, the mens rea ofsecond-degree murder can be established by proving either intent or recklessness as to causing death. However, the law does notdistinguish a difference in moral culpability based on either form of intent. [38] In R v Nygaard, (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 1074, Cory J discussed the distinction between what was then section212(a)(
i) and
section 212(a)(ii) [now
section 229(a)(
i) and
section 229(a)(ii)] of the Criminal Code in addressing the argument that the“recklessness” mens rea requirement under
section 229(a)(ii) made a homicide under this
section less grave than a homicide undersection 229(a)(
i) in which an offender “means to cause death”. He found at para 58 that: ... I cannot accept that contention. The variation in the degree of culpability is too slight to take into account.[...] Society would, I think,find the drawing of any differentiation in the degree of culpability an exercise in futility. The difference in the calibration on the scaleof culpability is too minute to merit a distinction. I would conclude that the crime defined in s. 212(a)(ii) can properly bedescribed as murder and on a “culpability scale” it varies so little from s. 212(a)(
i) as to be indistinguishable. [Emphasis added.] [39] As such, I need not resolve the factual issue of whether Mr. Dodgson meant to kill Mr. Herblin or meant to cause him gravebodily harm and was reckless as to the result. It is enough that, under either form of mens rea, the jury unanimously found that thiselement of the offence had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. 2. Mr. Holloway [40] I turn next to Mr. Holloway. I reiterate that the Crown took the position that Mr. Holloway was guilty of homicide as a partyto the offence.
The jury accepted this submission, but found that the evidence did not establish an intent to commit murder on therequisite standard. [41] In Stephens, the Court discussed a judge’s role in the fact-finding exercise for sentencing where two different paths tomanslaughter were before the jury. Notably it found as follows: In my view, it is not implicit in the verdict that the jury chose the second path to manslaughter versus the first. To say so would beimpermissibly reconstructing the jury’s reasoning contrary to Ferguson.
Moreover, R v Thatcher, (SCC), [1987] 1SCR 652 confirms that jurors may arrive at a unanimous verdict for different reasons and on different theories of the case. Quiteconceivably, some may have chosen the first path and some the second, with a unanimous destination: Stephens at para 19. [Emphasis added.] [42] Similarly, in R v Cayen, 2022 NWTSC 16, the Court engaged in findings of fact after a jury trial resulting in a manslaughterconviction, where more than one possible path to finding manslaughter existed.
The Court held as follows, at para 14: To try and determine why the jury reached a verdict of manslaughter and what path they took is to do what Ferguson specifically saysnot to do, that a sentencing judge is not to attempt to reconstruct the logical reasoning of the jury. My task is to accept all facts expressedor implied that are essential to the jury’s verdict… [43] In the case at bar, the pathways open to the jury to convict Mr. Holloway of manslaughter were: (
i) he acted to aid or abet Mr.Dodgson in committing the unlawful assault upon Mr. Herblin; and/or (ii) he formed a common intention to carry out an unlawful actwith Mr. Dodgson. [44] The jury must have found that Mr. Holloway was guilty of a culpable homicide under section 222(5)(
a) of the Criminal Code– causing the death of another by means of an unlawful act. This was the sole option available on the evidence. [45] While counsel for Mr. Holloway suggests that a manslaughter conviction under section 21(2) of the Criminal Code was notavailable on certain evidence, I disagree. In my view, the jury may have determined that a path to a guilty verdict for manslaughter wasavailable either as an aider/abettor or in pursuit of a common intention. That is, Mr.
Holloway may have intended to help/encourage Mr.Dodgson in circumstances where a reasonable person would have appreciated the foreseeable consequences of non-trivial bodily harmbefalling Mr. Herblin. Alternatively, Mr. Holloway could have joined Mr. Dodgson in a common unlawful purpose without foreseeingthe probability of murder, but in circumstances where a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk of non-trivial bodily harm as aresult of carrying out the common intention. A party to an offence may be guilty of manslaughter under sections 21(1)(b), 21(1)(
c) or21(2) of the Criminal Code in instances where the principal is guilty of murder: see R v Jackson, (SCC), [1993] 4 SCR573 at pages 583 and 587 – 588.
[ 46 ] The evidence was capable of supporting a conviction for manslaughter as either an aider/abettor or in carrying out a common intention. The jury could have reached its verdict under any of these paths. In my view, it is not incumbent upon me to determine which path was used for the purposes of sentencing.
That is, as each path is based upon objective foresight of death, establishing which specific path is not necessary for establishing the moral culpability findings required to determine a fit sentence. [ 47 ] As noted in the case law above, where an ambiguity exists as to which path to manslaughter may have been chosen, it is incumbent upon this Court to set out the salient facts for the purposes of sentencing: see R v Moreira , 2021 ONCA 507 at paras 48-50 . [ 48 ] In the case at bar, both the period of parole ineligibility (for Mr. Dodgson) and length of sentence (for Mr.
Holloway) will be reflected, in part, by their degree of moral culpability. Aside from the undisputed evidence before the jury – as outlined above – I make the following factual findings. C. Evidence of Planning/Agreement [ 49 ] I make the following findings of fact which are essential to the jury’s verdicts. [ 50 ] Prior to the fatal assault, Mr. Dodgson and Mr. Holloway entered into a discussion wherein they arranged to get Mr. Herblin into a position where he would be unable to prevent or deter them from entering the Croque Saveurs premises in order to rob the adjacent Spiritleaf store.
I say this mindful of the fact that Mr. Dodgson denied entering into any such conversation and that Mr. Holloway admitted that there may have been a “small discussion” but that the use of violence was not contemplated. Again, I approach the evidence as a whole utilizing the analytical framework suggested in W(D) . [ 51 ] Despite being both a Vetrovec witness and having consumed drugs and alcohol over the relevant time period, the evidence of AB was consistent over time and was largely corroborated by various CCTV footage.
AB indicated that by the relevant time frame, the other occupants of the Dodge Caliber (including “Gucci”) had departed and that just her and Mr. Dodgson and Mr. Holloway remained in the vehicle. [ 52 ] AB indicated that they circled the strip mall, at which point they observed Mr. Herblin sitting in his Mazda 3. She described how at one point during this series of events they parked the Dodge at the back of the mall and had a discussion about how they had “everything that they needed in the back of the car”. [ 53 ] The CCTV footage confirmed that Mr.
Herblin had been sitting in his vehicle and had just exited it to go back inside of the Croque Saveurs restaurant premises. [ 54 ] I find that after circling in the Dodge Caliber, the offenders entered into a discussion going back and forth as to “who was going to do what” in relation to how they were going to enter the Croque Saveurs premises. There was a discussion about possibly restraining Mr. Herblin, which included Mr. Holloway approaching from the west side of the strip mall and Mr. Dodgson approaching from the opposite side. The discussion included approaching Mr.
Herblin as he sat in the vehicle and taking certain measures, including taking a possible set of keys off of him. [ 55 ] Notably, the discussion contemplated the possible use of violence in either getting Mr. Herblin to comply or in restraining him. The use of a knife was discussed and, specifically, there was a discussion about possibly stabbing Mr. Herblin if he resisted. The two offenders were frustrated by this point in the early morning hours. [ 56 ] The existence of some form of plan or agreement is evidenced by the coordinated timing of the attack, again as confirmed by the CCTV cameras. Mr.
Holloway was dropped off on Bow Trail at approximately 6:02 am on March 14, 2020 and can be seen holding a long pipe in his hand. He admitted being dropped off and possessing this pipe in his evidence. [ 57 ] The footage then tracks the Dodge Caliber entering the back alley behind the strip mall, immediately after depositing Mr. Holloway. The footage captured Mr. Dodgson running towards Mr. Herblin at 6:03 am. He was further captured running away from the parking lot at approximately 6:04 am. Again, while Mr.
Dodgson denied a firm recollection of events, he did recall getting into a “tussle” with an individual near the Mazda 3. When the time it took for Mr. Dodgson to run across the parking lot is subtracted from the equation, his total interaction with Mr. Herblin lasted approximately 48 seconds. [ 58 ] I find that both offenders agreed to work together or to assist one another in restraining or detaining Mr. Herblin in order to gain access to the Spiritleaf store. Mr. Holloway approached the Mazda 3 and, finding it empty, smashed out the vehicle’s windows in order to lure Mr. Herblin out into the parking lot.
After breaking the windows, Mr. Holloway left the scene on foot, looking back over his shoulder once as Mr. Dodgson approached the Mazda 3. [ 59 ] As mentioned above, Mr. Herblin exited the Croque Saveurs premises in order to deal with his vandalized vehicle. While in the parking lot, Mr. Dodgson approached him. I find that - for whatever reason - his interaction with Mr. Herblin did not proceed as anticipated. At this point, Mr. Dodgson took the knife with which he was armed and stabbed Mr. Herblin nine times.
Five of these stab wounds entered bodily cavities and three of the wounds caused serious bleeding and, ultimately, death. [ 60 ] In so acting, Mr. Dodgson either intended to cause the death of Mr. Herblin or intended to cause him bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause him death, and was reckless as to whether death ensued. Again, Mr. Herblin was able to make it to about the Shell gas station after he was stabbed, and Mr. Dodgson ran off after the stabbing. [ 61 ] Mr. Holloway did not know that Mr. Dodgson was going to kill Mr. Herblin at the time he smashed the windows of the Mazda 3, thus luring Mr.
Herblin outside. He did know that there would be an attempt to restrain or subdue Mr. Herblin, and that this action would necessarily involve some form of assault. [ 62 ] Mr. Holloway was a part of the earlier conversation wherein the possible use of violence was discussed. A reasonable person
in the same circumstances would have therefore understood that they were assisting or participating in a scheme in which serious bodily harm was a foreseeable consequence of the unlawful assault. V. Victim Impact Statement [ 63 ] Mr. Herblin’s widow, Jean, prepared a victim impact statement for the Court. In it, she speaks of her loss of a husband, partner and friend. She described what happened as a “nightmare” and expressed a daily heaviness in her heart and feeling as though she is operating in a constant state of grief.
She stated that waiting to find out why her kind, gentle and generous husband was taken from her has been extremely difficult, and that she “will never understand how someone could have such disregard for another human being to think they are dispensable”. [ 64 ] Ms. Jean Herblin continues to experience insomnia and anxiety. She also spoke of the devastating impact that the loss has had on the couple’s daughter as she moves through the various milestones of life without her father. Joy has been taken from their lives. [ 65 ] The offenders’ actions have clearly caused irreparable harm to Mrs.
Herblin and the couple’s daughter. Society at large too suffers a harm with the loss of one of its members in such a callous, needless fashion. VI. Principles of Sentencing [ 66 ]
Section 718 of the Criminal Code sets out the core objectives in sentencing. It provides as follows: Purpose 718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (
a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; (
b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (
c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (
d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (
e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (
f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community. [ 67 ] All sentencing must start by acknowledging the fundamental principle contained in
section 718.1 of the Criminal Code , which provides that “a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”: see R v Friesen , 2020 SCC 9 at para 30 . [ 68 ] The principle of proportionality was explained by Lebel J in R v Ipeelee , 2012 SCC 13 at para 37 as follows: The fundamental principle of sentencing (i.e., proportionality) is intimately tied to the fundamental purpose of sentencing — the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society through the imposition of just sanctions.
Whatever weight a judge may wish to accord to the various objectives and other principles listed in the Code , the resulting sentence must respect the fundamental principle of proportionality. Proportionality is the sine qua non of a just sanction. First, the principle ensures that a sentence reflects the gravity of the offence. This is closely tied to the objective of denunciation.
It promotes justice for victims and ensures public confidence in the justice system. […] Second, the principle of proportionality ensures that a sentence does not exceed what is appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender. In this sense, the principle serves a limiting or restraining function and ensures justice for the offender. In the Canadian criminal justice system, a just sanction is one that reflects both perspectives on proportionality and does not elevate one at the expense of the other. [ 69 ] Additional sentencing considerations are provided in s 718.2 of the Criminal Code .
Given the matters before me, the relevant considerations include: (
a) that a sentence may be increased or reduced for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstance with respect to the offence or the offender; (
b) that a sentence should be similar to those sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances; (
d) that an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and (
e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to the victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. [ 70 ] As per our Court of Appeal in R v Alcantara , 2017 ABCA 56 at para 99 , in crafting a fit sentence, one must bear in mind that: A sentence is to be the product of consideration of the established principles of sentencing, being: proportionality, legality, rationality, individuality, parity (including equality before the law) and restraint.
The extent and contours of these principles are informed by the constitutional, social and ethical values that society expects will be reflected in sentencing and which are essential to our notions of justice and our belief in the rule of law. These principles apply to every case, but are subject to the priority of proportionality chosen by
Parliament, and a balancing which is influenced by what the court considers to be the relevant objectives under s 718 of the Code. [71] In this instance, both offenders are Indigenous. Their circumstances have been described, in part, above. I remain alive to theinstruction of the Court in R v Gladue, (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 688 at para 66 to: …pay particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders, with the implication that those circumstances are significantlydifferent from those of non-aboriginal offenders. The background considerations regarding the distinct situation of aboriginal peoples inCanada encompass a wide range of unique circumstances, including, most particularly: (
A) The unique systemic or background factors which may have played a
part in bringing the particular aboriginal offender before thecourts; and (
B) The types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender because of his orher particular aboriginal heritage or connection. ... [72] The impact of these circumstances was more recently discussed in Ipeelee, where the Court explained, at paras 73 – 74 that: First, systemic and background factors may bear on the culpability of the offender, to the extent that they shed light on his or her level ofmoral blameworthiness. This is perhaps more evident in Wells where Iacobucci J. described these circumstances as “the unique systemicor background factors that are mitigating in nature in that they may have played a
part in the aboriginal offender’s conduct” (Wells, atpara. 38 (emphasis added)). Canadian criminal law is based on the premise that criminal liability only follows from voluntary conduct.Many Aboriginal offenders find themselves in situations of social and economic deprivation with a lack of opportunities and limitedoptions for positive development.
While this rarely — if ever — attains a level where one could properly say that their actions were notvoluntary and therefore not deserving of criminal sanction, the reality is that their constrained circumstances may diminish their moralculpability. […] Failing to take these circumstances into account would violate the fundamental principle of sentencing — that thesentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.
The existence of suchcircumstances may also indicate that a sanction that takes account of the underlying causes of the criminal conduct may be moreappropriate than one only aimed at punishment per se. […] The second set of circumstances — the types of sanctions which may be appropriate — bears not on the degree of culpability of theoffender, but on the effectiveness of the sentence itself.
As Cory and Iacobucci JJ. point out, at para. 73 of Gladue: “What is important torecognize is that, for many if not most aboriginal offenders, the current concepts of sentencing are inappropriate because they havefrequently not responded to the needs, experiences, and perspectives of aboriginal people or aboriginal communities.” […] The Gladueprinciples direct sentencing judges to abandon the presumption that all offenders and all communities share the same values when itcomes to sentencing and to recognize that, given these fundamentally different world views, different or alternative sanctions may moreeffectively achieve the objectives of sentencing in a particular community. [emphasis in original] [73] As recently commented upon by this Court in R v Delorme, 2019 ABQB 2, statutorily imposed parole ineligibility periods aredifficult to reconcile with a meaningful consideration of the Gladue factors: para 90.
I note this in relation to Mr. Dodgson, given that hisconviction for second degree murder carries with it a minimum parole ineligibility period. [74] With the above sentencing principles in mind, I turn to an appropriate sentence for each offender. VII. Analysis and Conclusions [75] Although both Mr. Holloway and Mr. Dodgson committed a homicide - that is, the culpable killing of Mr.
Herblin – eachindividual was convicted of a separate offence. [76] As such, while the two individuals worked in tandem for much of the evening, I shall highlight the specific actions of eachoffender as well as their personal circumstances as it relates to an assessment of their individual moral culpability as required. Sentencingis an individualized process – unique to the particular offender and their
part in crime committed. I turn, therefore, to the particular rolesplayed by each of Mr. Dodgson and Mr. Holloway and how their individual moral culpability may be best reflected in a just sentence. A. Mr. Dodgson [77] Pursuant to
section 235 of the Criminal Code, everyone who commits first or second-degree murder shall be sentenced toimprisonment for life.
Section 745(
c) of the Criminal Code provides that in cases of second degree murder the sentence shall beimprisonment for life with no eligibility for parole until at least 10 years of that sentence have been served.
In accordance with section745.4, the sentencing judge may substitute a period of parole eligibility of greater than 10 but no more than 25 years. [78] As recently confirmed by this Court in R v Ledesma, 2019 ABQB 204 (“Ledesma 2019”), the fixing of the period of paroleineligibility is part of the punishment for second-degree murder and, accordingly, forms an important element of sentencing policy: para34. [79] The Crown takes the position that Mr. Dodgson’s parole ineligibility period should be set between the range of 15-18 years.
Itsubmits that a sentence in this range is proportional considering the gravity of the offence and Mr. Dodgson’s degree of moralculpability. The Crown asserts that the primary sentencing principles in this instance are denunciation, deterrence and protection of thepublic. [80] The parity principle means that a sentence should be “similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences
committed in similar circumstances”. The Crown relies on a number of cases which it says are comparable in degree of severity andmoral blameworthiness. These include: R v Ledesma, 2022 ABCA 285 (“Ledesma 2022”); R v Kollie, 2021 ABCA 389; R vStrongman, 2007 ABCA 413, and; R v Hanley, 1999 ABCA 27. [81] Counsel for Mr. Dodgson asserts that a just and proportionate period of parole ineligibility should be set between 10-12 years.Mr.
Dodgson relies on the following cases in support of this suggested range: R v Powder, 2018 ABQB 1028; R v Frenchman, 2019ABQB 580; Ledesma 2019; R v Chretien, (ONSC), and; R v Yliruusi, 2011 BCSC 268. [82] In fixing an appropriate period of parole ineligibility, the court should pay regard to the character of the offender, the natureof the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission and any recommendations made by the jury: see s 745.4 of theCriminal Code and the Court’s discussion in R v Shropshire, 1995 SCC 47.
In Shropshire, the Court confirmed that fixing a paroleineligibility figure is a very fact-sensitive process: para 20. This aligns with sentencing as a whole being an individualized processrequiring the judge to weigh the sentencing objectives in a manner best reflecting the circumstances of the case: R v Nasogaluak, 2010SCC 6. [83] The Court in Shropshire went on to clarify that the fundamental objectives of a sentence (as enumerated in
section 718 of theCriminal Code) can be obtained through a careful crafting of the parole ineligibility period. In crafting this period, it stated, at para 31: …In permitting a sliding scale of parole ineligibility, Parliament intended to recognize that, within the category of second degree murder,there will be a broad range of seriousness reflecting varying degrees of moral culpability.
As a result, the period of parole ineligibility forsecond degree murder will run anywhere between a minimum of 10 years and a maximum of 25… [84] In discussing the minimum 10-year period it went on to state, at para 33 that: If the objective of s. 744 [now 745.4] is to give the trial judge an element of discretion in sentencing to reflect the fact that within seconddegree murder there is both a range of seriousness and varying degrees of moral culpability, then it is incorrect to start from theproposition that the sentence must be the statutory minimum unless there are unusual circumstances.
As discussed supra, a preferableapproach would be to view the 10-year period as a minimum contingent on what the “judge deems fit in the circumstances,” the contentof this “fitness” being informed by the criteria listed in s. 744. As held in other Canadian jurisdictions, the power to extend the period ofparole ineligibility need not be sparingly used. [85] In relating the factors set out in
section 745.4 of the Criminal Code to the sentencing objectives and principles containedelsewhere in the Criminal Code, I have regard to Justice Picard’s majority comments in R v Ryan, 2015 ABCA 286 at para 49 [leave forappeal to SCC dismissed ] that the factors laid out in
section 745.4: … are necessary considerations in a court’s search for a fit and proportional disposition.
But they are not exclusive considerations.Rather, when properly linked to the policies and considerations expressed in ss 718 to 726.2 of the Code, s 745.4 identifies specific areasof primary regard that must be taken into account in determining the period of parole ineligibility. [emphasis in original] [86] This means that in addition to the considerations listed under s 745.4 of the Criminal Code, objectives including denunciation,future dangerousness, deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation are considerations in determining parole ineligibility: Shropshire; R vGuignard, 2008 ABQB 283 at para 9, aff’d 2014 ABCA 315. [87] In determining an appropriate period of parole ineligibility for Mr.
Dodgson, I turn first to factors set out in s 745.4, beginningwith the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission. The offence of murder is one of the gravest offencesincluded in the Criminal Code. Mr. Herblin’s life has been cut short. A wife has lost her husband and a daughter has lost her father. Thedevastating impact upon the family is well reflected through the victim impact statement and Mrs. Herblin’s emotional testimony duringtrial. [88] In addition to the direct harm occasioned to Mr. Herblin’s family and friends,
an act of murder also causes harm to society andits values. Mr. Herblin was in the final phases of opening his own business. He had gone to Croque Saveurs after it had been initiallybroken into by the offenders and appeared to be simply cleaning up and securing the premises when he was killed merely because theoffenders wanted access to the cannabis store. This senseless act of violence offends society’s sense of decency and morality. [89] While Mr. Dodgson may not have to set out to commit such a horrific crime, he very quickly resorted to deadly violenceduring his brief encounter with the victim.
After inflicting grievous bodily harm, Mr. Dodgson left Mr. Herblin alone in a dark parkinglot, where the deceased unsuccessfully tried to flag down passing motorists before stumbling to the nearby gas station to seek medicalassistance. The attack itself was swift but vicious, and Mr. Dodgson’s subsequent act of abandoning a severely wounded victim wascallous. [90] In taking these actions, Mr. Dodgson was motivated by an intent to gain access to the Spiritleaf cannabis store in order to robit, as he had done previously. When his initial attempt to rob Spiritleaf at 3:00 am on March 14, 2020, by breaking into Mr.
Herblin’sadjacent restaurant was not successful, he drove around the city looking at other potential stores to rob. When these locations did not panout, he returned to the Bow Trail premises. He was running out of time to commit a robbery prior to daybreak. He was going to gainaccess to the Spiritleaf store even if he had to resort to an assault to do so. [91] There was some evidence of planning concerning the assault that led to Mr. Herblin’s death. The offenders discussed howthey might restrain Mr. Herblin in order to successfully access the cannabis store.
They circled the strip mall in the car, observing Mr.Herblin. The timing of events on the CCTV footage demonstrates a coordinated attack. This negates a finding that Mr. Dodgson’s actionswere purely impulsive, although I do conclude that the planning was minimal. [92] In my view, Mr. Dodgson’s activities throughout the evening demonstrate a disregard for the law and the safety of others. Hehad stolen the Dodge Caliber the offenders drove around in all evening. He had apparently consumed alcohol, marijuana, cocaine andmeth earlier in the evening, yet he drove back from Morley into Calgary.
This demonstrates a reckless and cavalier attitude toward both
the property and the safety of others which, in my view, manifested itself again during his assault upon Mr. Herblin. [93] I would characterize the nature of the offence and the circumstances in which it was committed as a violent, senseless andtragic act, motivated by an intent to rob Spiritleaf. The initial decision to assault Mr. Herblin was pre-planned, although the plan was farfrom sophisticated, and the extent of the assault seemingly evolved as events unfolded. The encounter was brief but violent, with Mr.Dodgson very quickly resorting to the use of his knife.
His actions in leaving a seriously wounded man alone and unable to summon anyassistance in a timely fashion were callous. [94] I turn next to an examination of the character of the offender. Prior to the sentencing hearing, I received a Gladue report forMr. Dodgson, summarized below. [95] Mr. Dodgson was 27 years old at the time of the offence. His mother is non-status from the Cadotte Lake Woodland CreeFirst Nation and his father is Caucasian. His parents separated just after his birth, and he does not have any relationship with his father.He has a number of half-siblings but is not close with any of them.
He has a positive relationship with his mother and considers her to bea primary support person in his life. His maternal grandmother attended residential school, but he did not get to know her very well. Hewas very close to his maternal grandfather, who passed away when Mr. Dodgson was 14 years old. Mr. Dodgson struggled emotionallywith this loss. He recently lost two close friends to suicide. [96] When Mr. Dodgson was two-years old he was first apprehended from his mother’s care by Child and Family Services due tohis mother’s substance abuse issues and occurrences of domestic violence in the home.
He was placed in his uncle’s care for a two-yearperiod and then returned to live with his mother. [97] Unfortunately, Mr. Dodgson’s mother continued to struggle with addiction issues. Mr. Dodgson also continued to witnessepisodes of domestic abuse in the home, which he described as traumatizing. [98] His mother was arrested when he was six and Mr. Dodgson was placed with his maternal grandfather, again for a two-yearperiod, until his mother was released. Mr. Dodgson and his grandfather attended Sweatlodge ceremonies and Sundances together. [99] When Mr. Dodgson was nine, he moved to Edmonton with his mother.
He began using marijuana at this time. At the age of10, he joined a gang called the “Crips”. His mother then moved them both to Calgary to remove Mr. Dodgson from his negative peergroup and to be closer to her current partner with whom she enjoys a healthy relationship. By the age of 14, Mr. Dodgson again startedassociating with negative peers and began using cocaine. [100] By the time he turned 16, his mother had kicked him out of the family home as he had begun bringing home stolen goods. Hewas expelled for fighting in the second semester of grade 12 and never returned to school.
He joined another gang at the age of 17. [101] While a teenager, Mr. Dodgson participated in an anger management program which included cultural components such asattendance at Sweatlodge ceremonies and spending time with Elders. [102] Mr. Dodgson was incarcerated for the first time when he was 18 years old. Since then, he has been in and out of custody on aregular basis. He has been subject to multiple community supervision orders, but often breached his conditions due to his addictionissues. [103] Mr. Dodgson began using alcohol at age 19 and fentanyl at age 24. He began using meth at age 26.
His Gladue report indicatesthat his drug use has continued while in remand, although he has been sober on and off while incarcerated. He acknowledged that he usessubstances to cope with pain and grief and has expressed a desire to attend a residential treatment facility, as well as programs includingthe support of Elders following his release. [104] When Mr. Dodgson was 23, he had a daughter, who was approximately five years old at the time of the offence. When hisdaughter was six months old, he took full custody of her, as her mother was homeless and using drugs. [105] Mr.
Dodgson’s daughter currently resides with his mother. Mr. Dodgson speaks with his daughter daily and he is hopeful toregain custody of her upon his release from prison and completion of a treatment program. [106] Mr. Dodgson has been remanded since his arrest. While in the Calgary Remand Centre he has been treated for depression andanxiety. [107] My analysis of Mr. Dodgson’s character involves an intersection with the above Gladue analysis: R v Laboucane, 2016 ABCA176 at paras 56-64 (leave to appeal refused: (SCC)).
The chief purpose of a Gladue analysis is to achieveproportionality, taking into consideration the gravity of the offence and the degree of moral responsibility of the offender: R v Swampy,2017 ABCA 134 at paras 21-25. [108] A review of Mr. Dodgson’s Gladue report highlights certain unique systemic or background factors which may have played apart in bringing him before this Court. As recently confirmed in R v Dichrow, 2022 ABCA 282 at para 47, a consideration of thesefactors may inform upon Mr. Dodgson’s culpability for the offence in question. [109] There is no question that Mr.
Dodgson experienced many hardships during his upbringing. He appears to have been raised inpart on his mother’s reserve and in cities, moving to Calgary when he was 11. [110] As noted above, Mr. Dodgson was apprehended by social services due to his mother’s addiction issues, and was placedtemporarily with various family members.
He joined his first of many gangs at a young age and, while still a youth started using drugsand alcohol and committing crime to support himself and his addiction. [111] Both systemic factors and particular individual factors – in this instance addiction, trauma, and family breakdown – bear upon
the level of Mr. Dodgson’s moral culpability. In my view, Mr. Dodgson’s upbringing created circumstances of limited economic and social opportunities. These opportunities appear to have remained constrained throughout his life; he was unemployed and appeared to have still been dealing with addiction issues at the time of the offence. [ 112 ] Mr. Dodgson’s Indigenous heritage has played some
part in bringing him before this Court as an offender. His upbringing, which includes childhood trauma and his ongoing addiction issues and continued immersion with negative peer influences leads me to conclude that he possessed limited options for positive development; the “cards were stacked against him” so to speak. Again, a sentence must reflect the degree of responsibility of an offender. [ 113 ] While these factors do not excuse Mr. Dodgson’s action, they help to some degree to explain them.
This explanation is a relevant factor. [ 114 ] However, while I accept that the systemic and individual factors discussed above play a role in assessing Mr. Dodgson’s moral culpability, I again note that any analysis as to the type of sanctions which may be more effective in justly sentencing an Indigenous offender are curtailed in this instance, given the statutory sentence mandated in cases of murder. [ 115 ] The Crown relies on Ledesma 2022 in support of its argument that Mr.
Dodgson is an incorrigible offender and that in such cases sentencing objectives focusing on restorative justice and rehabilitation are less significant in comparison to those focusing on public protection, personal deterrence and denunciation. The Crown takes the position that while Mr. Dodgson’s Gladue factors remain relevant, the nature of the offence coupled with Mr. Dodgson’s personal characteristics mean that these latter objectives are paramount.
As the Court held at paras 58-59 of Ledesma 2022 : [58] To be sure, Parranto is not authority for any proposition that if the crime is serious, the mere fact that there are relevant Gladue factors becomes irrelevant. Rather, Parranto underscores that even for very serious crimes the lens through which a fit sentence is perceived includes setting for a vision of the Gladue factors. Nevertheless, it is also well established by the cases that s 718.2(
e) of the Criminal Code does not create an automatic discount for indigenous offenders unrelated to principles such as proportionality. Such Gladue factors as exist must still be “salient” to the ascertainment of a fit sentence. […] [59] Viewing this case realistically, the tortured history of the appellant cannot change the fact that the public needs protection from him.
Tragically, that is sometimes the case with the result that the effect of those factors cannot overcome protection of the public: […]. [ 116 ] In Ledesma 2022 , the offender was already in remand following his arrest for aggravated assault when he killed a fellow inmate. Ledesma had a lengthy record (52 convictions) many of which were for crimes of violence/assaults, some of which took place while he was on probation. The offender was assessed as being “very high risk” for general recidivism and of “high risk” to use serious harm. Of note, Mr.
Ledesma had addiction issues but did not feel as though he required any treatment. Given Mr. Ledesma’s character, protection of the public was clearly the paramount objective, notwithstanding the relevant Gladue considerations. [ 117 ] I turn finally to the recommendations made by the jury. In this instance, six of the jury members made a recommendation for 10 years of parole ineligibility and six were silent. Case law diverges on how the court is to interpret “no recommendation”.
In R v Osei- Agyemang , 2011 ABCA 2 , the Court noted at para 14 that where the jury makes no recommendation, the recommendation is deemed to be 10 years. Our Court of Appeal also commented on instances where the jury’s recommendations have not been unanimous. The Court took the opinion that unanimity was not required: para 12. This approach can be contrasted with the approach taken by the courts in other jurisdictions: see for example R v Cerra , 2004 BCCA 594 at para 14 . [ 118 ] In any event, the jury’s recommendation is something that this Court may consider.
While it is something to be carefully regarded, I remain alive to the fact that the case law has stressed that “this recommendation is non-binding since the jury generally lacks a lot of relevant information”: Ryan at para 47 . In other cases, the jury may be privy to a variety of personal information informing as to the accused’s personal characteristics: Guignard at para 31 . In the case at bar, although the jury heard certain details of Mr. Dodgson’s life through his interview with police and during his testimony, they were not fully aware of the influences upon Mr.
Dodgson’s childhood that may have impacted upon his involvement in the current offence. This means the jury was not aware of all relevant considerations in assessing moral culpability. [ 119 ] The law is clear that I am to take a holistic view of the facts and to impose a fit and proportional sentence which reflects the goals that are most salient, given the nature of the offence and circumstances of the offender and further while taking into consideration any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. [ 120 ] Notwithstanding the very serious nature of the offence and Mr.
Dodgson’s limited efforts to engage in opportunities which might provide for further personal and social development, in my view, his Gladue factors remain salient to a determination of a fit sentence. His background circumstances have clearly played a role in bringing him before this Court and he seemingly has made some connection between his substance abuse and his criminal lifestyle.
His is not an entirely incorrigible case and this is not an instance where these factors are necessarily overcome by the objective of public protection. [ 121 ] I have considered the mitigating effect of the relevant Gladue factors as well as his limited attempts at addressing certain underlying factors. Also mitigating is his expression of remorse. Mr. Dodgson addressed the Court during this hearing and apologized for his actions and the hurt he has caused to the victim’s family. He acknowledged the role his addiction played in his actions and stated that in the future he will remain clean.
He stated that he wished he could go back in time and undo what was done. Tragically, he cannot. [ 122 ] While the above factors all play a mitigating role in assessing Mr. Dodgson’s moral culpability, I agree with the Crown that a number of aggravating factors have also been established on the requisite standard. [ 123 ] In Ryan , the majority of our Court of Appeal provided a non-exhaustive list of factors that might result in an increase in the period of parole ineligibility: para 59. In my view, certain of the aggravating factors alleged by the Crown have been established, while others have not.
[ 124 ] As discussed above, the assault occurred while both offenders were attempting to execute a shared plan to rob the adjacent cannabis store. I view the fact that the lethal assault occurred in the course of attempting to commit another crime as an aggravating factor: Ryan at para 57 (xvii); see also Hanley and Frenchman .
Section 725 (
c) of the Criminal Code provides that a sentencing court may consider any facts forming part of the circumstances of the offence that could constitute the basis for a separate charge. [ 125 ] Evidence of planning and deliberation including the taking of preparatory steps is an aggravating factor: Ryan at para 57 (xvi); see also R v Latimer , 2001 SCC 1 at para 85 . As noted above, both Mr. Dodgson and Mr. Holloway entered into a discussion that involved restraining Mr. Herblin in order incapacitate him, and using violence to do so, if required. The assault was therefore planned as opposed to spontaneous.
While Mr. Dodgson may not have decided to actually wield the knife until the assault was already underway, an attack in some form played a
part in the overarching premeditated plan to gain access to the premises. [ 126 ] Luring of a victim is also an aggravating factor: Ryan at para 57 (ii). Here, the plan between Mr. Dodgson and Mr. Holloway involved luring Mr. Herblin into a position in which he might be more easily incapacitated. [ 127 ] Tied into the above, I find that the vulnerability of Mr. Herblin in the circumstances is also aggravating. It took place in the dark in a near-abandoned setting because of the time of day, making it much more difficult for Mr. Herblin to seek any timely assistance.
This increased his vulnerability as a victim, although he may not fall under any “uniquely vulnerable” category of persons. In the circumstances at bar, Mr. Herblin’s position of being alone, looking after his unsecured business, and in the dark, made him more vulnerable, which I view as an aggravating factor: Ryan at para 57 (xi); see also R v Downey , 2012 NSSC 351 at para 17 . [ 128 ] The use of a weapon can be an aggravating factor: see R v C(SD) , 2013 ABCA 46 at para 25 . In this case, Mr. Dodgson used violence and inflicted injury with a knife, which he had brought to the location.
I view the use of a weapon to inflict nine wounds on Mr. Herblin to be an aggravating factor, although I do agree with counsel for Mr. Dodgson that, despite the number of stab wounds, this case is distinguishable from those where the courts have found the use of “gratuitous violence”, given both the nature of the assault and the time period over which it occurred. [ 129 ] Flight and attempts to cover up may also be aggravating: Ryan at para 57 (xii). Here, Mr. Dodgson indicated to Det. Cole that following the assault, he had given his clothing to another individual who had “gotten rid of” these belongings.
He then drove up to Northern Alberta for a period of time. When questioned by police, he was initially not truthful, and concocted a third-party suspect. These actions are somewhat aggravating. [ 130 ] The engagement of multiple perpetrators can be an aggravating factor: Ryan at para 57 (viii); see also R v TB , 2021 ABCA 17 at para 2 . However, this was not an instance where multiple perpetrators teamed up to assault a single individual, and in my view is distinguishable from cases where the number of perpetrators caused a victim to be more vulnerable to an attack.
I do not find the involvement of two offenders at separate times to be aggravating in this instance. [ 131 ] The Crown also asserts that both Mr. Dodgson and Mr. Holloway took steps to conceal their identity. While the offenders wore toques which they later appeared to have switched around, and at times had their jacket hoods pulled up, this could be equally consistent with dressing for the weather, as it was winter, and does not constitute an aggravating factor.
For example, I note that the McDonald’s CCTV footage shows an unidentified female previously with the group wearing a hat with her hoodie pulled up over it in the McDonald’s footage. I am mindful that Ferguson instructs that in order to rely upon any aggravating factors, I must be convinced of the existence of that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. [ 132 ] I am also satisfied, based on the evidence provided by AB and Sheriff Arndt, that Mr. Dodgson carved a statement that AB was a “KGB Rat” as well as the phrase “kill rats” into number 43 of the courthouse holding cells. I further accept that Mr.
Dodgson loudly called her a “rat” while they were both housed in the remand centre, on the first day of trial. I reject Mr. Dodgson’s testimony that any reference to AB being a rat was solely in connection to her decision to cooperate with police and provide them with information about stealing a car and doing a break and enter. Rather, I conclude that these expressions were made because AB was testifying for the Crown in Mr. Dodgson’s murder trial. [ 133 ] Mr. Dodgson is not a stranger to the criminal justice system.
He no doubt knows what it means to call someone a “rat” and what implications this might have for an in-custody Crown witness. I reject counsel’s submission that Mr. Dodgson was merely making an accurate factual statement. While no obstruction charges were pursued in relation to either this statement or to ones made to Ms. Chalifoux, I find Mr. Dodgson’s actions in making the cooperation of AB with the Crown known within the remand population to, at least, demonstrate a callous disregard for her wellbeing. [ 134 ] While Mr.
Dodgson’s actions in this regard may have been borne out of frustration and not for the specific aim of obstructing justice, I find that it carried with it the end result of possibly intimidating a participant in the justice system and is therefore somewhat aggravating: see R v Payne , 2007 BCCA 541 at para 48 . [ 135 ] Finally, a previous criminal record can be an aggravating factor. For sentencing purposes, the evidence proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Dodgson had prior convictions including convictions for: (
i) assault; (ii) failing to appear; (iii) failing to attend court; (iv) theft of a motor vehicle; (
v) possession of a weapon; (vi) failure to comply with a probation order; (vii) being unlawfully at large; (viii) obstructing a peace officer; (ix) possession of property obtained by crime under $5,000; (
x) failure to stop after an accident; and (xi) dangerous driving. [ 136 ] While not a minor record, Mr. Dodgson’s previous convictions do not demonstrate he was previously of dangerous character, although I do note the prior assault and weapons convictions. It may be, as Mr. Dodgson stated in his Gladue interview, that many of his previous convictions were linked to his addiction issues. [ 137 ] While I do agree with the Crown concerning the existence of a number of aggravated factors, I view its proposed parole ineligibility period as too high and find its comparable cases to be distinguishable.
In so stating, I acknowledge that sentencing is a highly individual process and that as such, precedents are of value on a more generalized basis, being of assistance in assessing proportionality after consideration of all of the legal sentencing principles, as adjusted for any aggravating or mitigating factors.
[ 138 ] In reviewing the following authorities, I am cognizant of the comments made by Slatter and Schutz JJA in Kollie at para 29 : …The point of Tran is not that counsel are precluded from citing other sentencing decisions, but rather that there is no such thing as a “factual precedent”. Prior decisions are only precedents on points of law, not on findings of fact: Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd. v Haynes , [1959] AC 743 . Collections of prior sentencing decisions are said to “embody the collective experience and wisdom of the judiciary”: Friesen , at para. 33 .
They do so, however, only at the most general level by reflecting particular outcomes of the proportionality analysis, after calibration following consideration of all the legal sentencing principles and the factual aggravating and mitigating circumstances. [ 139 ] In Kollie , our Court of Appeal upheld a 17-year parole ineligibility period for a murder committed during a planned robbery. There were three offenders, Mr. Kollie, Mr. Havyariama, and another who each played a role in what the Court described as a pre- mediated robbery involving a “high level of planning and sophistication”: para 6.
After the victim shopkeeper exited his store for the evening, he was pepper sprayed by Mr. Havyariama and his cash bag was taken by Mr. Kollie. The victim got up and chased down Mr. Kollie. A struggle ensued, during which Mr. Kollie stabbed the victim on six occasions and “sliced” him twice. During the struggle, Mr. Havyariama assisted Mr. Kollie by kicking and punching the victim in the head. The cause of death was the stab/slice wounds inflicted by Mr. Kollie, who was convicted of both robbery and second-degree murder.
The jury made no recommendations as to the ineligibility period. [ 140 ] While factually similar in that both cases involve a robbery plan gone awry, with offenders motivated by monetary gain, Kollie is distinguishable in several aspects. First, while the robbery/detainment of Mr. Herblin was planned, I do not find it involved “high level” planning nor any real “sophistication”. Rather, it appeared to be formed during the brief time the offenders circled the strip mall and seemed to be borne of last-minute frustration and desperation given all earlier attempts to rob an establishment. [ 141 ] While both Mr.
Herblin and the victim in Kollie were attacked in dark and isolated locations, the victim in Kollie was subject to a two-on-one assault, thus rendering him even more vulnerable. Both offenders also wore masks to conceal their identities, which I find did not occur in the case at bar. Further, while Mr. Kollie and Mr. Dodgson both had previous criminal records and committed serious offences after the offences in question, Mr. Kollie had a “lengthy and significant” criminal record and was on bail at the time of the offence and in breach of a weapons prohibition order. Finally, after the murder, Mr.
Kollie showed no remorse and attended a party where he bragged about his actions. Following conviction, he refused to fully cooperate in developing a presentence report. The trial judge described Mr. Kollie as “a danger to society” and concluded he “should be separated from society for a much longer period than the minimum”: Kollie at para 6 . [ 142 ] While Mr. Dodgson had a criminal record, I would not describe it as significant. The Court in Kollie found virtually no mitigating factors, outside a possible factor of youthfulness. Conversely, in addition to the Gladue factors outlined above which I find left Mr.
Dodgson with limited options for positive social development and thus impact upon his overall moral responsibility, Mr. Dodgson has expressed remorse for his actions. [ 143 ] In Strongman , our Court of Appeal upheld a 22-year parole ineligibility period for an offender (Crane) who participated in a brutal group attack upon a taxi driver in the course of a pre-planned robbery. When the group instructed the driver to pull over, Crane went to the driver’s side door of the taxi and stabbed the victim before pulling him out from the cab where he and a co-accused continued the attack.
They then placed the victim in the trunk. When the victim was heard banging, Crane stated “let’s go finish this” and he and another co-accused attended to the trunk, after which no further sounds were heard. The group had previously been drinking and consuming drugs, and money was taken from the interior of the cab some of which was used to buy more drugs. One of the groups in the taxi later told police what had happened. [ 144 ] The offender Crane was convicted of second-degree murder, unlawful confinement and robbery. Strongman has certain similarities to the case at bar.
Both involved a seemingly non-sophisticated attack as a part of a robbery. Both involved multiple parties, although the victim in Strongman was assaulted in a two-on-one situation. Mr. Crane committed aggravated assault while in remand on his murder charge while Mr. Dodgson is alleged to have done so. The Court found Crane’s subsequent assault to be a factor to consider in assessing his character. Both Mr. Crane and Mr. Dodgson made comments aimed at intimidating “rats” from giving evidence, although Mr. Crane actually threatened death. [ 145 ] Mr.
Crane had a much lengthier and more serious criminal record than does Mr. Dodgson, including 47 prior convictions; 10 of which included assault-related offences. Mr. Crane was described by the court as a dangerous man from whom the public needed protection, and who had little prospect for rehabilitation. Details of his unstable upbringing were before the court. [ 146 ] The sentencing court further noted that the victim’s work as a taxi driver left him particularly vulnerable: R v Strongman , 2007 ABQB 218 at para 37 . Mr. Crane showed no remorse whatsoever for his actions.
Of the jurors who made parole ineligibility recommendations, they ranged in term between 15-17 years. [ 147 ] In Hanley , two offenders were involved in the robbery of a jewelry store gone wrong. During the course of the robbery, one victim (the son) was stabbed four times in the upper torso by Mr. Hanley and subsequently died. The victim’s father was seriously assaulted, and Mr. Hanley ran off, knowing that it would be difficult for either victim to summon help in the circumstances.
Hanley was convicted of second-degree murder, aggravated assault and robbery, and his parole ineligibility period was set at 15 years. [ 148 ] Aggravating factors included that the assaults took place in the course of a planned and deliberate robbery involving two perpetrators acting in concert with masks and weapons – including a gun. Hanley stabbed both victims repeatedly with a knife found at the scene and his accomplice, Alook, used the gun to repeatedly pistol whip the father, and was instrumental in disabling the father from providing aid to his son.
Hanley was unlawfully at large at the time of the offence. [ 149 ] Mitigating factors included Hanely’s expression of remorse and the finding that the stabbing was not planned, but rather occurred as a result of unexpected developments at the scene. The trial judge found that an increased ineligibility period was also justified due to Hanley’s commission of additional crimes subsumed in the murder. Of note, the Court of Appeal held that:
...The trial judge was entitled to take into account all the circumstances in which the murder here was committed, including the fact it was part of a sequence of events involving not only a murder but also a robbery and an aggravated assault.
If a trial judge were precluded from taking into account the fact that a murder occurred during the needless violence of other offences, properly proven by the Crown, then this would have a number of illogical results. … Shropshire makes it clear that in imposing a sentence for murder, a trial judge can increase the period of parole ineligibility when the murder is committed in the course of other crimes[...] Hanley at para 13 . [ 150 ] Hanley is distinguishable in that the aggravating factors, while in some circumstances being comparable to the offence committed by Mr. Dodgson, are more severe.
I note that a firearm was brought to the scene in order to carry out the robbery and was used in the assault. Hanley also involved a true two-on-one form of assault. Disguises were also used by the offenders. [ 151 ] In my view, the comparator cases provided by the Crown are of limited assistance in assessing a fit period of parole ineligibility for Mr. Dodgson.
While certain aggravating factors are similar – including in some cases the commission of a homicide in combination with a planned robbery, and the abandoning of the victim in circumstances where he might be less able to seek assistance, the nature/circumstances of the offence in the authorities put forth by the Crown contain more aggravating factors, and character of the offender suggests a heightened level of dangerousness than the case at bar. Moreover, the authorities put forward by the Crown do not involve Indigenous offenders nor do they bring the special considerations under s 718.2(
e) of the Criminal Code into play. [ 152 ] Of course, no cases are a perfect fit. The exercise involves a balancing of the sentencing objectives given the unique circumstances of the offence itself and the offender, as well as the application of any relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. That said, I find that the cases relied upon by counsel for Mr.
Dodgson better reflect similar circumstances and moral culpability for the purposes of achieving parity in sentencing. [ 153 ] In Powder , the offender was part of a group that, after consuming drugs and alcohol, decided to break into the victim’s home and rob him of money and drugs. The accused did not enter the home, but took a position with a loaded rifle in the front of the home. The offender shot into the home and killed one of its occupants. He then fled and hid the rifle.
When interviewed shortly after the incident the offender denied any involvement, but approximately one year later he made an inculpatory statement to police. Of those jurors who made a recommendation, seven suggested a 10-year ineligibility period and one suggested a 12-year period. The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of between 16-20 years while the defence urged 12 years. [ 154 ] The offender in Powder had a short criminal record which included previous convictions for assault and assault with a weapon.
The Court found that there was some degree of planning concerning the robbery (although formed while impaired) and that this was an aggravating factor. A detailed Gladue report outlined the offender’s personal circumstances which included intergenerational trauma, substance abuse issues and a dysfunctional childhood. Mr. Powder was actively involved in programs aimed at sobriety while in the Remand Centre, and was doing well in them. Mr. Powder expressed remorse for his actions and their effect on the victim’s family. He was 21 at the time of the offence.
The Court fixed his parole ineligibility period at 12 years. [ 155 ] In Frenchman , the offender and his sister gained access to the home of an 80-year-old victim in an attempt to steal his vehicle and television. The offender tied the victim to a chair and kicked him several times, while his sister stabbed the victim repeatedly. The kicks themselves were not fatal but in combination with the stabbings contributed to the victim’s death.
Upon exiting the residence, the offender and his sister lit the premises on fire. [ 156 ] Aggravating factors included that the victim was elderly, vulnerable and was attacked during a home invasion. He had let the parties enter on the pretext of them needing to use his telephone. The victim was also restrained and left to bleed out, while timely treatment could have saved his life.
Also relevant was the fact that the murder took place in the context of the commission of the additional offence of robbery. [ 157 ] The offender in Frenchman had a criminal record which included assault causing bodily harm and unlawfully being in a dwelling house. A Gladue report indicated that the offender had a particularly troubled upbringing and that he suffered from FASD. The Court determined that a 13-year period of parole ineligibility was appropriate in all of the circumstances. [ 158 ] In Ledesma 2019 , the offender and two accomplices attended a pub in early morning hours intending to rob it.
A struggle ensued and as the bartender tried to run away, he was shot and killed by the offender who thereafter burned the clothes he had been wearing. The sentencing judge accepted that the offender had subsequently used the same gun in an accidental shooting and then took steps to dispose of the gun. The offender and another participant had been drinking alcohol all day and their plan to rob the pub was not a particularly sophisticated one. [ 159 ] Each member of the jury made a parole ineligibility recommendation of 10 years: Ledesma 2019 at para 57.
The Crown argued that a range between 15-22 years was appropriate for a murder committed with a firearm and in conjunction with a robbery: Ledesma 2019 at para 35. The defence took the position that a 10-year period was just in all the circumstances: Ledesma 2019 at para 36. [ 160 ] In setting the period of parole ineligibility in Ledesma 2019 at 12 years the Court noted a number of aggravating factors including a lengthy criminal record with over 30 convictions, nine of which were for firearm-related offences and two of which involved offences of violence.
The offender was subject to a weapons prohibition order at the time of the shooting. The offender took steps to conceal his identity both during and after the shooting. He attended at the pub armed and with a pre-exiting plan to commit a robbery. He also shot the victim while the victim was attempting to flee. [ 161 ] The Court in Ledesma 2019 also noted that the offender began having difficulties with the law at a young age and also began abusing substances at a young age: Ledesma 2019 at para 44. The offender showed a lack of remorse.
There was some debate as to whether the offender had taken any concrete steps to address his addiction issues while in custody. The Court accepted that the offender had the support of his family. No Gladue report was ordered, and there was limited evidence concerning the offender’s Indigenous background: Ledesma 2019 at para 79. [ 162 ] In Chretien , the offender and an accomplice broke into the home of a drug dealer in order to obtain drugs and money, and to assault him in retaliation for a previous incident. Both had been using cocaine prior to the incident. After breaking into the victim’s
apartment to effect this plan, Chretien hit the deceased multiple times on the head with an object and his accomplice kicked the deceased once in the face, causing minor injuries. The blunt force trauma caused by the object resulted in death: para 9. Chretien was found guilty of second-degree murder and his accomplice was found guilty of manslaughter. Both w
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