Kuciuk v. Sechelt (District), 2013 BCSC 528

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Kuciuk v. Sechelt (District), 2013 BCSC 528 Date: 20130327 Docket: 12-2716 Registry: Victoria Between: Shirley Kuciuk Petitioner And: District of Sechelt Respondent Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Bracken Reasons for Judgment Counsel for the Petitioner: S. C. Chapman Counsel for the Respondent: A. D. Bradley Place and Date of Trial/Hearing: Victoria, B.C. September 4, 2012 Place and Date of Judgment: Victoria, B.C.

March 27, 2013 [ 1 ] The petitioner seeks an order that the District of Sechelt Official Community Plan Amendment Bylaw No. 492-4, 2012 and Zoning Amendment Bylaw No. 25-250, Marine 3A Zone, 2012 (“the bylaws”) be set aside for illegality. The bylaws amended the Official Community Plan (“OCP”) and created a new M3A zone to allow the processing of sturgeon and sturgeon roe at Target Marine Hatcheries Ltd.’s fish hatchery operation (“Target”).

Bylaw 492-4, amends the definition of “fish hatchery” to include the processing of sturgeon and sturgeon roe grown on the target site. [ 2 ] The issues before the court concern the use of property owned by Target upon which it operates a fish hatchery. The property is in the Tillicum Bay area of the District of Sechelt (“Sechelt”), a neighbourhood that is otherwise residential. The petitioner, Ms.

Kuciuk, owns a home in the Tillicum Bay neighbourhood. [ 3 ] The petitioner argues that as a result of a decision by Sechelt to allow on site “package” waste disposal systems to be utilized in the area where the Target property is located, Sechelt failed to meet its obligations to consider the OCP Bylaw in conjunction with its waste management plan as required by s. 882(3) (a)(ii) of the Local Government Ac t, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 323. (“ LGA ”). [ 4 ] The petitioner also argues that as a result of the change in waste disposal method allowed by Sechelt, it failed in its obligation to properly consult those affected by the amendment to the OCP as required by s. 879 of the LGA . [ 5 ] Finally, the petitioner submits that, as a person affected by the bylaws, her ability to make representations at the public hearing held pursuant to s. 890 of the LGA was frustrated by a lack of information respecting the change to the waste disposal method Target is now allowed to use on its property.

The petitioner’s concern is with respect to liquid waste disposal as all non-liquid waste and offal is to be removed from the property and disposed of off-site. Facts [ 6 ] The fish hatchery was started on the site in 1986. The business was then operated by Aquarius Sea Farms. When Sechelt extended its boundaries to include the property, the fish hatchery continued its operation as a non-conforming use in an area that was otherwise zoned R3, single family residential. [ 7 ] The property was re-zoned in 1996 to allow the non-conforming fish hatchery use to become part of a new M3, fish hatchery zone.

However, the new zone specifically excluded fish processing on the site. In 1998, Target bought the business from Aquarius and continued the business as a fish hatchery. In 1999 Target began raising white sturgeon on the site; a use that was consistent with the permitted uses in the M3 zone.

At that time Target carried out all of its fish processing operations at another plant it owned in the Sunshine Coast area of British Columbia. [ 8 ] In early 2007, Target sold its fish processing facility on the Sunshine Coast and in the same year it applied to Sechelt to rezone its Tillicum Bay hatchery site to allow for commercial aquaculture. The proposal for rezoning was sent to the District Advisory

Planning Committee and two local ratepayers associations. All three bodies recommended the proposed rezoning be denied. [ 9 ] In 2008, Sechelt began developing a proposed zoning amendment and OCP amendment to allow for sturgeon roe harvesting and caviar processing as well as an education and interpretive centre on the Target site. [ 10 ] After consideration of the response at the public hearing, Sechelt passed the bylaws allowing the rezoning. Subsequently, in October 2008, sixteen local residents, including the petitioner, commenced legal action to challenge the bylaws.

The bylaws were quashed on November 30, 2009 (see Cameron v. District of Sechelt , 2009 BCSC 1637 ). [ 11 ] The issue concerned the preparation of a plan required by Sechelt for the management of liquid waste from the fish processing process. Sechelt required Target to prepare the plan as part of the application for rezoning. [ 12 ] Target prepared and delivered a waste management plan to Sechelt; however, the plan was not made public and those who attended the public hearing did not know what it contained.

The court found that Sechelt did not comply with s. 890 of the LGA as Sechelt did not afford a proper opportunity for those affected by the plan to address the issues of waste management at the public hearing. [ 13 ] On November 29, 2010, Target reapplied for a change to the marine hatchery zone to allow “caviar processing”. This was later re-stated as “the processing of sturgeon and sturgeon roe grown on the site”. [ 14 ] Sechelt then authorized a non-binding referendum question on the proposed re-zoning to be tied to the municipal elections in November of 2011.

The referendum question was simply stated: “Are you in favour of the District of Sechelt Council adopting bylaws to permit the processing of sturgeon and sturgeon roe on site at 7333 Sechelt Inlet Road pursuant to the application submitted by Target Marine Hatcheries Ltd.?” A majority voted in favour of the proposed change. [ 15 ] Sechelt then introduced bylaws to amend the OCP and to rezone a 0.35 ha portion of Target’s property. A public hearing was held on January 9, 2012.

The bylaws were approved by Sechelt, but subsequently quashed by the court with the consent of Sechelt as the district had recognized some flaws in the procedure. [ 16 ] Sechelt began the process again and gave first reading to “Bylaws No. 492-4, 2012 OCP and 25-250, 2012 Rezoning”. Pursuant to its obligation to consult with those affected by the proposed bylaws, Sechelt then distributed the proposed bylaws to various government agencies and business organizations in the district. There was no opposition generated as a result of that consultation.

The bylaws were also sent to the Tillicum Bay neighbourhood residents association and Sechelt received four written replies, including one from the petitioner. [ 17 ] The petitioner was concerned about the installation of a waste disposal field on the Target site. In a memorandum to Council from the Director of Development Services dated June 10, 2012, commenting on the petitioner’s concern, it was noted that this was a matter for the provincial Ministry of Environment (“MOE”) as a permit was required to discharge waste into the environment.

It was also noted that the location of any septic system would have to comply with local bylaws and regulations. [ 18 ] In a subsequent report to council dated June 18, 2012 the Director of Development Services again noted the petitioner’s concern and added that it was the understanding of District staff that Target was going to propose an onsite “package” liquid waste treatment system and thus a permit from the MOE would not be required.

The evidence indicates that the petitioner received a copy of the Director of Development Services’ report on or close to June 20, 2012. [ 19 ] On June 20, 2012, Sechelt considered the June 18, 2012 report and resolved that the consultation it had conducted was sufficient to meet its obligations under s. 879 of the LGA and directed staff to

schedule a public hearing respecting the bylaws. [ 20 ] On June 26, 2012, a public hearing pursuant to s. 890 of the LGA was held respecting the bylaws. At the hearing, several people made oral submissions to Council, including the petitioner. Some individuals, again including the petitioner, had more than one opportunity to address Council.

Those who spoke in favour of the bylaws emphasized the economic benefit of Target’s business to the community. [ 21 ] Those who were against the amendments emphasized the potential for increased noise from Target’s business operations and noted that as Target had been processing its product off-site for several years there was no reason why it could not continue to do so in the future. Many of those who were opposed to the bylaws expressed concerns about the possible impact on the environment that might result from the change in use of the Target site.

Council members were reminded of the previous commitments of Sechelt that the site would remain a hatchery and that fish processing would not be allowed on the site. [ 22 ] In July 2012, Council formally accepted written submissions from several residents who had spoken at the public hearing. Largely, these were individuals like the petitioner who were strongly opposed to the bylaws. The common theme in their submissions was opposition to what was perceived as an increased industrial use of the property in a semi-rural residential area.

The petitioner’s written submissions dated June 26, 2012, respecting the public hearing, noted her previously expressed concern related to waste disposal and in particular, the use of a disposal field on the Target site. [ 23 ] The petitioner says she was always concerned about waste disposal, but was reassured by the fact that a permit would be required from the MOE for any disposal of waste into the environment. She asserts that the possible use of a Type 3 “Package” Treatment system on the Target property was new information that had not been available prior to June 20, 2012.

She questioned why that information was only available to residents just prior to the public hearing and why residents did not have more information on the issue. [ 24 ] Her written submission was lengthy and detailed and she attached to it several earlier documents related to the Target site. She was concerned that the onsite treatment option had only become available to Target as a result of a recently approved zoning bylaw amendment related to a proposed residential development in the area known as Eden Bay Estates. Among the changes was one that

allowed Sechelt to consider and approve private waste treatment systems in Sewer Area 3, the same sewer area in which the Target property is located. [ 25 ] The underlying concern of the petitioner was that by allowing the amendment to accommodate the Eden Bay Estates development, Target had received an option to treat liquid waste on its property that had not been available previously or been the subject of either a consultation or public hearing process. That issue is the focus of the petitioner’s submission in this matter.

Section 882 LGA [ 26 ] Clearly, the petitioner was aware of the possibility of an onsite liquid waste treatment system might be utilized on the Target property on or soon after June 20, 2012, as she referenced the issue in her written submissions to Sechelt dated June 26, 2012. She argues that the issue of a private waste treatment system was new information and Sechelt has thus failed in its obligation under s. 882 of the LGA to consider any amendment to the OCP in conjunction with “any waste management plan that is applicable”.

Section 882 of the LGA provides: 882

(1) An official community plan must be adopted by bylaw in accordance with this section.

(3) After first reading of a bylaw under subsection (1), the local government must, in sequence, do the following: (

a) consider the plan in conjunction with (

i) its financial plan, and (ii) any waste management plan that is applicable in the municipality or regional district; [ 27 ] The petitioner argues that by first suggesting the issue was to be dealt with by the permit process under the MOE, and then providing Target the option to utilize an onsite treatment system, Sechelt failed in its obligation to consider the bylaws in conjunction with its waste management plan. [ 28 ] Sechelt argues that it has complied with all of its obligations under the LGA .

It says it complied by considering the bylaws in conjunction with the district’s waste management plan after the bylaws were read the first time. Sechelt says the waste management plan is not relevant to the Target property or the bylaws and therefore, there were no issues that needed to be addressed. [ 29 ] Sechelt argues that s. 882(3)(a)(ii) refers to plans that had been prepared by Sechelt and approved by the Provincial Government under the Environmental Management Act .

It says the Sechelt Liquid Waste Management Plan 2000 that has been approved under the Environmental Management Act is the only waste management plan in Sechelt dealing with liquid waste. [ 30 ] The district says the purpose of the waste management plan is to provide long-term planning for sewage collection and treatment in Sechelt and in the Sechelt Indian Government District. [ 31 ] The petitioner claims that Sechelt never considered the bylaws with reference to the liquid waste management plan initially and never reconsidered the bylaws with reference to the plan after it became aware of the possibility of an onsite treatment system rather than a disposal field.

Sechelt says that its liquid waste management plan is not relevant to the Target property as it does not deal with disposal fields or onsite treatment systems. Sechelt did not request a waste management plan from Target or require any specific system of liquid waste management. [ 32 ] The district further submits that the bylaws do not specifically deal with how waste water from the Target property was to be dealt with other than it could not be discharged into the environment without a permit from the MOE.

The bylaws relate solely to the use of a portion of the property for the purpose of processing sturgeon and sturgeon roe. It was not intended to focus on the management or disposal of waste water from the site.

Finally, Sechelt says the petitioner was aware that Target was considering the use of a private package treatment system by at least June 20, 2012 and she sought no further information from Sechelt. [ 33 ] While waste water disposal was an issue the petitioner was concerned with, it is clear from the material it was part of a more general opposition to what she and others perceived as a change in the use of the property from that of a fish hatchery to a more industrial use.

The district argues that the waste water treatment systems and the disposal of waste water are not relevant to the issue of the bylaws as the focus of the bylaws is how the property is used and not the detail of waste water management. [ 34 ] The petitioner submits that Target has in fact decided it will dispose of waste water by means of a private package treatment system on its property.

While it is not clear from the materials whether or not those plans are finalized, the district points out that Target’s plans will not be completely free from scrutiny as any discharge of waste into the environment will be subject to the supervision of the MOE. [ 35 ] The petitioner submits that Sechelt should have reconsidered its obligation under s. 882 after Target changed its waste management plan, sometime before June 18, 2012. I find little merit in this submission.

I agree with Sechelt that the definition of the words “waste management plan that is applicable in the municipality or regional district” is restricted. It does not refer to Sechelt’s OCP or to Target’s own specific waste management plan. It refers to only to waste management plans approved by the MOE under the Environmental Management Act . [ 36 ] The

section requires a municipality to consider “ when adopting an official community plan” how it might work in conjunction with any waste management plan. It does not consider how an amendment to the OCP works with any current waste management system in the OCP. [ 37 ] The petitioner also argues that no decision was ever made with respect to s. 882(3). It is argued that in this case the only consideration given to the waste management plan was by staff and not by Sechelt. There is no stated recommendation for Council to

consider the issue and there is no indication in the minutes of Council that they directed their attention specifically to this issue. If thereis a defect here, it is a technical one. Clearly, the staff report was considered and voted on by Council. And it is to be presumed thatCouncil read and understood the provisions in the report and by adopting it can be said to have considered it.

In any event, as alreadystated, as the waste management plan is not applicable to the bylaw, the defect is not material. [38] In my view, s. 882 is not relevant in these circumstances as the only applicable waste management plan does not apply tooperations such as Target. There may be some merit to the petitioner’s argument that a decision was never made on this section, butultimately, as already stated, I consider it to be at best a technical defect that should not result in the quashing of the bylaw.

Section 879 LGA - Failure to Consult [39] The petitioner claims that even though information respecting the proposed onsite treatment system was known to her prior tothe public hearing, there was no proper consultation with the public respecting the change to the OCP.

The petitioner says it wasunreasonable for Sechelt to conclude consultation was complete on June 20, 2012 when it was aware of a material change to the mannerin which Target planned to deal with liquid waste. [40] The petitioner submits that as the restrictions were changed to allow private treatment systems in Sewer Area 3 as part of theEden Bay Estates development, all of the documents related to the Eden Bay Estates zoning amendment bylaw should have beendisclosed to the public in connection with the consultation on the bylaw to amend the OCP.

She argues the amendments related to EdenBay are relevant to the Target rezoning because those amendments provided authorization for a private waste treatment system on theTarget property. [41] Sechelt argues that the OCP does not prohibit private waste treatment systems and in fact contemplates the limited use of suchsystems. At page 97 of the OCP, under the Heading “Sewer Area 3”, systems are clearly contemplated in certain restrictedcircumstances.

Later, at page 112 of the OCP, as part of the description of the Sandy Hook, Tillicum Bay and Tuwanek areas it isstated; The area is served by on-site sewage systems, and is not expected to be served by municipal sewer within the term of the OCP (see OCPchapter 13). Water supply is provided by the SCRD system. [42] Sechelt submits that it was not necessary to disclose documents or details of how waste water was to be managed as that isinformation that is not relevant to a zoning bylaw amendment.

Sechelt submits that the management of waste is a site specific issue thatis to be addressed by appropriate municipal and provincial authorities as the need arises. [43] Sechelt relies on Hastings Park Conservancy v. Vancouver (City), 2008 BCCA 117, where the court stated at paras. 63 and 64: [63] This submission is based on a misconception of the purpose of the public hearing.

Its purpose was not to consider a change in theform of development at Hastings Park, the issuance of a development permit (the application for which had yet to be made) or theentering into of the Operating Agreement (which had yet to be negotiated). The City was not required to hold a public hearing inconnection with those matters. [64] Rather, the purpose of the public hearing was to consider the proposed change of zoning before Council made its decision whetheror not to change it.

Section 566(1) of the Vancouver Charter required the holding of a public hearing before the Council amended theCD-1 zoning applicable to Hastings Park. The City was required to give the public a reasonable amount of information so thatreasonably informed representations could be made at the hearing about the proposed change of zoning to allow the use of slot machinesat Hastings Park. [44] The district also relies on Eadie v. Vinje Development Properties Ltd., 2009 BCSC 1472.

In that case, the court held that thedistrict was entitled to proceed with the zoning even though a “Debris Flow and Hazard Assessment” had not been discussed (para. 31). [45] The same point was made in Vancouver Island Community Forest Action Network v. Langford (City), 2010 BCSC 1357.

In thatcase, the district was not required to disclose a traffic impact study or a storm water management plan as part of a package of materialsmade available to the public prior to the public hearing. [46] Here, the district submits that the petitioner was aware of the June 20, 2012 staff report indicating that a Type 3 “Package”Treatment system might be utilized on the Target property and she spoke to that issue at the public hearing. The district says that therehas been adequate disclosure of all relevant documents and information in this case. [47] In Karamanian v.

Richmond (Township) (1982), (BC SC), 38 B.C.L.R. 106 (B.C.S.C.), the court discussedthe duty of procedural fairness that must observed by a local government. At para. 9, the court described the duty in this way: I cannot accept such a narrow

interpretation of s. 720 or of the requirements of the common law. In my view the purpose of theLegislature in enacting s. 720 was to provide a forum at which all aspects of the by-law might be reviewed so that members of the public,having become aware of the by-law's purpose and effect, would be in a position to make representations to Council of the manner andextent it affected property owned by them.

To make an intelligent assessment of the effect of a by-law on one's property and to be able toquestion proponents of the by-law one should be informed of the matters considered by the Planning Committee, the rationale for theirrecommendation, and such other relevant material considered by Council when it adopted the Committee's recommendations anddecided a public hearing be held. Anything less than full disclosure of the relevant information restricts the scope of the analysis and theconsequent representation a homeowner might otherwise make to Council at the public meeting.

Leaving homeowners ignorant ofpertinent information in the possession of Council frustrates the objective of a public meeting and denies those homeowners, whoseproperty is affected by the by-law, a full opportunity to be heard at a fair and impartial public hearing. [48] Here, the district has made clear through the bylaws that the purpose of the bylaws is to change the zoning of the Targetproperty to allow some processing of sturgeon and sturgeon roe grown on the Target site. It has invited consultation from those in the

community whose interests might be affected by the bylaws and has held a public hearing where members of the public have expressed their views; some in favour and some against. [ 49 ] The issue of waste water disposal has not yet been finalized, but it is obvious that all waste water will be disposed of by some form of on-site system. That is consistent with the liquid waste management plan for the area. The current proposal is by way of an on- site private package treatment system.

If such a system is not used and waste water is to be discharged into the environment by Target, it must first obtain a permit from the MOE. [ 50 ] The petitioner was aware of the proposed plan and has commented on the issue both in writing and at the public hearing. There is no evidence that there is any other undisclosed material or information respecting waste water. [ 51 ] The difficulty I have with the petitioner’s allegation is that I think she is taking the staff report of June 20, 2012 out of context.

In her submissions of June 8, 2012, she expressed the concern that Target would be using a septic disposal field that was outside of the proposed zoning amendment. The information in the June 18, 2012 staff report answers that concern.

While Target’s plan had changed and it was no longer proposing to use a septic disposal field the proposed onsite treatment system was expected to be a more efficient way to deal with liquid waste and thus, was expected to ameliorate the situation. [ 52 ] I think it is fair to say that Sechelt resolution on June 20, 2012 stating that it had met the consultation requirements under the LGA was reasonable given that the suggestion in the district planner’s report was that the petitioner’s concerns were alleviated as a result of the proposed package treatment system.

In any event, the consultation process is clearly less rigorous than the public hearing process and Sechelt is entitled to considerable deference in its decision as to how much consultation is appropriate. [ 53 ] Both parties agree that the standard of review with respect to a decision on consultation is that of reasonableness. In Gardiner v. Williams Lake (City) , 2006 BCCA 307 , the British Columbia Court of Appeal used the standard of patent unreasonableness and more recently the decision of Dunsmuir v.

New Brunswick , 2008 SCC 9 , altered that requirement to what was described as the deferential standard of reasonableness (para. 47). [ 54 ] It is also clear that the level of disclosure depends upon the circumstances. As noted in Wilde v. Metchosin District and Attorney General for British Columbia , 2005 BCCA 453 , at para. 12 : There is no statement of the law as to what is required for procedural fairness in every case. In each case, whether the disclosure process employed was fair will depend upon the circumstances of the case: see Eddington v. Surrey , [1985] B.C.J.

No. 1925 (B.C.S.C.) . [ 55 ] Finally, as noted in various staff reports, the proposed change of use by Target is not a significant change in land use. It does not constitute heavy industrial use; it is simply the process of a few individuals engaged in the stripping of fish and collection of sturgeon roe with all solid waste being removed from the site and disposed of elsewhere. In my view, there has been a broad community discussion with many speaking in favour and many opposed to the proposed change of use.

Sechelt has clearly made a decision it considers to be in the best interests of the community and it is entitled to deference.

Section 890 Public Hearing [ 56 ]

Section 890 of the LGA requires a local government to hold a public hearing before adopting an OCP or zoning bylaw. The purpose of the public hearing is to allow the public to make representations respecting matters contained in the proposed bylaws. A reasonable opportunity must be afforded to every person who believes that “their interest in property is affected by the proposed bylaw”. This can be done by written submissions to Council or by an opportunity to be heard at the public hearing.

In this case, the petitioner availed herself of both opportunities. [ 57 ] While this matter must be decided on the basis of the procedures followed by Sechelt respecting the current bylaws, it can perhaps be acknowledged that the changes allowed by the bylaws have been the subject of comment in the community for several years now. [ 58 ] In Fisher Road Holdings Ltd. v. Cowichan Valley (Regional District) , 2012 BCCA 338 , the court held that the assessment of whether or not a local government has breached its duties of notice and procedural fairness to the public is to be reviewed on the standard of correctness.

In order for the public hearing to be fair, it is clear that the public must have access to all relevant documents that the local government will be considering as it decides whether to pass a bylaw. Thus, it seems that the level of disclosure required depends on the circumstances of each case. [ 59 ] In Hubbard v.

West Vancouver (District) , 2005 BCCA 633 , the court stated at para. 23: [23] What I take from the authorities is that the process to be followed by council in these controversial matters must be fair in that the procedure adopted must give interested parties a proper opportunity to address the matter being considered by council. If a satisfactory opportunity has been given to opponents of the change to consider all relevant information and to make such comments as they see fit, then it will be for council to decide what in their considered view is in the public interest.

Having heard from those opposed to the bylaws in this case, the District council decided that it wished to have further comment on certain subjects from its staff. As the cases point out, this is not uncommon and is usually thought to be an acceptable process. If after receiving such information from staff, council was then required to call a new public hearing, the process would tend to be endless. I make reference to a comment of Southin J.A. in Jones v.

Delta , supra , at 29 of the report: To say that there ought to be a further hearing in this kind of process merely to enable someone who has already made his point to repeat his point yet again is to undermine the whole process of deliberation. Many deliberative bodies, both public and private, have, if not rules against repetition, at least a policy encouraging an absence of repetition. In the courtroom, judges consider they have the right to stop counsel who is repeating himself or is merely echoing what has been said by other counsel, and only in the rarest of cases do judges permit a matter to be reargued.

[60] In Pitt Polder Preservation Society v. Pitt Meadows (District), 2000 BCCA 415, the court considered several factors that hadbeen referred to in the decision of Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999), (SCC), 2 S.C.R.817 at paras. 21 through 28. Among the factors considered are the following: 1. the nature of the decision being made and the process followed in making it; 2. the nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of the statute pursuant to which the body operates; 3. the importance of the decision to the individual(

s) affected; 4. the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision; and 5. the choices of procedure made by the agency itself. [61] The level of disclosure required under the LGA will depend on the circumstances. In Fisher and Pitt Polder a high level ofdisclosure was required, whereas in Wilde less was needed.

As noted by Fenlon J. in Vancouver Island Community Forest ActionNetwork, there is no absolute rule as to disclosure, but rather a requirement of fairness in all of the circumstances of each case. [62] Sechelt argues that Target’s waste treatment plan, either by an MOE permit or onsite treatment system, is not relevant to thebylaws as the method used to dispose of waste water does not impact the Zoning Bylaw or the amendments to the OCP. I do notconsider it necessary for Sechelt to have disclosed all of the details of possible methods of disposing of waste water in order to complywith s. 890 of the LGA.

Conclusion [63] I am satisfied that the district has complied with its duty under s. 882(3)(a)(ii) as the liquid waste management plan in thedistrict provides for on-site liquid waste management and contemplates the use of field disposal systems in areas other than the urbancore. There is no specific referral to waste management related to the proposed use of Target on the site in the liquid waste managementplan. [64] I am also satisfied that the district has complied with its duty to consult under s. 879 of the LGA.

The standard of review to beapplied by the court respecting this issue is the standard of reasonableness: Catalyst Paper Corp. v. North Cowichan (District), 2012SCC 2 , [2012] S.C.J. No. 2 at para. 24. Here, Sechelt notified an array of business and government organizations and localresidents who it considered might be affected by the bylaws.

I am satisfied that the consultation carried out by Sechelt satisfies the test ofreasonableness. [65] As to the obligation of disclosure and provision of information under s. 890, I am satisfied on the evidence that the district hasmet its duty to disclose all relevant information. [66] In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that the district has complied with all aspects of its duty of procedural fairness and thepetition in this case must be dismissed. Costs may be spoken to if necessary. “J. K. Bracken, J.” The Honourable Mr. Justice Bracken