The Law Society of British Columbia Petitioner And: Gerhard Pyper also known as Gerhardus Abertus Pyper Respondent, 2017 BCSC 1197

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Law Society of British Columbia v. Pyper, 2017 BCSC 1197 Date: 20170707 Docket: Vancouver Registry: S171350 Between: The Law Society of British Columbia Petitioner And: Gerhard Pyper also known as Gerhardus Abertus Pyper Respondent Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Grauer Oral Reasons for Judgment In Chambers Counsel for the Petitioner: Michael Kleisinger The Respondent on his own behalf: Gerhard Pyper Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. July 5 and 6, 2017 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C.

July 7, 2017 INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] Gerhard Pyper originally practised as an advocate, or barrister, in South Africa, then practised law in British Columbia for many years. As of January 1, 2015, he ceased to be a member in good standing with the Law Society, and on January 29, 2015, he became a former member. The circumstances under which these changes in status occurred are presently the subject of litigation between Mr. Pyper and the Law Society. As a former member, Mr. Pyper, like any other non-member, is prohibited from practising law. [ 2 ] Since September 2016, Mr.

Pyper has been a director and shareholder of two companies, Seattle Environmental Consulting Ltd (“Seattle”) and ESS Environmental Ltd (“ESS”). These are former clients of his that he had represented in ongoing disputes involving WorkSafe BC. Seattle and ESS are involved in the asbestos inspection and abatement field. Their principles are Mike Singh and Shawn Singh. [ 3 ] On a number of occasions beginning in November 2016, Mr. Pyper has appeared, or has attempted to appear, in court to speak on behalf of those entities.

On all but two occasions, he has been denied an audience in that capacity by both the Court of Appeal and this Court. [ 4 ] The Law Society now seeks an order permanently prohibiting and enjoining Mr. Pyper from engaging in the practice of law as defined in

section 1 of the Legal Profession Act , SBC 1998, c 9 (the “Act”), until such time as he resumes membership in good standing of the Law Society. The Law Society also seeks an order prohibiting Mr.

Pyper from commencing, prosecuting or defending a proceeding in any court, except if representing himself as an individual party to a proceeding acting without counsel, but solely on his own behalf; and from representing himself as being a lawyer or any other title that connotes that he is qualified or entitled to practice law. [ 5 ] The Law Society’s application is based largely on what has been found and stated in the courts. In essence, it maintains that Mr.

Pyper is paid by his former clients as a director solely for the purpose of lawyering; in effect, acting as in-house counsel without the supervision of the Law Society. [ 6 ] Mr. Pyper denies this, maintaining that he is simply trying to scratch out a living, being paid nothing like what a lawyer would charge. In addition, he maintains: first, that this Court, by reason of institutional bias and discrimination, has no jurisdiction to hear this application; second, that if this Court has jurisdiction, the Law Society has no standing to seek an injunction because it has not come to

court with clean hands; and third, that the terms of the injunction are far too broad. Then, late in the day, Mr. Pyper sought an adjournment of this hearing to permit him to raise a constitutional challenge. I declined to adjourn the matter for reasons I discuss below. THE STATUTE [ 7 ] The Law Society relies on sections 15 and 85 of the Act .

Section 15 sets out the prohibition: 15

(1) No person, other than a practising lawyer, is permitted to engage in the practice of law, except (

a) a person who is an individual party to a proceeding acting without counsel solely on his or her own behalf, … (

e) a lawyer of another jurisdiction permitted to practise law in British Columbia under section 16 (2) (a), to the extent permitted under that section, (

f) a practitioner of foreign law holding a permit under section 17(1)(a), to the extent permitted under that section, and (

g) a lawyer who is not a practising lawyer, to the extent permitted under the rules.

(2) A person who is employed by a practising lawyer, a law firm, a law corporation or the government and who acts under the supervision of a practising lawyer does not contravene subsection (1).

(3) A person must not do any act described in paragraphs (

a) to (

g) of the definition of "practice of law" in section 1 (1), even though the act is not performed for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, from the person for whom the acts are performed, if (

a) the person is a member or former member of the society who is suspended or has been disbarred, or who, as a result of disciplinary proceedings, has resigned from membership in the society or otherwise ceased to be a member as a result of disciplinary proceedings, or (

b) the person is suspended or prohibited for disciplinary reasons from practising law in another jurisdiction.

(4) A person must not falsely represent himself, herself or any other person as being (

a) a lawyer, (

b) an articled student, a student-at-law or a law clerk, or (

c) a person referred to in subsection (1) (

e) or (f).

(5) Except as permitted in subsection (1), a person must not commence, prosecute or defend a proceeding in any court. [ 8 ]

Section 85 authorizes the granting of the sort of injunction the Law Society seeks: 85

(1) A person commits an offence if the person (

a) contravenes

section 15… …

(5) The society may apply to the Supreme Court for an injunction restraining a person from contravening this Act or the rules.

(6) The court may grant an injunction sought under subsection (5) if satisfied that there is reason to believe that there has been or will be a contravention of this Act or the rules.

(7) The court may grant an interim injunction until the outcome of an action commenced under subsection (5). … [ 9 ] The practice of law is defined in

section 1: "practice of law" includes (

a) appearing as counsel or advocate, (

b) drawing, revising or settling (

i) a petition, memorandum, notice of articles or articles under the Business Corporations Act , or an application, statement, affidavit, minute, resolution, bylaw or other document relating to the incorporation, registration, organization, reorganization, dissolution or winding up of a corporate body, (ii) a document for use in a proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, (iii) a will, deed of settlement, trust deed, power of attorney or a document relating to a probate or a grant of administration or the estate

of a deceased person, (iv) a document relating in any way to a proceeding under a statute of Canada or British Columbia, or (

v) an instrument relating to real or personal estate that is intended, permitted or required to be registered, recorded or filed in a registry or other public office, (

c) doing

an act or negotiating in any way for the settlement of, or settling, a claim or demand for damages, (

d) agreeing to place at the disposal of another person the services of a lawyer, (

e) giving legal advice, (

f) making an offer to do anything referred to in paragraphs (

a) to (e), and (

g) making a representation by a person that he or she is qualified or entitled to do anything referred to in paragraphs (

a) to (e), but does not include (

h) any of those acts if performed by a person who is not a lawyer and not for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect , from the person for whom the acts are performed , (

i) the drawing, revising or settling of an instrument by a public officer in the course of the officer's duty, (

j) the lawful practice of a notary public, (

k) the usual business carried on by an insurance adjuster who is licensed under Division 2 of

Part 6 of the Financial Institutions Act , or (

l) agreeing to do something referred to in paragraph (d), if the agreement is made under a prepaid legal services plan or other liability insurance program; [Emphasis added.] THE COURT PROCEEDINGS [ 10 ] On November 21, 22 and 25, 2016, Mr. Pyper appeared before Mr. Justice Verhoeven as agent for Seattle in litigation brought by Seattle, Shawn Singh and Mike Singh against persons connected to WorkSafe BC. The plaintiffs sought an order disqualifying WorkSafe BC in-house counsel from acting for two of the defendants. In an affidavit filed November 21, 2016, Mr.

Mike Singh deposed: The relentless attacks by WorkSafe has [ sic ] pushed Seattle to represent itself. I have appointed a new director [Mr. Pyper] in September 2016 to help me to prepare the paperwork and speak for Seattle in the Court. [ 11 ] In his Reasons for Judgment, Verhoeven J. said this ( Singh v Nielsen , 2016 BCSC 2331 ): [36] There is another matter I wish to address, and that is the representation of Seattle by Mr. Pyper. [37] No position was taken on behalf of the defendants with respect to Mr. Pyper's right of audience. I was told at the outset of the application that Mr.

Pyper is a director of Seattle and that Seattle is otherwise unrepresented. During the course of the hearing of the application I learned that Mr. Pyper is, in fact, former counsel for Seattle, and that he was previously but is not now a member of the Law Society of British Columbia. At the end of the day yesterday I was provided with an affidavit from the principal of Seattle, Mike Singh, which I read after court. Mr. Singh says in that affidavit at paragraph 11: The relentless attacks by WorkSafe [have] pushed Seattle to represent itself.

I have appointed a new director in September 2016 to help me to prepare the paperwork and speak for Seattle in the Court. I attach as Exhibit "A" [a] corporate search of Seattle. [38] The corporate record search shows that Mr. Pyper is a director of Seattle. [39] The circumstances suggest to me that Mr. Pyper was appointed in order to allow him to represent the company very much as a lawyer and a member of the Law Society would do. As I said, no objection was taken by the defendants and for that reason the issue was not addressed. Also as mentioned, counsel for the individual plaintiffs, Mr.

Sumandeep Singh, took no active role on the hearing of the application. He adopted the position taken and the arguments brought on behalf of Seattle by Mr. Pyper. In practical terms, therefore, the application was argued by Mr. Pyper. [40] These circumstances are highly troubling. It appears to me that what may be involved here potentially is a breach of the Legal Profession Act , S.B.C. 1998, c. 9. However, that issue is not before me.

I do not have complete information, and as a result it would be inappropriate for me to make any conclusions or any findings with respect to that matter. [41] However, I direct that the court staff deliver a copy of these reasons for judgment to the Law Society of British Columbia, to be dealt with in such manner as the Law Society may deem fit. [42] I wish to express the point as well, that although Mr. Pyper was not denied audience, because no issue was made of it, that does not mean that on a future application or other proceeding a right of audience will be allowed. That is to be dealt with on another day.

[12] Mr.

Justice Verhoeven subsequently struck the claims brought against Scott Nielsen, formerly counsel to WorkSafe BC andnow a Deputy Registrar of the Supreme Court, as: so plainly without merit that, when set against the other meritless claims, proceedings and allegations these same plaintiffs have made, itis clear that they have no foundation, serve no useful purpose, and have been made to harass, vex and oppress Nielsen and the Board. (Singh v Nielsen, 2016 BCSC 2420 at para 24.) [13] Other litigation involving Seattle and the Singhs led to a hearing in the Court of Appeal on December 15, 2016: Workers’Compensation Board of British Columbia v Seattle Environmental Consulting Ltd, 2017 BCCA 19 (“WCB v Seattle”).

At that hearing,Mr. Pyper sought leave to address the court on behalf of Seattle, in his capacity as director. The Workers’ Compensation Board(WorkSafe BC) opposed that application. [14] In considering the application, the court reviewed a number of relevant decisions related to Mr. Pyper including Pyper v TheLaw Society of British Columbia, 2016 BCSC 2090; Verhoeven J.’s decision in Singh v Nielsen, and a disciplinary decision of the LawSociety, Re Pyper, 2016 LSBC 1. The court quoted from Verhoeven J.’s decision as quoted above, then noted: [13] Mr.

Justice Verhoeven found that the allegations made in the application were scandalous and unfounded. He awarded specialcosts against the plaintiffs, although not against Mr. Pyper personally, saying: [44] The order as to costs I make is that the plaintiffs, all of whom were applicants, are jointly and severally liable for special costs ofthe application.

The reasons for the order for special costs are the comments that I made earlier about the lack of bona fides with respectto the application itself, and the scandalous and unfounded accusations that were made during the course of the hearing and in thematerials presented to the court, including the Notice of Application and the affidavit of Mike Singh. [14] In the present case, Mr. Pyper proposes to speak to the joint factum filed on behalf of all of the respondents by counsel for theindividual respondents, Mr. Sumandeep Singh. Mr.

Sumandeep Singh has acted for the respondents in the appeal and signed the jointfactum filed on their behalf months ago. [15] In Atlantic Chemicals Trading of North America Inc. v. Morizon Holdings Ltd., 2005 BCCA 456 at para. 3, Mr. Justice Essonnoted that “the right of a corporation to be represented by other than a member of the bar is very limited” and a matter of the “discretionor indulgence” by the Court. He cited as “authoritative” the decision of this Court in Vernrose Holdings Ltd. v.

Pacific Press Ltd. (1978), (BC CA), 7 B.C.L.R. 298 where McIntyre J.A. (as he then was) speaking for the Court said this (at 304): … For reasons that are indicated in Tritonia Ltd. v. Equity & Law Life Assur. Society, [1943] A.C. 584 at 586, [1943] 2 All E.R. 401, andin Rondel v.

Worsley, [1967] 1 Q.B. 443, [1966] 3 All E.R. 657, affirmed [1969] 1 A.C. 191, [1967] 3 All E.R. 993 (H.L.), the courts asmasters of their own proceedings must retain a discretion whether to hear from time to time in the course of the dispatch of their businesssuch persons other than barristers as they may consider should be heard in the interests of justice. The court in its discretion may grant aprivilege of audience to such persons in any case where it deems it necessary or proper and deny it in other cases.

This, no doubt, is apower which should be exercised rarely and with caution, and it is one the courts will be zealous to preserve. [Emphasis added by Esson J.A.] [16] I agree with these observations. The factum of the respondents is before the Court. Mr. Sumandeep Singh signed the factum andrepresents the individual respondents based on the same arguments. Until two weeks before the hearing, he also represented Seattle. AsMr. Sumandeep Singh was speaking to the joint factum on behalf of the individual respondents, it was not necessary to hear Mr. Pyper inthis case. Mr.

Pyper’s appointment as a director is designed to circumvent the fact that he is not currently licenced to practice law in thisprovince. There is no suggestion that there is any other reason for his appointment. It would not be proper to hear from Mr. Pyper. Asit was neither necessary nor proper to hear from Mr. Pyper, the matter proceeded based on the written factums and oral argument aspresented by counsel. [Emphasis added.] [15] Mr.

Pyper submits that the underlined portion in paragraph 16 of the Court of Appeal’s Reasons for Judgment amounts to afinding of fact that was not open to the court to make, was unsupported by any evidence, and has left him without any recourse since, as anon-party, he cannot appeal the decision or seek a re-hearing. [16] The Reasons for Judgment of the Court of Appeal in WCB v Seattle were released on January 13, 2017. On that same date, inthe same case, Mr.

Pyper appeared before Madam Justice Duncan “in person for the applicant, Seattle Environmental and ESSEnvironmental.” Counsel for the respondent Workers’ Compensation Board brought the Court of Appeal’s Reasons to the attention ofDuncan J., not in relation to Mr. Pyper’s appearance, but in support of the proposition that the subject matter of the application was resjudicata. Madam Justice Duncan adjourned the application to allow the applicants an opportunity to consider the reasons, and toreschedule the hearing for a full day in the event it went ahead. [17] Mr. Pyper was back in Supreme Court before Mr.

Justice Leask on January 16, 2017, in the matter of Singh v Nielsen, stating “Ispeak for Seattle Environmental, the corporate plaintiff, who is appearing in person”. Mr. Justice Leask responded, Mr. Pyper, I have been told in the Court of Appeal they took the view that you shouldn’t be appearing even in a matter where you arepersonally affected. Is that not true? [18] Mr. Pyper views this as indicating that Mr.

Justice Leask had obtained information from, or was influenced by, someone behindthe scenes, and believes that Registrar Nielsen was poisoning the judges against him (this last being another scandalous and unfoundedaccusation of the sort that led Verhoeven J. to award special costs against Mr. Pyper’s company and the Singhs. Having himself beenvictimized, as he assures me, by a client’s egregiously defamatory public accusation, one would have thought Mr. Pyper would be more

sensitive to raising such an allegation, based as it is on nothing more than a post hoc logical fallacy). [ 19 ] In any event, before Leask J. counsel for the respondents objected to Mr. Pyper’s appearance. After reviewing what the Court of Appeal had to say about it being neither necessary nor proper to hear from Mr. Pyper, Mr. Justice Leask and Mr. Pyper had this exchange: THE COURT: …In the circumstances, Mr. Pyper, I am not going to give you leave to represent the company. I am certainly ready to give an adjournment for the company to find someone else to represent them, either a director or-- or counsel.

I’m not trying to punish the company, but-- MR. PYPER: I am a director--a director of the company. THE COURT: I know you are a director of the company, but the Court of Appeal thinks you were made a director of the Company in order to allow you to appear and represent them, and the Court of Appeal doesn’t think that’s proper, and as I have the discretion I’m going to exercise that discretion not to hear you. Now I am not trying to punish the company. They are welcome to get another director or counsel and I’ll give you an adjournment to enable them to do that…. [ 20 ] Mr.

Justice Leask went on to make it clear that his exercise of discretion in the matter before him would not be binding on other judges, but that in the circumstances, the company would be taking a risk if it continued to appear in court with Mr. Pyper as its representative, without any backup. [ 21 ] Mr. Pyper next sought leave to appear on behalf of Seattle on January 23, 2017, in another action commenced by the Singhs, Seattle and ESS against the WorkSafe BC and others. On this occasion, WorkSafe BC applied before Mr. Justice Kent for an order striking the notice of civil claim. Mr.

Pyper’s application for leave to appear was supported in part by an affidavit sworn by Shawn Singh in which he deposed: The Plaintiffs’ financial resources have been depleted because of WorkSafe’s relentless attack on the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs knew Mr. Pyper and are aware of the fact that the British Columbia Law Society intentionally keep [ sic ] Mr. Pyper out of practice by refusing to process his application to become a member after the Law Society cancelled his license for reasons that does [ sic ] not make sense to the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs are aware that Mr.

Pyper is unemployed now for more than two years and is struggling financially. The Plaintiffs offered Mr. Pyper a position of director in ESS and Seattle [to] speak for the Companies in the Court and to help the Plaintiffs to organize documents and prepare for the onslaught by WorkSafe against the Plaintiffs. Seattle and ESS can at least provide limited employment to Mr. Pyper, to help them to survive to some extent. Mr.

Pyper on the other hand has at least have knowledge has [ sic ] about our litigation, and help Seattle and ESS to present the truth in the pursuit of justice, to the Courts. [ 22 ] When the hearing got underway, Mr. Pyper introduced himself as speaking for the corporate plaintiffs who were appearing in person. After introductions were completed, Kent J. said this: THE COURT: Well, Mr. Pyper, I have had occasion this morning to read the Court of Appeal decision on January 13, 2017, which would seem to suggest that you don’t get to first base on your ability to represent the company. [ 23 ] Once again, Mr.

Pyper takes this as indicating that Kent J. had obtained information about him from, or had been influenced or poisoned by, someone behind the scenes. [ 24 ] In any event, an exchange followed in which Mr. Pyper said this: MR. PYPER: I’ve been the lawyer for them. THE COURT: For whom? MR. PYPER: For the plaintiffs… THE COURT: Oh, I see. So, yes, okay. MR. PYPER: …before, so it’s-- it’s not a matter that they were looking for-- I was looking for opportunity to circumvent, as the Court of Appeal say, the fact that I’m not a member.

I have fairly, I wouldn’t say in-depth knowledge, but I have the general knowledge of the case of the plaintiffs in the course of the extensive litigation - “extensive” is probably an understatement - litigation between WorkSafe and the plaintiffs, very plain and simple, ran out of money, and opportunities to deal with it through the normal course of legal representation, and approached me to see if I can assist them when they appoint me as director for the respective companies. And I agreed to that. [ 25 ] Mr. Justice Kent ultimately dismissed Mr.

Pyper’s application for leave: [2] [T]here are serious concerns here about the dignity of the court, and its process. We are confronting here a situation where not once, but twice, the court has expressly refused permission for Mr. Pyper to speak on behalf of the companies in court. In one instance of refusal, Mr. Justice Leask gave express warning to the company not to persist with this tactic, and advise them they were running a risk that, if this were to occur again, another judge might make precisely the same ruling. [3] I read the affidavits filed in support of the application.

I understand the need articulated in the affidavit material for the assistance of someone with legal training in order to properly represent the interests of the corporations. The fact is, however, that

Mr. Pyper is not currently a licensed lawyer, and advocacy in front of the court certainly qualifies as practising law within the meaning ofthe Legal Profession Act. There is an exception permitted for corporate entities, or indeed other people, to be represented by non-lawyersin court where it is in the interest of justice to allow that sort of thing to occur, and that is the exception sought to be invoked in this case. [4] The difficulty is that the court is now twice refused Mr.

Pyper permission, and there is nothing different about today’sapplication that distinguishes it in any meaningful way from what has occurred in the past before Mr. Justice Leask, and before the Courtof Appeal. [5] It is only appropriate that I be consistent with the other jurists who have ruled on this matter. I am satisfied that the appointmentof Mr. Pyper as a director of the company was for the sole purpose of granting him a form of corporate status which might provide afoundation for him to seek permission to address the court on behalf of the company.

In other words, it was a deliberate strategy tobolster an application for an exception to the prohibition found in the legal profession act which prevents non-lawyers from practisinglaw, including advocacy in front of a court whether on behalf of individuals or corporations. [6] In all the circumstances, I am obliged to follow suit. I dismiss the application for permission for Mr. Pyper to address the Courttoday on behalf of the plaintiffs in this matter. [26] Mr. Pyper made one last attempt to speak on behalf of his companies. On February 8, 2017, Seattle applied without noticebefore Mr.

Justice Fitch in Court of Appeal chambers seeking leave for Gerhard Pyper to speak on behalf of Seattle when the hearing wasset. At that time, Mr. Mike Singh deposed that Seattle had appointed Mr. Pyper as a director “based on the provisions of

section 94.1 ofthe Workers Compensation Act”. That

section permits lay advocates. It allows a person to give advice about matters such as theinterpretation of the Act, the Board’s practices and procedures, and to communicate with or appear before the Board, and provides thatsection 15 of the Legal Profession Act does not apply to a person while performing such functions. [27] Mr. Justice Fitch declined to deal with the matter on the ground that it should properly be heard by the division assigned to hearthe appeal.

He was at pains to point out, however, that the application seemed to be a collateral challenge to a factual finding made bythe court, and stated that in the absence of a material change in circumstances, Seattle could have no reasonable expectation that thedivision would permit Mr. Pyper to speak on its behalf. [28] Mr. Pyper has taken all of this very personally. Before me, he frequently referred to his dismay that the judges should hate himso, and his inability to understand their hostility towards him. DISCUSSION 1. Has the Supreme Court lost jurisdiction? [29] In Mr.

Pyper’s submission, judges in both the Court of Appeal and this Court have gone out of their way to deprive him of anaudience, focusing on him in a discriminatory and hostile manner. The justices of the Court of Appeal, he asserts, jumped to conclusionsand made findings of fact far beyond their jurisdiction and without any evidentiary support. Judges of this court, he contends, havetreated him with hostility before even hearing what the application was about. He attributes this to discrimination and prejudice,evidently influenced by persons or discussions behind the scenes. [30] As to discrimination, Mr.

Pyper points out that judges have permitted Mike Singh to speak for Seattle. He notes that Mr. Singh,like him, is a director of the company. So why is it that Mr. Singh is permitted to speak for the company, but Mr. Pyper is not? Is itbecause, Mr. Pyper asks, he is a “God-fearing Christian” but Mr. Singh is Sikh? Because Mr. Pyper is “white” but Mr. Singh is“coloured”? Or because he has a law degree but Mr. Singh does not? [31] What is clear, Mr. Pyper, maintains, is that these judges have all been biased against him, treating him with contempt, hostility,ridicule and discrimination.

Citing a number of cases that discuss bias and discrimination, including: Bell Canada v CanadianTelephone Employees Association, 2003 SCC 36 at para 38; Liteky v United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) at 550; Metropolitan PropertiesCo. v Lannon, [1969] 1 QB 577 (CA); Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2003 SCC 45 , [2003] 2 SCR 259 at para 57;Marchand v Public General Hospital Society of Chatman (2000), (ON CA), 138 OAC 201 at para 140, Cardinal vKent Institution, (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 643 at para 23; and Newfoundland Telephone Co. v Newfoundland (Board ofCommissioners of Public Utilities), (SCC), [1992] 1 SCR 623,, Mr.

Pyper argues that the situation is one of institutionalbias so that the court has lost jurisdiction over him. [32] These cases do indeed stand for the proposition that the denial of a right to a fair hearing must always render a decision invalid,and that a decision-making authority has no jurisdiction to render a decision affecting the legal rights of an individual that is arrived at bya procedure that offends against the principles of natural justice. But Mr. Pyper was unable to parlay these principles into a want ofjurisdiction of the court as a whole.

While a reasonable apprehension of bias will colour all that a judge decides in a matter, it cannot besaid to colour all that any other judge might decide. Bias is a personal matter. [33] I am not satisfied that the facts here do give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. That Mr. Pyper has taken the judicialpronouncements so personally is distressing. As judges, we always have more to learn about how our actions and words might be taken,and there is a lesson for us here in how Mr. Pyper has experienced what occurred. But it seems to me that the concern expressed by thejudges was not personal to Mr.

Pyper in terms of his religion or his race or any other similar aspect. Rather, it was based upon hisapparent attempt to circumvent the Legal Profession Act, a concern which, in my view, fairly arose on the evidence in the affidavitmaterial put before the courts and in Mr. Pyper’s own statements. [34] As for influence going on behind the scenes, it seems not to have occurred to Mr. Pyper that, in this information age, judgeshave access to computerised records concerning the matters that they are scheduled to hear and all matters related to it. Being aware of

recent decisions of the Court of Appeal is hardly a reasonable ground for apprehending bias. What the Court of Appeal had to say on the subject was clearly relevant information for the judges of this court to know. [ 35 ] But even if there was an indication of bias on the part of judges in previous hearings, no authority suggests that in the absence of evidence of some controlling influence on the court as a whole, of which there is none here, bias must be assumed on the part of any other judges of the court that might come into contact with the litigant.

That, indeed, would be to prejudge the matter. [ 36 ] Accordingly, I conclude that this Court has jurisdiction to hear the Law Society’s application. 2. Can Mr. Pyper challenge the constitutionality of

section 15 of the Act? [ 37 ] At the end of the first day of this hearing, when Mr. Pyper had completed his jurisdiction argument, I advised that I was going to rule against him on that point with reasons to follow (set out above), and that we should therefore proceed with the rest of the application. At the beginning of the second day, Mr. Pyper advised that, having considered the matter overnight, he wished to challenge the constitutionality of

section 15 of the Act , and of various rules of the Law Society. He passed up Notice of Constitutional Question filed that morning, and sought an adjournment so that the notice could be properly served on the Attorney General, with argument to proceed at a later date. [ 38 ] Mr. Pyper had made references in his materials to the question of the constitutionality of

section 15 , but had not given notice as required by

section 8 of the Constitutional Question Act , RSBC 1996, c 68, and had not brought the issue forward. He explained that he had anticipated that success on the jurisdiction issue would render such an argument moot. I denied him the adjournment. We were already more than halfway through the hearing of the petition, and I considered it far too late in the day to change course. I made no ruling on the merits of his argument concerning the constitutionality of the challenged provisions. 4. Was Mr.

Pyper practising law within the meaning of the Act? [ 39 ] The Law Society points out that the test set out in section 85(6) requires only that the court be satisfied that there is “reason to believe that there has been or will be a contravention of this Act ”, a relatively low hurdle: Law Society of British Columbia v Gorman , 2011 BCSC 1484 at para 37 . [ 40 ] The Law Society concedes that it is not unusual for a corporate litigant to act in person through a director or officer, where the court grants leave for it to do so, and for that representative to be paid as a director or officer.

But that is where the remuneration relates to the director’s or officer’s regular duties for the company, not to representing it in court: see, for instance, Law Society of British Columbia v Bryfogle , 2007 BCCA 511 at paras 35-38 . The concern here as expressed by the Court of Appeal and the judges of this court is that Mr. Pyper’s appointment as a director was simply a means to permit him to be paid to act as a lawyer, when he was not otherwise allowed to do so.

If, as director, he was representing Seattle for free, then, concedes the Law Society, he would not be practising law. [ 41 ] We have already seen how the evidence changed somewhat. The affidavit evidence submitted by Mr. Mike Singh before Verhoeven J., and Mr. Shawn Singh before Kent J., indicates that Mr. Pyper was indeed hired as director so that he could represent the companies in court, organize documents, and so on. Before Fitch J.A. the evidence changed somewhat, and reference was made for the first time to

section 94.1 of the Worker’s Compensation Act , RSBC 1996, c 492 . [ 42 ] Before me, Mr. Pyper explained it this way. He is indeed paid to be a director, albeit modestly, and was made a director so that he could help the company deal with the avalanche of orders and penalties from WorkSafe BC. That is permissible under

section 94.1. But the company can only afford to pay him to do that if he helps them win its court case – otherwise, the WorkSafe matters are superfluous. If the company had to pay lawyers, it could not afford to pay him anything. Therefore, by assisting it with the court matters, doing research, assembling chambers records, and speaking in court, he saves the company legal fees, which savings then allow the company to pay him to do the work permitted by

section 94.1. [ 43 ] On the evidence as a whole, and taking Mr. Pyper’s explanation at its face value, I conclude that Mr. Pyper did indeed engage in the practice of law as defined in

section 1 of the Act , contrary to section 15(1) of the Act. This is because he appeared as an advocate for Seattle and ESS, and prepared documents for use in court. That this was lawyering cannot be doubted. He did it to save the company having to hire a lawyer to do it. Doing so would be excluded from the definition of “practice of law” only if he performed those acts “not for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, from the person for whom the acts are performed”. Even as Mr.

Pyper explained it, I cannot conclude otherwise than that he acted in the expectation of a fee or reward, direct or indirect. [ 44 ] In the circumstances, I am satisfied that there is reason to believe that there has been a contravention of the Act . [ 45 ] At the end of the hearing, and not until then, Mr. Pyper promised that he would not do this again—that he would act only for himself in the actions in which he was involved personally, and would not again seek to speak on behalf of any company. I expect that Mr. Pyper can be taken at his word.

But the fact remains that he has already been found to have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law during his temporary suspension, and continued to do so (I find) even after the Court of Appeal told him that it was improper for him to seek to speak on behalf of the companies in the litigation in which they were involved. Moreover, his promise came very late in the day. [ 46 ] Taking all of these circumstances into account, I think it appropriate to issue the injunction subject only to two questions raised by Mr. Pyper.

The first is whether the Law Society is disqualified from seeking this relief because it comes into court with dirty hands. The second is whether the terms of the injunction are unnecessarily broad. 5. Is the Law Society disqualified by the “clean hands” principle?

[47] As discussed in Muyres v Gauthier, 2010 BCSC 839 at para 66, Mr. Pyper relies on the well-established equitable maxim thathe who comes to equity must come with clean hands, and the related maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio: a person is not permitted tofound his or her claim on his own illegal or immoral conduct. [48] In Mr. Pyper’s submission, the Law Society has been guilty of numerous egregious acts in its dealings with him.

During histemporary suspension in 2014, these included failing to staff his office properly so that his clients could find out what was going on,failing to inform his clients in a timely manner about his suspension, and, when a former client made damaging defamatory allegationsagainst him publicly, failing to respond by publicly declaring that he was not guilty of the alleged misconduct. [49] After that, when Mr.

Pyper had applied for readmission in 2015, the Law Society, he says, did absolutely nothing to process hisapplication despite creating a legitimate expectation that if he applied, his application would be processed by March 2015. He complainsthat he has therefore been left in limbo, unable to earn a living, at least until April or May of this year when he gave the Law Societynotice that he intended to withdraw his application as he proposes to seek admission to the Law Society of Alberta. [50] Mr.

Pyper points out that if the Law Society had acted properly and punctually in processing his application, he would not havebeen left in a position where he was vulnerable to an application such as this one, seeking to enjoin him from the unauthorized practice oflaw until he becomes a member in good standing. He has, he says, been trying to accomplish this for some time. [51] On this basis, Mr. Pyper contends, the Law Society has failed to come to court with clean hands and is not entitled to theremedy it seeks. [52] I am unable to agree with that position.

The Law Society does not come to court seeking an equitable remedy. The injunctionit seeks is statutory in nature. In such circumstances, where a breach of the enactment is demonstrated, as I find it has been here, thecourts will refuse an injunction only in exceptional circumstances: Vancouver (City) v Maurice, 2005 BCCA 37 at para 34; North PenderIsland Local Trust Committee v Conconi, 2010 BCCA 494 at para 38. [53] Here, the acts and omissions of which Mr.

Pyper complains are raised by him in his action against the Law Society, and areproperly assessed in that context where all of the relevant evidence can be fully canvassed. They do not give rise to “exceptionalcircumstances” that would justify depriving the Law Society of the injunctive relief it seeks where it has established the requisitestatutory grounds. [54] In this regard, I note that it is the statute that sets out the test. The common law test set out in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada(Attorney General), (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 311 is not applicable. [55] There is no doubt that Mr.

Pyper found himself in a very difficult position. Given his age, alternative employment is difficult tofind. The fact remains that in British Columbia, it was open to him to work in any field but the law, and it is that field in which he choseto continue acting notwithstanding repeated warnings from the courts. 6. Are the terms sought too broad? [56] The short answer is “yes”. [57] Mr. Pyper tells me that he is qualified to practice as an advocate in three countries in Africa, and that he proposes to seekmembership in the Law Societies of other provinces, likely Alberta and possibly Ontario.

As a member of the Law Society of a differentProvince, he would be eligible to practice in the British Columbia courts to the extent allowed by the mobility provisions, subject toobtaining an appropriate permit. [58] I agree with Mr. Pyper that the second term of the injunction should be drafted to limit the prohibition to the courts of BritishColumbia. The

preamble to both terms should be drafted in a manner that puts him in no worse a position than if he had soughtadmission to the Law Society of another Province immediately after becoming a former member of the Law Society of BritishColumbia. Consequently, the words “Until such time as he becomes a member in good standing of the Law Society…” should beamended to include “or of the Law Society of another jurisdiction and obtains a permit to practice in British Columbia”, or words to thateffect.

CONCLUSION [59] The Law Society is entitled to an injunction in the terms sought, amended in the manner I have just discussed. [SUBMISSIONS RE COSTS] [60] Mr. Pyper submits that he should not be required to pay costs because of correspondence he wrote to the Law Society datedApril 1, 2017. In that letter, he responded to a letter from the Law Society dated March 30, 2017. Mr. Pyper advised, among otherthings, as follows: It is unnecessary to apply for an interim injunction.

I categorically hereby state that I will not bring an application again or try to speakfor Seattle Environmental in the Court until the decision of the Court of Appeal is being dealt with or until I am legally licensed topractice again. You can rely on my undertaking in this regard. [61] Contextually, it is evident that this exchange of correspondence concerned an adjournment of the hearing of the Law Society’sapplication because Mr. Pyper was of the view that it would take three days to argue.

The Law Society indicated that it was prepared toagree to an adjournment but would seek an interim injunction in the meantime. When the Law Society received Mr. Pyper’s letter, itagreed to the adjournment and did not apply for an interim injunction.

[ 62 ] It is equally evident that Mr. Pyper was intent upon proceeding to a hearing that raised a number of issues, particularly the question of whether this court had lost jurisdiction due to institutional bias. It was only at the very end of this hearing that he made a promise that, if made earlier, might have obviated the application. By then, the Law Society had already been put to all of the expense of bringing it. [ 63 ] In these circumstances, I award the Law Society its ordinary costs on Scale B, as sought. “GRAUER, J.”