R. v. Morgan-McDougall, 2011 ONCJ 119
Opinion
Court File No. 10-143 and 10-757 Citation: R. v. Morgan-McDougall, 2011 ONCJ 119 ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN v. MARGARET MORGAN MCDOUGALL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE BRUCE E. PUGSLEY on February 10, 2011 at ORANGEVILLE, Ontario APPEARANCES: L. Hunking Counsel for the Crown R. Covre Counsel for Morgan-McDougall THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2011
THE COURT: Will you stand up please for a minute. Is there anything you'd like to say before sentencing? You don't have to, but now is your chance if you wish. MS. MORGAN-MCDOUGALL: Um, I would like just to say Your Honour, that I'm very thankful that none of the emergency service, or firefighters, or police officers were injured or hurt attending the fire at my home. THE COURT: Thanks very much. I'm going to be a little while reading my judgment, so you're welcome to sit down while I read it and you can sit beside counsel. MS. MORGAN-MCDOUGALL: Thank you, Your Honour. THE COURT: Thanks. MR.
COVRE: Thank you, Your Honour. Wanna sit beside me, please. MS. MORGAN-MCDOUGALL: Sure. THE COURT: I think we should start by making Ms. Santini's latest letter exhibit four. That's letter and attachments dated February 4, 2011, will be Exhibit four on the sentencing hearing, Madam Clerk. THE CLERK: Okay. THE COURT: I will need it back for the exact number in a minute. EXHIBIT NUMBER 4 : Letter of February 4, 2011 - produced and marked.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT PUGSLEY, J. (Orally): The defendant, a 50 year old women with no prior record of any nature comes before the court for sentencing on two counts, breach of recognize contrary to subsection 145(3) of the Criminal Code of Canada and arson connected to the destruction by fire of her matrimonial home contrary to
section 434.1 of the Criminal Code . The background facts here can be briefly summarized as follows: The defendant and her husband were in an extremely dysfunctional relationship, each abused alcohol and the husband was emotionally abusive to the defendant. The defendant in turn suspected her husband of having another relationship. The defendant moved out of the matrimonial home and was basically, to summarize, feeling miserable. The parties owned a home in an estate subdivision in the Hamlet of Violet Hill, in this county.
They were in the early process of separating and the defendant wanted that house to be sold. The defendant's husband was resistant. They have no children together. On January 2, 2010 the defendant arranged to meet her husband at the family home. He attended but later than she expected. They spoke about the sale of the home and then the defendant's husband left. Sometime after the time he left in the evening the defendant decided that she was going to kill herself in the house. She obtained a quantity of gasoline from a can in the garage and poured gasoline into the area of the family bedroom.
When igniting the gasoline she then changed her mind and decided she would not commit suicide in the fire. She took the family dog and got into her car intending to leave and kill herself in some other fashion. Instead she drove into the ditch near their driveway and that was where she was found by the first responders when the fire was called in. At 8:47 p.m. the Rosemont Fire Department, the Ontario Provincial Police and paramedics all responded to this structure fire.
When they arrived the house was fully engulfed in flames and no efforts by the fire department could prevent the house from being totally destroyed. The home I'm told was valued at $280,000.00. When they arrived on site the paramedics and then the O.P.P. located the defendant in the ditch in her car with the family dog.
The first responders asked if she was hurt and she replied, "No excuses." They asked if anyone was in the home and she replied again, "No excuses." They asked the defendant if she was in the house when the fire started and she replied, "Yes." They asked her how she found out that the house was on fire and she replied, "I started it." They then asked her if she burnt her own house down and she replied, "Yes, my life is so miserable." The defendant was arrested for arson, was held for a bail hearing and released on a recognize. One term of that recognize was that she not attend at the property in Violet Hill.
In fact the defendant did go there in the face of the recognize on or about June 21, 2010 leaving a message for her husband about the woman she presumed was her husband's paramour. The defendant was subsequently released again. On October 12, 2010 she entered a plea of guilty to the arson and to the breach of recognize charges. The presentence report was ordered. On December 13, 2010 the court registered a conviction on these two counts and embarked on a sentencing hearing. At the hearing the court received for consideration the victim impact statement of the defendant's husband Mr. Hazell.
That statement spoke clearly to the court of the economic and emotional effect on the victim of the loss of his residence and all of his keepsakes and belongings. Much of the financial loss will be unrecoverable as the home was destroyed by this defendant's own criminal act. On behalf of the home insurers, two exhibits have now been filed identifying a loss which I'm now told is in the total sum of $111,946.03 which the insurer has now paid to the mortgage holder T-D Canada Trust. The insurer seeks a restitution order against the defendant in that sum.
On sentencing the defendant filed multiple letters supporting her good character. Significantly her psychiatrist gave live oral evidence with respect to the defendant's mental state at the time of the arson and her prospects for future good health. The presentence report filed was a very positive report. Dr. Rauf Sirman testified as an expert witness. The defendant is his patient. His qualifications are sterling and were unchallenged. Dr. Sirman first met the defendant on May 10, 2010. He has met her regularly for first assessment and then for treatment since that time. His assessment of the defendant was filed as Exhibit 3(
a) at the sentencing hearing. He commenced his evidence by reviewing that report. Dr. Sirman reported that the defendant had described trying to kill herself on a previous occasion and then again on the evening of January 2, 2010. On each occasion the method of suicide was to be by way of carbon monoxide poisoning caused by running a motor vehicle in the household garage. On January 2, 2010, the defendant reported to Dr. Sirman that she could not get the car to fit into the garage - the complainant's motorcycle was in the way.
She then decided to kill herself by burning herself to death on the couple's marriage bed. She obtained gasoline, spread it about the room and lit it, but then left taking the family dog. She reported that she then planned to kill herself in a motor vehicle accident. At the time the defendant had been drinking and was depressed. She and her husband were both alcoholics as were both the defendant's parents. Dr. Sirman noted that the defendant has struggled with anxiety and depression most of her adult life complicated by a history of alcoholism.
His formal diagnosis of the defendant was that she suffered from a major effective disorder that is, major depression, type - unipolar and non-psychotic on the background of a chronic substance abuse disorder that is alcoholism, which appeared to him to be in remission when he assessed her in May of 2010. The defendant also suffered from a dependent type personality disorder. His assessment of her prognosis when he wrote his report was good. Dr. Sirman assessed the defendant's risk to the community and to herself. He's of the opinion that she is not a risk to the former, but may be a risk to herself.
He found the arson to be an isolated act which will likely never repeat itself. The defendant does not fit the psychiatric profile of an arsonist. Dr. Sirman supplemented and updated his assessment in his oral evidence. Since he began treating the defendant she has been placed on two types of medication - an antidepressant and, after the breach of recognize, an antipsychotic drug to reduce her impulsive behaviour and help her organize her thoughts. He believes that at this time the defendant prognosis is good and her risk to herself is reduced as long as she does not renew her relationship with the complainant.
Dr. Sirman also has first hand knowledge of the effects upon mentally ill offenders of being incarcerated physically and the availability of treatment in a jail setting. If jailed he predicted that the defendant's mental health condition would deteriorate even if treated. The availability of treatment within a jail setting was much reduced. To paraphrase, essentially the progress that the defendant has made was at risk of being reversed. If untreated there is a risk the defendant will revert to her past pattern of behaviour and problematic relationships again.
If this happens, the person most at risk is the defendant herself. With continued treatment the defendant's prognosis remains good. In cross-examination Dr. Sirman agreed that after he started to treat the defendant she then breached her recognizance. He described being very disappointed in this and commenced an antipsychotic medication to try and allow the defendant to remain better focused. He assessed her reaction to this medication as being very good.
The multiple letters of support filed by the defendant speak to the regard she is held in her community and the fact that what she did was very much out of character. Considering the plea of guilty and the medical and character evidence, the Crown seeks a sentence of jail in the mid-reformatory range, plus probation and restitution to the insurer. The Crown submits that a conditional sentence is not available by operation of
section 752 of the Criminal Code , since the Crown's position is that this arson is a serious personal injury offence. The Crown's submission is that all arson is likely to endanger others and thus falls within the definition. The defence submits that given the defendant's plea of guilty, her unusual circumstances and her then untreated mental health issues, a noncustodial sentence is proper.
Restitution to the insurer cannot and is not opposed by the defendant. Restitution to the complainant was engaged in a civil ligation setting and I'll speak to that issue later. The Crown also relies upon case law which emphasizes how seriously arson offences should be treated when defendants are sentenced. As the Court of Appeal of Ontario stated clearly in R vs.
Mirzakhalili reported at 2009 ONCA 905 the court stated that, " This court has consistently held that conditional sentences are not appropriate for serious arson offences ." Further, the Crown submits that the cases cited by both counsel involved offences that predate the 2007 amendment to the Criminal Code which further limited the available of conditional sentences in cases involving serious personal injury offences. The Crown's submission already alluded to is that a conditional sentence of imprisonment is simply not available on this offence.
In support of this the Crown notes that the definition of serious person injury offence in
section 752 of the Criminal Code includes, "conduct endangering or likely to endanger the life or safety of another person or inflicting or likely to inflict severe psychological damage upon another person". If I accept the Crown's submission
section 742.1 of the Criminal Code precludes a conditional sentence from being imposed here. Ironically as observed during submissions a fully noncustodial sentence is however a legal sentence, since there is no minimum sentence for
section 434.1 Criminal Code offence. Given the double effect of the
section 752 definition and the strong statement of the Ontario Court of Appeal referred to already, is there still a route to a conditional sentence here? Certainly the sentence sought by the Crown-within the reformatory system-is not a basis to reject such a sentence. I agree that should the defendant be sentenced to jail her sentence would not be more than two years less one day.
Further this offender considered in isolation to her offence, is I find exactly the type of offender that the conditional sentence regime was intended to apply to - a nonviolent, medically beset adult first offender who represents no risk to the community. Indeed the unchallenged expert opinion of Dr. Sirman is that if incarcerated in jail the chances of the defendant receiving proper and consistent medical treatment in the jail is very poor and the risk that the defendant will slide back into mental health difficulties correspondingly greater. I note, Dr. Sirman has experience as a jail psychiatrist.
He is in a position to know. Indeed I am lead to ask on a broader basis, who would benefit at all from the physical incarceration of this defendant? Not her, since medically the effect upon her would be potentially great. Not the complainant or the insurance company, since her ability to answer any part of the financial effects of her crime would probably be diminished if not destroyed by jail. Not the community, since the community stands to benefit far more from a healthy defendant in the long run.
I question as well the extent of any added deterrent effect on others in the community should the defendant be forced to serve her sentence of incarceration in a bricks and mortar jail setting instead of in the community, particularly if the conditional sentence had very strict terms. A conditional sentence is a sentence of incarceration and serves to denounce and deter the acts of the defendant in aid of the community at large. The Crown's view of the
section 752 definition in this case hinges, I think, on the potential for harm from the defendant's act of arson here. As it was submitted, every emergency responder has the potential of an accident as they go to a call, putting themselves and other drivers at risk. Firefighters are inherently at risk battling a fire by the nature of their trade and every fire has the potential to harm a firefighter. When firefighters are at the scene of a fire they are potentially unavailable to response to other calls as the Crown submits.
Further, although not argued, a bystander-perhaps a child viewing the fire in the middle of the night could potentially be psychologically harmed in a serious way. I note that on the facts of this case no other structure was at risk and no firefighter was placed at the extreme risk posed by having to enter a burning building. I also take judicial notice of our local program of mutual assistance, whereby one fire department assists neighbouring departments when necessary ensuring continuing coverage for all. In my view such potential sources of harm are too remote to trigger the
section 752 definition of serious personal injury offence. Were such potentials considered other offences where the punishment upon indictment is more than 10 years could be caught by
section 752 where the mere potential existed that someone, somewhere, somehow, might be harmed.
Consider this example. Breaking and entering a house may be punished by life in prison. The psychological effect on a householder of having their home entered has often been described by Crowns and in victim impact statements. Such effects could indeed be psychologically crippling to the homeowner. Does this make a break and enter to someone's house a serious personal injury offence for which a conditional sentence is unavailable? I've not been directed to any case where that is the decision of the court-and I think not. In my view, the
interpretation the Crown seeks to place on the
section 752 definition in the context of this case is overbroad, remote and not intended by Parliament. Sometimes words have to be given their plain sense. To define a duck as an ostrich does not make it an ostrich. I conclude that arson under
section 434.1 of the Criminal Code is not a serious personal injury offence and that a conditional sentence is therefore still available here as an option in sentencing. Given the Court of Appeal's view of such a sentence in an arson case, ought I to exercise that option in the defendant's case in any event? Arson is after all an inherently serious offence punishable by indictment with the potential for jail in the penitentiary for 14 years. I note however that the arson cases cited by the Crown do not involve the same fact situation as I'm faced with here.
In each cited case the arson was planned, was deliberate, was executed often for personal or commercial monetary gain, or for fraud in a preplanned and crafty manner. Such is not the case here. Dr. Sirman's expert opinion is that the defendant, acting on an impulse and in despair, sought to commit suicide by fire. She tried to kill herself first with her car in the garage, but the way into the garage was blocked.
She then poured gasoline in the marriage bedroom and lit a fire intending to die in the house in the bedroom, but then fled taking the family dog resolving instead to try a different form of suicide with her vehicle. She was depressed and had a dispute in the recent past with the complainant, had consumed alcohol, was mentally unable to cope with her relationship issues and started the fire to deliberately end her life. She stood to gain nothing by her act. Rather the opposite. It was not an action taken on any prior plan, but was a foolish act fuelled by her then mental illness and done spontaneously.
The effect was a very serious fire causing the total destruction of her house and this too must be seriously considered on sentence. In my view, however, the acts of this defendant and the unchallenged medical reasons for those act make this case of arson one that is out of the range of acts of arson for which a jail term not served in the community is required by the case law binding on me. In other words, the facts of this offence and this offender are such that a conditional sentence on strict terms is not only an available sentencing option, but also the appropriate sentence here.
I summarize my reasons (for clarity) as follows: 1 . The acts of the defendant were spontaneous acts. 2 . The defendant stood to gain nothing from her arson. 3 . The defendant fully admitted to her actions immediately. 4 . The defendant has accepted full responsibility for her acts, pleading guilty and showing great remorse. 5 . The defendant consents to a restitution order in favour of the insurer. 6 . The defendant was mentally ill at the time of her act, not such as to establish a defence, but rather to explain her despair and motivation to self harm. She also does not fit the profile of an arsonist. 7 .
The defendant has been treated for her mental illness and the prognosis for the future is good. 8 . The risk to the public posed by this defendant is very low. 9 . The Crown agrees that a sentence of less than two years is appropriate here. 10 . The defendant has no prior criminal record. 11 . The defendant's presentence report is extremely positive. 12 . The defendant is well respected in her community and her acts were highly uncharacteristic of her usual behaviour. 13 .
The uncontradicted medical advice and evidence is that the defendant will likely not receive proper and complete mental health treatment if physically incarcerated and if that should happen her mental health would likely suffer in custody. I conclude that she might come out of jail in a worse state of mental health than when she went into custody.
14 . The defendant was arrested and has served time prior to plea. 15 . A conditional sentence of imprisonment is a sentence of imprisonment and not merely a form of probation. If the defendant breaches her sentence the entire balance of her sentence may be converted to jail - jail which may be longer than the sentence sought by the Crown today. This final factor serves to deter the defendant and others while also serving to denounce her actions.
The sentencing factors are properly balanced under sections 718 and following of the Criminal Code to effect both denunciation and rehabilitation, while at the same time properly using incarceration as a sentencing last resort. In my view the defendant's circumstances and the facts of this case illustrate the value of judicial discretion in sentencing. This offender in this case is the rare case where a conditional sentence is indeed appropriate on a charge of arson and that is the sentence I intend to impose here.
The length of the sentence and the terms of that order will however reflect the very serious offence that the defendant has committed. There is no controversy between the Crown and defence with respect to the issue of restitution to the insurance company. The question of restitution in favour of the complainant husband was however complicated by the matrimonial property issues currently being litigated between the parties. However rocky their past relationship was, the complainant has suffered undoubted financial loss at the hands of the defendant.
The proper place to quantify that loss however is in the family court since it is not a simple issue of addition and subtraction where matrimonial property is potentially involved and legal title to property may be overridden by the family law. I'm not in a position as a criminal court to decide the issue of restitution in favour of the complainant, if any, and any Gardiner hearing would run the risk of reaching a different result than that of the family court since quantum and entitlement are not agreed.
I will therefore not make a restitution order in favour of the complainant husband and added submissions of the Crown indicate that is not, in any event, sought today. The defendant breached her recognize and in a particularly blatant way, by going to the house she was barred from going to and by leaving an inflammatory note for the complainant there. That said, leaving the note also ensured she would be caught, illustrating her lack of foresight. This lack of foresight is not surprising given Dr. Sirman's evidence.
She's entered a plea of guilty to that offence and is to be sentenced for that offence today as well. Breaches of court orders commonly attract a sentence of jail. Here the defendant has served five days time before sentencing equivalent at the time of the offence to 10 days. I'll ask you now to stand up please ma'am. On the breach of recognize the sentence of the court is that-the sentence is time served 10 days plus one day which is today. You'll be released from the courthouse today on this count.
On the arson charge, my sentence is as follows: You'll be imprisoned for the term of 18 months and shall serve your sentence of imprisonment in the community, subject to you complying with the following conditions: 1. Keep the peace and be of good behaviour. 2. Appear before the court when required to do so. 3. Report within two working days, in person, to your supervisor and thereafter when required by the supervisor and in the manner directed by the supervisor. 4. Remain within the Province of Ontario unless written permission to go outside the Province is obtained from the court or your supervisor. 5.
Notify your supervisor in advance of any change of name or address and promptly notify the supervisor of any change of employment or occupation. 6. Not be outside your residence for the duration of this order, except for the purpose of: (
a) reporting to your supervisor; (
b) to comply with any condition of this order as approved of in advance by your supervisor; (
c) for medical emergencies, appointments or procedures for yourself, or a member of your immediate family; (
d) for legal appointments, or court or tribunal appearances; (
e) for lawful employment upon hours, places, or
schedule as your supervisor may approve of in advance of such employment;
(
f) each Saturday from 12 noon to 4:00 p.m. to shop for personal necessities; I'll pause for a second, Mr. Covre is there a request with respect to religious observance? MR. COVRE: Yes, there is ah? THE COURT: What day of the week and what time? MR. COVRE: Sunday, please. THE COURT: Sunday. Times? MR. COVRE: It varies. The times vary with respect to Mass. So, perhaps we can say nine till noon, would that be alright? MS. MORGAN-MCGOUGALL: That would be great. MR. COVRE: Nine till noon. (
g) each Sunday from 9:00 a.m. to 12 noon for the purpose of religious observance; MR. COVRE: Thank you. (
h) such other times with the prior written permission of your supervisor, such permission to be specific as to place, time and reason and such permission to be on your person while away from your residence. 7. You will abstain absolutely from the purchase, possession and or consumption of alcohol, or drugs prohibited by law. 8. You will not possess any weapon as defined by the Criminal Code . 9. You will continue to attend upon Dr. Sirman or his designate for medical treatment until formally discharged from his care. 10.
You will take such counselling, assessment and/or treatment for anger management, substance abuse and/or mental health issues as may be directed by your supervisor or delegate. 11. You will sign any necessary consents to enable your supervisor to contact directly Dr. Sirman, his delegate and any other service provider, such that the supervisor can monitor your compliance with this sentence. 12. You will make reasonable efforts to seek and maintain employment and provide proof of compliance with this condition upon the request of your supervisor or delegate. 13.
You will reside where approved by your supervisor or delegate and not change your residence without first obtaining the written approval of your supervisor or delegate. THE COURT: Do you understand these terms ma'am? MS. MORGAN-MCDOUGALL: I do. Yes, Your Honour. THE COURT: It is an extremely serious matter to breach this court order. If you do so and you are found to have breached this order, you could serve the remainder of your sentence up to and including the total 18 months in a real jail with clanging steel doors. Do you understand that? MS. MORGAN-MCDOUGALL: I do. Yes, Your Honour.
THE COURT: If this order needs to be reviewed, or changed you can bring the matter back before the court and ask the court to reconsider the terms of the order. You can do that by yourself going to the counter. You can go through your lawyer, or you can go through your supervisor and the court will consider your request to change the terms of the order. In a few minutes you'll receive a copy of the order. Please make sure you understand your rights and obligations under that order. If you have any questions, take them up with Mr. Covre or your supervisor to clarify those questions.
Have I missed any terms with respect to the order? MR. COVRE: I think in fairness Your Honour, there should be a non-association term with Mr. Hazell. THE COURT: Is that sought by the Crown? MR COVRE: It is. It is. THE COURT: All right. You will not associate directly or indirectly with Ronald Hazell. Do you understand that term ma'am? MS. MORGAN-MCDOUGALL: I do, yes. THE COURT: To assist the defendant's treatment, I am going to ask you Mr. Covre to provide a copy of this order to Dr. Sirman. MR. COVRE: Oh, I shall absolutely.
THE COURT: I think it's important that he knows what the duties and obligations... MR. COVRE: I'll... THE COURT: ...of this defendant are. MR. COVRE: ...I will be advising him actually today as to, at least verbally, as to Your Honour's order and then I'll certainly would, my client will provide me with a copy and I'll provide it to him. THE COURT: Excellent thank you. MR. COVRE: Thank you sir. THE COURT: There will be a stand alone restitution order in favour of RSA Group/Western Assurance Company in the amount of $111,946.03. I note that madam clerk that is a stand alone order... COURTROOM CLERK: Yes.
THE COURT: ...not part of the conditional sentence order and will not be part of the probation order which I'm about to deal with. This is a DNA secondary offence. You will within the next two business days report to the Dufferin Detachment, the Ontario Provincial Police in Primrose. I'm sorry, I see the officer standing. Is there a possibility of having the sample taken today? OFFICER FROM THE BODY OF THE COURT: Yes, Your Honour there is. THE COURT: All right. Instead of that, you will attend today for the purpose of providing a sample of your DNA to the national DNA data bank.
That will be much easier than getting you up to Primrose again. After the completion of your conditional sentence, you will be placed on probation for a further 18 months. Let me stop for a second, that means the court is keeping an eye on you for three years ma'am.
The terms of that order are as follows: you'll keep the peace and be of good behaviour; you'll return to court as required; you will report to and be under the supervision of a probation officer forthwith upon the completion of your conditional sentence and thereafter as required by your probation officer; you will take such counselling, assessment and/or treatment for alcohol issues, anger management and/or mental health issues as may be directed by your probation officer; you will continue to be under the care of Dr.
Sirman and/or his delegate until discharged from his care; you will sign any necessary releases in favour of your probation officer so that they may contact Dr. Sirman or his delegate and/or other service providers directly to see how you are doing with that counselling assessment and/or treatment; you will not possess any weapons as defined by the Criminal Code ; you will not purchase, possess, consume any alcohol or drugs prohibited by law. Any other terms? I'm sorry there should be a non-association term as well? MR. COVRE: I think so, Your Honour.
THE COURT: You will not associate directly, or indirectly with the complainant Ronald Hazell. I should indicate in both the conditional sentence order and the probation order counsel that should be except as is necessary for the purposes of court. MR. COVRE: Or any legal proceeding, yes. THE COURT: Yes, for legal proceedings. Thank you for the wording. Do you understand those terms? MS. MORGAN-MCDOUGALL: I do. Yes, Your honour. THE COURT: Again, it's a serious matter to breach the terms of this order. If you do so and you are convicted, you could easily go to jail. Do you understand that warning? MS.
MORGAN-MCDOUGALL: I do. Yes, sir. THE COURT: Again, if this order needs to be reviewed or changed you can bring the matter back before the court and ask the court to reconsider the terms of the order and the court will do so. You can do that either by going to the counter yourself, going through your lawyer or by going through your probation officer and the court will consider your request. In a few minutes you will also get a copy of this order. It sets out what your rights are, but also your obligations. Please make sure you understand those rights and obligations.
If you have any questions take them up with your lawyer, or your probation officer. Anything I missed on that order? MR. COVRE: No. MR. HUNKING: Not from the Crown thank you. THE COURT: Any ancillary issues I missed? MR. HUNKING: Not for the Crown thank you. MR. COVRE: No, our Honour. THE COURT: There's no firearm prohibition related to this offence? MR. HUNKING: No, sir. THE COURT: All right. Okay. So, there are a number of other counts on these other informations. The Crown's position with
respect to those? MR. HUNKING: To be marked as withdrawn please sir. THE COURT: All right. Those other counts are withdrawn at the request of the Crown and there will be considerable paperwork for your client to sign before she leaves the building upstairs in the main court office. MR. COVRE: Yes. THE COURT: She could go up there now please and they will get that process started. MR. COVRE: I, I shall direct her, yes Your Honour and I want to thank Your Honour for your consideration of this matter and extend my thanks to my colleague and also to Ms. Marcon who ah, who was very fair in dealing with this as well.
THE COURT: All right. MR HUNKING: Thank my friend for his comments and thank you Your Honour. THE COURT: Thanks very much. Thank you. Good luck ma'am. MS. MORGAN-MCDOUGALL: Thank you, Your Honour. MR. COVRE: Thank you. FORM 2 CERTIFICATION OF TRANSCRIPT SUBSECTION 5(2) Evidence Act I, K.J. McFadden, certify that this document is a true and accurate transcript of the recording of R v. Margaret Morgan McDougall in the Ontario Court of Justice held at 10 Louisa Street, Orangeville, Ontario N9W 3P9 taken from Recording Number, 42/11 Courtroom No. 102 the original of which has been certified in Form l.
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY K.J.MCFADDEN ____________________ ________________________________ Date: Feb. 23, 2011 K.J. McFadden, Court Reporter Transcript Ordered:....................... Transcript Completed:..................... Ordering Party Notified:..................
Loading document…