Veeken v. Spratt et al. Date:, 2017 BCPC 114

Citation: Veeken v. Spratt et al. Date: 20170419 2017 BCPC 114 File No: 1650549 Registry: Prince George IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA BETWEEN: PAUL VEEKEN CLAIMANT AND: MINISTER OF JUSTICE, CITY OF PRINCE GEORGE, SOLICITOR GENERAL DOUGLAS MCCREADIE, ERHAN TOYATA AND PRISCILLA SPRATT DEFENDANTS Defendants’ Dismissal Applications REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE J. T. DOULIS Appearing on their own behalf: P. Veeken Counsel for City of Prince George : M. Houg Counsel for Minister of Justice, Solicitor General, Douglas McCreadie and Erhan Toyata A. Kemp Counsel for Priscilla Spratt N. Trofimuk (by phone)

Place of Hearing: Prince George , B.C. Date of Hearing: April 4, 2017 Date of Judgment: April 19, 2017 [ 1 ] On December 5, 2016, Paul Veeken filed in the Provincial Court of British Columbia (Small Claims Court) a Notice of Claim (the “Claim”) against the following six defendants: a. Priscilla Spratt, Carvel, Alberta; b. Solicitor General, Legal Services Branch, Victoria, B.C.; c. B.C. Minister of Justice, and Suzanne Anton, Victoria, B.C.; d. Constable Douglas Keith McCreadie, Royal Canadian Mounted Police - Prince George Detachment; e.

Sergeant Erhan Toyata, Royal Canadian Mounted Police - Prince George Detachment; and f. City of Prince George. [ 2 ] On January 12, 2017, Mr. Veeken amended the Claim to remove the B.C. Minister of Justice and Suzanne Anton as Defendants and on March 30, 2017, he re-amended the Claim to restore the B.C. Minister of Justice and Suzanne Anton as defendants. [ 3 ] In his Notice of Claim, as amended, Mr.

Veeken asserts the defendants are each liable for: a. general damages; b. damages as set out in the Claim; c. aggravated damages; d. punitive and exemplary damages; e. special damages; f. interest pursuant to the Court Order Interest Act ; g. costs; and h. such further and other relief as the Court may seem just. [ 4 ] All the defendants have filed a Reply disputing the Claim on the grounds that it falls outside the jurisdiction of this court and in any event, is without merit. Background Facts [ 5 ] The Claim and Replies provide the following background facts to the matter before the Court: a.

In 2014, by way of Information 37730, Mr. Veeken was charged with sexual interference of a person under 16 years of age, contrary to s. 151 of the Criminal Code ; b. In February 2015, Mr. Veeken was convicted in the B.C. Supreme Court one count of sexual interference of a person under 16 years of age, contrary to s. 151 of the Criminal Code ; c. On November 18, 2015, Mr. Veeken was sentenced to a two year jail sentence as a result of his conviction in February 2015; d. Mr. Veeken’s conviction and sentence were publicly reported in various media; e.

Between the time of his initial arrest in 2014 and his sentence on November 18, 2015, Mr. Veeken was on judicial interim release on an Undertaking or Recognizance to a Justice or Judge; f. On December 23, 2015, Mr. Veeken was arrested on allegations of breaching a court order as a result of incidents which were alleged to have occurred between July to December 2015. The trial of the charges arising from these allegations is scheduled for October 23, 2017; and g. Mr. Veeken was also arrested with respect to other allegations of his breaching the terms of his judicial interim release on January 27, 2015.

These breach allegations were resolved on January 11, 2016, with Mr. Veeken entering into a peace bond. Claim against the Complainant: Priscilla Spratt [ 6 ] With respect to his claim against Priscilla Spratt, Mr. Veeken says that between July 2014 and January 2016, Pricilla Spratt and Michaela Veeken made false allegations to the police with respect to his non-compliance with the terms of his recognizance. He claims Ms. Spratt was a party to a conspiracy with Michaela Veeken to have him charged with breaching his recognizance.

[ 7 ] Priscilla Spratt filed a Reply on January 5, 2017, denying liability and the court to dismiss the Claim on the following grounds: a. the substance of the Claim is outside the jurisdiction of this court; b. the Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action against Ms. Spratt; and c. the Claim is frivolous, constitutes an abuse of process or is improper. Claim against the RCMP [ 8 ] Constable Douglas Keith McCreadie was the lead investigator on the allegations that Mr. Veeken breached his recognizance (“Breach Allegations”). Mr.

Veeken asserts that Constable McCreadie’s investigation into the Breach Allegations was seriously deficient. It is unclear to me whether the Breach Allegations subject of the Claim includes the incidents currently scheduled for trial on October 23, 2017, as well as those resolved by way of a peace bond on January 11, 2016. [ 9 ] With respect to Sergeant Erhan Toyata, Mr. Veeken asserts he was Constable McCreadie’s supervisor and failed to provide Constable McCreadie with proper supervision, training and oversight in the investigation of the Breach Allegations. In his Claim, Mr.

Veeken asserts Constable Toyata supported the deficient investigation. [ 10 ] With respect to the RCMP - Prince George Detachment, generally, Mr. Veeken asserts its investigation into Breach Allegations was seriously deficient. [ 11 ] With respect to the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General (collectively, the “Ministers”) Mr. Veeken says these government officials are vicariously responsible for the inadequate or improper police investigation. [ 12 ] The two named police officers and Ministers are represented by one legal counsel, Mr. Andrew Kemp.

They dispute the Claim on the basis of jurisdiction and merit. Mr. Kemp submits: a. Mr. Veeken’s claim is in essence one of defamation and or malicious prosecution and therefore outside the jurisdiction of this Court; b. Sergeant Toyata had no involvement in training or supervising Constable McCreadie’s investigation into the Breach Allegations; c. Police officers are not personally liable for negligence committed in the course of their duties; and d. Mr.

Veeken’s allegation of “irreparable damage” to his family is not actionable. [ 13 ] The Ministers admit that: a. at all relevant times Constable McCreadie was a member of the RCMP and acting as a provincial constable within the meaning of the Police Act , RSBC 1996, c. 367; b. Constable McCreadie investigated the Breach Allegations; and c. If the Court were to find Mr. McCreadie was negligent in his investigation of the Breach Allegations and Mr. Veeken suffered loss and damage as a result, then the Ministers are vicariously liable for that negligently caused loss and damage. [ 14 ] Mr.

Kemp says that it is unnecessary and redundant for both Ministers to be named defendants. He submits that the appropriate defendant is the Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General and asks the claim against Minister of Justice and Suzanne Anton be dismissed. [ 15 ] Mr. Kemp admitted on the record on behalf of the two Ministers that should this Court find Constable McCreadie was negligent and Mr.

Veeken suffered damages as alleged in the Claim, then the Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General is vicariously liable for any such negligence and damage. [ 16 ] The Ministers’ Replies do not specifically address the Ministers’ liability if this Court finds Sergeant Toyata or other members of the Prince George RCMP detachment negligent in the investigation of the Breach Allegations. I understand from Mr. Kemp’s submissions at the Settlement Conference that in the event this Court finds: a.

Sergeant Toyata did have some supervisory and oversight of Constable McCreadie or other officers involved in the investigation of the Breach Allegations; b. Sergeant Toyata was negligent in that duty; and c. Mr. Veeken suffered damages as a result of that negligence, then the Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General is vicariously liable for any such negligence and damage. Claim against the City of Prince George [ 17 ] Mr. Veeken also named the City of Prince George (the “City”) as a defendant in the Claim because it employed the RCMP to keep the peace and enforce the law in the City.

He contends the City ultimately employed the Prince George RCMP detachment and the two named officers, and therefore vicariously liable for their deficient investigation of the Breach Allegations. [ 18 ] The City has filed Reply on January 31, 2017, in which it disputes the claim on the following basis: a. the limitation period for Mr. Veeken to commence these proceedings has expired and pleads Section 6(1) of the Limitation Act which

states: Basic limitation period 6

(1) Subject to this Act, a court proceeding in respect of a claim must not be commenced more than 2 years after the day on which theclaim is discovered. b. Mr. Veeken failed to comply with ss. 735 and 736 of the Local Government Act, R.S.B.C. 2015, c. 1 which states: Division 1 — Legal Proceedings Against Municipality or Regional District Limitation period for certain actions 735 All actions against a municipality or regional district for the unlawful doing of anything that (

a) is purported to have been done by the municipality or regional district under the powers conferred by

an Act, and (

b) might have been lawfully done by the municipality or regional district if acting in the manner established by law must be commenced within 6 months after the cause of action first arose, or within a further period designated by the council or board ina particular case, but not afterwards. Notice requirement respecting damages 736

(1) A municipality or regional district is in no case liable for damages unless notice in writing, setting out the time, place and mannerin which the damage has been sustained, is delivered to the municipality or regional district, as applicable, within 2 months from the dateon which the damage was sustained.

(2) In case of the death of a person injured, failure to give the notice required by this

section is not a bar to the maintenance of the action.

(3) Failure to give the notice required by this

section or its insufficiency is not a bar to the maintenance of an action if the court beforewhom it is tried, or, in case of appeal, the Court of Appeal, believes (

a) there was reasonable excuse, and (

b) the defendant has not been prejudiced in its defence by the failure or insufficiency c. Mr. Veeken’s claim is one of vicarious liability and therefore not maintainable against the City. In this regard, the City relies on ss.11 and 14 of the Police Act and Gulkinson v. Vancouver Police Board, 2015 BCCA 361, leave to appeal to SCC dismissed (SCC). [19]

Section 11 of the Police Act states: Ministerial liability 11

(1) The minister, on behalf of the government, is jointly and severally liable for torts committed by (

a) provincial constables, auxiliary constables, special provincial constables, IIO investigators and enforcement officers appointed onbehalf of a ministry, if the tort is committed in the performance of their duties, and (

b) municipal constables and special municipal constables in the performance of their duties when acting in other than the municipalitywhere they normally perform their duties.

(2) Even though a person referred to in subsection (1) (

a) or (

b) is not found liable for a tort allegedly committed by the person in theperformance of his or her duties, the minister may pay an amount the minister considers necessary to (

a) settle a claim against the person for a tort allegedly committed by the person in the performance of his or her duties, or (

b) reimburse the person for reasonable costs incurred by the person in defending a claim against the person for a tort allegedlycommitted in the performance of his or her duties.

(3) The Minister of Finance must pay out of the consolidated revenue fund, on the requisition of the minister, money required for thepurposes of subsection (2). [20]

Section 14 of the Police Act and s. 20 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, RSC 1985, c R-10 authorized the RCMP tocarry out the powers and duties of a provincial police force.

Section 14 states:

Part 3 — Agreements to Use R.C.M.P. Royal Canadian Mounted Police as provincial police force 14

(1) Subject to the approval of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, the minister, on behalf of the government, may enter into, executeand carry out agreements with Canada, or with a department, agency or person on its behalf, authorizing the Royal Canadian MountedPolice to carry out powers and duties of the provincial police force specified in the agreement.

(2) If an agreement is entered into under subsection (1),

(

a) the Royal Canadian Mounted Police is, subject to the agreement, deemed to be a provincial police force, (

b) every member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police is, subject to the agreement, deemed to be a provincial constable, (

c) the provisions of this Act respecting the powers and duties of the provincial police force and provincial constables apply, subject tothe agreement, and with the necessary changes and insofar as applicable, to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and its members, and (

d) the officer commanding the division of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police referred to in the agreement and the second in commandof the division are deemed to be the commissioner and deputy commissioner, respectively, appointed under this Act.

(3) If a power or duty given under the regulations or under any Act to the provincial police force or a provincial constable is expresslyexcluded from the powers and duties given by agreement under subsection (1) to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or its members,the Lieutenant Governor in Council may make the regulations the Lieutenant Governor in Council considers necessary to authorize orrequire a member of the public service of British Columbia to carry out the power or duty. [21] Mr. Houg, counsel for the City argues that at common law, vicarious liability was not fixed on the "employer" of a peaceofficer.

He cites Gulkinson for the principle “the common law has consistently rejected the notion of vicarious liability on the part of amunicipality . . . for acts or omissions of police constables” (para. 14). Settlement Conference [22] This matter came before me on April 4, 2017, for a settlement conference. At that time, I bifurcated the settlement conferencein order to deal firstly with the challenges to the Court’s jurisdiction and secondly with the applications seeking Mr. Veeken’s claim bedismissed under s. Rule 7(14)(

i) on the basis that it is (

a) without reasonable grounds; or (

b) discloses no triable issue; or (

c) is frivolousor an abuse of the court's process. [23] I heard from legal counsel for the defendants on the issue of jurisdiction and from Mr. Veeken. I advised the parties I wouldprovide a written decision on the jurisdictional arguments. This is my decision. Is the subject matter of Mr. Veeken’s Claim within the jurisdiction of this Court? [24] The defendants assert the Claim, in essence, is for defamation or malicious prosecution or both, and therefore beyond thejurisdiction of the Provincial Court of British Columbia (Small Claims).

Section 3 of the Small Claims Act which states: Claims the court may hear 3

(1) The Provincial Court has jurisdiction in a claim for (

a) debt or damages, (

b) recovery of personal property, (

c) specific performance of an agreement relating to personal property or services, or (

d) relief from opposing claims to personal property if the amount claimed or the value of the personal property or services is equal to orless than an amount that is prescribed by regulation, excluding interest and costs.

(2) The Provincial Court does not have jurisdiction in a claim for libel, slander or malicious prosecution. Claim against Priscilla Spratt: Civil Conspiracy [25] With respect to Priscilla Spratt, Mr. Veeken says she is liable for the tort of conspiracy “to create allegations of Breach ofRecognizance with respect to conditions imposed upon me through allegations brought about through court file #37730.” [26] Civil conspiracy is an intentional economic tort. [27] In Canada Cement LaFarge Ltd. v. British Columbia Lightweight Aggregate Ltd., (SCC), [1983] 1 S.C.R. 452,at p. 471, the Supreme Court of Canada formulated two branches to the tort of conspiracy: (

a) whether the means used by the defendants are lawful or unlawful, the predominant purpose of the defendants’ conduct is to causeinjury to the claimant; or (

b) where the conduct of the defendants is unlawful, the conduct is directed towards the claimant (alone or together with others), and thedefendants should know in the circumstances that injury to the claimant is likely to and does result. In situation (2) it is not necessary that the pre-dominant purpose of the defendants' conduct be to cause injury to the plaintiff but,in the prevailing circumstances, it must be a constructive intent derived from the fact that the defendants should have known that injuryto the plaintiff would ensue.

In both situations, however, there must be actual damage suffered by the plaintiff. [28] Under the first branch, conspiracy to injury, sometimes called lawful means conspiracy or “simple motive conspiracy”, theclaimant must show: a. an agreement or concerted action; b. between two or more persons;

c. with the predominant purpose of causing injury to the claimant; and d. the overt acts committed did cause damage to the claimant. See: Watson v.

Bank of America Corporation, 2015 BCCA 362 , para. 125. [29] In the second branch, conspiracy to injure by unlawful means, also called “unlawful means conspiracy” the Claimant mustshow: a. an agreement or concerted action; b. between two or more persons; c. to engage in unlawful conduct; d. aimed at the claimant in the circumstances where injury to the claimant may result; e. the claimant suffered damage. [30] In unlawful means conspiracy, the claimant is not required to prove the predominant purpose of the defendants’ conduct was tocause injury to the claimant, only that the conspirators directed their unlawful contact at the claimant and knew or should have knowninjury would result and in fact did result. [31] Mr.

Veeken’s pleading and submissions could be interpreted to advance a claim of civil conspiracy under either of the twobranches. With respect to the first branch, where the conduct is lawful, Mr. Veeken must prove: a. Pricilla Spratt acted in concert by agreement or common design with Michaela Veeken; b. for the predominate purpose of harming Mr. Veeken; and c. their conduct caused him harm. [32] With respect to second branch, unlawful means conspiracy, Mr. Veeken must prove: a.

Priscilla Spratt acted in concert by agreement or common design with Michaela Veeken; b. they committed an unlawful act (such as deceit or public mischief or obstruction of justice); c. their conduct was directed towards Mr. Veeken; d. they knew or ought to have known that injury to Mr. Veeken was likely to occur from their unlawful act; and e. their unlawful conduct in furtherance of their conspiracy caused harm to Mr. Veeken. [33] Mr. Veeken says as result of the conspiracy he suffered significant damages and financial loss. [34] What is anomalous about Mr.

Veeken’s claim is that he has named only one of the alleged conspirators a defendant in theseproceedings; however, I am not aware of any requirement he do otherwise. [35] In order to make out a claim of unlawful conduct conspiracy, the claimant must prove unlawful conduct by each conspirator. There is no basis for finding an individual liable for unlawful conduct conspiracy if her conduct is lawful or if she is the only actor. This tort targets unlawful conduct in concert. It does not transform lawful conduct into tortious conduct. [36] For the purposes of clarifying Mr. Veeken’s Claim, I am ordering Mr.

Veeken to provide particulars of his claim of civilconspiracy against Priscilla Spratt as follows: a. describe fully who the parties to the conspiracy are and their relationship with each other; b. set out the dates when the conspiracy entered into or continued; c. the nature and particulars of the agreement; e. the purpose, objects and means of the conspiracy; f. the overt acts alleged to have been done by each of the conspirators; g. the manner and extent to which the overt acts were unlawful; and h. the injury or damage he suffered as a result of the conspiracy.

Negligent Investigation [37] At the Settlement Conference, Mr. Veeken acknowledges that he cannot maintain a claim for libel, slander or maliciousprosecution in this court. He submits his claim against the two police officers, Ministers and the City is in negligence. He pleads thatConstable McCreadie and the Prince George RCMP were negligent in the investigation of the Breach Allegations and his Supervisor,Sergeant Toyata, the Ministers and the City are vicariously liable for this negligence and the ensuing damage.

[38] In Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41 , 3 S.C.R. 129, the Supreme Court ofCanada recognized the tort of negligent investigation. In order to prove negligent investigation, a claimant must show: a. the investigating officer owed the claimant a legal duty of care; b. the investigating officer breached that duty of care; and c. the claimant suffered compensable damages as a result of that breach. [39] The tort of negligent investigation mirrors that of malicious prosecution except for the element of malice: Nelles v.Ontario, (SCC), at para. 42. Mr.

Veeken says he is not alleging malicious prosecution, which is not within thejurisdiction of this court; rather, he asserts investigative negligence. [40] I have directed Mr. Veeken to file an affidavit setting out the evidentiary basis for his allegations the police investigation intothe Breach Allegations was negligent, in that it fell below the standard that would have been expected of a reasonable police officer. Personal Liability for Negligent Investigation [41] Pursuant to s. 14 of the Police Act and s. 20 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, R.S.C., 1985, c.

R-10, British Columbiaand Canada authorize the RCMP to carry out the duties of a provincial police force. By operation of this agreement the RCMP isdeemed to be a provincial police force and pursuant to s. 14(2) of the Police Act, every RCMP officer is deemed to be a provincialconstable. [42] Section 21(2) of the Police Act protects provincial constables from personal liability for acts done in the performance of theirduties and in the exercise of their powers as a provincial constable. It states: Personal liability 21

(2) No action for damages lies against a police officer or any other person appointed under this Act for anything said or done oromitted to be said or done by him or her in the performance or intended performance of his or her duty or in the exercise of his or herpower or for any alleged neglect or default in the performance or intended performance of his or her duty or exercise of his or her power. (3) Subsection (2) does not provide a defence if (

a) the police officer or other person appointed under this Act has, in relation to the conduct that is the subject matter of action, beenguilty of dishonesty, gross negligence or malicious or wilful misconduct, or (

b) the cause of action is libel or slander. [43] As provincial constables, Constable McCreadie and Sergeant Toyata cannot be held personally liable for negligentinvestigation unless they performed their duties or exercised their powers as provincial constables with dishonesty, gross negligence ormalicious or wilful misconduct. It is the designated minister who is liable for their negligence. Mr. Kemp submits the designatedminister pursuant to s. 11 of the Police Act, is the provincial Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General. [44] At the Settlement Conference Mr.

Veeken said he was limiting his claim against the police officers to negligence. In the Claim,however, Mr. Veeken says the police investigation into the Breach Allegation was “lazy, sloppy, incompetent, carelessly indifferent andinsufficient.” He later says: I am claiming punitive damages as the conduct of the aforementioned was, in some cases, wilful, malicious, contemptuous,negligent and high-handed, and showed a wanton disregard of my personal rights. [45] Notwithstanding, Mr. Veeken’s concessions at the April 4, 2017 Settlement Conference, it is not clear to me that Mr.

Veekenintended to withdraw any and all allegations that Constable McCreadie or Sergeant Toyata or any other member of the Prince GeorgeRCMP detachment involved in the investigation of the Breach Allegation went beyond simple negligence. The Police Act does notshield individual officers from gross negligence, dishonesty, malice, wilful misconduct and defamation. If Mr. Veeken intends to limithis Claim against the police officers and the Ministers to simple negligence, then he must express this intention clearly andunequivocally. Should the Claim be dismissed in whole or in part? [46] Rule 7(14)(

i) empowers a judge to dismiss a claim at a settlement conference where, after discussion with the parties andreviewing the filed documents, the judge determines that it: (

a) is without reasonable grounds; (

b) discloses no triable issue; or (

c) isfrivolous or an abuse of process. This rule furthers the purpose of the Small Claims Act, set out in s. 2, which holds: The purpose of this Act and the Rules is to allow people who bring claims to the Provincial Court to have them resolved and to haveenforcement proceedings concluded in a just, speedy, inexpensive and simple manner. [47] In Meyer v. DiMambro, 2013 BCPC 95 , Judge Skilnick discussed those circumstances in which a Judge could dismissa claim at a settlement conference.

He writes: [3] One of the functions of a Settlement Conference in proceedings under the Small Claims Act is to perform a cursory test of the meritsof a claim. As has often been said, the Settlement Conference Judge is essentially a gatekeeper whose task it is to keep out those claimswhich have no merit, those which are unsupported by any evidence (without actually weighing the existing evidence) and those whoseoutcome can be easily determined without a significant expenditure of the court’s time and resources, such as on a point of law.

Thedismissal of a claim at a Settlement Conference is a remedy that should be used with caution and only in clear cases. [Citations omitted]

[48] In Lura v. Jazz Forest Products

(2004) Ltd., 2014 BCPC 14 , Judge Skilnick states in part: [11] The dismissal of a claim prior to trial is a drastic remedy, and is one that should be used only in the clearest of cases. In discussingwhen this remedy should be used by a settlement conference judge, Chief Justice Esson of the British Columbia Supreme Court wrote,in Artisan Floor Co. v. Lam [1993] B.C.J. No. 518; (BC SC), 76 B.C.L.R. (2d) 384: I think it is clear that the judge presiding at a settlement conference has power to give judgment, at least where, in the words of R. 7 (14)(b), he is dealing with "issues that do not require evidence".

The question whether the plaintiff could possibly succeed against therespondents was such an issue. [12]

Summary determination of a claim is a remedy which should only be used where it is clear from the facts which are not in issue, orfrom a proper application of the law, or from a combination of the two, what the result will be. . . [49] Judge Skilnick identified those circumstances where it is appropriate to make a

summary determination of a claim. Theseinclude where: a. the claim is statute barred; b. the claim is precluded by a limitation period; c. the claim is precluded because of a failure to give notice; d. the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim; e. the claim is brought against the wrong party; f. the claim is an unsupported allegation of professional negligence; g. the claim is a clear abuse of process. [50] Pursuant to Small Claims Rule 7(14(j), I directed Mr. Veeken to prepare, file and serve a comprehensive affidavit setting out theevidentiary basis for his claim within 60 days.

This affidavit should append as an exhibit documents that are relevant to his claim,including the recognizance in issue. This settlement conference will continue after Mr. Veeken has filed and served his affidavit at a dateto be fixed by the judicial case manager in consultation with the parties. [51] At this time, I will dispose of the Defendants’ applications for dismissal as follows: a. I dismiss in its entirety the Claim against the City of Prince George on the basis the City is not vicariously liable for the negligence ofthe RCMP police officers by statute or common law.

Sections 11 and 14 of the Police Act impose liability for provincial constables onthe minister, on behalf of the Provincial government; b. I dismiss the Claim against the Minister of Justice and Suzanne Anton on the basis of their Reply and Mr. Kemp’s submissions, onbehalf of both Ministers, that in the event the Court were to find any RCMP officer negligent in the investigation of the BreachAllegations and that Mr. Veeken suffered loss and damages as a result of that negligence, then the Minister of Public Safety and theSolicitor General is vicariously liable to Mr. Veeken for that loss and damages; c.

I adjourn until stage two of this Settlement Conference Constable McCreadie and Sergeant Toyata’s application the Claim againstthem be dismissed on the basis of ss. 11, 14 and 21(2) of the Police Act. In this regard, if it is Mr. Veeken’s intention to limit his Claimagainst the police officers to one of simple negligence, then he is to state this intention on the record in clear and unequivocal language; d. I adjourn until stage two of this Settlement Conference Priscilla Spratt’s application pursuant to Small Claims Rule 7(14)(

i) the Claimagainst her be dismissed on the basis it discloses no cause of action against her and that it is “frivolous, constitutes an abuse of process oris improper.” e. I adjourn until stage two of this Settlement Conference the Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General’s application pursuant toSmall Claims Rule 7(14)(

i) the Claim against the province be dismissed on the basis it is frivolous and in any event has no reasonablebasis for success. ________________________________ J. T. Doulis Provincial Court Judge