D.J.S. v. J.M.D., 2013 BCSC 2302

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: D.J.S. v. J.M.D., 2013 BCSC 2302 Date: 20131213 Docket: 08-5133 Registry: Victoria Between: D.J.S. Claimant And: J.M.D. Respondent Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Macaulay Reasons for Judgment Counsel for the Claimant: J.L.A. Kahan Counsel for the Respondent: R. S. Gill Place and Date of Hearing: Victoria, B.C. October 11, 2013; December 4 and 5, 2013 Place and Date of Judgment: Victoria, B.C.

December 13, 2013 [ 1 ] The respondent mother applies to vary final orders that Justice Dorgan made in July 2011 at the end of trial (the “present order”) respecting the claimant father’s access to their two sons. The two sons, who I will refer to as T.S. and A.S., both of whom have birthdays in August, were respectively ages 9 and 6 at the time of the order. T.S. is now age 12 and A.S. is age 9. [ 2 ] For present purposes, the important aspects of Dorgan J.’s order are as follows: 1. The [mother] shall have sole custody and sole guardianship of the Children; 2.

The [father] will have reasonable access to the Children, to include but not be limited to (

a) Mondays, from after school to 6:00 p.m. (

b) Wednesdays, from after school to 5:30 p.m. (

c) alternating weekends, from after school on Friday until 9:15 a.m. on Sunday (

d) excepting up to seven days around the May long weekend, and three weeks each summer; together with such further access as the parties arrange by agreement; 3. All access shall be subject to the condition that the [father] have a qualified attendant or nanny present at all times while the Children are in his presence; PROVIDED THAT this restriction does not apply when the [father] attends with the Children at a school or extracurricular activity where other adults are present and responsible for the conduct and well-being of the Children; 4.

Whenever the [father] retains new attendants, child care professionals or other members of his support team, he will instruct them to meet with the [mother] and discuss with her the Children’s care, transportation and activities before they assume any duties that involve the Children in any way; 5.

The [father] will instruct his attendants, child care professionals and other members of his support team to communicate with and advise the [mother] as necessary on any aspect of the Children’s care, transportation or activities, and to contact her immediately in case of any emergency affecting the children or the [father’s] ability to have them in his care; 6. When necessary, the [father] may arrange for the transportation of the Children by the [father’s] attendants without the [father] being present, for periods not to exceed 30 minutes;

If while exercising access, the [father] is unable to parent the Children personally due to ill health, physical or cognitivelimitations or for any other reason, other than for periods of under thirty minutes, the Children will be returned to the [mother]. [3] The mother seeks to vary the present order by terminating access on Mondays; altering the change over time on Wednesday toafter school or program; reducing weekend access to one weekend per month, to be selected at the discretion of the mother, from afterschool or program on Friday until 9:15 a.m. on Sunday; restricting contact between the father and the children, including email,electronic and telephone contact, outside of scheduled access; and finally, adding a peace officer assist clause.

I observe that the timerequired for after school programs on Wednesday could have the effect of removing Wednesday access entirely. [4] The father not only opposes the further restrictions but says that if the mother has established the requisite material change incircumstances, his time with the children should be expanded and the governing conditions made less restrictive than under the presentorder. [5] The present order does not say whether it was made under the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), or the FamilyRelations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128 (now replaced by the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25).

The parties originally applied forcustody under both statutes. In the circumstances, however, it is not necessary to conclusively determine which statute underpins thepresent order, because the test for varying an order is the same under both (see Boychuck v. Singleton, 2008 BCCA 355, at para. 14).

Theparty applying to vary a custody or access order must establish that there has been a material change in circumstances affecting thechildren since the order was made: Divorce Act, s. 17(5); Family Law Act, ss. 47, 60. [6] According to the mother, the material changes of circumstance justifying the additional restrictions are: 1. The father’s open ongoing defiance of the present order; 2. The father’s abdication of the expected role of an access parent, including his refusal to support or facilitate the children’sschoolwork, activities and social life with their peers; and 3.

The father’s discussion with the children of adult issues that tend to place the mother in an unfavourable light, therebyadversely affecting the emotional stability of the children. [7] It is questionable whether any of these amount in law to a material change of circumstances. I observe, however, that the fatheralso says that there have been material changes of circumstances. [8] According to the father: 1. The children are now older and have expressed a desire to have greater control over their own lives and contact with him; 2.

The father now has a live-in caretaker to assist him with meeting the needs of the children; and 3. The children are benefiting positively from the father’s influence and support. [9] I have the same reservations respecting the father’s alleged material changes.

While they are not directly before me on thepresent application, due to the overlapping nature of the submissions and the potential for additional applications, I intend to address theirlegal significance as well. [10] After receiving the mother’s Notice of Application, the father filed a separate application to vary the order by naming him aguardian of the children under the Family Law Act; varying the parenting time so as to equalize it between the parents; and finally,varying the order by removing some of the restrictive conditions applicable to his access.

The material changes of circumstances that thefather intends to rely on are as set out above. The father also applied for a “Views of the Child” report. [11] The mother responded, in part, with an application to stay the father’s application until he either satisfies the costs awarded toher after the trial or posts security for the costs of his application. [12] By order made October 11, 2013, I adjourned generally the mother’s application respecting costs as well as the father’sapplications, with the exception of the application for a “Views of the Child” report, which I granted.

I also directed that the balance ofthe father’s application and the mother’s application regarding costs or security not be reset for hearing until after the final disposition ofthe mother’s original application. [13] In making the order of October 11, 2013 I did not intend to hamper the father’s ability to revisit issues respecting the terms ofaccess in the event that there has been a material change of circumstances.

It is for that reason that I consider it necessary to considerwhether either party demonstrated a material change of circumstances. [14] A material change of circumstances must be one that affects the child (Gordon v. Goertz, (SCC), [1996] 2S.C.R. 27 at para.49). I must assume the correctness of the original decision and only consider changes in circumstances that have comeabout since the making of the present order (para. 11).

The particular change “must have altered the child’s needs or the ability of theparents to meet those needs in a fundamental way” and should represent a “distinct departure from what the court could reasonably haveanticipated in making the previous order” (para. 12).

These requirements are summarized at para. 13, as follows: It follows that before entering on the merits of an application to vary a custody order the judge must be satisfied of: (1) a change in thecondition, means, needs or circumstances of the child and/or the ability of the parents to meet the needs of the child; (2) which materiallyaffects the child; and (3) which was either not foreseen or could not have been reasonably contemplated by the judge who made theinitial order. [15] As I will set out below, I am not persuaded that there has been any change in the conditions, means, needs or circumstances of

either child or in the ability of the parents, in particular the father, to meet those needs that was either unforeseen or that could not have been reasonably contemplated by Dorgan J. when she made the present order. [ 16 ] A review of Dorgan J.’s reasons, coupled with her awareness that even at the time of trial the boys wanted to spend more time with their father, a factor that predictably would increase as time passed, illustrates the foregoing.

It is clear now, as it was at trial, that the father’s end goal is substantially more time with the children, whether that time is considered access or parenting time, than Dorgan J. permitted. It is also clear that the mother’s concerns about the father’s ability to effectively parent the children are substantially the same today as they were at the trial. [ 17 ] The trial was lengthy and, after its conclusion, Dorgan J. gave extensive reasons. I will not refer to all of them. In

summary, however, she made the following relevant observations and conclusions of fact: 1. The parents had spent nearly four years attempting to resolve the parenting arrangements for the children (para. 6); 2. The father sought, during trial, joint custody and joint guardianship, with a rotating one-week-on/one-week-off schedule, altered during final submissions to each weekday from 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., and either one or the other child overnight from Thursday to Friday morning, alternating weekly, along with equal shared vacation time (paras. 12, 13); 3.

The mother sought an order consistent with the order granted; 4. The basis for seeking restricted access arose from the father’s limitations attributable to a brain injury that he sustained in a 2001 motor vehicle accident (para. 16); 5. In addition, the father has a congenital condition that impairs his vision. His vision is blurry beyond two to three feet (para. 19); 6. The father is catastrophically impaired due to his brain injury (para. 20); 7. The father had the support of a team of health and rehabilitation specialists (para. 31); 8.

The father’s level of function had improved by the time of trial but his neurological condition is permanent and all that can be anticipated is learned coping and compensatory skills and strategies (paras. 32, 35); 9. The time that the children spent with their father had become an increasingly contentious issue, leading to the father wanting the children to be with him 50 percent of the time (para. 43); 10.

The father is hostile towards the mother in relation to parenting issues, making collaborative decision-making and compromise impossible, and resulting in the mother feeling a complete lack of trust between them. This resulted in the mother genuinely believing that she is unable to effectively communicate with the father (paras. 45, 47); 11. The mother’s perception is reasonable and represents the reality for their parenting situation (para. 50); 12. The resultant conflict arising from ongoing contact between the parents is unpleasant and relationship-destroying (para. 51); 13.

The mother continues to support the needs of the children to have a strong relationship with the father (para. 54); 14. There is acute sibling rivalry between the children and they exhibit fairly dramatic acting-out behaviour, particularly around the times of transporting (para. 62); 15. The children are very involved in extracurricular activities, including hockey and karate (para. 63); 16. The mother takes on the volunteer positions involved and required in many of the children’s activities, including coaching and fundraising (para. 65); 17.

The mother attends meetings relating to school activities, works at event concessions, organizes field trips, arranges play dates, and encourages and participates in social times with other families (para. 65); 18. The father is less involved in these activities (para. 66); 19. The mother is concerned about the amount of time the children spend playing computer games, watching TV and using electronic gadgets for entertainment when they are with their father (para. 67); 20.

The father defends the activities as sometimes educational, but, in any event, necessary due to his inability to participate in many physical activities and as downtime from their otherwise busy schedules (para. 67); 21. Dr. Burima completed a parenting assessment in 2007 and also, before trial, a report authorized under s. 15 of the Family Relations Act (paras. 69, 70); 22. Dr.

Burima concluded that the father had met the diagnostic criteria for a major depressive disorder, although another doctor made the diagnosis, and needed treatment before there should be any consideration of increasing his time with the children. The judge concluded that the father should not be required to undertake treatment for depression before access can be expanded (paras. 72, 77, 81, 109); 23. Dr. Burima concluded that the father was overly emotionally dependent on his children for his well-being (para. 78);

24. The father denies that he is depressed (para. 80); 25. The father suffers from chronic fatigue arising from the brain injury that affects his ability to parent over prolonged periods of time (para. 84); 26. In addition, the father’s memory impairment and impaired executive function dramatically affects his ability to meet the expectations of the job as parent of two children, age six and nine, on a sustained basis over blocks of time (para. 85); 27.

The father has very limited interest and participation in the community at large; he also sometimes requires sleeping medication and suffers from apnoea; he is chronically fatigued (para. 89); 28. The father has, according to the transcript of the reasons, about 9 to12 functional hours per day (para. 90), although this is likely an misstatement as the evidence on the point stated that the father required up to 14 hours of sleep in each 24 hour period and that he had about 12 hours a week in functional time; 29.

As a result, the father loses track of significant dates and events or sometimes cannot deal with them (para. 91); 30. The father’s ability to parent in a sustained way over a lengthy period of time is impaired (para. 93); 31. Even with assistance from attendants and an anticipated full-time nanny, the father’s abilities are compromised and limited (para. 94); 32. There is always a trained, experienced attendant or a hired nanny on overnight visits. That is appropriate. (para. 95); 33.

Even with a live-in nanny, the greatly expanded time that the father sought is risky and not in the best interests of the children (para. 98); and 34. It is in the best interests of the children to move to two overnights on a weekend at the same time (para. 108). [ 18 ] It is against that backdrop that I must consider the alleged material changes of circumstances. [ 19 ] The mother relies on the following evidence of events. First, she referred to events that occurred in September 2011, shortly after the order was made.

Apparently, on occasional non-access days, the father met T.S. after school and walked home alone with the child. Counsel for the mother wrote to his counterpart and stated that the father was participating in activities without a qualified attendant or nanny present. The mother deposed that her son told her that his father walked him home because he wanted more “dad time” with him.

The mother expressed concern about the emotional impact on T.S. and, as well, that A.S. felt left out by the additional time the father was sharing with his older brother. [ 20 ] The mother did not depose to any further incidents of this type. The father did not directly respond but deposed in his affidavit that T.S. is now old enough that the father should be permitted to spend short periods walking with him whenever T.S. wants. He further deposed that he began to walk T.S. home in November 2012 when he found out that his son was walking home alone. The father denied pressuring his son in any way.

On November 28, 2012, the mother sent an email to the father in which she stated, in part: By walking [T.S.] to his home on a non-access day you are not only confusing the boys and creating a competitive environment between them but also violating a court order. The order is also clear that you are required to be supervised by an attendant during access. According to the father, he stopped walking T.S. home after school in late December 2012 and has not done so since.

The mother contends that the father’s conduct amounted to a pattern of behaviour in non-compliance with the present order. [ 21 ] The mother also deposed that the father has encouraged T.S. to participate with him in an online video game. T.S. enjoys the game but, in the result, is in constant email contact with the father and has, according to the mother, become increasingly obsessed with the game such that it is distracting from family time, homework and other activities.

The mother states that this has now become the root of most conflict between her son and her. [ 22 ] The father deposed that he only allows the children to play strategy or educational video games and that the game described above is an online basketball league game.

He attached emails dated December 2012 referring to the game and, coincidentally, also referring to waiting on one occasion for T.S. to walk with him. [ 23 ] While the game in question does not appear to be age inappropriate, the mother deposed in her reply affidavit that the children play other games when at their father’s house that she considers inappropriate due to their violent content.

She also deposed that the boys watch age inappropriate movies when at the father’s home. [ 24 ] The mother also pointed out that T.S. is an anxious child, who feels that he is responsible for his father and needs to take care of him. The mother says this adds stress for the child and affects his behaviour on non-access days. [ 25 ] The mother further deposed that items, including homework, are not picked up at school on access days and items are frequently left at the father’s home after access visits.

According to the mother, the children do not do their homework while at their father’s house. [ 26 ] The mother deals with some of these problems during weekend access time by picking the children up at their father’s home and taking them to their recreational events, such as hockey practices and games.

In that way, she retains control over their sports equipment and makes sure it is available for the children. [ 27 ] Much parental conflict is associated with these efforts although there are also frequent problems if it is left to the father to make the necessary arrangements for getting the children to and from their activities. For example, the father has to rely on cabs to get to and

from early morning hockey practices or games, as none of his attendants work at that time. In the result, the cab driver is often the only other adult involved. [ 28 ] The mother described similar problems associated with some of the children’s other recreational activities although hockey appears to pose the most significant challenges. [ 29 ] The father does not agree with the mother’s concerns. According to him, she is “obsessed” with the boys’ hockey and pretends that he loses their equipment so as to control him and the children.

He pointed out that the children play hockey at a recreational rather than elite level. [ 30 ] I am not persuaded that the father has an adequate understanding as to what is needed to ensure the children participate fully in activities such as hockey or, if he does understand, that it is reasonable to expect him to successfully organize their attendance and participation. [ 31 ] In my view, all the problems outlined above are reasonably foreseeable manifestations of the father’s cognitive deficits and emotional needs associated with his brain injury.

They do not result, as the father believes, from an attempt by the mother to control or frustrate his relationship with the children. Nor do they result, as the mother believes, from any further deterioration in the ability of the father to parent. [ 32 ] The mother also contends that she has not met and discussed matters involving the children with the father’s attendants and, on one occasion in November 2012, with a substitute nanny. The mother deposed that she only met the regular live-in nanny casually at a hockey game.

The mother believes that the father is wilfully disobeying the provision in the present order that requires the father to instruct all members of his support team to meet with her to discuss any aspect of the children’s care, transportation or activities, and to contact her immediately in case of any emergency affecting the children or the ability of the father to have them in his care. [ 33 ] In this regard, the mother further deposed that there are times during weekend access when there is no attendant or nanny present or one of the children is left at home with the nanny for more than thirty minutes while the father takes the other child to a sports event. [ 34 ] The father did not directly contest these additional problems.

He deposed that it should not be necessary for the mother to meet and interview his treatment team. He appears to interpret the order as wrongfully permitting the mother to assess his care providers and assert further control over him. He also believes that T.S. is now old enough to spend short periods of time alone with him.

While I am satisfied that the father misinterprets the intent underlying the present order, which is to ensure contact between the care providers and the mother only in relation to the children, it is apparent that a problem has developed. [ 35 ] When the father first hired a full-time live-in nanny in February 2011, before final judgment in this matter, he provided her with a memorandum setting out her daily duties, including those that related to the children.

There is no evidence that those instructions ever changed to reflect the terms of the present order after it was made. [ 36 ] Further, the case manager of the father’s care team deposed that the mother “should not have the opportunity to vet the attendants and support workers provided by a licensed agency”. This suggests that the case manager was not aware of the specific provision in the order, but only of the father’s incorrect

interpretation. It is extremely regrettable if the father has not provided copies of the relevant parts of the present order to his caregivers. [ 37 ] I also note that the case manager deposed that the team members have reported that the mother can be unpleasant at times, but that the complaints have lessened since a stable team was put in place.

Any unpleasantness is likely attributable to a misunderstanding of the purposes of the communications. [ 38 ] If Dorgan J. had expressly foreseen this particular risk, she might have added a specific provision in her order requiring the father to give a copy of the relevant parts of the order to his caregivers but it would not have resulted in any other changes to the order that she made.

Like the other problems, any misunderstanding flows from the father’s deficits and accordingly, is not a material change of circumstances. [ 39 ] The mother contends that the father’s non-compliance is chronic and that Dorgan J. would not have contemplated such a possibility. With respect, that is an oversimplification. I agree that judges do not expect any person to wilfully disobey an order but I am persuaded that most, if not all, the non-compliance here is attributable to the father’s deficits and is not, to this point at least, a deliberate flouting of the present order.

If the father deliberately flouts the order, there are, if necessary, other remedies available. [ 40 ] I do not accept that the father has intentionally disobeyed the present order with regard to any of the matters discussed above. Unfortunately, his parenting and communication difficulties were and are foreseeable and will likely continue to some extent in future.

Hopefully, with the agreement and assistance of counsel, the live-in nanny and his care team will be instructed or reminded of the obligations that the current order places on them. [ 41 ] With regard to the police officer assist clause, the mother relies on s. 16 (6) of the Divorce Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), and the inherent jurisdiction of the court to enforce its own orders.

Section 16 permits the court to make orders respecting custody and access. Section 16 (6) reads: The court may make an order under this

section for a definite or indefinite period or until the happening of a specified event and may impose such other terms, conditions or restrictions in connection therewith as it thinks fit and just. Section 17(3) permits the court to include in a variation order “any provision that under this Act could have been included in the order in respect of which the variation order is sought”. Although counsel did not refer to any authority on the point, I accept that s. 16(6) is broad enough to permit me to order a peace officer assist clause.

[ 42 ] I do not accept the father’s contention that any peace officer assist clauses must now stem from the arguably more restrictive grounds set out in Division 5 of

Part 3 of the Family Law Act which addresses compliance issues respecting parenting time or contact with a child. It is, as a result, unnecessary for me to address whether such an application could succeed in the present circumstances. [ 43 ] However, since I have concluded that the father is not deliberately flouting the order, I also conclude that a peace officer assist clause is unnecessary and probably unhelpful. Any police intervention would likely increase the antipathy that the father already feels towards the mother and should be avoided if possible.

I accept the father’s contention that a peace officer assist clause would be a “heavy hammer” in the circumstances. [ 44 ] I turn next to the father’s alleged material change of circumstances. In essence, apart from the presence of the live-in nanny, which Dorgan J. knew about before releasing her reasons and making her order, the father’s alleged change of circumstances arises from the fact that the children are now two years older than they were at the time of the present order. Of course what that means is that A.S. is now the same age as T.S. was at that time.

T.S. is not quite yet in his teens. [ 45 ] It is appropriate to take the children’s views about the family arrangements and dynamics into consideration although, as the author of the “Views of the Child” report apparently told them, only adults can make the final decision here. I am satisfied that the report accurately reflects what the children said; each clearly stated that he wants more time with his father. Curiously, however, both children started the first interview by telling the author that he was sad because the interview cut into time that would otherwise be spent with the father.

While the statements may have been true, the fact that both started the process in that way suggests that some preceding discussion and planning occurred. A “Views of the Child” report is not evaluative in nature so I do not intend to read anything further into the statements. [ 46 ] T.S. likes it at his father’s home and would like to spend a lot more time there. By the time of his second meeting with the author, T.S. stated that he wanted to reverse the present living arrangements in favour of more time with his father than his mother.

T.S. acknowledged, however, that he finishes his homework at his mother’s home and doesn’t really do any at his father’s because of the lack of time that he has there. [ 47 ] A.S. clearly enjoys the time that he spends with his father and looks forward to seeing him. He is less happy on the days that he goes to his mother’s home. A.S. also stated that he wanted to spend equal time with each parent. A.S. feels that his mother is too rules- oriented in comparison to his father. [ 48 ] As the author concluded, both children want to spend substantially more time with their father.

Nonetheless, and notwithstanding the father’s love for the children, there continues to be an issue whether expanded parenting time is in the overall best interests of the children. [ 49 ] There is no new medical or psychological evidence on the application to vary. The father’s recovery was complete by the time of the trial. His cognitive deficits and needs today are the same as they were at the trial. There has not been, and will not be in the foreseeable future, any significant improvement. Accordingly, the question remains essentially the same.

How much contact is in the best interests of the children? [ 50 ] The question of expanded parenting time for the father was, of course, a central issue at the trial in 2011. The views of the children were also factors for consideration then in reaching a conclusion respecting the best interests of the children in that regard. [ 51 ] The Custody and Access Report in evidence at trial indicated that T.S. had been saying, as early as 2007, that he wanted to spend more time with his father and that he thought his father could take care of him. Dr.

Burima reported that both children had apparent difficulties behaving reasonably, cooperating or obeying that were attributable to them thinking they could reason their way out of consequences for misbehaving. While the father was physically affectionate with the children and set behaviour limits, he did not follow through with consequences in the event of misbehaviour. Dr. Burima also observed that the father was overly emotionally dependent on the children for his well-being. [ 52 ] Dr. Burima also described the mother’s parenting style.

She observed the mother being directive and firm, but the children were very competitive for the mother’s attention and unable to play cooperatively in spite of her directions. T.S. had particular difficulties in this regard. In spite of the children's difficulties, the mother did not impose consequences although she readily praised compliant behaviour. [ 53 ] Justice Dorgan did not expressly refer to the views of the children in her reasons, but it was obvious on the evidence before her that the children looked forward to and enjoyed what amounted to play time with their father, whom they love.

The fact that they were not held accountable for any misbehaviour may well have contributed to T.S.’s desire to spend more time with his father. It is probable, and predictably so, that the children’s current wish to spend more time with their father is similarly motivated. [ 54 ] I do not accept that the father has demonstrated any material change in circumstances. For the most part, the mother has identified compliance issues, some of which hopefully can be resolved, or at least ameliorated, with the assistance of counsel.

Others may continue just because they are unfortunate by-products of the father’s condition and limitations. While I do not encourage other attempts to enforce the judgment at this time, I recognize that there is a risk that the court may have to step in to limit access if the father either refuses or is unable to meet the best interests of the children. [ 55 ] The relationships between the children and their father are very important, but complex, and will likely continue to present many challenges, including some that the father is unaware of.

That must have been apparent to Dorgan J. and explains why she ordered sole custody, sole guardianship and imposed restrictive controls over access.

The father, with the assistance of his advisers and assistants, must now find a way to accept those controls rather than fighting them. [ 56 ] Of the controls that were imposed, one that perhaps needs clarification in order to permit flexibility without exposing the children to risk, and subject to the agreement of the parties, is to expressly allow the father to travel to and from local activities with the children by cab without a care attendant or nanny in attendance. Once at events, in which the children are active participants, such as

school concerts and hockey, other adults such as teachers and coaches take over direct control and it is not necessary for the father to have an attendant or nanny present. In my view, para. 3 of the present order permits that exception and, by implication, may even extend to travel to and from such events. [ 57 ] I also point out, in the hope that it assists the parties, that I do not interpret the present order as requiring the nanny or other temporary caregiver to return the child to the mother after 30 minutes if the father has attended an event with the other child.

As the children grow older and their interests and respective commitments diverge, it will likely be more necessary for the father to spend time alone with one rather than with both children. At that point, the parties should agree on a reasonable variation of the order to reflect that reality. [ 58 ] In the circumstances, I dismiss the mother’s application to vary the present order insofar as it relates to access. Given the nature of the father’s response to the application, I decline to award costs to him.

If any of the applications that I adjourned become necessary to decide, I will remain seized although I will unseize myself upon request if I cannot be available within a reasonable period of time. “M. D. Macaulay, J.” The Honourable Mr. Justice Macaulay