R. v. Gray, 2019 BCPC 281

Citation: R. v. Gray 2019 BCPC 281 Date: 20191127 File No: 33323-3-C, 5-A, 6-A, 7-A, 11-A Registry: Terrace IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGINA v. CHANTILLE DORALDINE GRAY REASONS FOR SENTENCE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE J.T. DOULIS Counsel for the Crown: K. Tourangeau Counsel for the Defendant: B. Crampton Place of Hearing: Terrace , B.C. Date of Hearing: October 16, 2019 Date of Judgment: November 27, 2019

A Corrigendum was released by the Court on December 6, 2019. The corrections have been made to the text and the Corrigendum is appended to this document. INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] Chantille Doraldine Gray is before the court for sentencing having entered guilty pleas to six offences charged on five informations. All offences occurred in Terrace, BC. Ms. Gray’s most substantive offence charges her with unlawfully causing bodily harm to Frederick Ryan, a complete stranger. On New Year’s Eve 2017, in a spontaneous and confusing melee, Ms. Gray punched Mr.

Ryan, and in doing so unintentionally stabbed him with a knife she had hidden in her sleeve. [ 2 ] Ms. Gray was arrested and charged under Information 33323-01. She was released from custody on a recognizance of bail before Judge Wright on January 3, 2018. The recognizance imposed a number of conditions, including an 8:00 p.m. curfew and a prohibition against possessing any weapon or knives. Over the next 30 months, Ms. Gray breached the recognizance multiple times.

She entered guilty pleas to four counts of breaching her curfew and one count of breaching the condition prohibiting her from possessing a knife, except in circumstances not present in this case. [ 3 ] The Crown and defence propose a global sentence of 118 days jail, 24 months’ probation and various ancillary orders. Taking into account her entitlement to enhanced credit for time spent in pre-sentence custody, Ms. Gray would have 110 days left to serve on a jail sentence. However, the Crown and defence do not agree where the jail sentence should be served, behind bars or in the community.

ISSUES [ 4 ] The sole issue to be determined at this sentencing hearing is whether Ms. Gray should be sentenced to real jail or to serve a conditional sentence in the community. HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS [ 5 ] The lead information came before me for trial on March 13 and 14, 2019. The trial ended on March 14, 2019, with the consent of the Crown, Ms. Gray entered a guilty plea to the lesser included charge of unlawfully causing bodily harm (s. 269) on Information 33323-3-C. Also on March 14, 2019, Ms. Gray entered guilty pleas to three counts of breaching her curfew conditions of recognizance.

At that time, I ordered a Presentence Report from Community Corrections and a Gladue Report. The matter came before me for sentencing on October 16, 2019. On that date Ms. Gray entered a guilty plea to Counts 1 and 2 on 33323-11-A.

I heard submissions of counsel and received into evidence the following exhibits: Exhibit 1: Presentence Report of Probation Officer Leanne Whyte, dated June 10, 2019; Exhibit 2: The Gladue Report of Cynthia Bishop, dated September 19, 2019; Exhibit 3: The Justin Conviction List of Chantille Doraldine Gray, dated May 29, 2018; and Exhibit 4: Victim Impact Statement of Frederick Ryan, dated March 13, 2019. [ 6 ] At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing I reserved my decision. These are my reasons for sentence.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENCES [ 7 ] On December 31, 2017, Frederick Ryan went out for a late afternoon dinner at the Golden Dragon with his friend, Rob Anderson. After dinner they had planned to spend New Year’s Eve at Mr. Ryan’s residence. They got into Mr. Anderson’s pickup truck, with Mr. Anderson driving and Mr. Ryan in the front seat passenger. As they approached the intersection of Lakelse Avenue and Kalum Streets in Terrace, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Ryan noticed two or three persons on the roof of the Happy Gang Senior’s Centre attempting to remove one of its flags. Mr.

Ryan began video-recording the activity with his cell phone. Mr. Ryan and Mr. Anderson decided to investigate. Mr. Anderson turned onto Kalum Street and then drove down the alley behind the Happy Gang Senior’s Centre. Mr. Ryan saw a group of people congregating behind the Centre, who he video-recorded with the intention of providing this information to the police. [ 8 ] As Mr. Anderson and Ms. Ryan were travelling slowly by the gathering, someone struck Mr. Anderson’s pick up. Mr. Anderson stopped the vehicle. Mr.

Ryan put down his phone, opened the passenger door, and confronted the group, demanding they stay away from the truck. As he and Mr. Anderson started to leave someone hit the truck a second time. Mr. Anderson stopped, Mr. Ryan got out of the vehicle and chased the suspect for about 10 to 15 feet. Mr. Ryan tried to get back into the truck but was obstructed by a swarm of people between him and the open passenger door. Mr. Ryan became alarmed and felt threatened. Still, he was determined to force his way back into the truck. At some point he was accosted by a female later identified as Chantille Gray.

At the time, Ms. Gray had concealed a knife in her sweater sleeve. Ms. Gray punched Mr. Ryan. This act caused her knife to puncture Mr. Ryan’s abdomen. [ 9 ] At about the same time the Royal Canadian Mounted Police arrived. Mr. Ryan realized he was bleeding from stab wounds to both his hip and stomach. Ms. Gray’s knife caused the wound to Mr. Ryan’s abdomen. Mr. Ryan brought his injuries to the attention of the attending RCMP officer, identifying Ms. Gray as the assailant. The officer observed Ms. Gray attempting to place her knife in the pocket of another person present at the gathering. The police arrested Ms.

Gray and seized knife. [ 10 ] Mr. Ryan was treated by Emergency Health Services and transported to the hospital. It took three weeks for his wounds to heal sufficiently for him to return to his work as a maintenance supervisor. Under Information 33323-3-C, Ms. Gray was charged with assault with a weapon ( s. 267 (

a) of the Criminal Code ), assault causing bodily harm ( s. 267 (b)), wilfully resisting or obstructing a peace officer ( s. 129 (

a) and mischief ( s. 430 ). [ 11 ] Ms. Gray was placed on a recognizance of bail before Judge T. Wright on January 3, 2018. This recognizance imposed a curfew

from 8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. which Ms. Gray has been charged with repeatedly breaching on Informations 33323-5-A, 33323-6-A, 33323- 7-A, 33323-8-A; 33323-9-A, 33323-10-A and 33323-11-A, Count 1 . Ms. Gray has also placed on a condition she have no knife in her possession except for the immediate preparation of food or for purposes directly and immediately related to her employment.

She was charged with breaching this condition in Court 2 of Information 33323-11-A. [ 12 ] On March 14, 2019, pursuant to 606(4) Chantille Gray pled guilty to u nlawfully causing bodily harm, contrary to s. 269 of the Criminal Code , which was a lesser included charge to Count 1 on Information 33323-3-C, assault with a weapon. Also on March 14, 2019, Ms. Gray entered guilty pleas to breaching the curfew conditions of her January 3, 2019 recognizance on Informations 33323-5-A, Count 1, 33323-6-A and 33323-7-A. On October 16, 2019, Ms. Gray entered guilty pleas to Counts 1 and 2 on 33323-11-A.

The Crown indicated its intention to direct a stay of proceedings on the remaining counts and Informations. [ 13 ] With respect to Information 33323-5-A, Count 1, the Crown submits that on April 28, 2018, at 1:32 a.m. RCMP Constable Hunter went to Ms. Gray’s residence on 3556 Spokeshute Street, on the Kitsumkalum First Nations Reserve to conduct a curfew check. Constable Hunter knocked loudly on two separate doors, four times each, yelling “police – curfew check.” Neither Ms.

Gray nor anyone answered the door. [ 14 ] With respect to Information 33323-6-A, Count 1, the Crown submits that on May 2, 2018, at 7:45 p.m. RCMP Constable Haus saw Ms. Gray walking down Grieg Street in Terrace, BC. Constable Haus was aware Ms. Gray had a curfew requiring her to be in her residence at 8:00 p.m. At that time Ms. Gray still lived at 3556 Spokeshute Street on the Kitsumkalum First Nations Reserve. Constable Haus conducted patrols after 8:00 p.m. and located Ms. Gray in a field with five other people. He approached Ms. Gray at 8:00 p.m, advising her she was to be home at that time. Ms.

Gray told Officer Haus she was waiting for her ride. Officer Haus arrested Ms. Gray and waited in the area until 8:17 p.m. When nobody came to pick up Ms. Gray, Officer Haus transported Ms. Gray back to the detachment. [ 15 ] With respect to Information 33323-7-A, the Crown submits that on April 19, 2018, at 11:32 p.m. Constable Hunter attended Ms. Gray’s residence at 3556 Spokeshute Street, on the Kitsumkalum First Nations Reserve to conduct a curfew check. The officer knocked loudly on the west entrance of Ms. Gray’s residence.

Constable Hunter went to the north entrance, again knocking loudly and yelling, “police – curfew check.” He then returned to the west entrance where he knocked again yelling, “police – curfew check.” No one responded to the knocking or came to the door. [ 16 ] With respect to Information 33323-11-A, Counts 1 and 2, the Crown submits that on June 21, 2019, at 8:30 p.m. Officer Egland was on patrol on Lakelse Avenue in Terrace, BC. He noticed group behind Gemma’s Boutique. Constable Egland located Ms. Gray among the group and arrested her for failing to comply with her 8:00 p.m. curfew. At the time, Ms.

Gray was wearing a backpack. Upon searching the backpack prior to lodging her in the cells, the police discovered a folding knife. Ms. Gray says she had that knife for mushroom picking, an activity in which she was clearly was not engaged at the time of her arrest. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER [ 17 ] Chantille Doraldine Gray was born in Terrace, BC on October 2, 1992, which means she is now 27 years old. Her father was an alcoholic who passed away when Ms. Gray was 17. Ms. Gray is close to her mother and three sisters, but they too are preoccupied with their own struggles, trauma and addictions. Ms.

Gray has two children, ages 8 and 6, who have been in the care of the Ministry of Child, Family and Community Services for the past five years. She is a status member of the Lakalzap Band from Laxgalt’sap, a community in the treaty territory of the Nisga’a First Nations. [ 18 ] Ms. Gray has only a Grade 10 education. She left school to panhandle and sell drugs to feed herself and her addictions. Ms. Gray is a child of alcoholics and herself is an alcoholic – so much so she now has sclerosis of the liver. [ 19 ] At the time of the substantive offence, Ms. Gray had been homeless for four years.

She slept in alleyways, couch surfed and camped. Her support system was other street people. This chaotic existence made it difficult for Ms. Gray to obtain social assistance. For the past two years, however, Ms Gray has lived with Andrew Collins on the Kitsumkalem First Nations Reserve. Mr. Collins is a heavy duty mechanic who provides Ms. Gray with the necessaries of life. The report writers see him as a stabilizing force in Ms. Gray’s life, although he too may use alcohol or drugs. [ 20 ] Ms. Gray’s struggle with alcohol and homelessness has taken its toll.

She is physically unwell and unable to obtain social assistance due to her inability to navigate the system. CRIMINAL RECORD [ 21 ] Ms. Gray has a criminal record beginning in 2009, when she was 16 years old: Exhibit 3. Ms. Gray has six convictions for breaches of court orders, three for assault and one s. 810 peace bond. Her last conviction was in February 2017 for assaulting a peace officer. [ 22 ] Ms. Gray’s performance while on community supervision has been poor. Her reporting was inconsistent as was her attending counselling as directed. PO Whyte supervised Ms. Gray off and on since 2017.

She has witnessed a marked change in Ms. Gray’s attitude toward supervision. PO Whyte believes Ms. Gray now has a genuine interest in rehabilitation for her addictions and past trauma. [ 23 ] Ms. Gray has taken responsibility for her actions, however, as PO Whyte notes, she has not demonstrated much remorse. She justified her actions against Mr. Ryan as defending a friend and she shows little insight into their impact on Mr. Ryan. VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT [ 24 ] Frederick Ryan has provided a Victim Impact Statement marked Exhibit 4, which sets out how the offence has affected him emotionally. He states:

I have become irritable towards co-workers and have lashed out. I am currently dealing with restless sleeps. Some nights I act outviolently sleepwalking. I do not feel safe in the downtown area of Terrace. [25] As to how the offence affected Mr. Ryan physically, he states, both scars ache and itch occasionally. Mr. Ryan is referring toscars resulting from the two wounds he suffered on December 31, 2017, one to his abdomen caused by Ms. Gray and the other to his hipcaused by some unknown person. [26] Mr. Ryan also fears for his security.

He states: I have a concern for myself, friends & family, when a group of strangers come too close. POSITION OF THE CROWN AND DEFENCE ON SENTENCING [27] The Crown and defence agree on the appropriate sentence in terms of the duration of jail, probation and ancillary orders. Theydo not agree whether jail should be real jail or jail in the community. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK [28]

Section 269 of the Criminal Code reads as follows: 269 Every one who unlawfully causes bodily harm to any person is guilty of . . . (

b) an offence punishable on

summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding eighteen months. [29] Section 145(3) of the Criminal Code reads as follows: Failure to comply with condition of undertaking or recognizance

(3) Every person who is at large on an undertaking or recognizance given to or entered into before a justice or judge and is bound tocomply with a condition of that undertaking or recognizance, and every person who is bound to comply with a direction under subsection515(12) or 522(2.1) or an order under subsection 516(2), and who fails, without lawful excuse, to comply with the condition, direction ororder is guilty of . . . (

b) an offence punishable on

summary conviction. [30] The maximum jail sentence for a

summary conviction offence not otherwise legislated is set out in s. 787(1) of the CriminalCode: General penalty 787

(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, everyone who is convicted of an offence punishable on

summary conviction is liable to a fineof not more than five thousand dollars or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months or to both. PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING [31]

Section 718 of the Criminal Code, sets out the fundamental purpose of sentencing, which is to contribute, along with crimeprevention initiatives, respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society, by imposing just sanctions, to haveone or more of the following objectives: (

a) denunciation; (

b) deterrence; (

c) protection of the public; (

d) rehabilitation of the offender;(

e) reparation to victims; and (

f) promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender. [32]

Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code codifies the proportionality principle, which requires the sentence to be proportionate to thegravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. The gravity of the offence refers to what the offender did wrong. Itincludes two components: (

a) the harm or likely harm to the victim; and (

b) the harm or likely harm to society and its values: R. v.Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 , at para. 130. [33] Other important sentencing considerations are set out in s. 718.2, which states a sentence should be increased or reduced toaccount for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender. [34]

Section 718.2(

b) codifies the parity principle which holds sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offendersfor similar offences in similar circumstances. In R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, at para. 79, the Supreme Court held the “parity principle . . .means that any disparity between sanctions for different offenders needs to be justified.” [35]

Section 718.2(

c) codifies the totality principle which holds that where sentences are imposed consecutively, the combinedsentence should not be unduly long or harsh; a sentence should not exceed the overall culpability of the offender. It may offend thetotality principle if it is substantially above the normal level of a sentence for the most serious of the individual offences involved, or itseffect is crushing and not in keeping with the offender’s record and prospects: R. v. M.(C.A.), (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R.500. [36] Sections 718.2(

d) and 718.2(

e) codify the restraint principle which holds an offender should not be deprived of liberty if lessrestrictive principles may be appropriate and all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstancesshould be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.

RANGE OF SENTENCE [37] The Crown and defence jointly submit the appropriate sentences for the offences which Ms. Gray has entered guilty pleas,which are set out below. [38] With respect to Count 1, as amended, on Information 33323-3-C (unlawfully causing bodily harm contrary to s. 269(

b) of theCriminal Code): a. 60 days jail, followed by 24 months probation; b. pursuant to s. 487.05(1) of the Code, an order requiring Ms. Gray provide a number of samples of bodily substances that arereasonably required for the purposes of forensic DNA analysis be taken from Ms. Gray; and c. pursuant to s. 110 of the Code, an order prohibiting Ms.

Gray from possessing any of the weapons set out in that subsection. [39] With respect to Count 1, Information 33323-5-A (breach of undertaking on April 28, 2018, contrary to s. 145(3)), 14 days jail, tobe served consecutively to any other jail sentence I impose today. [40] With respect to Count 1, Information 33323-6-A (breach of undertaking on May 2, 2018, contrary to s. 145(3)), 14 days jail, tobe served concurrently to the sentence imposed on Information 33323-7-A, and consecutive to the sentence imposed on Information33323-3-C and Information 33323-5-A. [41] With respect to Count 1, Information 33323-7-A (breach of undertaking on April 18, 2018, contrary to s. 145(3)), 14 days jail, tobe served concurrently to the sentence imposed on Information 33323-6-A, and consecutive to the sentence imposed on Information33323-3-C and Information 33323-5-A. [42] With respect to Count 1, Information 33323-11-A (breach of undertaking on May 2, 2018, contrary to s. 145(3)), 14 days jail.For Count 2 on Information 33323-11-A breach of undertaking on May 2, 2018, contrary to s. 145(3)), 30 days jail.

The two jailsentences imposed under Information 33323-11-A are to be served concurrent to each other and consecutive to any other jail sentence Iimpose today. [43] The total jail time Ms. Gray would serve for all offences being sentenced is 118 days less time served. Ms. Gray spent fiveactual days in pre-trial custody or eight days with enhanced credit. This means Ms. Gray will have 110 days jail left to serve. [44] The defence seeks a conditional sentence, which the Crown opposes given Ms. Gray’s history of breaching court orders.

AGGRAVATING MITIGATING FACTORS AND COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES [45] As the sentencing judge, I must consider the gravity of the offences of which Ms. Gray was convicted, her degree ofresponsibility in their commission, having regard to her unique individual circumstances. This individualization in sentencing requiresme to consider all aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the collateral consequences. An aggravating factor, either statutorily orjudicially mandated, will induce a court to impose a longer sentence than otherwise may be imposed.

A mitigating factor will reduce thesentence that might otherwise be imposed. The absence of an aggravating factor does not equate to a mitigating factor or vice versa. TheCrown bears the burden of proving disputed aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt; the defence bears the burden of provingdisputed mitigating factors on a balance of probabilities: R. v. Dreger, 2014 BCCA 54, para. 45. MITIGATING FACTORS Sentencing Indigenous Offenders [46] R. v. Gladue, (SCC), and R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, which are the governing cases with respect to how s.718.2(

e) should be applied, and establish the framework for sentencing Indigenous offenders. The judge has a statutory duty imposed bys. 718.2(

e) to consider the unique systemic and background factors which may have played a

part in bringing the particular offenderbefore the Court and the types of sentencing procedures and sanctions that may be appropriate because of the offender’s particularIndigenous heritage. The offender is not required to establish a causal link between background factors and the commission of theoffence before being entitled to have those factors considered by the sentence judge. Judges may take judicial notice of the broadsystemic and background factors affecting Indigenous people generally and case-specific information from the offender and thepresentence reports.

Generally, an offender’s Indigenous heritage is considered a special and mitigating factor for sentencing purposes:see Sheck v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2019 BCCA 364 . [47] Ms. Gray is a status member of the Nisga’a First Nations and therefore the principles relating to sentencing Indigenousoffenders as set out in s. 718.2 apply. [48] Ms. Gray is the daughter of Darold Gray and Susan Evans Gray. Although she grew up in Terrace, BC, Ms. Gray is a member ofthe Lakalzap Band from the Village of Laxgalts’ap, formerly known as Greenville. This is one of the four villages that comprise theNisga’a Nation.

Susan Gray was a member of the Nisga’a First Nations and Darold Gray was Gitxsan. Ms. Gray’s father andgrandparents attended residential school. Susan Gray, the offender’s mother, attended boarding school in Chilliwack. Ms. Gray wasraised predominately by her biological parents but did spend 6 months in the care of the Ministry of Child, Family and CommunityDevelopment when she was 5 years old. Ms. Gray experienced alcohol and perhaps drug use in her family as well as parental absenceand family strife. Ms. Gray was sexually abused by her sister’s boyfriend when she was 13.

She reports to Cynthia Bishop she sufferedphysical and emotional abuse from her father regardless of his sobriety. [49] Although she was not raised in Nisga’a territory, Ms. Gray did have some connection with her traditional culture. Her mother,who was a seamstress, sewed regalia for Ms. Gray and her sisters, and Ms. Gray was involved in traditional dancing.

[50] PO Leanne Whyte surmises on page 9 of her report: A combination of substance misuse issues, anger management, chronic homelessness, inappropriate coping skills and lack of pro-socialsupports has contributed to Ms. Gray’s involvement in the criminal justice system.

She does acknowledge that alcohol misuse was afactor in her offending both with the current index offences and her past criminal justice involvement but has little insight into the impactof her violent behaviour and justifies same as part of daily struggle of a lifestyle characterized by alcohol misuse, chronic homelessnessand conflict. [51] The PSR and the Gladue report reveal Chantille Gray as suffering from the systemic factors which the Courts acknowledgehave contributed to the overrepresentation of Indigenous people in prison. Those Gladue factors specific to Ms.

Gray include: a. being disconnected from her Indigenous community and culture; b. her family’s experience in residential schools; c. physical and emotional abuse while growing up; d. loss of close family members (sister and father) when she was 17; e. involvement in the criminal justice system since she was a teenager; f. impoverished economic and social conditions; g. low educational achievement; h. underemployment and barely substistence living; i. family dislocation and fragmentation; j. being placed in care when she was young and having her children apprehended and placed in the permanent care of theMinistry; k. intergenerational drug and alcohol abuse; l. intergenerational domestic violence; m. transgenerational trauma; and n. victimization by sexual abuse. [52] Although she perceives her past in the best possible light, Ms.

Gray’s young life was marked by domestic violence, alcoholism,neglect and family dysfunction. She currently suffers from serious social disadvantage arising from an array of physical and mentalhealth issues. I am satisfied that those factors, both systemic within society and specific to Ms. Gray have played a role in her criminalbehaviour. In my view the Gladue factors attributable to Ms. Gray ought to be taken into account to arrive at an appropriate sentence.

Mental Health Issues [53] The BC Court of Appeal has recognized that mental health issues can diminish an offender’s culpability where they havecontributed directly or indirectly to the omission of the offence. This is simply the application of the proportionality principle andextends to different categories of mental health issues. In R. v. Williams, 2019 BCCA 295 , the BC Court of Appeal held (atpara. 81), [81] . . .

Where it is demonstrated that [mental health issues] have contributed to the offence, they are a mitigating factor that reduces theoffender’s moral blameworthiness and therefore must be weighed in order to arrive at a proportionate sentence. [54] The appellate court found Mr. Williams’ childhood deprivation, abuse and neglect led to his exploitative and controllingrelationships. Although causation was indirect it contributed to why Mr. Williams committed the sexual offence. [55] R. v.

Badhesa, 2019 BCCA 70 is a manslaughter case in which the offender, heavily intoxicated from alcohol andopium and suffering from severe psychotic depression, beat his mother to death and assaulted his wife. The appellate court stated atparas. 42 - 44 [citations omitted]: [42] When mental illness causes or contributes to the commission of an offence, it is a mitigating factor and a sentence may be reducedbecause the offender's moral culpability is attenuated.

In these circumstances, general deterrence is a less weighty consideration becausea mentally ill offender is not an appropriate medium for making an example to others …Nor does specific deterrence or severepunishment play a significant role in the determination of a fit sentence. The former is meaningless when an offender is out of touch withreality and the latter may be disproportionate to the offender's degree of responsibility. . . [43] Cases involving mental illness and intoxication in combination are, of course, intensely fact-driven.

Detailed and specific medicalevidence is essential to a proper understanding of their relationship in a particular case, if any, as well as their impact on the offender’smoral culpability. Generalizations are insufficient . . .

In our view, insofar as possible, taking into account all of the relevant evidence, asentencing judge should strive to determine the extent to which an offender’s mental illness contributed to the offending conduct,including any contribution to his or her self-induced intoxication . . . [44] When assessing a fit sentence, the judge should attribute a degree of moral culpability to the offender commensurate with the

magnitude of the mental illness and its overall role in the commission of the offence. . . Where mental illness played a central role, theimportance of deterrence and punishment should be given less weight and treatment and public protection concerns should be increased.. . This decreased emphasis on deterrence and punishment is consistent with the proportionality principle, which is the sine qua non of ajust sanction . . . [56] In R. v.

Scofield, 2019 BCCA 3 the BC Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge’s finding that the offender’simpaired cognitive functioning that was a causal factor in his offending, should be given considerable weight in reducing the importanceof the principles of deterrence and denunciation and in reducing his moral culpability. The appellate court referenced the Manitoba Courtof Appeal decision in in R. v. Okemow, 2017 MBCA 59, which states (paras. 72-73) an offender’s moral blameworthiness may bereduced where there is a connection between a mental condition and the offence.

That connection need not be the only causative factor,but it is important that the sentencing judge assess the extent to which such a mental condition played a role in the criminal conduct.

Asthe court said in Okemow, in part [citations omitted]: [72] A reduction of moral blameworthiness for the purposes of sentencing, either for an adult or a young person, due to a recognized andproperly diagnosed mental illness or other condition where the functioning of the human mind is impaired, is a “fact-specific” case-by-case determination as opposed to an automatic rule that the mental illness or cognitive limitation necessarily impacted the commission ofthe offence in question . . . [73] Ascertaining the moral blameworthiness of an offender with a mental illness or some other form of cognitive limitation is a tactfuland considerate exercise.

Sentencing judges must avoid committing one of two obvious errors in principle. The first is being indifferentto the question of whether an offender’s mental circumstances affected his or her degree of responsibility. The other error in principle isthe reverse situation, namely, assuming an offender’s moral blameworthiness for an offence is reduced automatically because he or shehas a mental illness or other cognitive limitation.

It is suggested that, when sentencing offenders with a mental illness or some other formof cognitive limitation, such as a form of FASD, sentencing judges keep separate and properly assess the following questions: 1. Is there cogent evidence that the offender suffers from a recognized mental illness or some other cognitive limitation? 2.

Is there evidence as to the nature and severity of the offender’s mental circumstances such that an informed decision can bemade as to the relationship, if any, between those circumstances and the criminal conduct? 3 Assuming the record is adequate, the sentencing judge must decide the offender’s degree of responsibility for the offence takinginto account whether and, if so, to what degree his or her mental illness or cognitive limitation played a role in the criminal conduct. . . . [57] R. v. Swaby, 2018 BCCA 416 , leave to appeal to SCC refused [2019] S.C.C.A.

No. 17, was a child pornography case.Justice Bennett for the appellate court upheld the lower court’s decision that Mr. Swaby’s combination of cognitive, intellectual andmental health problems warranted a sentence below the typical range for child pornography. Although a jail sentence would be thenorm, Mr. Swaby’s mental health problems both reduced his moral blameworthiness and increased the negative impact of incarceration.The appellate court upheld the lower court’s imposition of a conditional sentence. [58] Cynthia Bishop, the Gladue Report writer, indicates that Ms.

Gray has displayed behaviours suggesting she may suffer fromFetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (“FASD”). She refers to Ms.

Gray’s long history of low impulses control, lack of executivefunctioning, poor memory, maladaptive behaviour, limited social skills, and difficulties in social communication. [59] In Proportionate Justice: An Examination of Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders and the Principles of Sentencing inSaskatchewan, 2019 82-1 Saskatchewan Law Review 75, 2019 CanLIIDocs 413, author Zoe Johansen-Hill explains that FASD can causephysical, psychological, and behavioural effects including characteristic facial features.

It can result in learning and attention deficits,poor memory, impulsivity, and an inability to appreciate the consequences of one’s actions. It is often aggravated with secondaryconditions such as attention deficit disorders, learning disorders, and substance abuse, as well as negative social/environmentalcircumstances such as unemployment, poverty, and substance abuse. FASD presents a conundrum for sentencing judges.

On one hand itis mitigating because it is an involuntary medical condition diminishing the offender’s moral blameworthiness in certain offences; on theother hand the impulsivity and lack of foresight associated with FASD can pose a danger to the public. [60] As the BC Court of Appeal directs in Williams, as the sentencing judge I must determine whether and to what extent Ms. Gray’smental health issues contributed to the commission of the offence. Ms. Gray has no formal medical diagnosis of FASD or any othermental illness.

I accept FASD it is a complex condition requiring a comprehensive interdisciplinary assessment and can take some timeand effort to arrange. Ms. Bishop’s research suggests Ms. Gray possibly has some sort of neurodevelopmental or neurocognitive disorder.Certainly, she has an alcohol addiction. [61] In R. v. E.M.Q., 2015 BCSC 201 , Mr. Justice Pearlman was faced with a similar circumstances wherein the offender’smother and community support network believed the offender suffered from FASD. The defence provided no expert medical opinion tocorroborate this belief.

Moreover, Justice Pearlman had no evidence FASD was a factor in the commission of the offences before thecourt. He states at para. 140: [140] Again, as I noted earlier in these Reasons, Probation Officer McPherson notes that E.M.Q.’s mother, the Nemiah Valley drug andalcohol counsellor, and Three Voices of Healing’s Client Report all state that E.M.Q. suffers from FASD. A diagnosis of FASD can beconsidered as a mitigating factor in sentencing: R. v. Ramsay, 2012 ABCA 257 . Here, I have no medical diagnosis of FASD.The Client Report from Three Voices of Healing is not in evidence.

Further, E.M.Q. bears the onus of proving on a balance ofprobabilities not only that he suffers from FASD but also that the disability played a role in the commission of the offence: R. v.Ramsay at para. 19; R. v. Batisse, 2009 ONCA 114 at para. 38. In the absence of evidence confirming a diagnosis of FASD bya trained professional, or evidence that FASD had any effect on E.M.Q.’s offending behaviour, the defence has not met that burden.Accordingly, I have not taken FASD into account as a mitigating factor.

[62] In absence of medical or “cogent evidence” Ms. Gray has FASD and it played a role in her criminal conduct, I cannot considerit mitigating. FASD covers as spectrum of neurocognitive disorders and the court needs evidence as to how the condition impairedMs. Gray’s ability to control her behaviour. As noted in the authorities cited above, the effect of FASD on moral blameworthiness is factspecific. In R. v.

Ramsay, 2012 ABCA 257 , the Alberta Court of appeal explained [citations omitted]: [25] The degree of moral blameworthiness must therefore be commensurate with the magnitude of the cognitive deficits attributable toFASD. The more acute these are shown to be, the greater their importance as mitigating factors and the less weight is to be accorded todeterrence and denunciation, all of which will serve to “push the sentence ... down the scale of appropriate sentences for similaroffences” (for the careful application of this sliding scale to an especially severe case of FASD . . . [63] Ms.

Gray reported to PO Whyte that she experienced auditory hallucinations that worsen when she is sober or detoxing. Inaddition to her psychosis, Ms. Gray says also suffers from anxiety and depression. Again, there is no medical evidence before the courtto confirm Ms. Gray’s self-diagnosis. [64] In this case, the evidence does not disclose a significant or causal connection between Ms. Gray’s mental health issues and theoffences. Neither does the evidence show that by reason of her mental illness incarceration would have a disproportionate or potentiallycrushing effect.

Nevertheless, I accept that the combination of Ms. Gray’s traumatic childhood, addictions, homelessness, and physicaland mental health issues would have likely impaired her decision-making and judgment and contributed to her commission of theoffences. Addiction Issues [65] Ms. Gray began using tobacco when she was 7 years old and marijuana when she was 8. She began drinking at age 10 and foryears has consumed alcohol almost daily. Ms. Gray admits she is an alcoholic. She attributes her involvement with the criminal justicesystem to her alcohol misuse. The defence submits Ms.

Gray’s breaches of curfew may be the result of her alcoholism and transportationproblems. In R. v. Leslie, 2016 BCCA 213 , para. 34, citing R. v. Pop, 2013 BCCA 160 , the BC Court of Appealconfirmed an offender’s degree of intoxication during the commission of an offence may diminish his or her moral blameworthiness tosome extent. The circumstances of the offences before me, as read in by the Crown, do not indicate Ms. Gray’s level of intoxication atthe time of their commission. However, Ms. Gray reported to PO Whyte that she was under the influence of alcohol at the time of theoffence. In fact, Ms.

Gray asserts her entire involvement in the criminal justice system is linked to her alcohol misuse. [66] The PSR and Gladue Report underscore Chantille Gray is flailing and needs help in the form of residential treatment toovercome her substance abuse and to address her childhood trauma. Although I accept this to be the case, I cannot find Ms. Gray’sdegree of intoxication during the commission of the offence as mitigating. Specifically, I have no evidence upon which I can concludethat: a. Ms.

Gray’s intoxication in the commission of any of the offences before the court was to the level of an alcohol-induceddelirium: R. v. Espinosa Ribadeneira, 2019 NSCA 7 , at para. 79 citing R. v. Hicks, (BC CA) where theoffender stabbed two victims to death while in a in a cocaine-induced psychotic state; b. Ms. Gray was acting out of character as the result of severe intoxication: Espinosa Ribadeneira, at para. 79; c. Ms. Gray’s level of intoxication demonstrated a lack of planning or even short-lived premeditation: Espinosa Ribadeneira, atpara. 79, citing R. v. Simcoe, (ON CA), [2002] O.J.

No. 884 at para. 25 (C.A.). In the s. 269 offence, Ms. Gray hadhidden a knife in her sweater sleeve; d. Ms. Gray has successfully addressed her alcohol abuse which led to the criminal conduct: Espinosa Ribadeneira, at para. 79. [67] Although Ms. Gray’s alcoholism is not in itself mitigating, when considered in combination with her other health, social,economic and educational disadvantages, it is significant. In Badhesa the appellate court held a fit sentence must take into account theoffender’s degree of moral blameworthiness, which is necessarily influenced by his or her mental state.

The Court states: [35] In our view, in assessing moral culpability, it was open to the judge to weigh the relative contribution of the accused's mental illnessand intoxication during the commission of the offences.

It was also open to the judge to find, as he did, that the appellant's degree ofintoxication due to his consumption of alcohol and opium was the more significant driver in the events giving rise to the charges.However, we are of the view that the judge made a palpable and overriding error in the assessment of moral culpability because he failedto consider the extent to which the appellant's mental illness contributed to his excessive consumption of alcohol. [68] In this case, I do not have sufficient evidence to weigh the relative contribution of Ms.

Gray’s mental health issues andintoxication to the commission of the offences. Nor can I determine the extent to which Ms. Gray’s mental health issues contributed toher consumption of alcohol. [69] What is truly mitigating is Ms. Gray’s early guilty pleas to the breach charges: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 . Althoughthe guilty plea to the s. 269 offence was not entered until the second day of trial, it is still mitigating because Ms. Gray, with the Crown’sconsent, entered a guilty plea to only one count on the four count information, and that was to a lesser included charge.

AGGRAVATING FACTORS [70] In this case I find aggravating: a. the bodily harm Ms. Gray caused to Mr. Ryan was a one-inch puncture wound from a knife hidden in her sleeve. Althoughbodily harm is a element of a s. 269 offence, the fact the harm was caused by a concealed knife is aggravating; b. Mr. Ryan was retreating at the time of the offence. (See: R. v. Sandy, 2013 BCSC 2388, wherein Madam Justice Gray held (at

para. 27) that attacking a retreating victim is aggravating); c. The offence had a significant and lasting impact on Mr. Ryan’s physical and emotional well-being. He still has a scar from theinjury which causes him pain; he feels unsafe when downtown in his home community. (See: s. s 718.2(a)(iii.1) of the Criminal Code);and d. Ms. Gray has a prior criminal record for both violent offences and offences against the administration of justice. [71] I find neither aggravating nor mitigating, but relevant: a. Ms. Gray has expressed no sincere remorse for the offence against Mr.

Ryan (See: Dreger wherein the BC Court of Appealheld that lack of remorse is not aggravating); and b. Ms. Gray attempted to place the knife in the pocket of another persons at the crime scene. (See: R v Mulligan-Brum, 2013BCCA 231, para. 25 wherein the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by referring to the fact that the accused did not surrenderto police and hid his weapon as aggravating factors. The court said that although these facts could be used in assessing remorse, theywere ordinary and not aggravating factors of the crime).

CONDITIONAL SENTENCE [72] A conditional sentence is a sentence of imprisonment served in the community under strict conditions. Its purpose is to giveeffect to the principle of restraint in the use of incarceration as a sanction and increase the restorative justice objectives of rehabilitation,reparations to the victim and community, and promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender and acknowledgment of the harmdone to the victim and the community probation order: R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 , para. 9. [73]

Section 742.1 sets out five prerequisites for the imposition of a conditional sentence: a. the offender must be convicted of an offence that is not specifically excluded; b. the offender must be convicted of an offence that is not punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment; c. the court must impose a sentence of imprisonment that is less than two years; d. the safety of the community would not be endangered by the offender serving the sentence in the community; and e.

The conditional sentence must be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in ss.718 to 718.2. [74] Neither party has an onus of establishing the offender should or should not receive a conditional sentence. Instead, the judgemust take into consideration all of the evidence in order to determine whether it is an appropriate sanction. [75] The sentencing judge must give serious consideration to the imposition of a conditional sentence where the statutory pre-conditions have been met: Proulx; R. v. Lynch, 2015 BCCA 140.

Except for offences specifically excluded, there is no presumption infavour of or against the imposition of a conditional sentence. A conditional sentence, however, must be a real alternative to a jail sentenceand not merely a substitute for community-based sanctions such as fines and probation. [76] In Proulx, the Supreme Court setout a two-stage process for deciding whether to impose a conditional sentence. In the firststage, a judge sentencing an offender for a Criminal Code offence must consider: (

a) whether a suspended sentence or a fine isinappropriate; (

b) the range of sentence is less than two years; and (

c) whether the offence is not excluded by s. 742.1. If thesepreconditions are satisfied, then the judge is required to consider a conditional sentence: R. v. Wells, 2000 SCC 10, para. 27. [77] After a preliminary assessment, I find the stage one factors are satisfied and will now consider whether Ms. Gray ought to serveher sentence in the community. At this second stage, I must consider (

a) the safety of the community; and (

b) the fundamental purposeand principles of sentencing set out in ss.718 and 718.2. Does the safety of the community preclude a conditional sentence? [78] The safety of the community requires me to weigh the risk Ms. Gray will reoffend and the gravity of the consequences ofreoffending. Ms. Gray punched Mr. Ryan while sequestering a knife up her sleeve. This action resulted in Mr. Ryan suffering a one-inchstab wound to his abdomen. This will be Ms. Gray’s fifth conviction for a violent offence since 2009. [79] Ms. Gray also has a record for offences against the administration of justice.

She has six convictions for breaches of courtorders prior to the imposition of sentence for the five breaches of recognizance now before the court. Ms. Gray also has a convictions forresisting or obstructing a peace officer. Although a record for breaching previous court orders may weigh against the imposition of aconditional sentence, it is not an absolute bar. [80] The Supreme Court of Canada in Proulx, provided the court with guidance on assessing the risk to the community whenconsidering a conditional sentence: [127] . . . 6. The requirement in s. 742.1(

b) that the judge be satisfied that the safety of the community would not be endangered by theoffender serving his or her sentence in the community is a condition precedent to the imposition of a conditional sentence, and not theprimary consideration in determining whether a conditional sentence is appropriate. In making this determination, the judge shouldconsider the risk posed by the specific offender, not the broader risk of whether the imposition of a conditional sentence would endangerthe safety of the community by providing insufficient general deterrence or undermining general respect for the law.

Two factors shouldbe taken into account: (1) the risk of the offender re-offending; and (2) the gravity of the damage that could ensue in the event of re-

offence. A consideration of the risk posed by the offender should include the risk of any criminal activity, and not be limited solely to therisk of physical or psychological harm to individuals. [81] Chief Justice Lamer, in Proulx, states at paras. 72 and 73 [citations omitted]: [72] The risk of re-offence should also be assessed in light of the conditions attached to the sentence. Where an offender might posesome risk of endangering the safety of the community, it is possible that this risk be reduced to a minimal one by the imposition ofappropriate conditions to the sentence . . .

Indeed, this is contemplated by s. 742.3(2)(f), which allows the court to include as optionalconditions “such other reasonable conditions as the court considers desirable . . . for securing the good conduct of the offender and forpreventing a repetition by the offender of the same offence or the commission of other offences”.

For example, a judge may wish toimpose a conditional sentence with a treatment order on an offender with a drug addiction, notwithstanding the fact that the offender hasa lengthy criminal record linked to this addiction, provided the judge is confident that there is a good chance of rehabilitation and that thelevel of supervision will be sufficient to ensure that the offender complies with the sentence. [73] This last point concerning the level of supervision in the community must be underscored.

As the Alberta Court of Appeal stressedin Brady, supra, at para. 135: A conditional sentence drafted in the abstract without knowledge of what actual supervision and institutions and programs are availableand suitable for this offender is often worse than tokenism: it is a sham. Hence, the judge must know or be made aware of the supervision available in the community by the supervision officer or by counsel. Ifthe level of supervision available in the community is not sufficient to ensure safety of the community, the judge should impose asentence of incarceration. [82] In this case, the defence admits Ms.

Gray struggles with alcohol addiction. Her current partner, Andrew Collins, also suffersfrom addictions. Ms. Gray lived with Mr. Collins on the Kitsumkalum Reserve at the time of one or more of the offences before thecourt and continues to do so. She relies on Mr. Collins for the necessaries of life. Both rely on public transit for transportation to andfrom Terrace. Mr. Collins did not attend Ms. Gray’s sentencing hearing and PO Whyte was unable to contact him to interview him.Ms. Gray is exploring residential treatment but has no definitive rehabilitative plan at this point. [83] Ms.

Gray was hospitalized in May 2019 for medical complications arising from her alcohol consumption. The report writers sayMs. Gray has pancreatitis and bleeding ulcers. Defence counsel submits Ms. Gray now has sclerosis of the liver. Ms. Gray expressed tothe report-writers her goals include sobriety, treatment and employment. Both PO Whyte and Ms. Bishop comment that in the past twoyears Ms. Gray has made some positive gains towards sobriety/harm reduction. [84] In my view the safety of the community invites some consideration of the amount of resources required to monitor and enforceMs.

Gray’s compliance with the strict terms of a conditional sentence. The defence proposes a conditional sentence without house arrest,but rather a curfew slightly more lenient than that imposed in the January 3, 2018 recognizance. In this way, Ms. Gray would have noimpediment to attending medical appointments and meeting with social workers while serving a conditional sentence. Although I agree aconditional sentence order on such terms may benefit Ms. Gray, it is not a true alternative to jail. I do not consider it appropriate tomanage Ms.

Gray’s risk of re-offending by stripping the conditional sentence of its mobility restraints or other jail-type sanctions. [85] It does not appear that Ms. Gray has taken any significant steps towards rehabiltation. She told PO Whyte she had never been toa doctor for her mental health concerns notwithstanding her episodic psychosis. Ms. Gray admits to using alcohol to cope with her stress,anxiety, depression, trauma and anger. She told Ms. Bishop she can abstain from alcohol for two to three weeks at a time, but continuesto use marijuana, crystal methamphetamine, crack cocaine, cocaine and heroin. Ms.

Gray asserts she would be willing to see a counsellorin the future despite her history of failing to attend or follow up with community resources. Although she did attend a treatment program,she ended up back on the streeet. Do the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing militate against jail in the community? [86] The offence of unlawfully causing bodily harm is a serious offence giving prominence to the principles of denunciation anddeterrence. Similarly, general deterrence and denunciation are paramount principles in the imposition of sentences for breaches of courtorders.

For this reason, breaches of court orders ordinarily attract a consecutive rather than concurrent sentence otherwise there is nopunishment for the breach: R. v. Paradis, 2016 BCPC 354 , para. 46. [87] In R. v. K.S.C., 2015 BCPC 199 , upon referencing Judge Gorman’s decision in R. v. Seaward, (NL PC), Judge Giardini states: [83] It is important that court orders be respected. It is critical that offenders not breach court orders or their undertakings to the courtwhile on release. The proper administration of justice and the public's confidence in the administration of justice depends on compliancewith such orders.

When such orders are breached, courts must stress the sentencing principles of specific and general deterrence. Thesetype of offences strike at the heart, purpose, and intent of our criminal justice system because they rob the victims of any sense ofsecurity that the court might provide through such orders. These types of offences make the court look impotent. [88] Judge Giardini in K.S.C. went on to state at para. 84, that the nature of the breach is an important consideration in s. 145(3)offences.

She notes, an accused’s failure to comply with an alcohol abstention or curfew condition is much less serious than failing tocomply with a no-contact condition. In this case, Ms. Gray’s breach of curfew are less serious than her breach of her no knife condition. ANALYSIS [89] Taking into consideration Ms. Gray’s personal circumstances, including her Indigenous heritage, the circumstances and gravityof the offence, I am satisfied the jointly proposed sentence of jail, probation and ancillary orders is appropriate.

Issue: Where should Ms. Gray serve her jail sentence? [90] The point of contention between the Crown and defence is whether Ms. Gray ought to serve the jail sentence behind bars or inthe community. Ms. Bishop in her Gladue Report has satisfied me there are a number community resources available to Ms. Gray toassist her in her rehabilitative journey. There are also culturally sensitive treatment resources in correctional facilities. [91] In support of its position, Ms. Gray ought to serve her jail sentences in the community, the defence points to her myriad ofhealth problems.

Unfortunately, I have been given no clinical records or reports diagnosing Ms. Gray’s medical conditions or treatmentoptions. Correctional institutions provide a broad spectrum of medical services to their inmates, indeed they are statutorily obligated todo so. [92] In this case, there is no evidence Ms. Gray’s medical conditions cannot be properly treated while incarcerated. [93] In R. v. Potts, 2011 BCCA 9 , the BC Court of appeal held that there has to be clear and convincing evidence to justifya compassionate reduction of sentence.

Madam Justice Rowles for the Court states at para. 85 [citations omitted]: [85] It is relatively rare for the health of an offender to be taken into account in sentencing but there are cases in which an offender’shealth may be relevant.

Although an offender’s health status may be relevant at sentencing, in general these matters are best consideredas part of the overall circumstances of the offender, rather than as a basis for deducting time from an otherwise appropriate sentence.There are cases in which an otherwise fit sentence may be reduced on compassionate grounds, but such reduction must be based oncurrent, clear and convincing evidence… [94] In Swope, the Court of Appeal held that deficiencies in the accommodation of the accused’s medical condition in prison are bestleft to be dealt with through administrative or other legal channels rather than indirectly through the modification of the sentence. [95] In R. v.

H.S., 2014 ONCA 323 , Ontario Court of Appeal overturned a conditional sentence (for sexual offences againsthis daughter) finding it manifestly unfit. The Court concluded that the trial judge erred in treating the accused’s health problems as amitigating factor because there was no evidence that they could not be properly treated while he was incarcerated. [96] The reasoning in the above-cited authorities applies to the determination of where Ms. Gray ought to serve a jail sentence. DISPOSITION [97] I am not confident that Ms.

Gray will comply with the strict terms of a conditional sentence order and I am not prepared toimpose a conditional sentence which is essentially a probation order in disguise. Accordingly, I find that Ms. Gray should not serve herjail sentences in the community. SENTENCING ORDERS [98] Chantille Doraldine Gray, with respect Information 33323-3-C, Count 1, as amended, charging you on December 31, 2017, at ornear Terrace, B.C. with unlawfully causing bodily harm to Frederick Ryan, contrary to

Section 269 of the Criminal Code, I sentence youto 60 days jail, less time served. You have five days in pre-sentence custody which is eight days with enhanced credit. This means youwill have 52 days jail left to serve on this matter; [99] Upon your release from custody you will be subject to 24 months’ probation on Information 33323-3-C, with following termsand conditions: a. You must keep the peace and be of good behaviour. b. You must appear before the court when required to do so by the court. c.

You must notify the court or the probation officer in advance of any change of name or address, and promptly notify the courtor the probation officer of any change of employment or occupation. d. You must have no contact or communication, directly or indirectly, with Frederick Ryan except with a further order of thiscourt. e. You must not go to any place you know to be the residence, school or workplace of Frederick Ryan except with a further orderof this court. f.

You must report in person to a probation officer at Terrace Community Corrections at within two business days after yourrelease from custody, unless you have obtained, prior to your release, written permission from the probation officer to report elsewhere orwithin a different time frame. After that, you must report as directed by the probation officer. g. When first reporting to the probation officer, you must inform him or her of your residential address and phone number. Youmust not change your residence or phone number without providing written notice to your probation officer. h.

Having consented, you must attend, participate in and successfully complete any intake, assessment, counselling, program,treatment or residential treatment program as directed by your probation officer. i. You must not possess, either personally or through another person, any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restrictedweapon, prohibited device, ammunition or explosive substance, anything that resembles a weapon or firearm, any weapon as defined insection 2 of the Criminal Code, or any related authorizations, licences or registration certificates.

j.

You must not possess any knife, except for the immediate preparation or eating of food, or for purposes directly and immediately related to your employment. [ 100 ] Chantille Doraldine Gray, with respect to Information 33323-5-, Count 1, charging you on or about April 28, 2018, at or near Terrace, B.C., with breaching your recognizance by failing to obey a curfew, I sentence you to 14 days jail to be served consecutively with any other sentence I imposed today; [ 101 ] Chantille Doraldine Gray, with respect to Information 33323-6-A, Count 1, charging you, on or about May 2, 2018, at or near Terrace, B.C., with breaching your recognizance by failing to obey a curfew, I sentence you to 14 days jail to be served consecutively to the sentences I imposed on Informations 33323-3-C and Informations 33323-5-A, and concurrently to the sentence I impose on Information 33323-7-A. [ 102 ] Chantille Doraldine Gray, with respect to Information 33323-7-A, Count 1, charging you, on or about April 19, 2018, at or near Terrace, B.C., with breaching our recognizance by failing to obey a curfew, I sentence you to 14 days jail to be served consecutively to the sentences I imposed on Informations 33323-3-C and 33323-5-A, and concurrently to the sentence I impose on Information 33323-6- A. [ 103 ] Chantille Doraldine Gray, on October 16, 2019, you pled guilty to Count 1 on Information 33323-11-A, charging you, on or about June 21, 2019 , at or near Terrace, B.C., with breaching your recognizance by failing to obey a curfew.

I accept your guilty plea and I find you guilty of that offence. I sentence you to 14 days jail to be served concurrently to the sentence I impose today on Information 33323-11-A Count 2, and consecutively to any other sentence I impose today. [ 104 ] Chantille Doraldine Gray, on October 16, 2019, you pled guilty to Count 2 on Information 33323-11-A, charging you on or about June 21, 2019 , at or near Terrace, BC, with breaching your recognizance by possessing a knife. I accept your guilty plea and I find you guilty of that offence.

I sentence you to 30 days jail to be served concurrently to the sentence I impose today on Count 1 of Information 33323-11-A and consecutively to any other sentence I impose today. [ 105 ] Chantille Doraldine Gray, I have sentenced you to a global sentence of 118 days on all matters before the court. You has spent five days in pre-sentence custody and you are entitled to eight days with enhanced credit on Information 33323-3-C.

You have a total of 110 days left to serve: 52 days on Information 33323-3-C and 58 days globally on the breach Informations: 33323-5-A (14 days), 33323- 6-A and 33323-7-A (14 days), 33323-11-A (30 days). [ 106 ] Chantille Doraldine Gray, Count 1 on Information 33323-3-C , is a primary designated offence. Pursuant to

section 487.051(1), I make an order in Form 5.03 authorizing the taking of samples of bodily substances from you for the purpose of registration in the DNA National Databank. [ 107 ] The samples will be taken from you while you are in jail and you must submit to the taking of the samples. [ 108 ] Also on Count 1, Information 33323-3-C, I make an order pursuant to s. 110 that you are prohibited from possessing any firearm, crossbow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, and explosive substance for five years. ___________________________ Judge J.T.

Doulis Provincial Court of British Columbia CORRIGENDUM- Released December 6, 2019 [1] In the Reasons for Sentence dated November 27, 2019, paragraph 97 is corrected to read: [97] I am not confident that Ms. Gray will comply with the strict terms of a conditional sentence order and I am not prepared to impose a conditional sentence which is essentially a probation order in disguise. Accordingly, I find that Ms. Gray should not serve her jail sentences in the community. ___________________________ Judge J.T. Doulis Provincial Court of British Columbia