R. v. Kanda, 2020 BCPC 292

Citation: R. v. Kanda 2020 BCPC 292 Date: 20201106 File No: 216612-2C Registry: Surrey IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Criminal Court REGINA v. JIM SINGH KANDA RE:

SECTION 11(

b) CHARTER APPLICATION ORAL RULING OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE J. LOPES Counsel for the Crown: R. Khangura Counsel for the Accused: M. Stern Place of Hearing: Surrey , B.C. Date of Hearing: October 13, 2020 Date of Judgment: November 6, 2020 A Corrigendum was released by the Court on July 17, 2021. The corrections have been made to the text and the Corrigendum is appended to this document.

Introduction [ 1 ] THE COURT: Mr. Kanda has been charged with a number of offences arising out of an incident that occurred on October 1st, 2016. Mr. Kanda was initially charged on October 2nd, 2016, but that indictment was stayed. He was then charged with offences arising from the same incident on February 26th, 2019. [ 2 ] Mr. Kanda applies for a stay on the basis that the delay between the first indictment and the end of the trial, a trial which has now been adjourned due to COVID, was unreasonable and contrary to the principles set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.

Jordan , 2016 SCC 27 , hereinafter referred to as " Jordan". Issue [ 3 ] The issue in this application is whether the gap period, that is the period between the initial indictment and the second indictment, is included in the calculation of delay. [ 4 ] The total delay period, including the gap period, is 44 months and 25 days. If the gap period is not included, the delay does not exceed the 18 month presumptive ceiling set out in Jordan . Chronology [ 5 ] The agreed chronology of the matter is as follows: October 1, 2016 Date of the alleged offences; October 2, 2016 Mr.

Kanda is arrested and the initial police information is sworn; October 5, 2016 Initial indictment is stayed. The Crown states on the record: "The police are still investigating the matter but at this time Crown is directing a stay of proceedings on the police information"; February 22, 2017

Section 490 Extension of Things Seized is made to extend it to May 22, 2017; On June 27, 2017

Section 490 Extension of Things Seized is made to extend it to October 3, 2017; October 24, 2017 DNA warrant is executed on Mr. Kanda; November 20, 2017 DNA is submitted to the laboratory; January 5, 2018 DNA report received by the police; May 16, 2018 Search warrant for Mr. Kanda's phone, which was seized from his home, is obtained; January 23, 2019

Section 490 Extension of Things Seized application hearing is cancelled; February 26, 2019 Second indictment, the 2C Information is sworn; March 4, 2019 Mr. Kanda makes his first appearance on the 2C. He is arrested and released on $6,000 cash bail with conditions; March 27, 2019 Initial disclosure is made to the defence; April 24 – July 8, 2019 Fix dates in Surrey Provincial Court; July 9, 2019 Arraignment hearing is held; October 16, 2019 Matter was called ahead and arraigned for earlier trial dates; June 10-12, 2020 Original trial dates that have been adjourned due to June 24-26, 2020 COVID. Legal Principles

Section 11(

b) of the Charter [ 6 ]

Section 11(

b) of the Charter provides that any person charged with an offence has the right to be tried within a reasonable time. [ 7 ] In Jordan , the Supreme Court established the current framework for evaluating pre-trial delay. The presumptive ceiling for matters in the Provincial Court is 18 months from the date charges are laid to the end of trial. The analysis of whether the presumptive ceiling has been exceeded begins by calculating the total delay from the charge to the end of trial. Then any delay in the proceedings attributable to the defence is subtracted, as is any delay attributable to exceptional circumstances. [ 8 ]

Section 11(

b) has both individual and societal interests underlying it. Excessive delay implicates the liberty, security and fair trial interests of people charged, as well as society's interest in having the prompt disposition of criminal matters and in having them determined on their merits: Jordan at paras. 153 - 158 . [ 9 ] The security of the person is negatively affected during the time awaiting trial by stigmatization, loss of privacy, stress and

anxiety. In addition, the accused person is entitled to mount a full and fair defence. That means that the proceedings should take placewhile the evidence is fresh and available. Society also has an interest in seeing that a person who is innocent is acquitted and those thatare found guilty are dealt with. The accused and society benefit from a trial that is held within a reasonable time. Position of the Defence [10] The applicant submits that his 11(

b) rights were engaged during the entire period of 44 months and 25 days. Although he was notformally charged during that period, he remained subject to the judicial process and his s. 11(

b) rights continued to be affected by theknowledge or expectation that further charges were imminent. [11] The defence relies on the following cases. [12] In R. v. Milani, 2014 ONCA 536, the court accepted the general rule that an accused's s. 11(

b) rights were not engaged duringthe gap between the Crown stay and a new or revived charge, however, set out an exception. That exception was if the charge had beenstayed with the intention of laying a new charge. The court stated at paragraphs 47 to 49 the following: [47]

Section 11(

b) serves to protect the charged person’s right to freedom and to be dealt with fairly and without delay within the courtsystem. The objective is to have an efficient system for dealing with accused persons. The ambit of s. 11(

b) does not extend on a societallevel to the speedy investigation of crime. Extending the protection of s. 11(

b) to persons who are not actively charged with an offencewould not advance the objectives of this protection. [48] There is a caveat however. There are circumstances in which unilateral state action may control whether or not charges arewithdrawn or re-laid. In such circumstances, where the formal charge has been withdrawn with the intention of laying a new charge, oran information has been quashed with a new information laid, it makes sense to consider the entire period from when the first chargeswere laid as part of the s. 11(

b) analysis. In such circumstances, the person, although not formally charged during the “gap” period,remains subject to the judicial process, and his s. 11(

b) interests will continue to be affected by the knowledge or expectation that furthercharges are imminent. It is reasonable to conclude that he remains subject to the process of the court. That is precisely what occurred inR. v. Antoine, ONCA [49] For all of these reasons, I would interpret s. 11(

b) as being engaged during any period that an accused person is in fact subject tocharges, or when a person no longer actively charged remains subject to the very real prospect of new charges. [13] The defence submits that this exception that the gap period does engage s. 11(

b) rights when the accused remains subject to thevery real prospect of new charges has been followed in British Columbia. [14] In the decision of R. v. Curry, 2016 BCSC 1435, the court analyzed whether the Jordan clock should run while charges werestayed. In that case, Mr. Curry was initially charged on January 10th, 2013. The Crown stayed the charges on April 23rd, 2013 in orderto stop the running of the Jordan clock while the investigation continued and to organize disclosure.

The court states the following atparagraphs 91 through 95: [91] However, for the following reasons I cannot accept the Crown’s position that the period during which the proceedings were stayeddid not engage Mr. Curry’s interests in liberty or security of the person. [92] Mr. Curry had been arrested on the charges, held overnight, and released on a recognizance that had held him to conditions,including a curfew, for the preceding three months or more. On April 23, 2013, when the stay was directed, he was making his firstappearance in court in relation to the charges. In my view, Mr.

Curry clearly “[stood] accused before the community of committing acrime”, in the language of Carter, quoted above, and the stay of proceedings, directed during that first appearance before the court, didnot alter that fact. There is no reason to conclude that the stay of proceedings put an end to the “stress, anxiety, and stigma” flowingfrom the charges that, as Jordan explained (at para. 20, quoted above), affect an accused person’s right to security of the person. [93] The Crown did not withdraw the charges against Mr. Curry, or ask that they be dismissed.

With the stay of proceedings, the chargesremained outstanding, and were available to be recommenced within the one-year period set out in s. 579(2) of the Criminal Code. Onthe agreed facts, Mr. Curry had no reason to believe that the proceedings would not be recommenced.

And, indeed, it was in fact theCrown’s intention to recommence if the ITO could be suitably redacted, as eventually it was. [94] In the calculation of the overall delay, the period during which the charges were stayed will not be deducted. [95] Before any deduction for defence delay, the overall delay thus runs from January 10, 2013 (the date of the first charge) through toJuly 8, 2016 (the date of the verdict after the trial). It amounts to 3½ years, or 42 months.

And further, at paragraph 186 the court states: The stay of proceedings directed by the Crown at an early stage may also (in this context) be viewed as an effort to minimize therestrictions on Mr. Curry’s liberty while the case was not ready to proceed. However, I emphasize that, as I have concluded, it did notstop the running of time for the purposes of s. 11(

b) or, therefore, reduce the overall period of delay. [15] In Curry, the cause of the stay was for further investigation and disclosure. Although the accused was not subject to bailconditions, the court found that the accused had no reason to conclude that the charges would not be re-laid and that he was still subjectto the same affects as a person facing outstanding charges. [16] R. v. Christhurajah, 2019 BCCA 210, is a case where the decision in Milani is cited.

It is not a case where there was a gapperiod as the accused was the subject of charges through a lengthy period while the parties awaited a constitutional challenge. However,the position of the defence in that case included that the charges should or could have been stayed during the waiting period. The Courtof Appeal rejected the submission, stating at paragraphs 128 and 129:

[128] In Milani , the accused was charged with certain offences and discharged following a preliminary inquiry. Some 23 years later, with advances having been made in DNA technology, he was charged again with the same offences. He applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter , claiming that his s. 11(

b) Charter rights were infringed on account of the delay. On appeal, the Court held that in his circumstances, not being aware of any ongoing investigation, the s. 11(

b) clock did not continue to run while he was no longer charged. However, of importance to Mr. Christhurajah’s case, the Court held that where the accused remains subject to the judicial process, such as when he expects further charges, the clock will continue to run whether or not the charges are stayed. Paragraphs 47 to 49 of Milani are quoted, and paragraphs 83 to 95 of the decision in Curry are referenced. And at paragraph 129 the court states: [129] In our view, staying the charges against Mr.

Christhurajah while the Appulonappa case proceeded through various levels of appeal would not have stopped the clock from running. While Milani speaks of the “knowledge or expectation that further charges are imminent”, we find that, in the unique circumstances of this case, Mr. Christhurajah’s s. 11(

b) Charter right would still have been engaged. Even if the formal charge had been withdrawn, he would still have been “subject to the judicial process” because he would be anticipating fresh charges if the s. 117 IRPA offence was ultimately determined to be constitutional. [ 17 ] The court in Christhurajah accepts the reasoning in Milani and Curry apply when the charges have been stayed and the accused expects further charges. [ 18 ] In a recent case, R. v.

R.K.K. , 2020 BCSC 45 , the court analyzed the gap period and found that the period of time between the initial Information and the second Information should be included in the Jordan analysis. In that case, the initial Information was stayed on November 10th, 2015 without any explanation from the Crown. Five months later, on April 8th, 2016, the Crown laid a second Information with the same offences.

In assessing the gap period the court stated at paragraph 20: In my view, where the Crown stays a charge and thereafter lays an identical or substantially similar charge in respect of the same conduct, the question of which of the two charges starts the clock running for the purpose of a Jordan analysis depends upon the reason for the stay of the first charge. If the stay takes place in circumstances where the accused reasonably believes that the charge is at an end, then the Jordan clock does not begin to run until the second charge is laid.

If, however, the circumstances are such that the accused reasonably understands that he or she remains subject to the very real prospect of new renewed charges, then it only makes sense that the clock begins to run at the time of the first charge. [ 19 ] The court in R.K.K. found that due to the lack of explanation as to the original stay and even though the accused was not subject to restrictions on bail, the resulting delay was attributable to the Crown.

Position of the Crown [ 20 ] The Crown concedes that the police-laid initial indictment in this case was stayed to permit continued investigation into the offences that Mr. Kanda was originally charged with. They submit that the gap period should be deducted from the calculation of the total delay because Mr. Kanda was not subject to charges and therefore not entitled to the protection of s. 11(

b) of the Charter . [ 21 ] The Crown concedes that the applicant is not responsible for any of the delay in this case and that there are no exceptional events relevant to this application. Further, the transitional exception does not apply. [ 22 ] The Crown acknowledges that there are conflicting conclusions regarding the gap period and the issue of whether this time is included in the overall calculation of the period of time for the Jordan analysis is fact specific. [ 23 ] There does exist a narrow or limited set of circumstances where courts make an exception to the general rule that s. 11(

b) is not engaged when an accused is not facing charges with the result of the inclusion the gap period in the total calculation. [ 24 ] The decision in R. v. Executive Flight Centre Fuel Services Ltd. , 2018 BCSC 2212 is one where the British Columbia Supreme Court, sitting with appellate jurisdiction, refused to include the gap period in the overall calculation of delay. In consideration of the gap period, the court discussed the exceptions stated in Milani at paragraphs 128 through 130: [128] While the Court in Milani held that s. 11(

b) was engaged during any period that an accused person is subject to charges or when a person no longer actively charged remains subject to the “the very real prospect of new charges”, I am of the view that the trial judge failed to appreciate the narrow scope of the Court’s latter remarks. [129] The caveat identified in Milani addressed a situation that had arisen in Antoine . In that case, the indictment charging Ms. Antoine with fraud was quashed by the Court because of a technical defect. Six days later, the Crown preferred a second indictment alleging the same offence but curing the defect. In these circumstances, Martin J.A. held that in determining whether an accused’s s. 11(

b) rights had been violated, the entire period after the laying of the first information should be considered. The gap was only six days, and for all practical purposes, it was a single proceeding. [130] In light of these facts, I incline to the view that the Court in Milani had in mind a much narrower application of the caveat than the facts presented in the case at bar. The Court in Milani was addressing the unique situation where a “formal charge has been withdrawn with the intention of laying a new charge, or an information has been quashed with a new information laid” (at para. 48).

It makes sense in these narrow circumstances, the Court held, to consider the entire period in analyzing the delay under s. 11(b). [ 25 ] The court in Executive Flight Centre concluded that although the corporation was aware of an ongoing investigation and that charges might result, this was not sufficient to engage s. 11(b). Leave to appeal was granted on the issue of how private prosecutions are to be considered in the context of Jordan : R. v. Executive Flight Centre Fuel Services Ltd. 2019 B.C.J. 711 (BCCA) . [ 26 ] The Crown provided a second case where the gap period was not included.

In R. v Buckley , 2018 NSSC 3 , the accused was arrested and charged on March 13th, 2012 for second degree murder. The Crown withdrew the charges on December 18th, 2012. The

investigation was ongoing and the Crown made a request for the extension of exhibits. On April 8th, 2016, the Crown laid a first degree murder charge. The court held that the gap period could not be used as there were no restrictions on his liberty and he was free to go about his life unimpeded by the court process (para. 48). [ 27 ] The Crown argues further that the cases provided to this court where the gap period was used in the calculation have specific factual underpinnings that differentiate it from this case. These specific factual underpinnings include: 1.

In Curry , the Crown conceded that it had stayed the proceedings to stop the Jordan clock. The Crown was of the view that the charges would very likely recommence, there were outstanding disclosure items, and Mr. Curry had been subject to bail conditions for three months. 2. In Christhurajah , the Court of Appeal declined to find that the first task of imminent charges was met, and found that he was subject to the judicial process. Secondly, the finding that he was subject to the judicial process was based upon the ongoing parallel court proceedings, which were potentially dispositive of the charges.

Lastly, the Crown argues that the court did not engage in a thorough analysis of how to treat the gap period, as they did not consider Executive Flight Centre or Curry. 3. Lastly, the Crown submits that R.K.K. can be distinguished from Mr. Kanda's circumstances, as the Crown declined, in that case, to provide an explanation for the stay of proceedings and that court did not have the decision in Executive Flight Centre . [ 28 ] The Crown concludes that cases that rely on the application of the exceptional calculation of the gap period in the overall calculation of delay have the following factors: 1.

The accused remains subject to the very real prospect of new charges. 2. The accused is aware of an ongoing investigation in the time when the proceedings are stayed. 3. The accused is subject to the judicial process. 4. The Crown has stayed proceedings to fix problems; and or 5.

There is some indication that new charges are imminent or the Crown intends to recommence proceedings. [ 29 ] Lastly, the Crown submits that this court cannot lose sight of the fact that Crown counsel in British Columbia function as gatekeepers in that they are required by statute to receive, consider, reject or approve criminal charges: Crown Counsel Act R.S.B.C. 1996 87. They act independently of the police. The pre-screening of charges occurred in this case after a police information was laid.

Analysis [ 30 ] The Crown has not argued that the additional charges on the second indictment affect the analysis other than to indicate that further investigation led to refinement of one count and additional firearms charges. These additional charges all relate to the same search that occurred at the time of the arrest and laying of the initial indictment. [ 31 ] The analysis, therefore, centres on whether the facts specific to Mr. Kanda result in a gap period that is attributable to the Crown. This time period is 28 months and 22 days.

I will use the factors that have been enunciated in the cases referenced earlier considering the gap period in my assessment. 1. During this time period was Mr. Kanda subject to the very real prospect of new charges? [ 32 ] Mr. Kanda was arrested on October 2nd, 2016 and held in custody until October 5th, 2016. A bail hearing had been set as the Crown had indicated on October 3rd, 2016 that if Mr. Kanda was seeking bail then a hearing of at least an hour would have to be set: transcript October 3rd, 2016 lines 20 through 27. [ 33 ] On October 5th, 2016, Mr.

Kanda appeared in custody and the Crown stated, "Your Honour will note a police information was laid over the weekend. Mr. Kanda appeared in courtroom 101 this Monday, consented to remain in custody until today for a bail hearing. The police are still investigating the matter but at this time Crown is directing a stay of proceedings on the police information": transcript October 5th, 2016 lines 16 through 24. [ 34 ] On October 6th, 2017, a year after the charges were stayed, the police swore an affidavit in support of an order for the further detention of things seized pursuant to s. 490(3) of the Criminal Code .

In this affidavit, the request for the further detention of exhibits is made based on the following statements: paragraph 29(

b) Preparation of a report to Crown Counsel which will include a written synopsis detailing the events, exhibits and witnesses in relation to proposed charges; and (

c) submission of a Report to Crown Counsel for consideration and disclosure to defence counsel as reasons for the request for the extension. The police also state that they will require at least three months to prepare the Report to Crown Counsel and a disclosure package with investigative materials, at paragraph 31; and at paragraph 33 state that if at any time during the course of the police investigation exhibits are not required for the continued investigation, investigators will return the seized items to Jim Kanda as soon as possible. [ 35 ] On October 24th, 2017, a DNA sample was taken from Mr.

Kanda pursuant to a warrant obtained on September 27th, 2017. [ 36 ] On December 27th, 2018, the police swore an affidavit in support of an order for the further detention of things seized pursuant to s. 490(3) of the Criminal Code . Again, the police state they are investigating the offences and that a submission of a Report to Crown Counsel for consideration of charges and disclosure to defence counsel is required: paragraph 51(d).

Again, it is stated that if at any time during the course of the police investigation exhibits are not required for the continued investigation, investigators will return the seized items to Jim Kanda as soon as possible: paragraph 55. [ 37 ] Charges were sworn February 26th, 2019. Mr. Kanda was arrested and released on restrictive bail conditions on March 4th, 2019.

During this time, it is clear that the investigation was ongoing. Mr. Kanda was subject to the continued detention of things seized from him. He had to provide a DNA sample. The police themselves swore that they were going to prepare a Report to Crown Counsel and would be preparing disclosure. Mr. Kanda was subject to the very real prospect of new charges. 2. Was the accused aware of an ongoing investigation in the time when proceedings are stayed? [ 38 ] Mr. Kanda was arrested and held in custody from October 2nd, to 5th, 2016.

He was in court when the Crown stated that the police were still investigating this matter "but at this time" the Crown was directing a stay of proceedings on the police information. He was aware of the ongoing police investigation due to the applications for extension made February 22nd, 2017, June 27th, 2017 and January 23rd, 2019. He had to provide a DNA sample pursuant to a warrant on October 24th, 2017. He was arrested again on March 4th, 2019 and released on restrictive bail conditions. [ 39 ] I find that Mr.

Kanda was aware of an ongoing investigation in the time when the proceedings were stayed due to the investigative steps that were taken and that affected his personal and privacy interests. 3.

Was the accused subject to the judicial process? [ 40 ] This analysis is more difficult due to the conflicting decision regarding the gap period calculation. [ 41 ] The decision in Milani specifically states that a person who is not formally charged in the gap period can remain subject to the judicial process. [ 42 ] In Curry , the court found that even though the accused was not subject to bail conditions, the stay for further investigation and disclosure did not alter the status of the accused person.

He was still subject to the same effects as a person facing charges. [ 43 ] In Christhurajah , the court stated that even if the formal charge had been stayed the accused would still have been subject to the judicial process because of the anticipation of fresh charges after the determination of the parallel proceedings. [ 44 ] However, the court in Buckley held that during the gap period there were no restrictions on the accused's liberty and he was not subject to the court process.

This was despite applications for extension of exhibits and the ongoing investigation. [ 45 ] Finally, in Executive Flight Centre the court interpreted the Milani exception to be narrow in scope and defined it as a unique situation where a formal charge has been withdrawn with the intention of laying a new charge or an Information has been quashed with a new Information laid. [ 46 ] In Executive Flight Centre , the private prosecution was not stayed with the expectation or intention that the charges would necessarily be recommenced or re-laid: see paragraph 137.

The intention of laying a new charge at the time the initial charge was stayed was integral in the analysis to the court and differentiates that case from the facts here. [ 47 ] What is meant by “subject to the judicial process” in the gap cases has not been defined with any real precision. It does mean being subject to bail conditions, but it can also mean the effect of being aware of charges forthcoming in certain circumstances. [ 48 ] I find that Mr. Kanda was subject to the judicial process during the gap period. Mr. Kanda was made aware by the steps taken by the Crown and the police.

He was initially charged and held in custody. He was informed that the police were still investigating and, at this time, the charges were being stayed. From the time the initial Information was stayed on October 5th, 2016 to the second Information being sworn on February 26th, 2019, considerable resources were expended in the investigation and Mr. Kanda was made aware that the police were still investigating and that their intention was to forward charges to the Crown and make disclosure. Mr.

Kanda was subject to state action in the continued detention of things seized and the execution of a DNA warrant on his person. [ 49 ] I find that in the circumstances of this case Mr. Kanda was subject to the judicial process during the gap period. 4. Did the Crown stay proceedings to fix problems? [ 50 ] This factor is not helpful unless the Crown precisely specifies the reasons as to the stay of proceedings on the record. In this case, the reason was "further investigation." The Crown cannot and should not be compelled to provide specific reasons.

I presume this factor is used in the analysis to allow for a consideration of whether the gap period was due to technical reasons or whether it was an attempt to stop the Jordan clock from running. There may be other reasons as well. [ 51 ] In this case, the Crown was prepared to do a bail hearing initially indicating their approval of the initial charges. The reason for the stay, further police investigation, does not relieve the Crown from the duty to provide the accused and society with a fair trial within a reasonable time.

There was no substantial difference between the two Informations and no compelling reason was provided by the Crown as to why the investigation took an additional 28 months and 22 days. [ 52 ] I accept that the reasoning in Curry , Christhurajah and R.K.K. applies when the Crown stays the initial indictment to buy time until the second indictment and the accused reasonably understands that they are subject to the very real prospect of new charges during the gap period. 5.

Is there some indication that new charges are imminent or the Crown intends to recommence proceedings? [ 53 ] This factor is repetitive after the assessment of whether the accused remained subject to the very real prospect of new charges. In my view, these factors amount to the same thing. [ 54 ] In this case, for the reasons stated in number 1 above, I find that there was an indication in this case that new charges were imminent due to the statement of the Crown at the time the initial Information was laid, the sworn affidavits of the police, and the execution of the DNA warrant on the accused.

Conclusion [ 55 ] In this case, during the gap period Mr. Kanda was subject to the judicial process, he expected further charges at the conclusion of the investigation, and is, therefore, an exception to the general rule. During the investigation, Mr. Kanda was made aware that the police intended to resubmit charges to the Crown. Mr. Kanda's personal property and his privacy were subject to state interference based on the statements of the police that charges were being investigated and would be forwarded to Crown counsel. Mr.

Kanda's right to be tried within a reasonable time was totally controlled by the police and Crown counsel during the entire time from the initial Information to the end of the now adjourned trial dates. The gap period is attributable as delay as Mr. Kanda's s. 11(

b) interests were negatively affected by the loss of privacy, stress, and anxiety of the outstanding charges. The societal interest in having serious allegations of violence and firearms offences tried within a reasonable time was negatively affected. [ 56 ] In these circumstances, the gap period is included in the calculation of delay. Therefore, the total delay is 44 months and 25 days. There are no defence delay periods or exceptional circumstances to attribute time to. The delay is substantially over the 18 month ceiling. Mr. Kanda's s. 11(

b) interests have been breached and pursuant to s. 24(1), I order a stay of proceedings on all counts on the outstanding Information. (RULING RE

SECTION 11(

b) CHARTER APPLICATION) CORRIGENDUM - Released July 17, 2021 In the Oral Ruling Re:

Section 11(

b) Charter Application dated November 6, 2020, the following changes have been made: In paragraph [48], the date of October 5 th , 2106, should read: October 5 th , 2016 . _____________________________ The Honourable Judge J. Lopes Provincial Court of British Columbia