Innovations for Audio Video v. City of Vancouver Date:, 2011 BCPC 433

Citation: Innovations for Audio Video v. City of Vancouver Date: 20110104 2011 BCPC 0433 File No: 09-25758 Registry: Vancouver IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA BETWEEN: INNOVATIONS FOR AUDIO VIDEO INC. CLAIMANT AND: CITY OF VANCOUVER DEFENDANT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE M. MACLEAN Appearing for the Claimant: D. Lazarescu, Company Represenative Counsel for the Defendant: B. Jordan Place of Hearing: Vancouver , B.C.

Dates of Hearing: June 14,15,16,17 and July 14, 2010 Date of Judgment: January 4, 2011 INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] Innovations for Audio Video Inc (“Innovation”) claims against the City of Vancouver (the “City”) for damages as a result of the City not awarding Innovation a contract for the installation of a sound system at the Killarney Ice Arena. The claim is cast as a breach of contract. Innovation claims its proposal was in response to a tendering process initiated by the City. Innovation alleges that it was the lowest compliant bidder for the installation of the sound system.

Innovation says the contract for the installation of the system was ultimately awarded to a company with a proposal inferior to that submitted by Innovation. [ 2 ] Innovation claims for lost profit of $19,026.94 which it submits it would have earned but for the purported breach of contract by the City. Innovation also claims $7,800 which it paid to a lawyer for advice it received with respect to its claim against the City. Lastly, Innovation claims $57,078.69 in punitive damages. [ 3 ] The City submits there is no legal basis for Innovation’s claim.

The City says when it issued a Request for Proposals (“RFP) for the supply and installation of a sound system for the Killarney rink, it retained the right to reject any or all of the proposals it received. Further, the City submits it retained the right to cancel the entire RFP process and, in particular if the project did not receive funding. The City says it cancelled the RFP prior to awarding a contract due to a lack of funding. [ 4 ] Three witnesses testified during the trial. All three were called by Innovation. Mr. Maxey testified. He worked for the city for a number of years. Mr.

Maxey was the person from the City responsible for the installation of the sound system at the Killarney Arena and for administering the RFP. The City had the assistance of Mr. Barry Mckinnon. Mr. Maxey testified that the RFP was cancelled because of the lack of funding. He testified that subsequent to the cancellation of the RFP, the Killarney Community Centre Society agreed to fund the installation of a sound system. [ 5 ] Mr. Mckinnon testified. Mr. Mckinnon has expertise in the area of sound engineering, sound equipment and installations. Mr.

Mckinnon was retained by the City to provide it advice regarding the technical aspects of the RFP and the proposals it received in response to the RFP. A central feature of Innovation’s cross-examination of Mr. Mckinnon and of its closing argument was that Mr. Mackinnon demonstrated a pattern of bias against Innovation. Innovation submits Mr. Mckinnon deliberately set out to disqualify Innovation’s proposal by misleading the City as to concerns he purported to have about Innovation’s proposal. Innovation asserts Mr. McKinnon lied under oath on a number of occasions. [ 6 ] Lastly, Mr.

Lazarescu testified on behalf of Innovation. Mr. Lazarescu is the principal shareholder of Pro Sound and Communications a company located in Bellingham, Washington. Innovation is a wholly owned subsidiary of Pro Sound & Communications. It was evident from his testimony and his cross-examination of Mr. McKinnon that Mr. Lazarescu has significant knowledge and experience in sound engineering, sound equipment and installations. BACKGROUND [ 7 ] The city issued the RFP on January 29, 2008. It is a lengthy and comprehensive document. The RFP set out the technical requirements and expectations for the proposed system.

The RFP contained many other requirements for parties submitting proposals for the installation of the sound system. [ 8 ] Innovation and four other companies submitted proposals in response to the RFP. Innovation’s proposal was filed as an exhibit. Innovation’s proposal provided for the supply of some equipment of a brand not specified in the RFP. However, the RFP allowed for the specified equipment or its equivalent.

Innovation submits the equipment it proposed was equivalent or superior to the equipment specified in the RFP. [ 9 ] The choice of speakers and Innovation’s desire to use a speaker which it asserts was equal to the speakers specified in the RFP remained an issue at the time its proposal was being considered. In some respects it remained an issue at trial. There was significant evidence as to whether the equipment and its installation proposed by Innovation was in fact superior to the equipment identified in the RFP. The relative merits of each system were explored both in Mr.

Lazarescu’s evidence and during a very thorough cross-examination of Mr. McKinnon. [ 10 ] The RFP included Articles 13 and 14. By

Article 13 the City retained the right to accept or reject any proposal submitted even if it received only one proposal. By this

Article the City also retained the right to accept a proposal which may not be the lowest price or one which may deviate from the requirements of the RFP. [ 11 ]

Article 14 states the City was under no obligation to award a contract pursuant to the RFP.

Article 14.1 provided the project and the award of a contract pursuant to the RFP was contingent upon funds being approved for the project. This provision proved to be significant as the funding for the project was not approved resulting in the cancellation of the RFP. [ 12 ] The City received Innovation’s proposal in February 2009. The proposals, once received by the City, were sent by Mr. Maxey to Mr. McKinnon for his review and for him to provide advice to Mr. Maxey. Mr. McKinnon set out his initial views in correspondence to Mr. Maxey on February 23 and 24. Mr.

McKinnon identified some issues with regards to Innovation’s proposal. It is apparent from a review of the correspondence Mr. McKinnon did not have concerns regarding the other proposals. An issue regarding Innovation’s proposal and identified by Mr. McKinnon was the brand of speakers Innovation intended to use and whether they would have a valid manufacturer’s warranty if the products were installed by Innovation in Canada [ 13 ] It is apparent from the correspondence between Mr.

McKinnon, the City and Innovation, that the issue of the warranty remained a live issue with the City until the RFP was ultimately cancelled. Innovation submits that the warranty issue was not a real concern and was used simply as a means to disqualify its proposal. INNOVATION’S POSITION [ 14 ] Innovation submits it is entitled to damages equal to the profit it would have earned had it been selected to install the sound systems. The profit sought by Innovation includes not only the profit which it would have earned but also includes what Mr.

Lazarescu would have personally earned from Innovation for the Killarney project. [ 15 ] Innovation claims the City had an obligation to award the contract to Innovation as Innovation was the lowest priced proposal which complied with the terms of the RFP. Innovation says its proposal was superior to or at least of equal quality to the other proposals submitted in response to the RFP. [ 16 ] Approximately seven weeks after the cancellation of the RFP the Killarney Community Centre Society agreed to fund the installation of the sound system.

There was no further RFP or similar request for proposals for the installation of the system. Mr. Maxey testified he felt there was sufficient information from which to base a decision as the system to be installed and the party to install it. The system was ultimately installed by one of the companies which provided a proposal under the RFP. Innovation submits that the proposal from that company was inferior to the proposal which Innovation had submitted in response to the RFP.

Innovation submits the City had a duty to negotiate a contract with Innovation for the Installation of the sound system once the Killarney Community Centre Society agreed to fund the project. [ 17 ] Innovation submits the RFP issued by the City had the same legal effect as an Invitation to Tender. Essentially, Innovation says the City was contractually bound to award the contract to Innovation because it submitted the lowest priced compliant bid.

Innovation submits the City is liable for damages arising from the breach of not awarding it the contract for the installation of the sound system at the Killarney Arena.

[ 18 ] Innovation claims an overriding obligation of the City in the context of the foregoing legal issues, was to treat all the proposals submitted in response to the RFP fairly. Innovation submits that the City did not treat its proposal fairly. Further, it submits, had it treated Innovation fairly, the City would have awarded the Killarney contract to Innovation. As a result of this breach, Innovation submits the City is liable to pay it damages. [ 19 ] Innovation claims that the manner in which its bid was treated by the City justifies the award of punitive damages.

Innovation submits those damages ought to be triple the amount it claims for its loss of profit. Innovation says that the award of the punitive damages is to deter the City or others in a similar position from treating contractors like Innovation in the manner it says it was treated by the City. THE CITY’S POSITION [ 20 ] The City submits Innovation has not established a legal basis upon which it would be entitled to damages. [ 21 ] The City submits the RFP does not have the legal effect argued by Innovation. The City says the language of the RFP is clear.

The City, by the terms of the RFP, reserved to itself the right to terminate the RFP at anytime. The City submits it did not incur any contractual liability prior to the termination of the RFP. [ 22 ] The City also submits the terms of the RFP expressly provided that the awarding of a contract for the installation of the sound system was contingent upon funds being available. The City submits the evidence establishes that as a result of lack of funding for the sound system the RFP was cancelled.

Although funding was provided by the Killarney Community Centre Society approximately seven weeks after the cancellation of the RFP, the City submits it was not obliged to award or negotiate a contract for the project to Innovation. [ 23 ] The City submits regardless of whether the RFP is referred to as such or is referred to as An Invitation to Tender, the court must look at the language of the document in the context of the factual circumstances to determine if liability would arise from the City’s conduct.

The City submits based on the terms of the RFP, the circumstances leading to a consideration of the proposals, and the ultimate termination of the RFP does not give rise to damages. [ 24 ] The City does not dispute that it was obliged to comply with the terms of the RFP, however, the City submits that those obligations were terminated when the RFP was terminated in accordance with its terms. The City also does not dispute that it owed a duty to all those who submitted proposals in response to the RFP including Innovation to treat them fairly.

The duty of fairness, however, must be considered in the context of the terms of the RFP. The City submits, in any event, it discharged that duty and as such no liability arises in that regard. [ 25 ] The City questions some other aspects of the damages claimed by Innovation. The City disputes Innovation’s claim for legal fees of $7,800. The City submits this claim is not allowed under Section 19(4) of the Small Claims Act . [ 26 ] The City submits the circumstances of this case do not justify the award of punitive damages. The City emphasizes punitive damages were not raised in Innovation’s Notice of Claim.

The City argued the punitive damages would far exceed the monetary jurisdiction of the Court. [ 27 ] In regards to Innovation’s claim of damages for loss of profit, the City submits based on its claim, Innovation’s profit margin of 118 percent is excessive. The City says Mr. McKinnon, when assessing the proposals applied a 35 percent profit margin. The inclusion of Mr. Lazarescu’s wages as part of Innovation’s claim likely explains the discrepancy between the profit margin expected by Mr. McKinnon and profit margin claimed by Innovation.

DISUCUSSION AND EVIDENTIARY ANALYSIS [ 28 ] On the evidence it appears from a technical perspective the installation including the equipment proposed by Innovation was at least as good as the others who submitted proposals to the RFP. However, it is not necessary for the purposes of this case to decide that issue as the concerns of whether Innovation could pass on to the City valid warranties for the equipment it proposed to install remained a live issue with the City. Mr. Lazarescu attempted to demonstrate both in his evidence and his cross-examination of Mr. Maxey and Mr.

Mckinnon that the provision of warranties was not a real concern. Based on all of the admissible evidence, however, there remained sufficient ambiguity or uncertainty regarding the warranties that it was not unreasonable for the City to remain concerned about the issue of warranty until the RFP was cancelled. CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES [ 29 ] In view of Innovation’s submissions regarding the credibility of both Mr. Maxey and Mr. Mckinnon, it is necessary to address the credibility and reliability of each of the witnesses. [ 30 ] In regards to Mr.

Maxey, it was apparent that he was relying on the advice he received from Mr. McKinnon. It was also apparent that Mr. Maxey was mistaken in his evidence as to some of the details and in particular the rationale for preferring the brand of speakers set out in the RFP. Mr. Maxey said that the City had been very happy with the speakers which had been installed on another project in the City. The project to which Mr. Maxey referred in fact post-dated this project and that could not have formed a basis for preferring that brand of speakers for the Killarney Arena. Mr. Maxey was clearly mistaken.

There is little doubt that Mr. Maxey supervised many projects for the City over the years. It is understandable that his recollection of the details of each of them was imperfect. As such, Mr. Maxey’s recollection of events surrounding the RFP and the Killarney project is not on its own reliable, however, I accept Mr. Maxey’s evidence where it is corroborated by the contemporaneous documents or other reliable evidence. [ 31 ] With respect to Mr. Mckinnon, the evidence does not establish the he was being untruthful to Mr.

Maxey or attempting to mislead the City regarding Innovation’s proposal when he gave advice to Mr. Maxey. Neither was Mr. Mckinnon being untruthful or

attempting to mislead the Court when he gave his evidence. Mr. Mckinnon’s evidence was generally consistent on material matters. His demeanor in giving his evidence did not suggest he was being untruthful. His evidence was balanced and fair in the sense that he was prepared to make concessions where appropriate. Notwithstanding concerns Mr. McKinnon had regarding the Innovation proposal he agreed in his evidence it had advantages. Again, as the matter evolved and in particular because the RFP was cancelled it is not necessary to evaluate the relative technical merits of each proposal.

Suffice it to say that the evidence does not establish that Mr. Mckinnon’s views of Innovation’s proposal was coloured by bias against Innovation. [ 32 ] Mr. Mckinnon remained consistent in regards to his concern regarding the warranty issue in relation to the equipment which Innovation was proposing to supply. Mr. Mckinnon’s concern regarding the availability of warranties was not unreasonable based on the information which he had at the time. The evidence falls far short of establishing that the concern about the warranties was manufactured or contrived by Mr.

Mckinnon or the City out of bias against Innovation. [ 33 ] Innovation argued that Mr. McKinnon treated its proposal differently than the other proposals. It says this was unfair and demonstrated a bias against Innovation. However, Innovation’s proposal differed from the other proposals in the type of speaker being proposed. Also Innovation was a relatively new corporate entity in British Columbia. While Mr. Lazarescu had significant experience both in British Columbia and the United States, it was Innovation which was proposing to contract with the City. As such it was not unfair for Mr.

Mckinnon to consider Innovation’s proposal with those issues in mind. Mr. Mckinnon would not have been discharging the duty he owed to the City if he had not considered issues raised by Innovation’s proposal. [ 34 ] Mr. Lazarescu testified on behalf of Innovation. Mr. Lazarescu was a very articulate and knowledgeable witness. He clearly has a great deal of experience and knowledge about the technical aspects of the sound equipment and installation of sound systems. Innovation had been incorporated in British Columbia not long before it submitted a proposal in response to the RFP.

As such, as a corporate entity it may have lacked experience or a record of installations completed, however, Mr. Lazarescu, as its principal would have provided the necessary technical and practical experience such that Innovation would be capable of installing a sound system in the Killarney Arena. [ 35 ] Mr. Lazarescu was a reliable witness regarding the technical aspects of the proposed installation of the sound system and generally how events unfolded in regards to his dealings with Mr. Maxey. [ 36 ] There were, however, two areas of Mr. Lazarescu’s evidence which were less reliable.

The first is the basis for his belief as to why Mr. Mckinnon may have been biased against him or Innovation. The second related to whether the equipment Innovation was proposing to install carried a warranty which would have been valid in Canada. [ 37 ] Mr. Lazarescu may honestly believe that Mr. Mckinnon was carrying a grudge from an incident which had occurred a number of years earlier. It was apparent that Mr. McKinnon was unaware of the incident to which Mr. Lazarescu was referring. Mr. Mckinnon’s evidence on the point was credible.

There is no credible evidentiary basis to believe that the incident to which Mr. Lazarescu was referring led to Mr. Mckinnon being biased against Innovation in Mr. Mckinnon’s assessment of Innovation’s proposal. Again, Mr. Lazarescu may honestly believe that bias was at play but the evidence falls far short of establishing that. [ 38 ] In regards to the warranty issue, Mr. Lazarescu may believe this was not an issue and that it was simply contrived or being used as a means of rejecting Innovation’s proposal, however, the credible, reliable and admissible evidence does not support Mr. Lazarescu’s belief.

Based on the information which Mr. Mckinnon and the City had at the time they were considering the proposals it was not unreasonable for the City to have continuing concerns regarding whether the equipment to be supplied by Innovation would carry a valid warranty in Canada. [ 39 ] In addition to the foregoing, Innovation argued that the cancellation of the RFP by the City and the subsequent funding agreement with the Killarney Community Centre Society was a sham and was a means by which the tendering process was being corrupted by the City.

The evidence does not establish the cancellation of the RFP and subsequent funding by the Killarney Community Centre Society was a sham or a means to circumvent the RFP process. The RFP was validly cancelled when funding was not forthcoming. The evidence does not establish that the City improperly cancelled the RFP in order to avoid awarding the contract to Innovation. The City was relying on the terms set out in the RFP which permitted it to cancel the RFP at any time and in particular if funding was not approved. Innovation would have or should have known of that term of the RFP when it submitted its proposal.

LEGAL ISSUES [ 40 ] Innovation submits it is entitled to damages as a result of the City not retaining Innovation to install the sound system. Innovation submits that the RFP gave rise to binding obligations as is usually found in an Invitation to Tender. As such, according to Innovation, the City was bound to accept Innovation’s proposal for the sound system on the basis that it was equal to or superior to all the proposals submitted in response to the RFP. Innovation says its proposal was the lowest priced compliant bid.

As a result, according to Innovation, once all the proposals had been submitted to the City it was contractually bound to award Innovation the contract for the installation of the sound system at the Killarney Arena. Alternatively it says the City was contractually bound to negotiate a contract with Innovation once funding had been obtained for the project. [ 41 ] Innovation relies on a line of cases, the most recent of which is Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia

(2010) SCC 4. In that case the Province issued a tendering contract for the design and construction of a highway. The Province initially issued a request for expressions of interest. This resulted in a number of firms responding. The Province then issued a Request for Proposals. By the terms of the Request for Proposals the Province limited the list of qualified bidders to six firms which had participated in the earlier process which requested expressions of interest. [ 42 ] Tercon was one of the six qualified parties selected by the Province and submitted a bid in response to the Request for Proposals.

The terms for submitting a bid included Tercon paying a significant security deposit which it was required to increase had it been successful. [ 43 ] The Province accepted a bid from an entity which had not been among the six approved bidders contrary to the terms of the

Request for Proposals. As a result, Tercon claimed damages against the Province. The Province argued that it was protected frompaying damages by virtue of a very broad exclusion clause contained in the Request for Proposals. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ofCanada held that the exclusion clause did not provide the Province with immunity from damages. [44] The Terms of the Request for Proposals and the underlying factual matrix in Tercon (supra) is much different than the case atbar. However, the Supreme Court of Canada set out some principles which assist in dealing with such cases.

The majority of the Courtstates that a compliant bid in response to a tender call “may give rise to a contract.” The Court cited a number of cases which were alsorelied upon by Innovation. The use by the Court of the word “may” as opposed to “shall” is a recognition that the legal effect of acompliant bid in response to a request for proposal depends upon the intentions of the parties as reflected by the language they use in thetendering documents and specifically whether the parties intend to enter into contractual relations by the submission of a bid.

The trialjudge found in Tercon (supra) there was an intention to create contractual relations on Tercon submitting a compliant bid. The Provincedid not appeal that finding nor did the Supreme Court of Canada revisit the issue in detail other than to agree with the trial judge. Thiswas so even when it was contemplated that further negotiations would be required. [45] In Tercon (supra) a fundamental contractual term of the Request for Proposals was that there would only be six bidders, each ofwhom had participated in the request for expression of interest.

The Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge that the Provincebreached this express term when it permitted a bid from an entity which had not been one of the six qualified bidders and it had breachedits implied duty to act fairly towards all bidders by permitting that bid. [46] The situation in the case at bar and the express terms of the RFP are quite different from the circumstances in Tercon (supra). One obvious difference is the scale of the two projects. In Tercon (supra) the preparation of the bid would have required an expenditureof significant resources.

In addition each of the qualified bidders in that case were required to post a deposit with their bid. Theinstallation of the Killarney sound system was very modest in compared with the project in Tercon (supra). In addition, the expresslanguage of the RFP from the City was quite different than the language in the Requests for Proposals in Tercon (supra). In Tercon(supra) the language was described as unequivocal that only the six proponents qualified under the earlier process would be considered.

The Province breached that condition. [47] Tercon (supra) is the most recent of a long line of legal authorities dealing with tenders and requests for proposals. Earlier casessuch MJB Enterprises Ltd. v. Defence Construction

(1951) Ltd. (1999) (SCC), 1 S.C.R. 619. held a contract does notalways arise upon the submission of a tender. A tender in response to invitation to tender or request for proposal may or may not giverise to contractual obligations. That would depend on the intention of the parties as reflected by the language of the documents seekingproposals. The City submits that any obligations which may arise through the tendering process came to an end when the RFP wasterminated in accordance with its terms.

In this case that was when the funding for the project was not forthcoming. [48] Here, the language is unequivocal; the City expressly retained the right to terminate the RFP at any time and the project wascontingent on the City receiving funding. In addition, the City was not obliged to accept the lowest bidder. Those submitting proposalsin response to the RFP would have or should have been aware of those terms. As it turned out the City was obliged to terminate the RFPdue to lack of funding.

Although funding was eventually provided through the Killarney Community Centre Society some time later, theCity did not have a subsisting obligation to Innovation or any of the other parties submitting proposals in response to the RFP. [49] Although Innovation considered its proposal to be the lowest compliant bidder, on the evidence the City did not have anobligation to award it the contract. This is particularly so when the warranty issue remained a valid concern.

Although Innovationargued that the warranty issue was not a real concern and was being used improperly to exclude its proposal from consideration, theevidence does not support Innovation’s argument on this point. The City’s concern was not unreasonable based on the information theCity had at the time it was considering the proposals. In this sense the City was exercising its business judgment which it was entitled todo. Hub Excavating v. Orca Excavating et al.

(2009) BCCA 164. [50] Innovation submits that the City was obliged to negotiate with it when funding was subsequently provided by the KillarneyCommunity Centre Society and a sound system was going to be installed in the Killarney rink. The City submits it was under noobligation to negotiate with Innovation after the RFP was terminated. A number of cases were cited by both the City and Innovation. These include Dolyn v. Paradigm

(2007) O.J. No. 63, Stanco Projects v. Her Majesty the Queen

(2006) BCCA 503, and CambridgePlumbing Systems Ltd. v. Strata Plan VR1632

(2009) B.C.J. No. 892. [51] In Dolyn (supra) and Cambridge (supra) the courts held that the obligations arising from the tendering process had come to anend when the tendering process was properly terminated. In additional, the courts did not find the defendants in those cases hadbreached their obligation to treat the bidders fairly. [52] Stanco (supra) involved the liability between the Province which had called for tenders and the company responsible foradministering the bidding process.

That was not an issue here. [53] There may be situations in which a party in the position of the City unfairly uses information obtained in tendering process incontracting with a third party subsequent to the termination of the tendering process. That was also not the case here. There is noevidence that the City took advantage of any information it received in the RFP process which was unfair to any party includingInnovation. [54] In regards to the City’s duty to treat Innovation fairly, the evidence does not support Innovation’s argument it was not treatedfairly. While the City and its advisor, Mr.

MacKinnon reviewed in detail Innovation’s proposal they were not unreasonable in thatreview. The equipment which Innovation suggested using may have been of equivalent quality but it was not unfair for the City toquestion it on the basis of the uncertainty relating to the availability of the manufacturer’s warranty. CONCLUSION

[55] Regardless of the City’s obligations arising from the issuance of the RFP and upon receipt of the proposals including that fromInnovation, the City discharged those obligations including its obligation to treat all of the proposals fairly. The obligations of the Citywere terminated when the RFP process was properly terminated. [56] There is no evidence the City breached any duty it may owed to Innovation subsequent to the termination of the RFP.

The Citywas not bound by contract or otherwise to offer the contract to Innovation when the funding was ultimately approved by the KillarneyCommunity Centre Society. [57] Based on the foregoing reasons the claim of Innovation as against the City is dismissed. [58] Even if the evidence had established the City’s liability for breach of contract, Innovation would not have been entitled to theloss of profit which it claimed. As a corporate entity Innovation would only be entitled to its loss of profit which would not include Mr.Lazarescu’s wages. The loss of Mr.

Lazarescu’s wages was his loss not a loss to Innovation. Mr. Lazarescu was not a party to theaction. [59] Innovation would not be entitled to reimbursement of the legal cost it incurred regarding this claim. Section 19(4) of the SmallClaims Act prohibits the awarding of such costs. [60] Innovation claimed punitive damages. In addition to the amount claimed far exceeding the monetary jurisdiction of this Court,the circumstances here would not justify the award of punitive damages.

Punitive damages are reserved for those exceptional cases inwhich the conduct of the defendant is “high handed, malicious, arbitrary or highly reprehensible...that departs to a marked degree fromordinary standards of decent behaviour. “ Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Company (2002) 2002 SCC 18 , 1 S.C.R. 595. Thatstandard for the awarding of punitive damages has no application in the circumstances of this case. [61] The City submits it is entitled to additional costs such as photocopy charges and other disbursements. It says it is entitled tothese in view of the nature of the allegations made by Innovation.

Innovation was represented by Mr. Lazarescu. He is not a lawyer buthe did his best in assisting the proceedings as being conducted expeditiously as possible. Mr. Lazarescu clearly felt his company wastreated badly and wanted his day in court. In the circumstances the application by the City regarding disbursements is dismissed. _________________________________ The Honourable Judge M. MacLean Provincial Court of British Columbia