Agnico Eagle v. GN, 2016 NUCJ 13

Nunavunmi Maligaliuqtiit NUNAVUT COURT OF JUSTICE Cour de justice du Nunavut Citation: Agnico Eagle v. GN, 2016 NUCJ 13 Date: 20160428 Docket: 08-105-352 Registry: Iqaluit Applicant: Agnico Eagle Mines Ltd. -and- Respondent: Government of Nunavut ________________________________________________________________________ Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Tulloch Counsel (Applicant): Peter Mantas Counsel (Respondent): Bruce Russell Location Heard: Iqaluit, Nunavut Date Heard: February 12, 2016; February 23-24, 2016 Matters: Application for Judicial Review REASONS FOR JUDGMENT (NOTE: This document may have been edited for publication)

Table of Contents REASONS FOR JUDGMENT . 1 I. OVERVIEW ... 3 II. BACKGROUND FACTS .. 3 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW ... 5 IV. APPLICABLE LEGISLATION .. 9 A. The Tax Rebate Regulations . 9 B. The P.P.T.A. 11 C. Analysis of the appropriate tax rate based on legislation .. 11 V. RES JUDICATA .. 12 VI. LIMITATION PERIOD .. 13 VII. COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES .. 15 VIII. PURPOSE OF A JUDICIAL REVIEW ... 17 IX. CONCLUSION .. 17 I. OVERVIEW [ 1 ] This judicial review is in relation to a decision made on behalf of the Minister of Finance, Government of Nunavut [G.N.], by Mr.

Daniel Young, Manager of Taxation and Insurance on June 8, 2015. [ 2 ] The decision involves the taxation by the G.N. on a purchase of fuel by Agnico Eagle Mines Ltd. [A.E.M.], for its mining operations in the territory during the years of 2010 and 2013. II. BACKGROUND FACTS [ 3 ] A.E.M. operates a mine in a remote place within the Territory of Nunavut. [ 4 ] They are the only company in Nunavut that have entered into a Development Partnership Agreement [D.P.A.], with the G.N.

This is a unique relationship which allows the mining company to apply for a tax rebate on eligible petroleum products used directly in the operation of their mining activities. The only caveat is that they must be in compliance with the terms of this agreement in order to do so. In this case, compliance with the D.P.A. is admitted. The overall purpose of the rebate is to encourage mining in Nunavut. [ 5 ] Due to the climate and geography that exists, A.E.M. only gets fuel shipments during the summer months and at that time they must order enough fuel to last them through Nunavut’s long winters.

[ 6 ] The same batch of fuel is used for different things. At issue in this case is fuel used for heating and machinery (classified as being for a non-motive use), fuel used for vehicles and equipment (classified as being for a motive use), and fuel used for aviation purposes. [ 7 ] It typically takes a full year for A.E.M. to use the fuel purchased.

There is therefore a considerable lapse between the purchase of the fuel and the consumption of the fuel. [ 8 ] The Petroleum Products Tax Act , RSNWT 1988, c P-5 (Nunavut) [P.P.T.A.], and the Petroleum Products Tax Regulations , RRNWT 1990 c P-3 (Nunavut) [Petroleum Products Tax Regulations] , govern tax on fuel. Both parties agree that the P.P.T.A requires A.E.M. to wait until use of the fuel is known before applying to the government for a rebate. [ 9 ] A.E.M. submits that, since 2006, the use of the fuel was not a consideration in spite of the requirement under the P.P.T.A.

The company was used to purchasing the fuel, paying the tax at a rate of 3.1 cents per litre, and then filing for a rebate in the same amount. Tax was never before decided on the ultimate use of the fuel. [ 10 ] Pursuant to Section 2(1) of the P.P.T.A., these different uses attract different rebate rates as follows: […] (

c) For aviation purposes, the rate is 1 cent per litre of fuel. (

e) For motive use, the rate is 9.1 cents per litre of fuel. (

f) For non- motive use, the rate is 3.1 cents per litre of fuel. [ 11 ] This case involves a recalculation by the G.N. of the 2010 and 2013, rebates based on the actual usage of the fuel during those years. [ 12 ] The G.N. submits that A.E.M. paid tax at the rate of 3.1 cents per litre instead of at the rate of 9.1 cents per litre, pursuant to section 2(1)(

f) of the P.P.T.A. [ 13 ] A.E.M. argues that the correct rate is 1 cent per litre not 9.1 cents per litre pursuant to this

section of the P.P.T.A. [ 14 ] In June of 2015, the G.N. completed an assessment of A.E.M.’s application under the Fuel Tax Rebate Program for 2010 and 2013. The Minister then deducted the amounts it decided it was entitled to keep, together with interest, from the latest rebate owing to A.E.M. The amount it seized was $2,503,215.49. [ 15 ] There is no argument over the G.N.’s authority under the P.P.T.A. to deduct the amounts if, in fact, they are owing by A.E.M. [ 16 ] The applicant’s position is that the Minister made an error in law with respect to the decision that would justify it being altered or set aside. [ 17 ] A.E.M. submits that the G.N. erred in its

interpretation and application of the legislation.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW [18] The applicant submits that the proper standard of review in this case is “correctness” while the respondent argues that it is“reasonableness”. This is an important issue. [19] The seminal case with respect to standard of review is Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, [2008] 1 SCR 190, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir]. Inthat case, the Supreme Court of Canada simplified the standard of review analysis.

Following Dunsmuir, only these two standards ofreview remained. [20] Reasonableness is a deferential standard, and generally applies to questions of fact, discretion, policy, and questions of mixed factand law (Dunsmuir, at para 52).

Reasonableness is “concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibilitywithin the decision-making process [and] whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which aredefensible in respect of the facts and law” (Dunsmuir, at para 47). [21] In general, the correctness standard will apply to constitutional questions, true questions of jurisdiction, and questions of generallaw outside the delegate’s specialized area of expertise (Dunsmuir, at paras 55, 58-60).

Correctness offers no deference to the initialdecision-maker, and the reviewing court is entitled to substitute its view of the matter in place of the decision-maker’s view (Dunsmuir,at para 50). [22] The first step for the court on judicial review is determining if the standard of review is sufficiently identified in the jurisprudence(Dunsmuir, at para 57). [23] The applicant submits that the previous decision of Mahar, J., Agnico Eagle v Nunavut, 2014 NUCJ 30, [2014] Nu J No 29 (QL)[Agnico Eagle], involving the same parties and the same legislation is determinative that the proper standard of review is “correctness”.I respectfully disagree. [24] In the above-noted decision there is no discussion by either party or the court as to the appropriate standard of review.

Instead, itsimply says at paragraph 26 of the judgment: “The standard of review is correctness. The parties are in agreement on this issue, as is theCourt.” (Agnico Eagle). [25] It is this Court’s opinion that Mahar J. may have come to a different decision as to the standard of review if he had had the benefitof hearing competing arguments on the issue. [26] The case of R v Mazhero, 2009 NUCA 4 , 2009 NUCA 04, [2009] Nu J No 4 (QL), was also proffered as supporting theapplicant’s position that correctness is the proper standard of review. Again I disagree.

This case can easily be distinguished on thegrounds that it bears no relation to the standard of review question before the court. Further, it is an appeal and not a judicial review. [27] Therefore, I am not satisfied that the standard of review has been sufficiently identified in the jurisprudence. Accordingly, astandard of review analysis is required. [28] The parties agree that the four factors which come into play, according to Dunsmuir, are: a. The presence or absence of a privative clause or a statutory right of appeal; b.

The expertise of the tribunal relative to that of the reviewing court on the issue in question; c. The purposes of the legislation and the provision in general; and,

d. The nature of the question --- law, fact, or mixed law and fact. [ 29 ] At issue in this appeal is a decision by the G.N. to recalculate A.E.M.’s tax rebate on its fuel purchases in 2010 and 2013, based on actual usage. This recalculation resulted in a finding that some of the fuel should have been taxed at 9.1 cents per litre instead of 3.1 cents per litre.

On top of this, the G.N. imposed interest. [ 30 ] This decision is based upon the P.P.T.A. and the Tax Rebate Regulations, Nu Reg 012-2006 [Tax Rebate Regulations]. [ 31 ] The parties agree that there is no privative clause in the P.P.T.A. or Petroleum Products Tax Regulations . This simply means that there is no statutory direction from parliament or the legislature indicating the need for deference. [ 32 ] The next factor to be considered is the expertise of the Minister relative to the expertise of the reviewing court.

The issue in question is the applicable rate to be applied in calculating the tax rebate for A.E.M., according to its use of the fuel under

section 2 of the P.P.T.A. [ 33 ] The Nunavut Legislature assigned the authority to administer the Fuel Tax Rebate Program to the Minister as opposed to the court. There is a presumption that the standard of reasonableness applies where a delegate is interpreting its own enabling statute ( Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Assn , 2011 SCC 61 , at para 34 , [2011] 3 SCR 654 ; McLean v British Columbia (Securities Commission) , 2013 SCC 67 , at paras 19-33 , [2013] 3 SCR 895 ). [ 34 ] The decision made by the Minister is based upon his

interpretation of the P.P.T.A. This is the G.N.’s own enabling statute for calculating fuel tax rebates and therefore the Minister, a front-line adjudicator with expertise in this legislation, attracts considerable deference. This factor militates in favour of reasonableness. [ 35 ] The third factor to be considered is the purpose of the enabling legislation and the

section of the statute in question. The P.P.T.A. does not contain a separate purposive clause, but I think the parties will agree that the Fuel Tax Rebate Program is in place to encourage mining within the Territory of Nunavut. In fact, the applicant made this submission early on in their argument before the court. [ 36 ] Further, the P.P.T.A. requires those companies applying for a rebate to comply with a Development Partnership Agreement . Compliance is necessary in order to qualify for any rebate under the program. This additional requirement is within the sole jurisdiction of the parties. [ 37 ] Although this case does not involve any

interpretation of whether or not A.E.M. is in compliance with the D.P.A., the fact that this extra layer exists supports a finding that the purpose of the legislation is not only to encourage mining, but to encourage it in a way that supports the territory and those communities which are affected. [ 38 ] The purpose includes an ability for the G.N. to tax petroleum products used in mining activities throughout the Territory and then to issue a fuel tax rebate based on the fuel’s actual use and the company’s compliance with an agreement focused on supporting communities. [ 39 ] I find that this factor supports a finding that the standard of review in these circumstances is one of reasonableness. [ 40 ] The final factor is the nature of the problem at hand.

Is this a question of law, a question of fact, or a question of mixed law and fact?

[ 41 ] The decision being reviewed is one of mixed fact and law. Although it may require some statutory

interpretation regarding

section 2 of the P.P.T.A., it is largely based upon the facts provided. This is evident from the numerous documents submitted in support of each party’s respective position. [ 42 ] This case does not involve questions which are of central importance to the legal system. The questions to be decided are within the jurisdiction of the Minister of Finance of the G.N. [ 43 ] In conclusion, after my review of the appropriate factors to be considered and the case law provided by both parties, I find that the standard of review in this case is one of “reasonableness”. IV. APPLICABLE LEGISLATION A.

The Tax Rebate Regulations [ 44 ] Sections one, five, eight, and nine of the Tax Rebate Regulations apply in this case. [ 45 ]

Section one is the

interpretation section. It provides a definition for the term “eligible petroleum products”. The parties agree that the petroleum products at issue in this case meet the definition and are eligible for the rebate in question. [ 46 ] Section 1(2) says the following: 1(2) For the purposes of these regulations, mine development, mine extraction and mine reclamation do not include transporting persons or supplies to or from a mine site. [ 47 ]

Section five sets out the eligibility criteria for corporations such as A.E.M., who are engaged in mine development, mine extraction, and mine reclamation activities. There is no doubt that A.E.M. qualifies under this

section of the Tax Rebate Regulations . [ 48 ]

Section eight is important because it sets out what must be included in any application made for a fuel tax rebate in Nunavut. [ 49 ] The applicable sub-sections are as follows: 8(1) An application for a tax rebate must be completed in the form approved by the Minister and must include receipts for petroleum products purchases in or brought into Nunavut and evidence showing that they were eligible petroleum products. 8(2) The parties agree that this

section does not apply to the case at hand. 8(3) An application made by a person referred to in

section 5 must also include the following: (

a) A copy of the development partnership agreement, (

b) A copy of the mining lease; (

c) Documents, records or other evidence showing that the applicant engaged in mine development, mine extraction or mine reclamation activities during the period; (

d) Documents, records or other evidence showing that the petroleum products were used solely in qualifying equipment and machinery and directly in mine development, mine extraction or mine reclamation.

8(4) An application for a tax rebate must be submitted within one year after the petroleum products were purchased in or brought into Nunavut, and may be submitted every six months. 8(4.1) Despite subsection (4), an application made by a person referred to in

section 5 must be submitted on or before March 31 in respect of eligible petroleum products purchased in or brought into Nunavut in the preceding year. 8(5) The Minister may, at the time an application is made or at any subsequent time, require an applicant to supply any additional information necessary to determine whether the eligibility requirements have been met. 8(6) Where the Minister requires additional information under subsection (5), the applicant shall supply that information within the time specified by the Minister. [ 50 ]

Section nine talks about how long records must be kept by those who qualify for a fuel tax rebate. It states as follows: 9 A person who receives a tax rebate shall retain complete and accurate records of petroleum products purchases and imports for four years after the end of the year in which the tax rebate is paid. B. The P.P.T.A . [ 51 ]

Section two of the P.P.T.A. applies in this case as it deals with tax on fuel. It reads as follows: 2 (1): Subject to this section, there shall be imposed, levied and collected on all petroleum products that are delivered by a vendor to a purchaser, a tax, (

a) In the case of gasoline purchased at a location on the highway system….(not applicable to this case). (

b) In the case of gasoline not purchased at a location on the highway system….(not applicable to this case). (

c) In the case of petroleum products used for aviation purposes, at a rate of one cent per litre, (

d) In the case of petroleum products used in a railway locomotive…(not applicable to this case). (

e) In the case of diesel oil used in a motor vehicle, at a rate of 0.85 times the rate of tax imposed on gasoline under paragraph (a). (

f) In the case of any petroleum products not falling under paragraphs (

a) to (e), at the rate of 0.29 times the rate of tax imposed on gasoline under paragraph (a). And where the use of petroleum products would otherwise be taxable under more than one paragraph of this subsection, it shall be taxed under the paragraph that occurs earliest in the subsection. C. Analysis of the appropriate tax rate based on legislation [ 52 ] For the sake of clarity the parties agree as follows: a. Section 2(1)(a), (b), and (

d) do not apply to the decision under judicial review in this case. b. Section 2(1)(

c) speaks to a rate of 1 cent per litre of fuel and deals with fuel used for aviation purposes.

c. Section 2(1)(

e) speaks to a rate of 9.1 cents per litre of fuel and deals with fuel used for motive purposes. d. Section 2(1)(

f) speaks to a rate of 3.1 cents per litre of fuel and deals with fuel used for non-motive purposes. e. The applicant argues that based on a strict

interpretation of the P.P.T.A., the proper rate to be applied is 1 cent per litre since aviation fuel comes before fuel used for motive purposes or non-motive purposes. f. In carefully considering A.E.M.’s application for a fuel tax rebate, there is no indication that any of the fuel purchased in 2010 or 2013, was directly used for aviation purposes. The position taken by A.E.M. that the rate to be applied is 1 cent per litre, based on a strict

interpretation of

section 2 of the P.P.T.A., is not supported by the material filed in answer to the G.N.’s request for further information. V.

RES JUDICATA [ 53 ] A.E.M. argues that the G.N. is estopped by the doctrine of res judicata from capturing monies owed by A.E.M. to the G.N. in the year 2010. [ 54 ] This is because the parties received an arbitration award that A.E.M. submits either dealt with the issue before the court or should have dealt with the issue before the court. [ 55 ] It is clear from the material filed that the arbitration which took place in relation to the 2010 taxes related to whether or not A.E.M. was in compliance with the Development Partnership Agreement so as to be entitled to any fuel tax rebate. [ 56 ] Arbitrator Wallace found A.E.M. to be eligible for a tax rebate on the fuel it purchased in October 2010, but not for the fuel it purchased in July 2010.

Therefore, the fuel purchased in July 2010 was subject to full taxation. [ 57 ] In 2010, A.E.M. paid taxes at the non-motive tax rate of 3.1 cents per litre. The G.N. asked for further information and A.E.M. confirmed in a letter dated August 23, 2013, that 17,092,781 litres of fuel purchased were used for a non-motive purpose and 9,265,166 litres were used for a motive purpose.

The G.N. decision indicates that, based on actual usage, there was an underpayment of tax on fuel purchased in 2010 in the amount of $555,909.96. [ 58 ] A.E.M. argues that even if the decision by the G.N. is correct, they are precluded from collecting this amount because they should have addressed any shortfall when they went before the arbitration board on the other matter related to the 2010 fuel tax rebate. [ 59 ] Arbitrator Wallace indicated in his report that the amount of the rebate was not before him.

He goes on to say, “this is an unfortunate result, which I have come to reluctantly, because it leaves the parties with a matter unresolved.” [ 60 ] Although it may seem unfair to be charged for the underpayment in 2010, given the clear indication in the award that the amount of the rebate was not before the tribunal, I cannot find that the Minister’s decision is estopped on the basis of res judicata. VI.

LIMITATION PERIOD [ 61 ] A.E.M. submits that the G.N. is precluded from claiming additional taxes because it is out of time. [ 62 ] In support of their argument, they look to the limitation statute of Nunavut, section 2(1)(

a) and 2(1)(b). That statute prescribes one to two years for claims grounded in penalties, damages, or sums of money in the nature of penalties ( Limitation of Actions Act , RSNWT 1988 (Nunavut)).

[ 63 ] In further support, they point this Court to

section 16 of the P.P.T.A. which reads as follows: 16(1) In this section, “principal” means the amount of the tax due plus any interest unpaid at the end of each year; “rate” means 1% more than the lowest rate of interest quoted by the bank in which the Consolidated Revenue Fund is located to its most credit-worthy borrowers. 16(2) Every person who is in arrears in the payment of the tax owing to the Government, shall pay to the Government, in addition to the tax, (

a) A penalty of $500 or an amount equal to 10% of the tax in arrears, whichever is lesser; and (

b) Notwithstanding subsection 17(1) of the Financial Administration Act, interest on the tax due for the period the tax is in arrears as calculated in subsection (3) 16(3) For the purposes of paragraph 2(b), interest shall be calculated every quarter on the principal at the rate existing on the first day of the quarter. 16(4) Where the Minister is satisfied that a person is in arrears in the payment of the tax owing to the Government because of extenuating circumstances, the Minister may remit the penalty mentioned in subsection (2) subject to the conditions that the Minister considers just, and in such a case the provisions of the Financial Administration Act relating to the remission of penalties apply. [ 64 ] Because the Limitation of Actions Act applies to claims “grounded in penalties, damages or sums of money in the nature of penalties”, this Court must be persuaded that the interest charged by the G.N. is indeed a penalty. [ 65 ] In fact, section 16(2) of the P.P.T.A. sets out a penalty which would be over and above any interest charged.

The G.N. has chosen not to impose that penalty in this case. [ 66 ] The P.P.T.A. makes it clear that interest is included in the definition of “principal” under the Act. [ 67 ] With the greatest of respect, I cannot find that interest claimed on taxes due is a penalty under this

section of the P.P.T.A., and therefore the Limitation of Acts does not apply. [ 68 ] Furthermore, it appears clear from the record in this case that the G.N. acted promptly to collect taxes due after fuel usage was known, both with respect to the year 2010 and the year 2013. [ 69 ] Although the P.P.T.A. doesn’t contain a specific limitation period, it seems to make sense, given the requirement under

section 9 to keep complete and accurate records for a period of four years, that the limitation period is in excess of the two years proposed by the applicant. [ 70 ] I find that the decision which is the subject matter of this judicial review is not out of time and the argument put forward by the applicant must fail on this point. VII. COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES [ 71 ] A.E.M. argues that they were advised by the G.N. to pay tax on fuel purchased at a rate of 3.1 cents per litre. They submitted that their company has been paying at that rate since 2006.

[ 72 ] A.E.M. went on to say that in June of 2015, the G.N. decided to change its practice retroactively without warning and imposed tax based on the actual use of the fuel. [ 73 ] The correspondence submitted by the applicant to support this argument is both insufficient and ambiguous. [ 74 ] In fact, it is specifically contradicted by evidence provided by the G.N. and attached as exhibits A1, A2, A3, and A4 [1] of Mr. Young’s affidavit.

These exhibits provide breakdowns showing that A.E.M. was paying taxes at both motive and non-motive rates for the years 2007-2008, 2008-2009, and 2009-2010. [ 75 ] The G.N. argues that in the year 2010-2011, A.E.M. provided a breakdown that indicated it was consuming fuel entirely for non- motive purposes.

It was at this time that the relationship between the parties became strained. [ 76 ] After receiving A.E.M.’s 2010-2011 application, the fuel tax rebate was denied on the grounds that A.E.M. was not in compliance with its Development Partnership Agreement . [ 77 ] The denial came before an arbitrator who found that A.E.M. was eligible for the rebate for fuel purchased after August 2, 2010, but was ineligible for the rebate for fuel purchase on or before August 2, 2010.

That award was made final on April 30, 2013, and the G.N. then requested A.E.M. to provide a fuel usage breakdown for the fuel purchased prior to August 2, 2010. [ 78 ] After the breakdown was provided by A.E.M., the G.N. assessed that additional funds were owing in the amount of $555,909.06 plus interest for fuel purchased in 2010.

That notice was provided to A.E.M. by the G.N. on July 3, 2014. [ 79 ] Despite this request for payment, A.E.M. did not pay the amount owed to the G.N. [ 80 ] In 2013, the evidence shows that A.E.M. paid at the rate of 3.1 cents per litre for fuel (the non-motive rate) when, in fact, some of the fuel was used for motive purposes which should have been paid at the rate of 9.1 cents per litre.

Again, the G.N. advised A.E.M. that this was in contravention of the law as it applied and requested payment which was not forthcoming. [ 81 ] At no time was there any mention that A.E.M. was using fuel for aviation purposes. [ 82 ] In any event, I find the argument on this point is not persuasive in my review of the decision made. VIII. PURPOSE OF A JUDICIAL REVIEW [ 83 ] This case involved many volumes of material and hours of argument over a number of days in court. Much of the time in court was spent by the parties rearguing the merits of the matter before the Minister. The

summary I have provided contains only the salient facts for the purposes of my overall decision. [ 84 ] The purpose of a judicial review is not to re-litigate the case before the court. [ 85 ] A judicial review is not an opportunity to persuade the court that the Minister got the facts wrong, and it is not an opportunity to repair any deficiencies in the decision.

[ 86 ] Instead, the purpose is to determine whether the Minister, in this case, had the authority to make the decision which is the subject matter of the review and, if so, whether the decision was reasonable. IX. CONCLUSION [ 87 ] The law, as set out in the P.P.T.A., is that any fuel tax rebate is calculated based on its’ use. Section 2(1) (subsections (

a) to (f)) applies. Following section 2(1)(f), the P.P.T.A. states: “and where the use of petroleum products would otherwise be taxable under more than one paragraph of this subsection, it shall be taxed under the paragraph that occurs earliest in the subsection.” [ 88 ] Use of the fuel purchased has to be included in any application made by A.E.M. for the fuel tax rebate. The uses identified are motive and non-motive.

Because the rate used for motive purposes comes before the rate used for non-motive purposes, the appropriate tax rate is 9.1 cents per litre. [ 89 ] The money collected by the G.N. for the underpayment of taxes allowed for the different rates and did not charge A.E.M. 9.1 cents per litre across the board. [ 90 ] Instead, the Minister collected only on the difference between 3.1 cents and 9.1 cents for the amount of fuel identified by A.E.M. as used for a motive purpose. [ 91 ] This Court finds that the Minister‘s decision made on June 8, 2015, is justified, transparent, and intelligible. It is detailed.

It sets out the amounts collected. It provides a basis for the calculations made with respect to both the underpayment and the interest collected. The decision is further clarified by the inclusion of attachments A to D of the Minister’s decision which give further clarity as to the actual amounts claimed. [ 92 ] This precludes the Court from substituting its own view for that of the decision maker. [ 93 ] I cannot find that the Minister made a legal error in law that would justify the decision being altered or set aside. [ 94 ] The Minister’s decision of June 8, 2015, falls within a range of reasonable outcomes.

The decision was made in accordance with the law and within the delegate’s authority. [ 95 ] This judicial review will therefore be dismissed without costs. [ 96 ] It is this Court’s fervent view that the parties should now use their best efforts to avoid any further litigation in relation to the fuel tax rebate issue. [ 97 ] A.E.M. needs certainty going forward as to the appropriate tax rate to be applied. They now have that clarity. [ 98 ] My hope is that the parties will move forward to repair their relationship quickly and fairly.

The work being done in this territory by Agnico Eagle Mines Ltd. is very important to Nunavut’s future. I am confident that if both parties focus on the beneficial aspects of their partnership, they can put this case behind them and work to foster an atmosphere of mutual respect. [ 99 ] I thank both counsel for their excellent submissions and for the hard work they put into this case.

Dated at the City of Iqaluit this 28th day of April, 2016 ___________________ Justice B. Tulloch Nunavut Court of Justice