ROSS RIVER DENA COUNCIL PLAINTIFF v. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, 2017 YKSC 58

SUPREME COURT OF YUKON Citation: Ross River Dena Council v. Canada (Attorney General), 2017 YKSC 58 Date: 20171023 S.C. No. 05-A0043 Registry: Whitehorse BETWEEN: ROSS RIVER DENA COUNCIL PLAINTIFF AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA DEFENDANT Before: Mr. Justice L.F. Gower Appearances: Stephen L. Walsh Counsel for the Plaintiff Suzanne M. Duncan and Geneviève Chabot Counsel for the Defendant REASONS FOR JUDGMENT TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION .. 3 2. PROCEDURAL HISTORY . 5

3. FACTUAL BACKGROUND .. 10 4. ISSUES .. 13 5. ANALYSIS .. 13 5.1 What are the principles applicable to the

interpretation of the relevant provision? . 13 5.1.1 General principles . 14 5.1.2 Principles applicable to constitutional documents . 18 5.1.3 Principles applicable to Aboriginal cases . 22 5.2 What obligations, if any, does the relevant provision impose on Canada? . 25 5.2.1 What is the ordinary meaning of the provision? . 25 5.2.2 What was the legislative intent behind the wording of the relevant provision? 31 5.2.2.1 The evidence of Dr. Paul McHugh . 31 5.2.2.1.1 RRDC’s challenges to the Dr. McHugh’s evidence . 42 5.2.2.2 The evidence of Dr.

Theodore Binnema . 61 5.2.2.3 Conclusion on legislative intent 73 5.2.3 Compliance with established legal norms . 74 5.2.4 What are the “equitable principles” in the relevant provision? . 81 5.2.5 Conclusion on the

interpretation of the relevant provision . 89 5.3 If the relevant provision creates a constitutional obligation upon Canada to consider and settle RRDC’s land claim, does that give rise to a “land freeze” until that obligation is honoured? . 97 5.4 Are the lands which comprise the Territory “Lands reserved for the Indians” within the meaning of s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 ? . 106 5.5 Are ss. 19(1) and 45(1) of the Yukon Act inconsistent with RRDC’s rights under the 1870 Order and, therefore, by virtue of s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 , of no force and effect with respect to the Territory? . 115 6.

CONCLUSION .. 122 APPENDIX “A” 126 1. INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] On July 1, 1867, the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick united to form the Dominion of Canada. They did so with the blessing of the Imperial government in Great Britain, under the authority of the British North America Act, 1867 (the “ BNA Act ”) , now known as the Constitution Act, 1867. At that time, the vast territories to the west and northwest of the new Dominion were known as Rupert’s Land and the North-Western Territory.

The Hudson’s Bay Company (“HBC”), which operated a fur trade under a royal warrant, the 1670 Charter, controlled the territories and exercised various governmental functions in them. [1] Rupert’s Land was roughly composed of the drainage basin for Hudson Bay. The North-Western Territory generally included all of the Canadian mainland territory northwest of Rupert’s Land, west to the borders of British Columbia and Alaska, and north to the Arctic Ocean. [ 2 ]

Section 146 of the BNA Act anticipated that the new Dominion would apply to the British government to have the two territories transferred to its jurisdiction by submitting an Address from the Houses of the Parliament of Canada.

In December 1867, the Parliament of Canada delivered such an Address to the Queen, asking the Imperial Parliament to “unite Rupert’s Land and the North- Western Territory with this Dominion” and to grant Canada authority to legislate in respect of the territories (the “ 1867 Address ”). [ 3 ] The purpose of the 1867 Address was to extend the lands within Canada from the Atlantic to the Arctic Oceans, and to the border of the-then-colony of British Columbia.

The two territories spanned over 7,500,000 square kilometres, composed largely of boreal forest, tundra and prairie, which now amounts to nearly 75% of Canada’s land mass. [2] In exchange for acquiring the right to govern those lands, the Canadian Parliament made two undertakings. The first was to provide that the legal rights of any Corporation, company or individual within the enlarged Dominion would be respected and placed under the protection of courts of competent jurisdiction. The second undertaking is the one at issue in this litigation.

It stated: … [U]pon the transference of the territories in question to the Canadian Government, the claims of the Indian tribes to compensation for lands required for purposes of settlement will be considered and settled in conformity with the equitable principles which have uniformly governed the British Crown in its dealings with the aborigines.

I will refer to this as the “relevant provision”. This case is about its modern-day

interpretation. [ 4 ] In response to the 1867 Address (and a subsequent Address which I will discuss later), in 1870, the British Privy Council enacted the Rupert’s Land and North-Western Territory Order [3] (the “ 1870 Order ”) as an Imperial Order-in-Council authorizing the transfer of the two territories to Canada. The relevant provision is specifically located in

Schedule A of the 1870 Order , which is now part of the Constitution of Canada because it is included in the

schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982 , referred to in s. 52(2)(

b) of that Act . [ 5 ] The plaintiff, Ross River Dena Council (“RRDC”) commenced this action in 2005. As stated, the principal issue is what the relevant provision means today, especially given its constitutional status. RRDC commenced a second action in October 2006. In that matter, the principal issue is whether Canada has failed to negotiate RRDC’s comprehensive land claim in good faith. The two actions are closely related, in that the 1870 Order figures prominently in the pleadings in both cases. These are referred to by the parties, respectively, as the “‘05 Action” and the “‘06 Action”. 2.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY [ 6 ] The parties originally agreed in case management to an order that both actions would be tried together, and that the evidence and rulings in one action would be applicable to the other. [ 7 ] These reasons follow a continuation of the trial, which originally commenced in November 2011. At that time, counsel for the parties asked me to answer two so-called “threshold” questions, which they drafted by way of a consent order. The first essentially asked whether the relevant provision was justiciable, in the sense of giving rise to obligations enforceable in this Court.

The second question asked whether the provision gave rise to obligations of a fiduciary nature. I answered both questions in the negative. [ 8 ] RRDC successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal of Yukon on the first question. [4] The Court of Appeal found that answering the first question, as it was drafted, did not advance the litigation, and that the question ought not to have been severed as an issue to be determined in advance of others.

In particular, the Court held that my reasons focused inordinately on the original intention of the Canadian Parliament in drafting the 1867 Address , as well as the intention of the British Privy Council in enacting the 1870 Order , with the 1867 Address contained within it (the written reasons of the Court of Appeal are cited as 2013 YKCA 6 ).

The Court of Appeal quashed the order arising from my answer to the first question and remitted the litigation back to this Court, stating that neither my answer nor my analysis in reaching that answer should be considered binding in further proceedings. [5] [ 9 ] While I will obviously comply with the Court of Appeal’s direction in this regard, many passages about the historical context of the relevant provision from my original reasons (cited as 2012 YKSC 4 ) remain apposite to the current analysis and have found their way back into these reasons. [ 10 ] When the trial recommenced in September 2014, there was some confusion between counsel as to whether the evidence introduced in the first phase of the trial was still part of the record (RRDC’s position), or whether the parties were required to begin the trial afresh (Canada’s position).

I dealt with this confusion in a pre-trial ruling on the admissibility of certain evidence. [6] In short, I ruled that the continuation of this trial follows the evidence already on the record from the first phase of the trial. That includes all of the documentary evidence (eight volumes of documents), as well as a report authored by an expert called by Canada, Dr. Paul McHugh, dated September 21, 2011 (“Dr. McHugh’s report”), and Dr. McHugh’s testimony.

The documentary evidence entered during the continuation of the trial includes two volumes of a common book of 201 documents, as well as two volumes of 110 documents which were footnoted by the Crown’s other expert, Dr. Theodore Binnema. It is important to note as well that RRDC’s counsel filed an academic

article authored by Dr. Kent McNeil, entitled “ Indigenous Rights Litigation, Legal History, and the Role of Experts ” [7] (the “McNeil Indigenous Rights article”), which I discuss immediately below. [ 11 ] At the outset of the continuation of this trial, in September 2014, Canada sought to enter a second expert report from Dr. McHugh dated July 1, 2014, as well as an expert report from Dr. Binnema, dated July 2, 2014. In my ruling [8] , I declined to admit Dr. McHugh’s second report. However, a good deal of the McNeil Indigenous Rights

article was a direct challenge to the reasoning and methodology employed by Dr. McHugh in his first report, dated September 21, 2011, as well as his testimony during the first phase of the trial. Accordingly, I allowed Dr. McHugh to testify a second time in order to respond to the criticisms of Dr. McNeil. [ 12 ] As for Dr. Binnema, I admitted his report of July 2, 2014 (“Dr. Binnema’s report”), subject to a few redactions where I felt he was purporting to opine on questions of domestic law. Dr.

Binnema also testified about his report. [ 13 ] RRDC called no witnesses in this trial. [ 14 ] When the trial originally began in November 2011, RRDC’s Statement of Claim only tangentially touched on the issue of the honour of the Crown, and RRDC’s counsel did not argue it further. [9] However, following the appeal, RRDC amended its Statement of Claim seeking a declaration that the relevant provision engages the honour of the Crown and that the honour of the Crown has not been upheld by Canada.

In particular, RRDC now pleads that the relevant provision: ... is a solemn commitment that engaged the honour of the Crown and, as such, it requires that the Crown: (

i) takes a broad, purposive approach to the

interpretation of the commitment; and (ii) acts diligently to fulfil[l] it. [10] In response to this change, Canada amended its Statement of Defence, pleading that, if the relevant provision does create a solemn obligation that engages the honour of the Crown: … then the Crown has acted honourably and met its obligation to fulfil it through its actions over the years and including but not limited to its actions in attempting to negotiate a comprehensive land claim and self-government agreement with the plaintiff and/or its representatives. [11]

[ 15 ] When the trial recommenced in September 2014, the parties agreed that only the ‘05 Action would be tried. The parties each closed their respective cases with respect to the evidence, however the trial had to be adjourned to allow counsel to finish their oral submissions. The adjournment was ultimately extended from September 2014 to March 2015, due to the intervening illness of RRDC’s counsel. [ 16 ] In its written argument for the trial, Canada asserted that the Crown had acted honourably in its dealings with RRDC by engaging in comprehensive land claims negotiations from 1973 to 2002.

RRDC declined to respond specifically to Canada’s arguments relating to the honour of the Crown in its written reply. [ 17 ] When the trial resumed on March 13, 2015, RRDC’s counsel began making oral submissions about his client’s conduct during the negotiations, and particularly advanced the client’s position that the Umbrella Final Agreement (“UFA”) was never properly ratified. The UFA forms the basis of the final land claim agreements obtained between Canada, Yukon and 11 other Yukon First Nations between 1995 and 2006.

The ratification question is a very important issue in the ‘06 Action. [ 18 ] Canada’s counsel objected to these submissions because the parties had agreed not to try the ‘06 Action at that stage. My concern, however, was that Canada put forward a significant amount of evidence and argument to say that, from 1973 on, it had made a good faith effort to come to a settlement with RRDC, but was unable to do so through no fault of its own, and therefore had complied with the honour of the Crown. I wanted to hear the counterpoint from RRDC. [ 19 ] In the result, on July 14, 2015, I decided to suspend my decision on the

interpretation of the 1870 Order until the ‘06 Action was tried. [12] This was to allow both parties to have a full opportunity to address the issue of whether Canada had negotiated in good faith throughout the modern era negotiations. I refer to this as the 2015 procedural ruling. I summarized my conclusion for that ruling at para. 44, as follows: In conclusion, I agree with Canada that, in these particular circumstances, it is appropriate to suspend my decision on the modern-day

interpretation of the 1870 Order until the issues in the '06 Action are tried. RRDC's asserted right to obtain a treaty before their lands were opened up for settlement is not absolute. Rather, it is subject to infringement by Canada, providing the infringement can be justified. For the sake of this argument, I will assume that the 1870 Order gives rise to a binding constitutional obligation on Canada to consider and settle RRDC's claims before opening up their lands for settlement.

I will further assume that there was an historic breach of that obligation by Canada by opening up the lands before commencing negotiations in 1973. However, if Canada can establish that it conducted itself in accordance with the honour of the Crown throughout the modern era negotiations, and was unable to obtain a treaty with RRDC notwithstanding, then that finding may have an ameliorating effect on any historic breach. Thus, the issue of whether the honour of the Crown was upheld during the negotiations is inextricably intertwined with whether Canada can be held liable for any historic breach.

Accordingly, Canada should be given a full opportunity to establish that it interpreted the relevant provision in a purposive manner and diligently pursued fulfillment of the purposes of the obligation arising from it, to use the language from Manitoba Metis , cited above. (emphasis in original) [ 20 ] The ‘06 Action was tried over six days in April 2017, and my reasons for judgment in that action, cited as 2017 YKSC 59 , are being concurrently released with these reasons.

In short, I found that RRDC had not proven that Canada failed to negotiate with due diligence and in good faith towards a settlement of RRDC’s comprehensive land claim. 3. FACTUAL BACKGROUND [ 21 ] It may be helpful to set out a number of undisputed facts, in order to establish some context, before turning to the issues: [13] 1. RRDC is a band within the meaning of the Indian Act , R.S.C. 1985, c.I-5. 2. RRDC and its members are a part of the Kaska tribe of Indians. 3. The Kaska tribe of Indians - now known as “the Kaska” or “the Kaska Nation” - is one of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada.

More importantly, for the purposes of this trial, the Kaska tribe of Indians is one of the “Indian tribes” referred to in the 1867 Address . 4. The Kaska claim as their traditional territory a tract of land that includes what is now the south-eastern part of the Yukon, as well as adjacent lands in the Northwest Territories and British Columbia. The issues in this trial concern only the portion of the Kaska’s claimed traditional territory located in the Yukon. 5.

In particular, this trial concerns the lands located within the boundaries of two trap lines: the larger one is known as the “Ross River group trap line” (recorded by the Yukon government as Group Trapping Concession No. 405); and the smaller trapping concession located in and around the community of Ross River (recorded as Registered Trapping Concession No. 415). I understand that the smaller trapping concession is subsumed within the larger group trap line. These lands are referred to as the “Territory” in the pleadings, and comprise approximately 35,380 km², or slightly more than 7% of the area of the Yukon.

In these reasons, I will refer to this area variously as the “lands”, the “lands at issue” or the “Territory”. 6. The portion of the Kaska’s claimed traditional territory located in the Yukon was, prior to 1870, part of the North-Western Territory referred to in s. 146 of the Constitution Act , 1867 , formerly the BNA Act . 7. In adopting the 1867 Address , the Canadian Parliament invoked s. 146 of the BNA Act to unite Rupert’s Land and the North- Western Territory with Canada, and to grant the new Parliament of Canada authority to legislate for the welfare and good government of

the new Territories. 8. The North-Western Territory, including the portion of the Kaska’s claimed traditional territory located in the Yukon, wasadmitted into Canada on July 15, 1870, pursuant to the combined effect of the 1870 Order and s. 146 of the BNA Act. 9. Shortly after the acquisition of Rupert’s Land and the North-Western Territory in 1870, Canada began a process of negotiatingtreaties with certain of the Aboriginal peoples occupying those lands: Treaty No. 1 was concluded in 1871 and the last of the numberedtreaties, Treaty No. 11, was concluded in 1921.

There was also an adhesion to Treaty No. 9 in 1930. Those treaties are today referred toas the post-Confederation treaties. Treaties 1 through 4 range from western Ontario, across southern Manitoba to southern Saskatchewan.Treaties 5 through 10 span from northern Ontario across the northern portions of the prairie provinces, and into northeast BC and southeast Yukon. Treaty No. 11 is north of the 60th parallel in the western Northwest Territories. 10. On or about August 8, 1973, Canada’s Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development announced the federal government’snew comprehensive land claims policy. 11.

RRDC’s claims to Aboriginal title and rights in the Kaska traditional territory in the Yukon formed part of the claims of theYukon Indian people, which were the first comprehensive claims accepted by Canada for negotiation in 1973, under its new policy. 12.

In 1981, Canada’s Minister of Indian Affairs issued a land claims policy statement that confirmed that, since 1973, the federalgovernment had operated under a policy that acknowledged Native interests in certain land areas claimed and allowed for the negotiationof settlements of claims where those interests could be shown not to have been previously resolved. 13.

Canada’s comprehensive land claims policy, published in 1986 under the authority of the Minister of Indian Affairs, confirmsthat the basis for the policy is the fulfillment of the treaty process through the conclusion of land claim agreements with those Aboriginalpeoples of Canada that continue to use and occupy traditional lands and whose Aboriginal title has not been dealt with by treaty orsuperseded by law. 14. To date, the claims of the Kaska (and thus RRDC) to compensation for lands required for purposes of settlement have not beenresolved. 4.

ISSUES [22] The global issue in this trial is to determine the current meaning of the relevant provision. However, in making thatdetermination, the following sub-issues arise: 1) What are the principles applicable to the

interpretation of the relevant provision? 2) What obligations, if any, does the relevant provision impose on Canada? 3) If the relevant provision creates a constitutional obligation upon Canada to consider and settle RRDC’s land claim, does thatgive rise to a “land freeze” until that obligation is honoured? 4) Are the lands which comprise the Territory “Lands reserved for the Indians” within the meaning of s. 91(24) of theConstitution Act, 1867? 5) Are ss. 19(1) and 45(1) of the Yukon Act, S.C. 2002, c. 7, inconsistent with the rights RRDC may have under the 1870 Orderand, are they therefore, by virtue of s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, of no force and effect with respect to the lands? 5.

ANALYSIS 5.1 What are the principles applicable to the

interpretation of the relevant provision? 5.1.1 General principles [23] In her text Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes,[14] Professor Ruth Sullivan, refers to the “modern principle” of statutoryinterpretation. This was first described by Elmer Driedger, more than 30 years ago, in the first edition of his text, Construction ofStatutes, where he stated: Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of

an Act are to be read in their entire context, in their grammatical andordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.[15] [24] The modern principle has been cited and relied upon in innumerable decisions of Canadian courts, and in Rizzo & Rizzo ShoesLtd. (Re), (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 (“Rizzo”), was declared to be the preferred approach of the Supreme Court ofCanada.[16] See also: Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v.

Rex, 2002 SCC 42 (“Bell”).[17] Professor Sullivan describes the three“dimensions” of the modern principle.[18] The first dimension is the textual meaning or ordinary meaning, which she notes thatDriedger calls the “grammatical and ordinary sense of the words.” She expands upon this as follows:

As understood and applied by modern courts the ordinary meaning rule consists of the following propositions: 1. It is presumed that the ordinary meaning of a legislative text is the meaning intended by the legislature. In the absence of a reason to reject it, the ordinary meaning prevails. 2. Even if the ordinary meaning is plain, courts must consider the purpose and scheme of the legislation; they must consider the entire context. 3. In light of these considerations, the court may adopt an

interpretation that modifies or departs from the ordinary meaning, provided the

interpretation adopted is plausible and the reasons for adopting it are sufficient to justify the departure from ordinary meaning. [19] [ 25 ] The second dimension is legislative intent or purpose. This aspect of

interpretation is captured in Driedger’s reference to “the scheme and object of the Act and the intention of Parliament.” [20] Consideration of legislative purpose underlies what is known as “purposive analysis”, which is particularly relevant to the

interpretation of constitutional documents. [21] Professor Sullivan observes that legislative purpose is often thought of in terms of the mischief or social ill it is designed to remedy or the problem it is meant to address: … This mischief or problem may be identified in an authoritative source such as the

preamble to legislation, a Commission report or a scholarly text. It may also be inferred by matching provisions in the legislation to conditions which existed at the time of enactment and to which the provisions are a plausible response. [22] She then continues: … The purpose of legislation is an historical fact - no less than the mischief or evil the legislation is designed to address. If the duty of courts is to give effect to the actual intent of the legislature, it must attempt to reconstruct the original purpose(

s) of the legislation by relying on historically accurate information. [23] [ 26 ] The third dimension of the modern principle is compliance with established legal norms. [24] Professor Sullivan notes that these norms are part of the “entire context” in which the words of

an Act must be read, and that they are an integral part of legislative intent. [25] She says that these legal norms include “rationality, coherence, [and] fairness” and that judges are concerned about violations of such norms. [26] The weight attaching to this factor depends on considerations which include: • the cultural importance of the norm engaged; • its degree of recognition and protection in law; and • the seriousness of the violation. [27] Lastly, on the point, Professor Sullivan states: If a possible outcome appears to violate a norm that is well- established and widely shared, if the violation is serious and there are no competing norms, this factor should receive significant weight. [28] [ 27 ] Professor Sullivan summarizes as follows: The modern principle says that the words of a legislative text must be read in their ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme and objects of the Act and the intention of the legislature.

In an easy case, textual meaning, legislative intent and relevant norms all support a single

interpretation. In hard cases, however, these dimensions are vague, obscure or point in different directions. In the hardest cases, the textual meaning seems plain, but cogent evidence of legislative intent (actual or presumed) makes the plain meaning unacceptable. If the modern principle has a weakness, it is its failure to acknowledge and address the dilemma created by hard cases . [29] (italics in original, underlining added) At the end of the day, says Professor Sullivan, after taking into account all relevant and admissible considerations, the court must adopt an

interpretation that is “appropriate … reasonable and just”. [30] [ 28 ] In speaking of the intention of the legislature, Professor Sullivan explains that it is the corporate mind of the legislature that approves and enacts laws, as distinct from the minds of the individual participants in the legislative process. She elaborates on this as follows:

… the mind that formulates legislative purposes must be distinguished from the minds of individual participants in the legislativeprocess, whether drafters, members of Cabinet or voting members of the legislature. Although the desires and intentions of theseindividuals obviously determine the content and form of bills, the “mind” that approves the content and form of a bill and enacts it intolaw is the corporate mind of the legislature.

Some commentators object to imputing intention to a corporate entity like a legislature on the grounds that any such “mind” is obviouslya fiction; an institution is incapable of forming actual intentions. However, this objection misses an important point. People never havedirect access to the content of other people’s minds; we are always in the position of inferring what others must have intended based onwhat was said and the context in which it was said.

This inference drawing process is the same regardless of whether the text to beinterpreted issues from Shakespeare in the form of a play, from an acquaintance in the form of an email or from an entity such as alegislature in the form of official texts.[31] [29] Professor Sullivan speaks further about the relative weight to be given to the dimension of parliamentary intention: … if the legislature’s intention seems clear and relevant to the problem at hand, a pragmatic judge will assign it significant weight.

Howmuch weight depends on • Where the evidence of legislative intent comes from and how cogent and compelling it is • How directly the intention relates to the circumstances of the dispute to be resolved. If the evidence of intention comes from a reliable source, its formulation is fairly precise, there are no competing intentions and theimplications for the facts of the case seem clear, then this factor appropriately receives considerable weight.[32] 5.1.2 Principles applicable to constitutional documents [30] In Edwards v.

Attorney-General for Canada, (UK JCPC), [1930] A.C.124 (P.C.) (“Edwards”), the JudicialCommittee of the Privy Council, then Canada’s highest court, was deciding whether women were considered “qualified persons” unders. 24 of the BNA Act, which authorized the Governor General to appoint members of the Senate.

Lord Sankey L.C., speaking for theCourt, noted that the common law of England generally deemed women incapable of exercising public functions,[33] but that theexclusion of women from all public offices was probably a relic from the days when the deliberative assemblies of earlier societies werecomprised of armed men, at a time when women did not bear arms.[34] He further observed that such customs were apt to develop intotraditions which remain unchallenged long after the reason for them has disappeared.[35] He did not think that it was right to apply“rigidly to Canada of today” precedents based on such traditions, arising in different centuries and in countries of different stages ofdevelopment.[36] Then, he famously concluded: 44 The British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits.

Theobject of the Act was to grant a Constitution to Canada. “Like all written constitutions it has been subject to development through usageand convention”: Canadian Constitutional Studies, Sir Robert Borden (1922), p. 55. 45 Their Lordships do not conceive it to be the duty of this Board -- it is certainly not their desire -- to cut down the provisions of theAct by a narrow and technical construction but rather to give it a large and liberal

interpretation so that the Dominion to a great extent,but within certain fixed limits, may be mistress in her own house, as the Provinces to a great extent, but within certain fixed limits, aremistresses in theirs. (my emphasis) [31] In his text, Constitutional Law of Canada,[37] Professor Peter Hogg discusses the living tree principle within the “doctrine ofprogressive

interpretation”. He notes that this doctrine is one of the means by which the BNA Act has been able to adapt to the changes inCanadian society, in that the words of the Act are continuously adapted to new conditions and new ideas.[38] Professor Hogg refers to“the general language used to describe the classes of subjects (or heads of power)” in ss. 91 and 92 of the BNA Act, and states that suchlanguage is “not to be frozen in the sense in which it would have been understood in 1867.”[39] [32] Professor Hogg then continues more broadly: Needless to say, the doctrine of progressive

interpretation does not liberate the courts from the normal constraints of

interpretation.Constitutional language, like the language of other texts, must be “placed in its proper linguistic, philosophical and historical contexts”.Nor is the original understanding (if it can be ascertained) irrelevant. On the contrary, the

interpretation of a constitutional provision“must be anchored in the historical context of the provision”. All that progressive

interpretation insists is that the original understandingis not binding forever. If new inventions, new conditions or new ideas will fairly fit within the constitutional language, contemporarycourts are not constrained to limit their

interpretations to meanings that would have been contemplated in 1867 (or whenever the text wascreated).

The idea underlying the doctrine of progressive

interpretation is that the Constitution Act, 1867, although undeniably a statute, is not astatute like any other: it is a “constituent” or “organic” statute, which has to provide the basis for the entire government of a nation over along period of time. An inflexible

interpretation, rooted in the past, would only serve to withhold necessary powers from the Parliamentor Legislatures, and deny remedies to hitherto unrecognized victims of injustice.

It must be remembered too that the Constitution Act,1867, like other federal constitutions, differs from an ordinary statute in that it cannot easily be amended when it becomes out of date, sothat its adaptation to changing conditions must fall to a large extent upon the courts.[40] (my emphasis) [33] The idea that the “original understanding” of the Constitution is forever binding is called “originalism”.[41] Professor Hogg iscritical of this approach: In Canada it is well established that the language of the Constitution Act, 1867 is not to be frozen in the sense in which it would havebeen understood in 1867.

Rather, the language is to be given a “progressive

interpretation” so that it is continuously adapted to newconditions and ideas. The principle of progressive

interpretation is flatly inconsistent with originalism, the whole point of which is todeny that the courts have the power to adapt the Constitution to new conditions and new ideas. It would be wrong to conclude that theprinciple of progressive

interpretation is necessarily inconsistent with the intentions of the framers.

What originalism ignores is thepossibility that the framers were content to leave the detailed application of the Constitution to the courts of the future, and were contentthat the process of adjudication would apply the text in ways unanticipated at the time of drafting.[42] (my emphasis) [34] The Supreme Court of Canada, in Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79 (“Same-Sex Marriage”), squarely dealt withthe question of originalism in deciding whether Parliament’s power over “Marriage” in s. 91(26) of the Constitution Act, 1867, wouldextend to legalizing same-sex marriage.

As Professor Hogg notes: … No one doubted that the original understanding in 1867 would have been that marriage was by its nature the union of a man andwoman with a view to the procreation of children. At that time, marriage and religion were inseparable and homosexual acts betweenconsenting adults were criminal (as they remained until 1969).[43] The Supreme Court addressed this as follows: … Canada is a pluralistic society. Marriage, from the perspective of the state, is a civil institution. The “frozen concepts” reasoning runscontrary to one of the most fundamental principles of Canadian constitutional

interpretation: that our Constitution is a living tree which,by way of progressive

interpretation, accommodates and addresses the realities of modern life …. … A large and liberal, or progressive,

interpretation ensures the continued relevance and, indeed, legitimacy of Canada’s constitutingdocument. By way of progressive

interpretation our Constitution succeeds in its ambitious enterprise, that of structuring the exercise ofpower by the organs of the state in times vastly different from those in which it was crafted.[44] (my emphasis) [35] The Court of Appeal of Yukon forcefully echoed these sentiments in its reasons on the appeal in this case, which I citedabove.[45] There, the Court referred to certain findings I made about governmental intentions in 1867 and 1870, and continued: 41 Our legal system has consistently rejected “originalism” - the idea that the intentions of the drafters of constitutional documentsforever govern their

interpretation - as a constitutional precept (Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General), (UK JCPC),[1930] A.C. 124). 5.1.3 Principles applicable to Aboriginal cases [36] The Supreme Court of Canada earlier dealt with the theme of progressive

interpretation, while not specifically using the term, inR. v. Van der Peet, (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (“Van der Peet”). There the Court addressed the

interpretation of“aboriginal rights” whenever that term is used in relation to title or rights “recognized and affirmed” under s. 35(1) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982. Lamer C.J., speaking for the seven member majority, stated: 20 The task of this Court is to define Aboriginal rights in a manner which recognizes that Aboriginal rights are rights but which does sowithout losing sight of the fact that they are rights held by Aboriginal people because they are Aboriginal …. (underlining alreadyadded)

21 The way to accomplish this task is, as was noted at the outset, through a purposive approach to s. 35(1). It is through identifyingthe interests that s. 35(1) was intended to protect that the dual nature of Aboriginal rights will be comprehended. In Hunter v. SouthamInc., (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, Dickson J. explained the rationale for a purposive approach to constitutionaldocuments.

Courts should take a purposive approach to the Constitution because constitutions are, by their very nature, documents aimedat a country’s future as well as its present; the constitution must be interpreted in a manner which renders it “capable of growth anddevelopment over time to meet new social, political and historical realities often unimagined by the framers” … (my emphasis) [37] In Van der Peet, the Supreme Court also confirmed that constitutional provisions applicable to Aboriginal peoples must begiven a “generous and liberal

interpretation” and that where there is doubt or ambiguity in the interpretive exercise, such doubt orambiguity must be resolved in their favour. Lamer C.J. expanded upon this issue as follows: 23 Before turning to a purposive analysis of s. 35(1), however, it should be noted that such analysis must take place in light of thegeneral principles which apply to the legal relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. In Sparrow, supra, this Court held atp. 1106 [S.C.R.; p. 179 C.N.L.R.] that s. 35(1) should be given a generous and liberal

interpretation in favour of Aboriginal peoples: When the purposes of the affirmation of Aboriginal rights are considered, it is clear that a generous and liberal

interpretation of thewords in the constitutional provision is demanded. [Emphasis added] 24 This interpretive principle, articulated first in the context of treaty rights … arises from the nature of the relationship between theCrown and Aboriginal peoples. The Crown has a fiduciary obligation to Aboriginal peoples with the result that in dealings between thegovernment and Aboriginals the honour of the Crown is at stake. Because of this fiduciary relationship, and its implication of the honourof the Crown, treaties, s. 35(1), and other statutory and constitutional provisions protecting the interests of Aboriginal peoples, must begiven a generous and liberal

interpretation … 25 The fiduciary relationship of the Crown and Aboriginal peoples also means that where there is any doubt or ambiguity with regardsto what falls within the scope and definition of s. 35(1), such doubt or ambiguity must be resolved in favour of Aboriginal peoples. (myemphasis) [38] On the other hand, the Supreme Court had earlier clarified in Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, (SCC), [1990] 2S.C.R. 85 (“Mitchell”), that while ambiguities in the

interpretation of statutes relating to Indians are to be resolved in their favour, thisdoes not imply automatic acceptance of the Indians’ preferred

interpretation. There, La Forest J. stated: … it is clear that in the

interpretation of any statutory enactment with Indians, and particularly the Indian Act, it is appropriate tointerpret in a broad manner provisions that are aimed at maintaining Indian rights, and to interpret narrowly provisions aimed at limitingor abrogating them. Thus if legislation bears on treaty promises, the courts will always strain against adopting an

interpretation that hasthe effect of negating commitments undertaken by the Crown; see United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939), at p. 533. At the same time, I do not accept that this salutary rule that statutory ambiguities must be resolved in favour of the Indians impliesautomatic acceptance of a given construction simply because it may be expected that the Indians would favour it over any othercompeting

interpretation. It is also necessary to reconcile any given

interpretation with the policies the Act seeks to promote.[46] [39] It may also be important to remember the Supreme Court’s caution in R. v. Blais, 2003 SCC 44 (“Blais”), about notovershooting the actual purpose of the right or freedom in question. In Blais, the Supreme Court was dealing with the question ofwhether Métis are “Indians” within the meaning of a constitutional document, the Manitoba Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (the“NRTA”). The Court referred to the “living tree” principle at para. 40: This Court has consistently endorsed the living tree principle as a fundamental tenet of constitutional

interpretation. Constitutionalprovisions are intended to provide “a continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental power”: Hunter v. Southam Inc., (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, per Dickson J. (as he then was), at p. 155. But at the same time, this Court is not free toinvent new obligations foreign to the original purpose of the provision at issue. The analysis must be anchored in the historical context ofthe provision.

As emphasized above, we must heed Dickson J.’s admonition “not to overshoot the actual purpose of the right or freedomin question, but to recall that the Charter was not enacted in a vacuum, and must therefore … be placed in its proper linguistic,philosophic and historical contexts”: Big M Drug Mart, supra, at p. 344; see Côté, supra, at p. 265. Dickson J. was speaking of theCharter, but his words apply equally to the task of interpreting the NRTA. Similarly, Binnie J. emphasized the need for attentiveness tocontext when he noted in R. v.

Marshall, (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, at para. 14, that “‘[g]enerous’ rules ofinterpretation should not be confused with a vague sense of after-the-fact largesse.”… [40] Interestingly, the Supreme Court subsequently distinguished and arguably narrowed the scope of application of Blais in Same-Sex Marriage. There, some of the interveners relied on Blais in submitting “ … that the intention of the framers [of the Constitution Act,1867] should be determinative in interpreting the scope of the heads of power enumerated in ss. 91 and 92 …”. The Supreme Court

responded curtly to that submission: That case [ Blais ] considered the interpretive question in relation to a particular constitutional agreement, as opposed to a head of power which must continually adapt to cover new realities.

It is therefore distinguishable and does not apply here. [47] 5.2 What obligations, if any, does the relevant provision impose on Canada? 5.2.1 What is the ordinary meaning of the provision? [ 41 ] Once again, the relevant provision of the 1867 Address, as incorporated into the 1870 Order , reads as follows: … upon the transference of the territories in question to the Canadian Government, the claims of the Indian tribes to compensation for lands required for purposes of settlement will be considered and settled in conformity with the equitable principles which have uniformly governed the British Crown in its dealings with the aborigines. (my emphasis) [ 42 ] I note, initially, that the words “will be” differ from the words “shall be” used in the first undertaking in the 1867 Address , which I touched on above at para. 2 of these reasons: That in the event of your Majesty’s Government agreeing to transfer to Canada the jurisdiction and control over the said region, the Government and Parliament of Canada will be ready to provide that the legal rights of any corporation, company or individual within the same shall be respected, and placed under the protection of Courts of competent jurisdiction. (my emphasis) [ 43 ] Later in these reasons, I deal with how Dr.

McHugh addresses this distinction. [ 44 ] That said, I think that the plain and ordinary meaning of the words “will be” in the relevant provision is sufficiently mandatory to indicate an obligation upon Canada to consider and settle Indian claims for compensation for lands required for the purposes of settlement.

However, as Professor Sullivan urges, even if the ordinary meaning of a legislative text seems plain, courts must go on to consider the scheme of the legislation as part of the entire context. [ 45 ] The assessment of this legislative scheme begins with s. 146 of the BNA Act , which was enacted by the British Parliament to give the young Dominion of Canada an opportunity to initiate the process by which it could acquire Rupert’s Land and the North- Western Territory.

Section 146 provides: It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, on Addresses from the Houses of the Parliament of Canada…to admit Rupert's Land and the North-[W]estern Territory, or either of them, into the Union, on such Terms and Conditions in each Case as are in the Addresses expressed and as the Queen thinks fit to approve, subject to the Provisions of this Act; and the Provisions of any Order in Council in that Behalf shall have effect as if they had been enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland . (my emphasis) [ 46 ] Next is the 1870 Order itself. [48] The relevant portions for present purposes are as follows: Whereas by the “ Constitution Act , 1867,” it was (amongst other things) enacted that it should be lawful for the Queen, by and with the advice of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, on Address from the Houses of the Parliament of Canada, to admit Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory, or either of them, into the Union on such terms and conditions in each case as should be in the Addresses expressed, and as the Queen should think fit to approve, subject to the provisions of the said Act.

And it was further enacted that the provisions of any Order in Council in that behalf should have effect as if they had been enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland : And whereas by an Address from the Houses of the Parliament of Canada, of which Address a copy is contained in the

Schedule to this Order annexed, marked A, … … It is hereby ordered and declared by Her Majesty, by and with the advice of the Privy Council , in pursuance and exercise of the powers vested in Her Majesty by the said Acts of Parliament, that from and after the fifteenth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and seventy, the said North-Western Territory shall be admitted into and become part of the Dominion of Canada upon the terms and conditions set forth in the first hereinbefore recited Address , and that the Parliament of Canada shall from the day aforesaid have full

power and authority to legislate for the future welfare and good government of the said Territory …[49] (my emphasis) [47] Next one must consider the impact of s. 2 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865[50] and s. 7(1) of the Statute ofWestminster.[51] By virtue of these provisions, the Canadian government was not competent to enact laws inconsistent with legislationapplicable to Canada that was enacted by the British government. These provisions respectively state: 2.

Any colonial law which is or shall be in any respect repugnant to the provisions of any Act of Parliament extending to the colonyto which such law may relate, or repugnant to any order or regulation made under authority of such Act of Parliament, or having in thecolony the force and effect of such Act, shall be read subject to such Act, order, or regulation, and shall, to the extent of such repugnancy,but not otherwise, be and remain absolutely void and inoperative. (my emphasis) and 7(1) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to apply to the repeal, amendment or alteration of the British North America Acts, 1867 to1930, or any order, rule or regulation made there-under. [48] Finally, the Constitution Act, 1982, expressly incorporated the 1870 Order into the Constitution, as it is identified in theSchedule to that Act. [49] The linkage between these various provisions is helpfully summarized by the Federal Court of Appeal in Singh v.

Canada(A.G.), (FCA), [2000] 3 F.C. 185, at para. 15: …[T]he supremacy of the Constitution was established well before 1982 and even before Confederation in 1867. Canada recognized theBritish Parliament as the proper authority for enactment of our Constitution down to and including 1982 when

section 52 of theConstitution Act, 1982 was adopted. It was a legal doctrine of the British Empire that imperial laws (that is, enactments of Westminster)applying to a colony were supreme over colonial laws. This position was codified by statute, the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865 […],section 2 ... The British North America Act, 1867 [30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.) [R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II, No. 5]], was an imperial law extending tothe colony of Canada and its supremacy was thus assured as long as Westminster was the recognized legislative authority for Canada inconstitutional matters.

While ordinary Canadian laws were freed from the application of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, and thusfrom the paramountcy of British laws, by the Statute of Westminster, 1931, the latter statute preserved the supremacy in Canada of theB.N.A. Acts over local laws. It is no accident that a new supremacy clause was inserted in subsection 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.Subsection 52(2) of that Act partially defines the Constitution of Canada to include the legislation listed in the

Schedule to the Act. TheColonial Laws Validity Act, 1865 is not so listed. To avoid any uncertainty as to the continuing supremacy of the Constitution it wastherefore necessary to insert subsection 52(1) to provide that: 52.

(1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitutionis, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. (my emphasis) [50] The Supreme Court of Canada also addressed these provisions in Reference re: Manitoba Language Rights, (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, as follows: 50 Since April 17, 1982, the mandate of the judiciary to protect the Constitution has been embodied … in s. 52 of the Constitution Act,1982. This

section reads: 52.

(1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitutionis, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. Prior to enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982, the governing provision was, pursuant to the Statute of Westminster, 1931, s. 2 of theColonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, … 51 The constitutional jurisprudence, developed under the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, was based on the invalidity doctrine.

IfParliament or a provincial legislature was ultra vires its constitutionally allocated powers in enacting a certain Act, then the repugnancyof that Act with the provisions of the British North America Act, 1867 would mean that the Act was “absolutely void and inoperative”.

Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 does not alter the principles which have provided the foundation for judicial review overthe years. In a case where constitutional manner and form requirements have not been complied with, the consequence of such non-compliance continues to be invalidity.

The words “of no force or effect” mean that a law thus inconsistent with the Constitution has noforce or effect because it is invalid. (my emphasis) [51] To summarize: 1) the relevant provision that the claims of the Indian tribes to compensation for lands required for purposes of settlement “will beconsidered and settled” was adopted by the Canadian Parliament as one of two undertakings in the 1867 Address, which in turn wassubmitted to the British government pursuant to the authority of s. 146 of the BNA Act; 2) the 1870 Order then “ordered and declared” that the North-Western Territory “shall be admitted into and become part of theDominion of Canada upon the terms and conditions set forth” in the 1867 Address, one of which was the relevant provision; 3) pursuant to s. 146 of the BNA Act, the provisions of the 1870 Order, which of course included the relevant provision, “shallhave effect” as if they had been enacted by the British Parliament; and 4) pursuant to s. 2 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865 and s. 7(1) of the Statute of Westminster, and subsequently pursuant tos. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, the relevant provision acquired constitutional force. [52] Thus, the “ordinary meaning” of the relevant provision would seem to lead to the conclusion that it is mandatory and that itbecame a constitutional obligation through the interplay of these statutory instruments.

In other words, the provision created a mandatoryconstitutional obligation that Canada consider and settle the claims of the Indian tribes for compensation for their lands required forpurposes of settlement. I will deal with the

interpretation of what the “equitable principles” means in more detail below at paras. 155 to166. [53] However, the textual or ordinary meaning is only one of the three dimensions of the modern principle of statutoryinterpretation.

The second dimension is legislative intent or purpose; that is, what did the Canadian Parliament and the British PrivyCouncil respectively intend in approving the words of the relevant provision and including them in the 1870 Order? 5.2.2 What was the legislative intent behind the wording of the relevant provision? [54] In this regard, Canada proffered the evidence of two historical experts, Drs. Paul McHugh and Theodore Binnema. I will dealwith each in turn. 5.2.2.1 The evidence of Dr. Paul McHugh [55] During the first phase of this trial, I admitted, over RRDC’s objection, Dr.

McHugh’s expert report, dated September21, 2011.[52] However, during the continuation of this trial in September 2014, I refused Canada’s attempt to enter a supplementaryreport from Dr. McHugh.[53] Nevertheless, I allowed Dr. McHugh to testify on a limited basis in response to the McNeil IndigenousRights article, which was critical of his testimony during the first phase of the trial. Therefore, the evidence of Dr. McHugh is comprisedof his initial expert report, as well as his testimony in both the first and second phases of this trial. [56] Dr.

McHugh has been a teaching member of the Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge, England, since 1986, and is now afull professor. He obtained his LL.B. (Honours), First Class, from Victoria University, in Wellington, New Zealand, in 1980. He thenobtained his LL.M. from the University of Saskatchewan in 1981. He subsequently obtained his Ph.D. from Cambridge in 1988, wherehe presently teaches constitutional law and property law. His curriculum vitae lists some 78 publications in the area of Aboriginal rightsand title of Aboriginal people in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. In addition, as I understand it, Dr.

McHugh has published fourbooks on Aboriginal law. He has also been the recipient of some seven prizes and awards for publications and contributions to legaleducation. [57] Dr. McHugh has been retained as an independent expert for the New Zealand Ministry of Justice, the Province of BritishColumbia and Justice Canada. He has presented papers at numerous conferences and colloquia as a legal historian. Dr. McHughprovided expert evidence for Canada in Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General), (2000), (ON CA),51 O.R. (3d) 641(CA) (“Chippewas”).

In 2013, he also testified as an expert for the Crown in Alderville First Nation v. Canada, 2016FC 733. [58] Canada asked Dr. McHugh to provide an expert opinion on the historical context of the 1870 Order to assist this Court indetermining the intention of Parliament in including terms about Aboriginal peoples. Canada also asked him to address the legalunderstanding of the Crown’s role at the time of the 1870 Order and to provide an account of how the Order would have beenunderstood as a legal instrument at that time. [59] In preparing to provide his expert opinion, Dr.

McHugh reviewed 536 documents provided by Canada and 33 documents that heobtained independently. These documents consist of a mixture of articles, historical documents, legislation, and case law. All of thedocuments reviewed by Dr. McHugh are in evidence. [60] More specifically, Canada asked Dr. McHugh to consider whether the relevant provision in the 1870 Order was intended to belegally enforceable at the time of its enactment, and to report on the impact, if any, that the Order would have had on the status and

rights of Aboriginal peoples in the transferred territories at that time . [ 61 ] Dr.

McHugh ’s expert opinion is essentially that there is no evidence to show that the wording of the relevant provision was intended or even thought to affect the legal position of Aboriginal peoples involved in the transfer of Rupert’s Land and the North- Western Territory to the Dominion of Canada. [54] He explained that the legal basis of Crown relations with Aboriginal peoples was formed in the Imperial era and carried over to colonial and then to early national times when jurisdictional competence was transferred from the British Parliament to the new Parliament of the Dominion of Canada . In his report , Dr.

McHugh states : … The Crown recognised the land rights of tribes and negotiated for their cession but these practices were undertaken as a matter of executive grace rather than from any legal imperative compelling this treaty -making . These relations engaged Crown beneficence and guardianship but they were never regarded as justiciable or enforceable by legal process - a possibility that the state of legal art could not admit ( until the late-twentieth century ) .

The reference to those ‘equitable principles ’ in the Addresses and instrumentation for the transfer of Rupert ’s Land and the Northwestern Territories in the 1870 Order in Council was not intended or contemplated at that time to change the received position of non- justiciability . [55] [ 62 ] This “received position ” was described in greater detail by Dr.

McHugh as follows : … In the late -nineteenth century ( and for most of the twentieth) , the Crown ’s relations with tribes in respect of their land “rights ” were conceived as a matter of non- justiciable executive grace in the sense that the “trust ” and “guardianship ” duties avowed by the Crown , including the practice of obtaining formal cessions of their land , were regarded as having a high moral character not enforceable directly through court proce ss .

It was not until the courts developed the common law doctrine of aboriginal title from the 1970s onwards that those collective land rights and associated Crown obligations became justiciable . There is no evidence that the 1870 transfer was designed to or seen at that time as changing that position . [56] [ 63 ] The path to Dr.

McHugh’s conclusions begins with the recognition that , from the earliest days of English settlement of the New World , British relations with Aboriginal tribes were managed under the authority of “royal warrant ”. [57] A Canadian example of a royal warrant is the 1670 Charter granted by the Crown to the H B C , which gave proprietary rights to HBC over the vast watershed lands of the Hudson Bay basin and entitled HBC the exclusive right to trade and govern within that territory . The territory became known as Rupert ’s Land .

The territory to the west and north of Rupert ’s Land became known as the North -Western Territory , with the exception of the land that became the colony of British Columbia . [58] [ 64 ] Dr. McHugh testified that a subsequent problem of competition in the fur trade between the HBC and the more latterly incorporated North-Western Company was resolved by the British Parliament amalgamating the two entities in 1821.

Also in 1821, the reorganized HBC received a Crown grant , or “Licence ”, to trade and otherwise represent the Crown in dealings with the Aboriginal populations of Crown territories not included in the HBC ’s charter or in any other colonial jurisdiction . That meant that the North - Western Territory came under the protection of the HBC , including what came to be the Yukon Territory . [59] [ 65 ] In 1838, the Licence was renewed for a period of 21 years . [ 66 ] Dr.

McHugh reported that in the late 1850s , the HBC was facing many pressures , such as the influx of settlers from the east and the south , mineral discovery and exploitation , the rise of the Red River community in what would become the province of Manitoba , and technological advances , such as the telegraph . [60] [ 67 ] According to Dr. McHugh , a debate arose over whether there should be a second renewal of HBC ’s licence , as the government of the Province of Canada took the position that the lands held by the HBC should be transferred to it, in whole or in part .

Chief Justice (of Canada) Draper communicated this to the British Parliament in 1857 , and that led to an inquiry by a Special Committee of the House of Commons, which recommended a negotiated settlement between the HBC and the Province of Canada in order to transfer the territories . Some attempts to negotiate followed , without result . The HBC Licence expired in 1859 . [61] [ 68 ] Dr. McHugh wrote that the issue of the transferring the HBC territories to the Province of Canada resurfaced in the mid- 1860s with the prospect of Confederation .

In 1865 , the Province of Canada sent representatives to the British Parliament in London to urge for the transfer of the HB C territories . The British government was sympathetic and enacted s. 146 of the BNA Act . [62] It was pursuant to this that, in December 1867 , during the first session of the new Canadian Parliament , the House of Commons and the Senate adopted an Address to request the transfer of Rupert ’s Land and the North -Western Territory to the Dominion . [63] [ 69 ] According to Dr. McHugh , Prime Minister John A.

Mac donald believed that the 1867 Address would secure for the Canadian government the governance rights of the HBC, leaving HBC’s proprietary rights to be determined by Canadian courts . However , the Governor of the HBC protested against the proposed unilateral annexation by Canada and the prospect that the Company’s rights would subsequently be adjudicated by courts appointed by the Canadian government .

The Colonial Office of the British government sympathized with HBC, and took the position that HBC’s agreement and British legislation were needed to authorize the transfer . [64] Accordingly, the British Parliament enacted The Rupert’s Land Act in 1868 . [65] This set the stage for the transfer of Rupert’s Land from HBC to Britain, following which the territory could then be transferred to Canada, once an agreement was reached with HBC for its surrender.

Negotiations between the HBC and Canada ensued until, eventually , with the assistance of Earl Granville , [66] a surrender agreement was reached on March 22, 1869. [ 70 ] Dr. McHugh opined that the surrender agreement, which dealt with Rupert’s Land, meant that a second Joint Address from the Parliament of Canada was required for the North-Western Territory, and this was issued on May 29 and 31, 186 9.

It repeated the request for the transfer of the North -Western Territory , on the terms and conditions of the 1867 Address , and requested that the transfer of Rupert’s Land be subject to the terms and memoranda attached to the second Address , including the agreement of March 22, 1869. [67] With respect to Rupert’s Land, item 8 of this agreement provided:

It is understood that any claims of Indians to compensation for lands required for purposes of settlement shall be disposed of by the Canadian Government in communication with the Imperial Government, and that the Company shall be relieved of all responsibility in respect of them . [68] (my emphasis) [ 71 ] Clause 14 of the 1870 Order was based upon para. 14 of HBC’s deed of surrender of Rupert’s Land . [69] Clause 14 state s: Any claims of Indians to compensation for lands required for purposes of settlement shall be disposed of by the Canadian Government in communication with the Imperial Government ; and the Company shall be relieved of all responsibility in respect of them . (my emphasis) [ 72 ] The second 1869 Address also includes the following acknowledgment : That upon the transference of the territories in question to the Canadian Government it will be our duty to make adequate provision for the protection of the Indian tribes whose interests and well -being are involved in the transfer , and we authorize and empower the Governor in Council to arrange any details that may be necessary to carry out the terms and conditions of the above agreement . (my emphasis) [ 73 ] Dr.

McHugh testified that the HBC wanted a “clean exit” with respect to any responsibilities it exercised vis-à-vis the Indian tribes under the 1670 Charter . He explained this was the reason for the repeated references in the 1870 Order to HBC being “relieved of all responsibilities in respect of ” the claims of Indians . Further , to the extent that the situation of the Indian tribes featured explicitly in the negotiations , Dr. McHugh took the position that it was couched in terms of a duty of “protection ” being transferred from the Imperial Crown to the Canadian government . [70] [ 74 ] Dr.

McHugh opined that it was understood in 1870 that there was a difference between the “reservation ” of individual or corporate “rights”, on the one hand, and the “protection ” of a certain class of Her Majest y’s subjects , on the other : Reservation of rights entailed a hard justiciable form of legal coverage whereas protection entailed a softer non- justiciable form reliant upon be nign executive discretion . (emphasis already added) [71] [ 75 ] This distinction is arguably exemplified in the first undertaking of the 1867 Address , which provides : That in the event of Your Majesty’s Government agreeing to transfer to Canada the jurisdiction and control over the said region , the Government and Parliament of Canada will be ready to provide that the legal rights of any corporation , company or individual within the same shall be respected , and placed under the protection of Courts of competent jurisdiction . (my emphasis) [ 76 ] In reaching his opinion, Dr.

McHugh placed a great deal of emphasis on a dispatch from Earl Granville, dated April 10, 1869 , to the Governor General of Canada . He views the dispatch as a key piece of evidence from a very prominent individual in the negotiations preceding the 1870 Order . This dispatch, Dr. McHugh said, conclusively shows that there was no intention by the parties to create a justiciable constraint on the Dominion of Canada with respect to the claims of the Indians and the duty to provide for and protect those Indians . I will deal with this dispatch shortly, but some context will assist in its

interpretation. [ 77 ] Earl Granville held various cabinet offices in the British government between 1851 and 1886 . [72] As the Colonial Secretary in Prime Minister Gladstone ’s first cabinet in 1868, Granville held a post of considerable prestige . Dr. McHugh described him as a brilliant “velvet-glove strategist ”, and when the negotiations between the HBC and the Canadian delegates on the transfer of the territories became deadlocked , Earl Granville intervened on behalf of the British government.

He suggested terms to the parties in what is now seen to have been a ‘take it or leave it ’ offer , in that he threatened to have the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council review the matter, if either party rejected the terms. [73] Indeed , that offer , set out in a March 1869 letter from Sir Frederick Rogers, of the British Colonial Office, found its way into

Schedule B of the 1870 Order and was the basis for the terms of HBC’s deed of surrender as well as the 15 “terms and conditions ” specified in the operative portion of the 1870 Order . [ 78 ] Following the agreement between the Canadian government and the H B C , on April 10, 1869, Earl Granville wrote his dispatch to the Governor General of Canada . In it, he touched upon the issue of the claims of the Indian tribes : On one point , which has not been hitherto touched upon , I am anxious to express to you the expectations of Her Majesty’s Government .

They believe that whatever may have been the policy of the Company , and the effect of their chartered right upon the progress of settlement , the Indian tribes , who form the existing population of this part of America , have profited by the Company’s rule . They have been protected from some of the vices of civilization : they have been taught , to some appreciable extent , to respect the laws and rely on the justice of the white man , and they do not appear to have suffered from any causes of extinction beyond those which are inseparable from their habits and their climate .

I am sure that your Government will not forget the care which is due to those who must soon be exposed to new dangers , and , in the course of settlement , to be dispossessed of the lands which they are used to enjoy as their own , or be

confined within unwanted ly narrow limits . This question had not escaped my notice while framing the proposals which I laid before the Canadian Delegates and the Governor of the Hudson’s Bay Company . I did not , however , then allude to it , because I felt the difficulty of insisting upon any definite conditions without the possibility of foreseeing the circumstances under which these conditions would be applied , and because it appeared to me wiser and more expedient to rely on the sense of duty and responsibility belonging to the Government and people of such a country as Canada .

That Government , I believe , has never sought to evade its obligations to those whose uncertain rights and rude means of living are contracted by the advance of civilized man . I am sure that they will not do so in the present case , but that the old inhabitants of the country will be treated with such forethought and consideration as may preserve them from the dangers of the approaching change , and satisfy them of the friendly interest which their new governors feel in their welfare . ” (my emphasis) [ 79 ] Dr.

McHugh interprets this dispatch as clearly indicative that the negotiations with H B C had not focused explicitly upon the position of the Indians . He further infers “strongly if not unmistakably” that Clause 14 in the operative portion of the 1870 Order (quoted above at para. 71) was aimed at the post -transfer rights and liabilities of the H BC, and was not aimed at erecting legal obligations relative to Indian lands that would subsequently become binding upon the Dominion of Canada . [74] [ 80 ] Dr.

McHugh also opined that, in the second paragraph of the Granville dispatch , Granville was adverting to the continuance by the Canadian government of the long-standing Imperial policies over Aboriginal affairs , following the transfer of those responsibilities from the British Crown to the Canadian government . Dr. McHugh further stated that Granville was almost certainly referring to the Robinson Treaties and related transactions that Canada had formerly conducted for the Indian lands surrounding the Great Lakes .

Thus , Granville expected that the equitable principles that had been applied in Canada, first by British governmental officials, and then by the Canadian government upon assumption of the responsibility for Indians , would be extended to the soon -to -be annexed territories . [75] In conclusion on this point , Dr. McHugh states : … This Granville put in terms of an expectation falling upon the honour of the Canadian government rather than it being a legal stipulation inserted into the transfer .

This makes it plain that if the parties had viewed the reference to ‘equitable principles ’ as entailing the creation or recognition of a justiciable obligation then it would have been acknowledged explicitly as such . Rather , the British authorities and H B C regarded the transfer as only creating legal rights for H BC .

Whereas the outcome of the transfer for the H B C itself was a set of hard legal rights ( ‘reservations ’) , for the Indian tribes their ‘protection ’ was transferred from the aegis of the H B C as grantee of Rupert’s Land and sometime administrator of the North West Territory [as written] to Canada . [76] (my emphasis) [ 81 ] Dr.

McHugh’s report continues on to examine the broader historical context of relations between Aboriginal peoples and the British Crown , to demonstrate that what he said was happening in Canada around the time of the 1870 Order was consistent with the driving themes of those relations elsewhere in the Victorian era . He also analyzed some of the early case law , such as R . v. St. Catharine’s Milling and Lumber Co. ( 1887 ) , 1887 CanLII 3 (SCC) , 13 S . C . R . 577 , aff’d (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 (J.C.P.C.) (“ St.

Catharine’s Milling ”) , and concluded : …The case -law shows that native peoples were regarded as holding all the legal capacities of the settlers so far as the protection of their individual person and personal property were concerned . Where , however , they claimed certain collective rights - to land most especially - the legal enforcement of those rights ( against squatters or trespassing stock , to give the strongest examples ) was a matter for the Crown . That is , the Crown acted as legal protector of native peoples collective or , to use the modern term , aboriginal rights . [77] (my emphasis) [ 82 ] Dr.

McHugh was careful throughout his evidence to clarify that he was opining on the probable intentions and perceptions of the relevant legal actors in the period leading up to Confederation and ultimately the 1870 Order . As an expert legal historian, he repeatedly stressed that he was not expressing an opinion on how the relevant provision ought to be interpreted today. To this extent, I understand his evidence goes to the purpose of the relevant provision as “an historical fact”, to use the language of Professor Sullivan, [78] or what is otherwise referred to as a “legislative fact”.

I also recognize that my ultimate determination on the sub-issue of legislative intent, as part of my overall assessment of the current

interpretation of the relevant provision, is a question of law. 5.2.2.1.1 RRDC’s challenges to the Dr. McHugh’s evidence [ 83 ] RRDC's counsel referred me to a number of academic articles in evidence in support of his argument that the relevant provision creates a constitutional obligation that is binding upon Canada today. First among these is a monograph by Dr. Kent McNeil entitled Native Claims in Rupert's Land and the North-western Territory: Canada's Constitutional Obligations [79] (the “McNeil Native Claims article”). The

article begins with the premise that the 1870 Order “recognized the existence of [A]boriginal land claims in Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory, and placed a constitutional obligation on the Canadian government to settle those claims.” (my emphasis). Dr. McNeil then continues on to examine the nature and extent of that obligation. At pp. 9 and 13, he referred to the relevant provision and stated at p. 19: “In addition to placing an obligation on the Canadian government to settle Indian claims, the 1867 Address also lays down a standard which the government must adhere to” (my emphasis). Dr.

McNeil suggests that this standard is the procedure outlined in the Royal Proclamation. [80] He then concludes: … Since the [ 1870 Order ] imposed a constitutional obligation on Canada to settle Indian, and probably Inuit and Métis, claims, it follows that it would be beyond the competence of Parliament and the provincial legislatures to abrogate or derogate from the rights on which those claims were based without first reaching a settlement with the aboriginal peoples involved.

On the basis of this approach, federal laws…would be inoperative to the extent that they are inconsistent with unsurrendered aboriginal rights in Rupert’s Land and the

North-Western Territory. [81] [ 84 ] In a subsequent essay in his book Emerging Justice , Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia [82] (the “McNeil Emerging Justice article”), Dr. McNeil continued to explore the fiduciary responsibilities of the federal government towards Aboriginal peoples. [83] He once again examined the relevant provision [84] and concluded that the inclusion of the provision in the 1870 Order “imposed a constitutional obligation on the Canadian Government to resolve land claims in both territories before opening the lands up to settlement.” [85] However, the focus of the

article was the undertaking contained in the May 28, 1869 Resolutions and the 1869 Address , that “it will be the duty of the Government [or, in the Address, “our duty”] to make adequate provision for the protection of the Indian tribes whose interests and well-being are involved in the transfer [of the two territories]”. [86] Dr. McNeil referred to this as the “protection” undertaking and suggested that it was “a term or condition for the admission of both territories” into the Dominion of Canada, [87] and that it created “a legally enforceable obligation”. [88] [ 85 ] RRDC's counsel cross-examined Dr.

McHugh about this latter essay, [89] and asked him whether he agreed with Dr. McNeil's opinion that the 1870 Order created a “constitutional obligation” on the Canadian government to resolve land claims in the territories before opening land up for settlement. Dr. McHugh replied that he is very familiar with the wo

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