R. v. Fox, 2017 BCSC 2665

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: R. v. Fox, 2017 BCSC 2665 Date: 20170620 Docket: 27178-2 Registry: Vancouver Regina v. Patrick Henry Fox Ban on Publication: Inherent Jurisdiction Before: The Honourable Madam Justice H. Holmes Oral Ruling re Firearms Act Counsel for Crown: M. Myhre Appearing on his own behalf by videoconference: P. Fox Place and Date of Trial/Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. June 20, 2017 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. June 20, 2017 [ 1 ] THE COURT: I am satisfied that the proper

interpretation of the provision is the one Crown counsel is putting forward, namely that “transport” is limited to personal transportation by the licence holder. The purpose of the Act is clear: to severely restrict the availability of high-capacity firearms, including by tightly regulating firearms which fall within the definition of “restricted firearm” in the Criminal Code . [ 2 ] I am satisfied that when the licensing provisions – and I am using the language quite loosely – refer to “transporting” such a firearm, the clear intent is that the transporting be done by the licence holder.

It is clear that the scheme as a whole does not contemplate transporting being done by someone who is not subject to the statutory scheme. [ 3 ] That intent is apparent in a number of the Act ’s provisions. One of those provisions is s. 17, where the word “individual” is used, in contrast to the word “person”, as used in s. 13. Transportation must be specifically authorized. Also, s. 33 deals with lending a firearm to someone else, and makes clear that that can be done lawfully only if the other person is a licence holder. [ 4 ] The Regulations underscore this intent. For example, s. 11(

d) of the Regulations sets out certain requirements with which an individual transporting a firearm in an unattended vehicle must comply. If the Act had intended a very broad

interpretation of transportation (whereby, for instance, transportation is directed by a licence holder but performed by someone else), then the licence holder would be unable to comply with s. 11(

d) because the licence holder would not be with the restricted firearm, and would be unaware that the firearm was in an unattended vehicle, if such was the case. [ 5 ] The conclusion I have reached removes the concerns I had about whether there was a sufficient basis to leave the jury with findings of fact to make without – and this would have been improper – also leaving them with an issue requiring them to interpret the law. [ 6 ] I am satisfied that no

interpretation of law is required, and that the elements of the offence can be appropriately set out in the charge in a way that leaves the jury simply with findings of fact to make. “The Honourable Madam Justice H. Holmes”