Y.T.A. v. D.R.A., 2024 BCPC 12

Citation: Y.T.A. v. D.R.A. 2024 BCPC 12 Date: 20240130 File No: F17695 Registry: Port Coquitlam IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA IN THE MATTER OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT , S.B.C. 2011 c. 25 BETWEEN: Y.T.A. APPLICANT AND: D.R.A. RESPONDENT CORRIGENDUM REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE W. LEE Counsel for the Applicant: S. Bhullar Appearing on their own behalf: D.R.A. Place of Hearing: Port Coquitlam , B.C. Date of Hearing: January 22, 2024 Date of Judgment: January 30, 2024

A Corrigendum was released by the Court on February 2, 2024. The corrections have been made to the text and the Corrigendum is appended to this document. Introduction [ 1 ] The parties are the parents of two children, both of whom reside with Y.T.A. [ 2 ] There are several interim orders in place flowing from an Application to Obtain an Order filed on February 9, 2017, by Y.T.A.

These include a support order made on June 4, 2019 by Judge Pothecary, that D.R.A. was to pay Y.T.A. child support of $597 a month for the two children based on a 2018 Guideline income of $37,346. [ 3 ] The June 4, 2019 order also imputed income to Y.T.A. at $18,000 and ordered that “special expenses are payable at a ratio of 2/3 from [D.R.A.] and 1/3 from [Y.T.A.], and they are payable within 14 days of [Y.T.A.] proving receipts to [D.R.A.].” [ 4 ] D.R.A. is current in his support payments according to a statement from the Family Maintenance Enforcement Program, now called the BC Family Maintenance Agency (“BCFMA”).

That statement indicates that the BCFMA is only enforcing the monthly support of $597 a month, and not for any special expenses. This is not surprising since the June 4, 2019 order failed to state what the special expenses were. The June 4, 2019 order was too vague for the claim for special expenses to be enforceable. [ 5 ] D.R.A. has now applied to vary the interim support order. Y.T.A. opposes this request. She also seeks an order to specify which special expenses are payable. [ 6 ] On August 22, 2023, this matter came before Judge Dorey at a Family Management Conference.

Judge Dorey ordered that a one-day trial be set on the issues of child support, retroactive variation of child support, cancellation of child support arrears and special expense arrears. [ 7 ] On September 6, 2023, Y.T.A. applied for a protection order against D.R.A. [ 8 ] These matters have now come before me for hearing. The Variation of the Support Order [ 9 ] Family Law Act s. 216(1) allows the Court to make an interim order. Section 216(3) governs an application to change, suspend or terminate an interim order and it states:

(3) On application by a party, a court may change, suspend or terminate an interim order made under subsection (1) if satisfied that at least one of the following circumstances exists: (

a) a change in circumstances has occurred since the interim order was made; (

b) evidence of a substantial nature that was not available at the time the interim order was made has become available. [ 10 ] Alternatively, it is open to the Court to make a final support order, in which case there does not need to be a change in circumstances, since the Court made the interim order. The terms of an interim order do not restrict a trial judge’s options when making a final order: K.W. v N.Q , 2021 BCSC 2495 at para. 52 . [ 11 ] D.R.A. has not asked me to set a final order.

Indeed, he has given evidence of possible employment or business opportunities that would improve his financial circumstances if they come to fruition. As such, a final support order is not appropriate at this time. [ 12 ] Since 2017, D.R.A. has been self-employed as a courier driver through his company [omitted for publication]. Before October 7, 2022, he drove a leased 2019 Mercedes Sprinter Van. On October 7, 2022, the van was involved in a motor vehicle accident when another vehicle turned in front of the van.

The van was a total loss. [ 13 ] D.R.A. received a payout from ICBC but he does not recall the amount and he did not provide any evidence of it. D.R.A. testified that he used the ICBC funds to pay off the leasing company and to cover debts. [ 14 ] Because of the loss of the van, D.R.A. says he now uses his Chevrolet Camaro for his delivery work. D.R.A. said he removed the back seats from his car to maximize his available carrying space, but it remains less than what was available in the van. D.R.A.’s income is based on what he delivers and the distance travelled.

Because the smaller Camaro holds less than the van, D.R.A. says his income has been reduced. [ 15 ] D.R.A. submitted both a letter and an email from ICBC confirming that the van was a total loss. [ 16 ] D.R.A. also submitted some documents from WCB referring to an injury occurring on March 10, 2011. This predates the motor vehicle accident. D.R.A. did not suggest he is currently disabled from working. The documents from WCB are irrelevant to this application. [ 17 ] D.R.A. also provided copies of 18 emails he sent between June 13, 2023 and November 9, 2023 seeking work.

He has not supplied copies of any responses. D.R.A. testified that he had not received any job offers. D.R.A. said he applied for other work but did not submit evidence of this. D.R.A. also failed to provide proof of any job applications from the date of the accident on October 7, 2022 to June 13, 2023, the date of the earliest job application email. [ 18 ] On July 24, 2023, D.R.A. filed a Form 4 Financial Statement in support of his application, declaring his income to be $15,439

received from his company. [ 19 ] D.R.A. also provided the following:

a) Personal Notice of Assessment for the year 2022 showing income of $15,439;

b) Personal Notice of Assessment for the year 2021 showing income of $13,371;

c) Personal Notice of Assessment for the year 2020 showing income of $17,985;

d) T2 Corporate Tax Return for [omitted for publication] for the tax year-end January 31, 2022, showing a taxable income of $22,275;

e) T2 Corporate Tax Return for [omitted for publication] for the tax year-end January 31, 2021, showing a taxable income of $16,069;

f) T2 Corporate Tax Return for [omitted for publication] for the tax year-end January 31, 2020, showing taxable income of $2,923. [ 20 ] D.R.A. asks to adjust the child support payable to a Guideline amount based on an income of $15,439. [ 21 ] I turn now to the question of whether D.R.A. has proven that he has suffered a change in circumstances since the June 4, 2019 interim order was made. [ 22 ] D.R.A. submits that since the October 7, 2022 accident, his income has been reduced. The most recent evidence of his income though comes from 2022 tax information.

D.R.A. has not provided any evidence showing income in 2023, which is the first full year that the impact of the loss of the van would be evident. Evidence of income from October 7, 2022 to date is critical to show the impact of the loss of the van, if any. Such evidence should include copies of all work orders or invoices issued during that year. Corporate and personal bank records showing the receipt of funds should be provided. This is especially important in the case of self-employed income.

It is not enough to provide some tax information stating an income amount without evidence justifying the income amount reported. [ 23 ] Absent such evidence, D.R.A. has not persuaded me that there has been a change in circumstances, and particularly, a reduction in income since October 7, 2022. [ 24 ] In the circumstances, I dismiss D.R.A.’s application to vary the interim child support order. However, my order does not prevent D.R.A. from seeking a final support order on terms that differ from the June 4, 2019 order. [ 25 ] As there are no support arrears, I need not deal with a request to cancel arrears.

Section 7 Expenses [ 26 ] I turn now to Y.T.A.’s request to clarify the order for payment of special expenses.

Section 7 of the Child Support Guidelines governs claims for special and extraordinary expenses. These are two different types of expenses. A special expense must be necessary and reasonable, and fall within the categories listed at ss. 7(1)(a), (b), (

c) or (e). An extraordinary expense must be extraordinary, necessary and reasonable, and fall within the categories listed at s. 7(1)(

f) and s. 7(1.1). [ 27 ] The relevant sections of the Child Support Guidelines are as follows: Special or extraordinary expenses 7

(1) In a child support order the court may, on either spouse’s request, provide for an amount to cover all or any portion of the following expenses, which expenses may be estimated, taking into account the necessity of the expense in relation to the child’s best interests and the reasonableness of the expense in relation to the means of the spouses and those of the child and to the family’s spending pattern prior to the separation: (

a) child care expenses incurred as a result of the custodial parent’s employment, illness, disability or education or training for employment; (

b) that portion of the medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to the child; (

c) health-related expenses that exceed insurance reimbursement by at least $100 annually, including orthodontic treatment, professional counselling provided by a psychologist, social worker, psychiatrist or any other person, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy and prescription drugs, hearing aids, glasses and contact lenses; (

d) extraordinary expenses for primary or secondary school education or for any other educational programs that meet the child’s particular needs; (

e) expenses for post-secondary education; and (

f) extraordinary expenses for extracurricular activities. Marginal note: Definition of “extraordinary expenses”

(1.1) For the purposes of paragraphs (1)(

d) and (f), the term extraordinary expenses means (

a) expenses that exceed those that the spouse requesting an amount for the extraordinary expenses can reasonably cover, taking into account that spouse’s income and the amount that the spouse would receive under the applicable table or, where the court has determined that the table amount is inappropriate, the amount that the court has otherwise determined is appropriate; or

(

b) where paragraph (

a) is not applicable, expenses that the court considers are extraordinary taking into account (

i) the amount of the expense in relation to the income of the spouse requesting the amount, including the amount that the spouse would receive under the applicable table or, where the court has determined that the table amount is inappropriate, the amount that the court has otherwise determined is appropriate, (ii) the nature and number of the educational programs and extracurricular activities, (iii) any special needs and talents of the child or children, (iv) the overall cost of the programs and activities, and (

v) any other similar factor that the court considers relevant. Marginal note: Sharing of expense

(2) The guiding principle in determining the amount of an expense referred to in subsection (1) is that the expense is shared by the spouses in proportion to their respective incomes after deducting from the expense, the contribution, if any, from the child. Marginal note: Subsidies, tax deductions, etc.

(3) Subject to subsection (4), in determining the amount of an expense referred to in subsection (1), the court must take into account any subsidies, benefits or income tax deductions or credits relating to the expense, and any eligibility to claim a subsidy, benefit or income tax deduction or credit relating to the expense. Marginal note: Universal child care benefit

(4) In determining the amount of an expense referred to in subsection (1), the court shall not take into account any universal child care benefit or any eligibility to claim that benefit. [ 28 ] I heard evidence from Y.T.A. of the costs for such items as diapers, food and parking. Such expenses do not fall within any of the categories listed at s. 7 and so are not special or extraordinary expenses as defined by the Child Support Guidelines. [ 29 ] Y.T.A. gave evidence of certain of the children’s expenses that the Government has paid. This included the costs of anesthesia for one child while she attended the dentist. [ 30 ] Y.T.A. did not provide me with a clear

summary of the expenses or the costs that she is claiming. It appears from the evidence that she claims the following:

a) Any medical, prescription or dental costs for the children, including the costs of anesthesia, which are not covered by insurance or government programs, such as the Single Parent Employment Initiative;

b) Net daycare costs after payment of any government subsidies;

c) After-school programs for the children;

d) School supplies. [ 31 ] Medical, dental and prescription costs fall under s. 7(1)(c). The amounts put forth by Y.T.A. were relatively modest and in the circumstances, I am satisfied that these claims are reasonable and necessary, and the parties should share these costs. [ 32 ] Daycare costs are necessary so that Y.T.A. can work as a support worker. I am satisfied that these costs are reasonable and necessary, and they should be shared pursuant to s. 7(1)(a). [ 33 ] Only one of the two children participates in after-school programs.

Given their costs, Y.T.A. restricts that child to two after- school programs, each of which is for one hour once a week for eight weeks. However, Y.T.A. did not provide any receipts showing the costs for these programs. Without that evidence, I cannot determine if the costs of the programs are reasonable. Therefore, I decline to include the costs of after-school programs as a s. 7 expense. [ 34 ] Y.T.A. has also incurred costs each year for school supplies. She has supplied receipts showing these expenditures. The amounts are reasonable and, because the school mandates them, they are necessary.

What is uncertain though is whether the school expenses can be considered extraordinary as required by s. 7(1)(d). The use of the term “extraordinary” suggests that the expenses must be something out of the ordinary. Y.T.A.’s evidence indicates that the school expenses are an annual charge and appear to be an ordinary cost each school year. I was not provided with any case authority to suggest otherwise and so I will decline to order the sharing of the annual school costs. [ 35 ] In

summary, the parties will share the following expenses pursuant to s. 7 of the Child Support Guidelines:

a) Any medical, prescription or dental costs for the children, including the costs of anesthesia, which are not covered by insurance or government programs, such as the Single Parent Employment Initiative.

b) Net daycare costs after payment of any government subsidies. [ 36 ] The parties may also agree in writing on the sharing of any other expenses.

Proportionate Sharing of Expenses [ 37 ] Section 7(2) of the Child Support Guidelines states that spouses are to share expenses in proportion to their income. [ 38 ] D.R.A.’s income is $37,346, according to the June 4, 2019 order of Judge Pothecary. [ 39 ] Y.T.A. filed a Form 4 Financial Statement on November 20, 2023 and declared an income of $36,710.83. This amount is supported by her 2022 notice of assessment showing an income of $36,170. Y.T.A. also receives the Child Care Benefit, but that amount is not included in income when assessing income for child support purposes: Moreau v.

Fliesen , 2008 BCSC 1358 at para. 26 . [ 40 ] The income of each party is approximately equal and so each party will pay 50% of the expenses. Provision of Receipts [ 41 ] Y.T.A. or the BC Family Maintenance Agency on her behalf will provide to D.R.A. a copy of any receipts for the s. 7 expenses. [ 42 ] D.R.A. will pay his 50% share of the receipt within 14 days after receipt. Application for Protection Order [ 43 ] There have been numerous protection orders made against D.R.A. My review of the court records shows the following:

a) February 9, 2017 without notice order of Judge Woods;

b) February 16, 2017 order of Judge Dossa, which by consent deleted and changed certain terms of the February 9, 2017 order;

c) April 7, 2017 without notice order of Judge Smith, cancelling the previous orders and setting out new terms;

d) June 22, 2017 order of Judge Jamieson continuing the April 7, 2017 order with a small change and setting an expiration date of April 7, 2018;

e) March 17, 2020 order of Judge Jamieson. D.R.A. was not present for this hearing. This order did not state an expiration date and so Family Law Act s. 183(4) would apply and the order would expire on March 17, 2021. [ 44 ] On September 6, 2023, Y.T.A. applied for a protection order against D.R.A. [ 45 ] On September 15, 2023, Judge Campbell made a conduct order in the absence of D.R.A. that he have no contact with Y.T.A., Y.T.A.’s partner M.J.W. or the two children.

The application for a protection order was adjourned to September 19, 2023, and the conduct order was to expire on that same date unless otherwise ordered by the Court. [ 46 ] On September 19, 2023, Judge Dorey made a conduct order in the absence of D.R.A. preventing contact by D.R.A., except in certain situations such as court appearances.

The application for a protection order was adjourned to January 19, 2024, and the conduct order was to expire on that same date unless otherwise ordered by the Court. [ 47 ] On January 19, 2024, there was no court time to hear this matter and it was rescheduled to January 22, 2024 before me. The conduct order was not renewed and has expired. [ 48 ] In support of the application for a protection order, Y.T.A. expressed her continued fear of D.R.A. She alleged that D.R.A. sexually assaulted her in 2018 and then two weeks later, cut himself with a knife in her presence.

No Criminal Code charges were ever laid against D.R.A. for the alleged sexual assault. [ 49 ] Y.T.A. said that on January 21, 2024, she saw D.R.A. drive by her home. She said he was driving with another person in the private driveway of her complex and did not stop. She did not think D.R.A. saw her. [ 50 ] Aside from this incident and appearances in Court, Y.T.A. said the last time she saw D.R.A. was in September 2018. [ 51 ] Y.T.A. also expressed concern that D.R.A. has filed frequent court applications to reduce the child support order.

I understood that Y.T.A. felt harassed by these applications. [ 52 ] The most recent support order was made on June 4, 2019. From my review of the court records, the only application to vary this order was made on July 24, 2023, when D.R.A. filed a Request for Scheduling to bring the child support issue back to Court. Given the amount of time that has passed, I see no basis for an allegation that D.R.A. has been harassing Y.T.A. through frequent court applications. [ 53 ] Y.T.A.’s partner, M.J.W., testified that on January 22, 2024, while he was in the washroom at the Port Coquitlam Courthouse, D.R.A. came in.

M.J.W. testified that D.R.A. slammed a folder down on a counter, asked M.J.W. how his day was going and then swore at M.J.W. No threat was made against M.J.W. M.J.W. said he did not fear D.R.A., but was worried for Y.T.A. and the children. [ 54 ] The purpose of a protection order is to protect against “family violence which is defined in s. 1 of the Family Law Act as follows: "family violence" includes, with or without an intent to harm a family member, (

a) physical abuse of a family member, including forced confinement or deprivation of the necessities of life, but not including the use of reasonable force to protect oneself or others from harm,

(

b) sexual abuse of a family member, (

c) attempts to physically or sexually abuse a family member, (

d) psychological or emotional abuse of a family member, including (

i) intimidation, harassment, coercion or threats, including threats respecting other persons, pets or property, (ii) unreasonable restrictions on, or prevention of, a family member's financial or personal autonomy, (iii) stalking or following of the family member, and (iv) intentional damage to property, and (

e) in the case of a child, direct or indirect exposure to family violence; [ 55 ] Section 183(2) of the Family Law Act sets out the test for making a protection order. The

section states:

(2) A court may make an order against a family member for the protection of another family member if the court determines that (

a) family violence is likely to occur, and (

b) the other family member is an at-risk family member. [ 56 ] The considerations for deciding whether to make a protection order are set out at sec. 184 and 185 of the Family Law Act . Those sections read as follows: Whether to make protection order 184

(1) In determining whether to make an order under this Part, the court must consider at least the following risk factors: (

a) any history of family violence by the family member against whom the order is to be made; (

b) whether any family violence is repetitive or escalating; (

c) whether any psychological or emotional abuse constitutes, or is evidence of, a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour directed at the at-risk family member; (

d) the current status of the relationship between the family member against whom the order is to be made and the at-risk family member, including any recent separation or intention to separate; (

e) any circumstance of the family member against whom the order is to be made that may increase the risk of family violence by that family member, including substance abuse, employment or financial problems, mental health problems associated with a risk of violence, access to weapons, or a history of violence; (

f) the at-risk family member's perception of risks to his or her own safety and security; (

g) any circumstance that may increase the at-risk family member's vulnerability, including pregnancy, age, family circumstances, health or economic dependence.

(2) If family members are seeking orders under this Part against each other, the court must consider whether the order should be made against one person only, taking into account (

a) the history of, and potential for, family violence, (

b) the extent of any injuries or harm suffered, and (

c) the respective vulnerability of the applicants.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), the person who initiates a particular incident of family violence is not necessarily the person against whom an order should be made.

(4) The court may make an order under this Part regardless of whether any of the following circumstances exist: (

a) an order for the protection of the at-risk family member has been made previously against the family member against whom an order is to be made, whether or not the family member complied with the order; (

b) the family member against whom the order is to be made is temporarily absent from the residence; (

c) the at-risk family member is temporarily residing in an emergency shelter or other safe place; (

d) criminal charges have been or may be laid against the family member against whom the order is to be made; (

e) the at-risk family member has a history of returning to the residence and of living with the family member against whom the order is to be made after family violence has occurred;

(

f) an order under

section 225 [orders restricting communications] has been made, respecting the at-risk family member, against the family member against whom the order is to be made. If child a family member 185 If a child is a family member, the court must consider, in addition to the factors set out in

section 184 [whether to make protection order] , (

a) whether the child may be exposed to family violence if an order under this

Part is not made, and (

b) whether an order under this Part should also be made respecting the child if an order under this

Part is made respecting the child's parent or guardian. [ 57 ] A valid consideration when deciding if I should grant a protection order is the passage of time with no incidents between the parties. In the decision L.V. v. T.V. , 2023 BCPC 106 , I set aside a protection order that had been in place for six years without any incidents. I found that there was a change in circumstances and no longer a likelihood of family violence. [ 58 ] In this case, there has been no contact between the parties since September 2018 other than the recent court appearances.

This includes the time since March 17, 2021, when no protection order was in place. It appears that the impetus for the current protection order application is D.R.A.’s request to vary the support order. I appreciate that Y.T.A. remains fearful of D.R.A. However, on the evidence before me, there is no basis to find that family violence is likely to occur. Accordingly, I dismiss the request for a protection order. [ 59 ] It remains evident to me that there is animosity between the parties. D.R.A. feels that M.J.W. has usurped his role in the family and moved into what D.R.A. referred to as his home.

The marriage has clearly ended and D.R.A. seems unable to accept that. [ 60 ] There are only interim orders in place and the parties have yet to move toward a final resolution of their family law dispute. I am mindful that there still exists the November 21, 2018 order of Judge Pothecary, allowing D.R.A. parenting time. Y.T.A. ’s legal counsel did hope to address before me the issues of parental responsibilities and parenting time but that was contrary to Judge Dorey’s August 22, 2023 order that the trial would deal only with support issues.

Final orders about parenting arrangements and child support are still necessary. [ 61 ] I now turn to Family Law Act s. 222, which governs conduct orders. The

section states: Purposes for which orders respecting conduct may be made 222 At any time during a proceeding or on the making of an order under this Act, the court may make an order under this Division for one or more of the following purposes: (

a) to facilitate the settlement of a family law dispute or of an issue that may become the subject of a family law dispute; (

b) to manage behaviours that might frustrate the resolution of a family law dispute by an agreement or order; (

c) to prevent misuse of the court process; (

d) to facilitate arrangements pending final determination of a family law dispute. [ 62 ] To manage the behaviour of the parties and reduce the possibility of further disputes, I will make a conduct order limiting their contact and communication. I order as follows: Pursuant to s. 225 of the Family Law Act , D.R.A. will have no contact or communication with Y.T.A. or M.J.W. except as follows:

a) Through writing, email or text for the sole purpose of arranging parenting time.

b) Through the BC Family Maintenance Agency concerning payment of child support and expenses.

c) Through or in the immediate presence of a lawyer.

d) Through court documents served by a third party, and during in-person court appearances or case conferences, but only with a sheriff present unless a judge waives this requirement. Pursuant to s. 222 of the Family Law Act , D.R.A. must not go to any place where Y.T.A. or M.J.W. lives, works, attends school, worships, or happens to be, even if D.R.A. is an owner of any such place or otherwise has a right to possess or enter such a place. If D.R.A. sees Y.T.A. or M.J.W., D.R.A. must leave their presence immediately without any words or gestures. The exceptions to these restrictions are as follows:

a) During in-person court appearances or case conferences, but only with a sheriff present unless a judge waives this requirement.

b) For the sole purpose of picking up and dropping off the children for parenting time. [ 63 ] This conduct order does not restrict parenting time with the children. I did not hear any evidence to suggest this was necessary. Furthermore, a conduct order should not be used to determine parenting time. Parenting time orders are made under

Part 4 of the Family Law Act, where the only consideration is the best interest of the children pursuant to s. 37. Conduct orders are made under

Part 10 of the Act to achieve the purposes set out in s. 222.

Applying for a Final Order [ 64 ] I direct that if either party wishes to seek a final order regarding parental responsibilities, parenting time or child support, they may file a Form 39 Request for Scheduling to reset the Application to Obtain an Order filed February 9, 2017, by Y.T.A. Either party can refer to this direction in item 4 of the Form 39 Request for Scheduling to set a court appearance to

schedule a trial. Order [ 65 ] The order I make is interim.

The terms are as follows: 1) The application of D.R.A. to vary the June 4, 2019 order of Judge Pothecary is dismissed, without prejudice to the right of D.R.A. to seek a final support order on terms that differ from the June 4, 2019 order. 2) Pursuant to the order of Judge Pothecary made on June 4, 2019, D.R.A. has a guideline annual income of $37,346. 3) Y.T.A. is found to be a resident of British Columbia and is found to have a guideline annual income of $36,710. 4) D.R.A. shall pay Y.T.A. his proportional share for the children’s special or extraordinary expenses.

The parties’ respective proportional shares are D.R.A. 50% and Y.T.A. 50%. 5) The following expenses will be special or extraordinary expenses:

a) Any medical, prescription or dental costs for the children, including the costs of anesthesia, which are not covered by insurance or government programs, such as the Single Parent Employment Initiative.

b) Net daycare costs after payment of any government subsidies.

c) Such other expenses as agreed to in writing by the parties. 6) Y.T.A., or the BC Family Maintenance Agency on her behalf, will provide to D.R.A. a copy of any receipts showing payment of the s. 7 expenses and D.R.A. will pay to the BC Family Maintenance Agency on behalf of Y.T.A. 50% of the expense amount within 14 days after delivery of the receipt. 7) The application of Y.T.A. for a protection order is dismissed. 8) Pursuant to s. 225 of the Family Law Act , D.R.A. will have no contact or communication with Y.T.A. or M.J.W. except as follows:

a) Through writing, email or text for the sole purpose of arranging parenting time.

b) Through the BC Family Maintenance Agency concerning payment of child support and expenses.

c) Through or in the immediate presence of a lawyer.

d) Through court documents served by a third party, and during in-person court appearances or case conferences but only with a sheriff present unless a judge waives this requirement. 9) Pursuant to s. 222 of the Family Law Act , D.R.A. must not go to any place where Y.T.A. or M.J.W. lives, works, attends school, worships, or happens to be, even if D.R.A. is an owner of any such place or otherwise has a right to possess or enter such a place. If D.R.A. sees Y.T.A. or M.J.W., D.R.A. must leave their presence immediately without any words or gestures. The exceptions to these restrictions are as follows:

a) During in-person court appearances or case conferences but only with a sheriff present unless a judge waives this requirement.

b) For the sole purpose of picking up and dropping off the children for parenting time. [ 66 ] I direct Ms. Bhullar to draft the order for filing. As this is not a consent order, there is no requirement for D.R.A.’s approval of the form of the order, and so no need to state in the order that the requirement for his signature is dispensed with. [ 67 ] I remind counsel of the 14-day time requirement for filing an order as set out in Provincial Court Family Rule 168. _____________________________ The Honourable Judge W. Lee Provincial Court of British Columbia CORRIGENDUM – Released on February 2, 2024

In the Reasons for Judgment dated January 30, 2024, the following changes have been made: [1] At paragraphs 62 and 65, references to section 183(3)(

a) of the Family Law Act should instead be

section 222 of the Family Law Act . _____________________________ The Honourable Judge W. Lee Provincial Court of British Columbia