K.A.F. v. G.D.L.R. et al Date:, 2015 BCPC 331

Citation: K.A.F. v. G.D.L.R. et al Date: 20151126 2015 BCPC 0331 File No: F17103 Registry: Port Coquitlam IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA IN THE MATTER OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT , S.B.C. 2011 c. 25 and IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILD, FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICES ACT, R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 46 BETWEEN: K.A.F. APPLICANT AND: G.D.L.R. RESPONDENT AND: THE DIRECTOR OF CHILD, FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICE RESPONDENT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE T.S. WOODS Counsel for the Applicant: N. Deol

Counsel for the Respondent: R. Swartzberg Counsel for the Director of Child, Family and Community Services and Social Worker S.B. D. Dunn Place of Hearing: Port Coquitlam , B.C. Date of Hearing: November 9, 2015 Date of Decision: November 26, 2015 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE PRESENT MOTION [ 1 ] The circumstances that have brought a single mother, her former spouse, their six-year-old child, the Director of Child, Family and Community Service (the “Director”) and one of the Director’s social workers before the court at this hearing are nothing short of extraordinary.

Those circumstances therefore require more than the usual introductory explanation, in part because they are wholly atypical and do not at all represent what normally unfolds in the course of proceedings in this province in which child protection issues arise. [ 2 ] To a point, this proceeding had a relatively straightforward appearance. The applicant K.A.F. and the respondent G.D.L.R. are the parents of six-year-old Child-S. Child-S. resides primarily with K.A.F.

By reason of a Consent Order made under the Family Law Act , S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 on September 4, 2013, G.D.L.R. has had specified parenting time with Child-S. every second weekend, from Friday to Sunday, without any requirement that that parenting time be supervised. G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-S has followed that pattern, generally, ever since the 2013 Consent Order was pronounced by Judge Craig of this court. [ 3 ] Then, on September 9, 2015, the applicant K.A.F. appeared before me at New Westminster (where this file originated and remained until its recent transfer to Port Coquitlam).

K.A.F. appeared before me seeking an order, ex parte , requiring that G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-S. henceforward be supervised. This, too, was not a particularly uncommon development. From time to time the court hears ex parte motions in situations where one parent, based on his or her own observations or upon reports he or she has received from the subject children or others, considers that the other parent has begun to treat the subject children in ways that pose a risk to them, necessitating supervision.

What was unusual about K.A.F.’s motion in that regard was that she came to court having virtually no idea as to why the supervision requirement she was asking the court to impose in relation G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-S. was necessary. [ 4 ] At the hearing on September 9th, a very tearful and fearful K.A.F. managed, to her credit, to get across to the court that she had filed her Application, Notice of Motion and Supporting Affidavit at the direction of a social worker (“Social Worker-S.B.”).

She brought her Application and Notice of Motion because she was told to do so in a telephone call she received from Social Worker-S.B. the day before. However, beyond informing her that the Ministry of Children and Family Development (the “Ministry”) had significant concerns about G.D.L.R. having children in his care and that he ought not to be permitted to have unsupervised visits with Child-S., Social Worker-S.B. gave K.A.F. essentially no other information.

Not surprisingly, this caused K.A.F. great anxiety and distress; it also put the court in an extremely difficult position. [ 5 ] The brief Affidavit that K.A.F. filed in support of her Notice of Motion was prepared with the helpful and skilled assistance of duty counsel. Alas, that duty counsel could not appear at the hearing of K.A.F.’s motion for an order requiring that G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-S. be supervised. K.A.F.’s Affidavit included the following statements: “… 2) On September 8, 2015 I was contacted by telephone by [Social Worker-S.B.] with the Ministry of Child and Family Services.

He told me that there are current significant concerns with [G.D.L.R.] having children in his care and that he should not have unsupervised visits with [Child-S.]. 3) It was further explained to me that I was the parent who should take steps to protect [Child-S.] by coming to this court and obtaining an order on an urgent basis to vary the parenting time in the current court order that allows [G.D.L.R.] to have [Child-S.] every other weekend from Friday after school until Sunday at 3:00 pm. That Order would allow him to have parenting time this Friday, September 11, 2015 to Sunday, September 13 th .

I was told to apply for an order that would only allow [G.D.L.R.] to have supervised parenting time with [Child-S.] until the social worker or his team leader advises me that [G.D.L.R.] is allowed to have unsupervised parenting time. 4) I was questioned by the social worker about discipline methods used by [G.D.L.R.] on [Child-S.], however, I do not have any details on exactly what was reported to the Ministry or whether any criminal charges are to be brought in this case.

I was just told to go to court to obtain the order I have applied for.” [ 6 ] These points in K.A.F.’s Affidavit evidence were echoed in the oral testimony she gave in support of her motion. “Q … I want to flag another point for you, and I appreciate you're in a bit of an awkward position. You've been told by a social worker -- A Yes. Q -- to come and get this order? A Correct. Q But you've not been told any specifics about why? A They will not -- the reason that they won't disclose -- that they told me they won't disclose is because it's regarding his current

fiancée's children. And because I have no relation to those children, they won't give me the information because it's a breach ofconfidentiality. So they won't tell me anything except that he -- the children have been apprehended, that he should not be havingunsupervised access to [Child-S.] and that was basically it.

They just asked me a lot of questions and said that they would call me if theyneeded further information from me, and said that I need to do this and that I asked them why they aren't coming -- like why aren't theydoing this if they think that [Child-S.] needs this protection and they said, "Well, you're an able bodied parent. You need to be able toprotect your child. So you need to go down there and do this," so -- Q Has -- A -- that's why I'm here. Q -- [Social Worker-S.B.] or his team leader or anyone from the Ministry of Child and Family Services provided you with any kindof letter -- A File?

Q -- or documentary -- A No. Q -- material? A I asked them that. I didn't really get an answer. I called the afterhours, I asked if there was like a file number that I could give toyou or something.

I didn't really understand how they expected me to come here without having really any information.” Trans., September 9, 2015, pp. 2-3 [7] In the result, and notwithstanding the paucity of information placed before the court on September 9th, I reached the conclusionthat to ensure that Child-S. was properly protected against the risk of coming to avoidable harm, it was necessary that I make the Ordersought even though the evidence advanced in support of it was almost wholly devoid of concrete detail.

In oral Reasons now indexed at2005 BCPC 322 , 2005 BCPC 0322, I expressed my rationale for doing so as follows: “In these circumstances, the potential risk to Child S. must be the controlling consideration, and even though K.A.F. has not beenassisted by anyone in being able to give much in the way of detail, the fact that a social worker with the Ministry of Child and FamilyDevelopment considers a supervision requirement to be a necessity is enough in these unusual and difficult circumstances, in myjudgment, to justify the making of an order in the terms sought by K.A.F.” (at para. 12) [8] As to how and by whom the supervision would be provided, I made these stipulations in the ex parte Order: “1.

Until further order of the court, all parenting time to be exercised by the Respondent, [G.D.L.R.] … with the child [Child-S], born[d.o.b.], ("Child S."), shall be supervised by [Social Worker S.B.], a social worker with the Ministry of Child and Family Developmentoffice at number 102-4430 Halifax Street, Burnaby, B.C., V5C 5R4, ("Social Worker S.B."), or his lawful designate. 2.

G.D.L.R.'s supervised parenting time with Child S. shall occur at such times and for such durations at such locations and on suchterms as Social Worker S.B. or his lawful designate directs. [9] I further ordered that G.D.L.R. be served “as soon as possible” by a sheriff with all of the materials placed before the court byK.A.F., together with a blank Reply form and a copy of the ex parte order I had made. I set the matter over for an appearance on thenext family list day in New Westminster, that being September 15, 2015. Importantly, I also made it a term of the ex parte Order that: “7.

Social Worker S.B. or his lawful designate is directed to attend at the court appearance now scheduled for September 15, 2015 at teno'clock a.m. so that he or his lawful designate has an opportunity to provide such evidence as he has and is able at law to provide tosupplement the skeletal evidence given by the Applicant, [K.A.F.], ("K.A.F."), in support of this ex parte application that K.A.F. hasbrought at Social Worker S.B.'s direction.” [10] This matter did, indeed, come back before Judge Walters of this court on September 15, 2015, and G.D.L.R. and Social Worker- S.B. did attend.

However, the appearance did not deal substantively with the ex parte Order I had made on September 9th and SocialWorker-S.B. did not provide any evidence to supplement that given by K.A.F. at the original hearing. The matter came back before Judge Walters yet again on October 6th and was again adjourned.

The ex parte Order thus remained (and remains) in force, unchanged,and no new evidence has been tendered to the court to shed light on the reasons why Social Worker-S.B. directed K.A.F. to apply for theorder requiring G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-S. to be supervised. [11] This brings me to the reason why this matter was placed back on my court list on November 9th. [12] By Notice of Motion filed on November 9, 2015, the Director and Social Worker-S.B., represented by counsel Ms.

Dunn, havesought an order deleting paragraphs 1 and 2 of the ex parte Order I made on September 9, 2015—that is, the paragraphs (quoted above atparagraph 8 of these Reasons) that provide that all of G.D.L.R.’s parenting time must be supervised by Social Worker-S.B. or hisdesignate and that G.D.L.R.’s supervised parenting time occur “at such times, for such durations, at such locations and on such terms as[Social Worker-S.B.] or his lawful designate directs”. No Affidavit was filed in support of the Notice of Motion filed by the Directorand Social Worker-S.B..

Neither was the hearing of it attended by Social Worker-S.B. The motion was opposed by K.A.F., representedby her counsel Ms. Deol, and supported by G.D.L.R., represented by his counsel Mr. Swartzberg. [13] At the conclusion of the hearing on November 9th, I informed the parties and their counsel that the Director and Social Worker-

S.B.’s motion to have the supervision terms deleted from the ex parte Order I made on September 9th was dismissed and I advised thatReasons would follow. [14] These are my Reasons for dismissing the Motion brought by the Director and Social Worker-S.B. [15] As I have noted, no Affidavit evidence was filed by the Director or Social Worker-S.B. in support of their motion to delete all supervision requirements regarding G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-S. from the ex parte Order of September 9th. Neither wasSocial Worker-S.B. present at the hearing of the motion on November 9th.

Indeed (I will say it again) no evidence at all was tenderedby the Director or Social Worker-S.B. in support of their joint motion. I will say that I found that to be surprising, not the least because(

a) K.A.F. brought her ex parte Notice of Motion at the express direction of Social Worker-S.B. without having been given any detail asto what his “current significant concerns” were regarding G.D.L.R. having unsupervised visits with Child-S.; (

b) Social Worker-S.B. wasunable to provide K.A.F. with any assistance of any kind in documenting and explaining the basis for the ex parte Notice of Motion that she brought at his instigation on September 9th; and (

c) the court to this day has no evidence from Social Worker-S.B. regarding the basisfor his concerns or his reasons for taking the highly irregular step of directing K.A.F. to, in effect, appear before the court as his agent toseek an Order requiring supervision of G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-S. [16] The Director and Social Worker-S.B. know that the position they put K.A.F. and the court in on September 9th has caused muchconsternation all around.

They know as well that it was expected by the court that, to the fullest extent possible and as soon as possible,Social Worker-S.B. would—for the benefit of K.A.F., G.D.L.R. and the court—fill the gap in the information lying behind the Notice ofMotion that K.A.F. brought at Social Worker-S.B.’s direction and the ex parte order that was made based upon it. No otherinterpretation can be placed upon the plain words of paragraph 7 of the ex parte Order which I reproduce again, below. “7.

Social Worker S.B. or his lawful designate is directed to attend at the court appearance now scheduled for September 15, 2015 at teno'clock a.m. so that he or his lawful designate has an opportunity to provide such evidence as he has and is able at law to provide tosupplement the skeletal evidence given by the Applicant, [K.A.F.], ("K.A.F."), in support of this ex parte application that K.A.F. hasbrought at Social Worker S.B.'s direction.” [17] While, as I have acknowledged, Social Worker-S.B. did indeed attend at the appearance on September 15th, Director’s counsel confirmed in submissions before me on November 9th that he (Social Worker-S.B.) tendered no Affidavit or other evidence on that brief,administrative appearance (or, indeed, on any other appearances that have occurred since). [18] Accordingly, at the hearing of the motion brought by the Director and Social Worker-S.B. on November 9th, I found myself in essentially the same position as I was on September 9th when, with some reluctance, I concluded that I had little option but to make an exparte Order that G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-S. be supervised without knowing more than the fact that a representative of theDirector with a statutory child protection mandate (Social Worker-S.B.) had “current significant concerns” that he considered could bemet by a court-imposed supervision requirement regarding G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-S.

It ought not to surprise anyone that Iremain reluctant to remove a supervision requirement without evidence from those seeking to have it removed that is capable ofpersuading me that the “current significant concerns” that prompted Social Worker-S.B. to direct K.A.F. to bring her ex parte motionhave since either been determined to be baseless or have otherwise been satisfactorily managed. [19] I should acknowledge that reference was made during submissions by Ms.

Deol, counsel for K.A.F., to a letter dated November5, 2015 from another social worker (“Social Worker-M.H.N.”) and her supervisor that had been provided to her (Ms. Deol) by Director’scounsel, Ms. Dunn, shortly before the hearing of the Director and Social Worker-S.B.’s motion on November 9th. Ms. Dunn was clearthat her clients had no intention of tendering that letter to the court or relying upon it in any way but Ms. Deol, on behalf of K.A.F.,wished it to form part of the record. The letter was, ultimately, exhibited to an Affidavit sworn by K.A.F. and filed after the hearing.

Some passages from it were read to the court by Ms. Deol on November 9th as part of the submissions she made on K.A.F.’s behalf,opposing the removal of the subject supervision requirement. [20] While Social Worker-M.H.N.’s letter contributed little to assist me in the decision I have made to dismiss the Director andSocial Worker-S.B.’s Motion to delete the supervision requirements from the ex parte Order made September 9th, I do note that it doesrefer to concerns the Ministry still had as of November 5th about G.D.L.R.’s disciplinary practices with his new partner’s children.

Theletter also refers to the Ministry’s concerns about domestic violence together with desires expressed by Child-S. during an investigativeinterview to have “a third party present during her visits”, to have those visits occur at places other than at G.D.L.R.’s home and to haveovernight visits with G.D.L.R. terminated. Mr. Swartzberg, counsel for G.D.L.R., properly emphasises the somewhat limitedevidentiary value of the hearsay statements attributed to Child-S. in Social Worker-M.H.N.’s letter and, as I have said, I have for nowaccorded those statements little weight.

However, to the extent that it does speak to the issues before me, I must acknowledge that thecontent of Social Worker-M.H.N.’s letter militates against, and not in favour of, the motion that the Director and Social Worker-S.B. have jointly brought to have the supervision requirements struck out of the ex parte Order I made on September 9th. SUBMISSIONS AND ANALYSIS [21] I turn now to Ms.

Dunn’s legal and policy submissions in favour of deleting the provisions in the ex parte Order requiringsupervision of G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-S. by Social Worker-.SB. or his lawful delegate (in effect, by Ministry staff). Thosesubmissions were centred upon two main points. [22] Ms. Dunn’s first point is a strictly legal one. Citing the reasons of Macfarlane J.A. (Carrothers and Hutcheon, JJ.A. concurring)in E.J.L. v. B.J.L. (1983), (BC CA), 54 B.C.L.R. 164 (C.A.), Ms. Dunn argues that, quite simply, when I made the ex parte Order on September 9th I did so without jurisdiction.

She argues that I lacked jurisdiction in what is in truth a Family Law Actproceeding to require the Director, Social Worker-S.B. or Ministry staff generally to do anything, including oversee the supervision ofG.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-S. to the extent such supervision is necessary for her protection. Ms. Dunn stresses that neitherthe Director nor Social Worker-S.B. are parties to the within proceedings brought by K.A.F. against G.D.L.R. under the Family Law Act

and that I had and have no power under any applicable legislation to make an order requiring that Ministry representatives carry out supervisory functions in circumstances like those before the court here. [ 23 ] The passage from E.J.L. which Ms. Dunn cites to the court is found at paras. 18-19 of the decision and I reproduce it below: “18 I turn now to consider the appeal brought by the Crown with respect to the order that access be supervised by a representative or appointee of the Ministry of Human Resources. 19 When that order was made the Crown was not a party to these proceedings.

The Crown submits that in the circumstances of this case it is not under any duty to provide such supervision. I agree. In cases like this it is often desirable that some supervision be provided. It is not unusual for the court to request that the ministry provide such supervision. If that is not possible, then other avenues have to be used. The duties of the Crown are to be found in a variety of statutes in the province. I am not persuaded that any of those apply to this case …” [ 24 ] For the purposes of Ms.

Dunn’s submission, references to the “Crown” in that passage can be taken to be references to the Director or Ministry in the present proceedings. [ 25 ] Significantly, E.J.L. was decided over 30 years ago against a different statutory background than the one that exists today regarding the subject of Ministry supervision of parenting where the children receiving that parenting are adjudged by the Ministry to be at risk.

While acknowledging the obvious potential benefits of Ministry supervision in such cases, Macfarlane J.A. also noted (in the passage quoted above) that, importantly, where there is no duty to provide supervision to be found in the “variety of statutes” that impose duties upon the Ministry, then the Ministry cannot be compelled to provide it. [ 26 ] When E.J.L. was decided in 1983, there was—under the then current version of what is now the Child, Family and Community Service Act , R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 46—no equivalent provision to the present s. 29.1. That

section provides: “29.1

(1) A director may apply to the court for an order that the director supervise a child's care if the director has reasonable grounds to believe that (

a) the child needs protection, and (

b) a supervision order would be adequate to protect the child.

(2) Notice of the time, date and place of the presentation hearing relating to an application under this

section must be served in accordance with

section 33.1 (1), (2) and (3).” [ 27 ]

Section 29.1 came into force on June 1, 1998 pursuant to B.C. Reg. 172/98—long after E.J.L. was decided—and, as can be seen, it created a power in the Director to apply to the court for an order that a parent’s time with a child be supervised if the Director reasonably believes that the child is in need of protection and that supervision will be adequate to afford the child the needed protection.

The existence of s. 29.1 thus provides a basis for distinguishing E.J.L. inasmuch as that case turned on the absence of any comparable provision in any legislation speaking to the Director’s powers and duties at the time E.J.L. was decided. [ 28 ] It is plain from K.A.F.’s uncontroverted evidence at the ex parte hearing that it was Social Worker-S.B.’s belief that: (

a) Child-S. was in need of protection during her visits with G.D.L.R.; (

b) an Order requiring G.D.L.R.’s parenting time to be supervised would be adequate to protect Child-S.; and (

c) an Order of the court mandating that G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-S. be supervised was necessary to meet Child-S.’s need for protection. [ 29 ]

Section 29.1 of the Child, Family and Community Service Act furnished Social Worker-S.B. with precisely the mechanism he required in order to act on his “current significant concerns” and an order of the court requiring supervision to address them. However, it is apparent that rather than act on his powers and duties under s. 29.1 himself , Social Worker-S.B. chose instead to direct K.A.F., as his agent, to take the necessary steps to obtain a court order so as to put in place the protective measures contemplated by, and available under, s. 29.1.

I am aware of no other legislative provision under which Social Worker-S.B. could have been operating when he directed K.A.F. to appear before the court and seek an order requiring that G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-S. be supervised based upon facts calling Child-S.’s safety into doubt known to Social Worker-S.B. and of which K.A.F. had no personal or other knowledge. [ 30 ] I cannot think that the fact that Social Worker-S.B. chose to operate through K.A.F. as his agent changes anything with respect to my jurisdiction to make the order I made, ex parte , on September 9 th .

But for having acted under his direction, K.A.F. would not only not have been on her feet before me on September 9 th seeking an order that G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-S. be supervised; she would not have known that there was even a need in the Ministry’s eyes for that supervision.

Social Worker-S.B. obtained the supervision order that he wished the court to make for the benefit of Child-S. through the efforts of the intermediary he deputised to act, in effect, on his behalf—a frightened and distressed single mother whose upset was magnified when Social Worker-S.B. declined to disclose to her the basis for his contention that G.D.L.R. must not have any more parenting time with Child-S. without a supervisor present. [ 31 ] In the result I made the order I made, ex parte , on September 9 th acting pursuant to the jurisdiction sourced in s. 29.1 of the Child, Family and Community Services Act that was invoked by Social Worker-S.B. by proxy via K.A.F.—a jurisdiction that specifically empowered me to make “an order that the director supervise a child's care” (emphasis added).

That is why the order I made imposed supervisory responsibilities and attendant discretion upon Social Worker-S.B. or his lawful designate, they being emanations of the Director.

[ 32 ] For all of these reasons I cannot accept Ms. Dunn’s arguments, advanced on behalf of the Director and Social Worker-S.B., that when I made the ex parte order requiring that G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-S. be supervised, I acted without jurisdiction. [ 33 ] Ms. Dunn’s second point is grounded more in considerations of public policy than in considerations of law.

She contends, on behalf of the Director and Social Worker-S.B., that I should delete paragraphs 1 and 2 of the ex parte Order of September 9 th because they interfere with the Ministry’s ability to allocate its limited resources to needs in the ways it considers most appropriate.

With respect, I do not believe that, having chosen to discharge the Director’s statutory duty to safeguard Child-S. by calling upon an agent or intermediary to bring a court application seeking an order that G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-S. be supervised, the Director can properly complain that the supervision requirement imposed at Social Worker-S.B.’s instigation requires that resources now actually be deployed to provide the requested supervision, particularly where the statutory source of the jurisdiction to respond to the request for court-ordered supervision specifically contemplates that the court application will produce “an order that the director supervise a child's care” (s. 29.1(1), emphasis added).

That argument is simply unmaintainable. [ 34 ] I believe I would be remiss if I did not also mention, in relation to this part of the Director and Social Worker-S.B.’s argument, that it is not lost on the court that Ministry resources that would ordinarily have been deployed to obtain an order under s. 29.1 in circumstances such as these were preserved for other uses by the Ministry when—instead of sending Social Worker-S.B. and Director’s counsel to court—Social Worker-S.B. dispatched a distraught and fearful single mother (without information) to attend, in effect in his place.

Since the subject of the Ministry’s desire to retain control, without court interference, over the ways it allocates its resources was raised as a basis for objection to the ex parte Order I made on September 9 th , I think it is only fair to point out the obvious fact that the costs of providing supervision for G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-S. have been offset to some unknown extent by the benefit the Ministry derived from having K.A.F. do its work (at no cost to it) in getting the order for supervision in the first place. [ 35 ] Beyond all of that, and most importantly, it must not be forgotten that if I were to give effect to the motion now brought by the Director and Social Worker-S.B. to delete the supervision provisions from the ex parte Order I made on September 9 th , the situation would revert to the way it was before K.A.F. brought her Notice of Motion seeking court-ordered supervision of G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-S. at the instigation of Social Worker-S.B.

I repeat that I still have nothing before me from Social Worker-S.B. that speaks to his “significant concerns” about Child-S. being in possible jeopardy if her parenting time with G.D.L.R. is not supervised, despite having directed (in paragraph 7 of the ex parte Order) that Social Worker-S.B. provide that at the first opportunity. The previously mentioned letter from Social Worker-M.H.N. confirms in a general way that those concerns continue to the present.

If I were to make the Order I have been asked to make by the Director and Social Worker-S.B. in their Notice of Motion filed and heard on November 9, 2015, Child-S. would lose the protective benefit of the Order that I made at the behest of Social Worker-S.B. (operating through K.A.F. as his agent) pursuant to powers and duties found in s. 29.1 of the Child, Family and Community Services Act in circumstances where I have been given no evidence by either the Director or Social Worker-S.B. that could convince me that the danger to Child-S. has passed.

My responsibilities to put Child-S.’s interests ahead of all other considerations—as reflected in, inter alia , s. 37 of the Family Law Act and s. 2 of the Child, Family and Community Services Act —simply do not permit me to yield to the arguments advanced on behalf of the Director and Social Worker-S.B., and supported by G.D.L.R., in favour of removing the supervision terms from the ex parte Order I made on September 9 th .

ADDITION OF THE DIRECTOR AS A PARTY [ 36 ] The actions of Social Worker-S.B. as a representative of the Director which I have recounted above have had the effect of converting the present Family Law Act proceeding into a hybrid proceeding. Exercising jurisdiction reserved to the Director under s. 29.1 of the Child, Family and Community Services Act , Social Worker-S.B.—through his agent, K.A.F.—moved the court on September 9 th to impose a supervision requirement regarding G.D.L.R.’S previously ordered parenting time with Child-S. of the kind specifically contemplated by s. 29.1.

Thus, events that have unfolded in this proceeding to this point bear the imprint of two statutes and reflect the exercise of jurisdiction under both the Family Law Act and the Child, Family and Community Services Act . Future developments will, as well, require the consideration of applications and motions concerning steps taken under both governing statutes. Mr. Swartzberg left no doubt that his client, G.D.L.R., will be taking steps to attempt to have the supervision terms that now bind him removed as soon as possible.

How, without the active participation of the Director in this proceeding, could the court properly consider and decide which next steps in the proceeding would best serve the safety and other interests of Child-S.? [ 37 ] The Provincial Court (Family) Rules , B.C. Reg. 417/98, at Rule 20(5) (b), confer a jurisdiction upon me to “order that a person be added as a party for … the proceedings generally”. Similarly, the

definitions

section of the Provincial Court (Child, Family and Community Service Act) Rules , B.C. Reg. 533/95, provide that “party” includes, “for the purposes of these rules … anyone the court decides is a party …”. [ 38 ] It is clear to me that—so as to ensure that when it is called upon to consider making further orders affecting the interests of Child-S. the court has everything it needs before it—I must do what I reasonably can now to ensure that in future the court has the benefit of evidence and submissions not only from K.A.F. and G.D.L.R., but from the Director as well.

The unfortunate and unwelcome difficulties that the court faced on September 9 th will be obviated in the future if all of those who can properly be accorded party status and who have information and evidence to offer which touches upon what will best serve Child-S.’s best interests are parties to this proceeding and engage as participants in it henceforward. Accordingly, I exercise ex mero motu my jurisdiction under the provisions noted above within the two sets of Provincial Court Rules that now jointly govern this hybrid proceeding to add the Director as a Respondent.

I comment, additionally, that in light of the steps that have already been taken in this hybrid proceeding by the Director by proxy pursuant to s. 29.1 of the Child, Family and Community Service Act , the Director will now need to consider its obligations regarding Child-S. in the round including, inter alia , those that arise pursuant to ss. 33.1 and following of that enactment.

DISPOSITION [ 39 ] The motion brought by the Director and Social Worker-S.B. on November 9, 2015, seeking an Order deleting paragraphs 1 and 2 from the ex parte Order I made on September 9, 2015 pursuant to s. 29.1 of the Child, Family and Community Service Act (that is, the supervision terms) is dismissed.

[ 40 ] The Director is added as a party Respondent to this proceeding. [ 41 ] Orders accordingly. ________________________________ Thomas S. Woods, P.C.J.