R. v. Campbell, 2017 ONCJ 570

O N T A R I O C O U R T O F J U S T I C E CITATION: R. v. Campbell, 2017 ONCJ 570 DA T E: J ul y · 4, 2017 B E T W E E N : Her M ajes t y t he Q u een — an d — Donald C amp b ell Heard J une 1 3, 2 0 17 Reaso n s for J udg m e nt rele a sed o n Ju l y 4 , 2017 H . C o o ke ........................................................................................... . C o u n s el f o r t he C r o wn H . B a s si ................................................................................. . C o u n s el f o r the D e fe n d a nt

T a ble o f Co n t e n ts: R . v . Ca m pbell I. I n tro d uction........................................................................................................................... 2 II. Ch a rter A p pl i cation.............................................................................................................. 3 A. O n us .................................................................................................................................. 3 B. Anal y sis – s. 1 0(b) ............................................................................................................ 3 C.

Anal y sis ............................................................................................................................ 5 III. s. 2 4(2) o f t h e Ch a r t er – E x clusion o f E v id e n c e ......................................................... 7 A. I n tro d uction ...................................................................................................................... 7 B. Ser i ous n ess o f t h e C h arte r - in f r i n g ing sta t e c o nduct ............................................... 7 C.

I m p act o n C h arter - pro t ect e d In t erests ....................................................................... 10 D. Societ y ’s I n t e re s t in a n Adju d i c ation o f t h e C a se ................................................... 10 E. Bala n cing ....................................................................................................................... 11 IV. D i sposition o f t h e T r i al ................................................................................................. 11 F elix J.: I.

In t r o d u c tion [ 1 ] T he def e ndant i s c harg e d w ith “O v er 80” ar i sing o u t o f a police in v estigation on A p ril 1 0 , 2 0 16. [ 2 ] T he in v estig a ting p olice o f f i cer and his pa r tner (a n ew police o f fic e r he w as t raining) r e c ei v ed infor m ation f r om pol i ce d i sp a t ch co n cerning a p o ssi b le i m pa i red dri v er.

Equipp e d w ith infor m a tion a b out p oor dri v ing and t h e id en tif y ing pa r ti c ula r s o f the v e hicle, the p o l ice w ent to the regi s ter e d ad dr ess o f the dri v er. [ 3 ] T he in v estig a ting p olice o f f i cer had c o nta c t w ith t h e d e fe n dant on a dri v e w a y in fro n t o f a r e side n ce. T here w ere no ph y sic a l i ndic a to r s sugg e st i ng th a t the dri v er w as into x ica t ed b u t there w a s a faint odo u r of a l coh o l. T he o ff i cer for m ed a re a s o nable s u spic i on a n d m ade an appro v ed s c reeni n g de v ice [AS D ] d e m and.

T he defe nd ant failed the A SD and w as arr e s te d . [ 4 ] T he def e ndant ( a s applica n

t) broug h t an appl i c a tion pu r s uant to s. 8, 9 , and 10(

b) of the C harter of R ig h ts a n d F reedo m s [ C har t e r ] se e king e x clusion o f the br e ath readin g s.

[ 5 ] The applicant asserted that there was an unjustified delay of approximately (7) seven minutes after arrest during which rights tocounsel were not provided. The applicant argued that the approach of the investigating police officer was akin to providing rights tocounsel “as soon as practicable” rather than “without delay” as required by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33[Suberu]. [ 6 ] The respondent Crown Attorney submits that the delay was reasonable and explained. There was no breach of the Charter. [ 7 ] For the reasons that follow, the applicant has established a breach of s. 8, s.9, and 10(

b) of the Charter on a balance ofprobabilities; However, the applicant has not established a remedy pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter. [ 8 ] The breath readings are admissible. [ 9 ] The defendant is found guilty. II. Charter Application A. Onus [ 1 0 ] The applicant bears the onus on the s.9 and s.10(

b) Charter arguments on a balance of probabilities. The respondent has the onuson the related s.8 assertion because there was a warrantless search and seizure in this case: R. v. Haas, (ON CA),[2005] O.J. No 3160 (QL)(C.A.), at paras. 24-26; leave ref’d [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 423. [ 1 1 ] With respect to the remedy sought pursuant to s.24(2) of the Charter, the applicant must establish a nexus between the breathsamples and the asserted Charter breaches.

The applicant must also establish on a balance of probabilities that the admission of theevidence would tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute: R v. Pino, 2016 ONCA 389 at para. 36 [Pino]. B. Analysis – s.10(b) [ 1 2 ] The submissions in this case make it clear that the s.8 and s.9 complaints are dependent on the core issue around provision ofrights to counsel.

[ 1 3 ] The police officer testified that the delay in the providing rights to counsel was for the following reasons: a. He was trying to determine his legal authority to tow the defendant’s vehicle given he had observed it on the roadway but it came torest on a private driveway. His consultations with others provided him with the logistical dilemma that he would have authority to towonly after the first breath test; b. He had to notify another unit to attend to address the tow of the vehicle; c.

During the search incidental to arrest he found $300.00 in twenty dollar bills in the defendant’s front right pocket and he had to countthis money in front of the defendant for safekeeping; d. Open liquor was located in the defendant’s vehicle and he was providing verbal direction to the second officer at the scene (histrainee) concerning the search. This also lead to officer safety and evidence preservation concerns around the need to secure evidence (theliquor) before anyone (possibly) came out of the residence; and, e.

His general practice to wait a minute or two for detainees to calm down given the arrest so that they might calmly process andunderstand their rights to counsel. [ 1 4 ] During cross-examination it was put to the officer that his approach to rights to counsel was more akin to providing rights tocounsel “as soon as practicable”. The officer largely agreed with this characterization. C. Analysis [ 1 5 ] It has been many years since the Supreme Court of Canada provided clear guidance concerning the timing of the provision ofrights to counsel.

Consider the Court’s clear statement found in Suberu at paragraphs 40 - 42: 40 As with "detention", any

interpretation of the phrase "without delay" must be consistent with a purposive understanding of theCharter provision in which it occurs. As this Court noted in R. v. Therens, (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at pp. 641-42,and in R. v. Bartle, (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173, the purpose of s. 10(

b) is to ensure that individuals know of their right tocounsel, and have access to it, in situations where they suffer a significant deprivation of liberty due to state coercion which leaves themvulnerable to the exercise of state power and in a position of legal jeopardy. Specifically, the right to counsel is meant to assist detaineesregain their liberty, and guard against the risk of involuntary self-incrimination. 41 A situation of vulnerability relative to the state is created at the outset of a detention. Thus, the concerns about self-incriminationand the interference with liberty that s. 10(

b) seeks to address are present as soon as a detention is effected. In order to protect against therisk of self-incrimination that results from the individuals being deprived of their liberty by the state, and in order to assist them inregaining their liberty, it is only logical that the phrase "without delay" must be interpreted as "immediately". If the s. 10(

b) right to counsel is to serve its intended purpose to mitigate the legal disadvantage

and legal jeopardy faced by detainees, and to assist them in regaining their liberty, the police must immediately inform them of the right tocounsel as soon as the detention arises. 42 To allow for a delay between the outset of a detention and the engagement of the police duties under s. 10(

b) creates an ill-defined and unworkable test of the application of the s. 10(

b) right. The right to counsel requires a stable and predictable definition. Whatconstitutes a permissible delay is abstract and difficult to quantify, whereas the concept of immediacy leaves little room formisunderstanding. An ill-defined threshold for the application of the right to counsel must be avoided, particularly as it relates to a right thatimposes specific obligations on the police.

In our view, the words "without delay" mean "immediately" for the purposes of s. 10(b).Subject to concerns for officer or public safety, and such limitations as prescribed by law and justified under s. 1 of the Charter, the policehave a duty to inform a detainee of his or her right to retain and instruct counsel, and a duty to facilitate that right immediately upondetention. [ 1 6 ] Police officers are required to provide rights to counsel immediately upon detention or arrest. [ 1 7 ] That presumptive constitutional obligation is suspended by operation of s.1 of the Charter during roadside sobriety investigations:R v.

Thomsen, (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.); R v. Orbanski, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). [ 1 8 ] Police officers are permitted to breach the Charter rights of a detainee while investigating drinking and driving offences.

The s.1Charter justification is premised upon a focused and efficient use of police investigative power to detect and prevent the carnageassociated with drinking and driving. [ 1 9 ] Once the detainee is arrested, the rational for the suspension of rights is gone. [ 2 0 ] The only justifiable basis for delaying the provision of rights to counsel is “subject to concerns for officer or public safety, andsuch limitations as prescribed by law and justified under s.1 of the Charter.”: Suberu, para. 42. [ 2 1 ] The explanations provided by the officer in items (

a) and (

b) above are not sufficient to justify a delay in the provision of rights tocounsel. The vehicle was in a private driveway, not a live lane of travel on the road. There was no safety issue to address associated withthe vehicle. Resolving the issue of the legal authority to tow the vehicle could be left to another officer. [ 2 2 ] Items (

c) and (

d) are legitimate police concerns but should not have been prioritized ahead of the provision of rights to counsel. Onthe record at this proceeding, counting money obtained incidental to arrest, should not have been prioritized ahead of rights to counsel.Seizing evidence such as alcohol was important but there was another officer present who was dealing with that task. The investigatingofficer was not personally dealing with that issue. [ 2 3 ] Item (

e) is a legitimate police concern as well. The officer testified that often it is beneficial to wait a minute or two after the arrestto allow the detainee to calm down. He testified that when providing rights to counsel, it is important that the detainee actually process

the infor m a tion pro v ided and unde r s t and t heir rig h t s . I bel i e v e th a t th i s w as a s inc e re b e li e f he l d by the o ff i ce r . If the l e ngth o f the delay for this pur p ose w as m ere m o m en t s , i t m ight p o s sibly be j u s t i fied in so m e ci r cu ms ta n c e s. T h i s is n o t to s u gge s t th a t a s tan da rd pr a c t ice of w aiting m inut e s t o p ro v ide rig h ts t o c ounsel s hould be cou n tena n ced. [ 2 4 ] T he t o tal delay in p ro v iding righ t s to c o unsel w as in the r a nge o f se v en m inut e s. T h e o f f i cer engaged i n ot h er a c ti v ities ( a s o u tlin e d in this judg m e n

t) prior to p r o v iding rig h t s t o c o uns e l. T he pr o v ision of righ t s to co u nsel s h ould ha v e been the prior i t y . T he o f f i c e r’s approach in t his c a se can n o t be har m onized w ith t he s t a ndard in Suberu . [ 2 5 ] T he appl i cant h a s e sta b li s h ed a bre a ch of s.10 (

b) o f the C harter and the d epende n t s .8 and s.9 bre a ch e s o n a b ala n ce o f pro b abiliti e s . III. s.24(2) of t h e C harter – Ex c lus i on o f E v i d ence A. In t r o d u c t i o n [ 2 6 ] T he appl i cant se e k s e x cl u sion of bre a t h sa m p l e r e su l t s o b tained f r om in v iolation o f s .8, 9 , and 10 (

b) o f the C harte r . [ 2 7 ] T he appl i cant h a s e sta b li s h ed on a ba l ance of prob a bilit ie s the ne x us bet w een t he bre a th sa m pl e s and the C harter bre a ch e s . B ut the applica n t has n o t e sta b li s h ed on a ba l ance of prob a bilit ie s th a t the ad m is s ion o f the e v idence w ould bring the a d m ini s tr a ti o n o f j u s tice into dis r eput e : R . v . Pin o , 2 0 16 O NC A 389 . B .

S e r i o u sn e ss of t h e C h art e r - i n f ri n gi n g s tate c ondu c t [ 2 8 ] T he co n du c t of t h e in v estigating o ff i cer in th i s c a se w as n o t in co m plia n ce w ith S u ber u . [ 2 9 ] T his w as an o ff i cer w ith al m ost a d e c a de of e x perienc e . H e w as keenly a w are of his r e spon s ibil i ty to p r o v ide rights to cou n sel. H e priorit i zed o t her a c t i v it ies ahead o f the pro v ision of rig h t s t o c o uns e l.

In e f fe c t, h i s e v idence d ro v e to w ards t h e log i st i cal c ons i de r atio n s a t the side o f the road in a so m e w hat d y na m ic s i tuat i on. H i s e x planations w ere l ogical and c o nce rn ed w ith h i s d uty as a pol i ce off i cer e v en if s u ch m atte r s sh o uld n ot suppla n t the pri m a c y of rig h ts to cou n se l .

[ 3 0 ] T he pol i ce h a d a l e gal oblig a tion to a d dre s s the tow of the v ehicle. I ha v e already held that the in v estig a ti n g o f f i cer did not ha v e to be t h at person gi v en th a t o ther o f f i cers could h a v e been t a s ked w ith th i s obligatio n . N e v ert h ele s s, gi v en the r e w as so m e d eba t e a bout his author i t y , it i s a c tu a lly co mm endable t h at he to o k ti m e to c l arify his author i t y . P olice o f fic e rs s hould c a ref u lly e x a m ine their a u thor i ty ( s t at u tory or o ther w i se) bef o re t a king a cti o n .

T h i s is a go o d th i ng in a de m ocr a c y . H o w e v er, th i s an a l y sis c o uld ha v e , and shou l d ha v e , oc c urred a f ter rig h t s to co u nse l . [ 3 1 ] C ounting the m on e y seized from t h e d efenda n t i nci d ental to a rre s t w a s an i m po r ta n t p olice duty so that t h e prope r ty is s a fe g uarded. T his w as n o t a fri v olous a c t on the pa r t of t he o f fic e r.

B ut once a gai n , it could ha v e w aited the si x ty secon d s needed t o co mm u nic a te r i gh t s t o cou n se l . [ 3 2 ] Seizing t he o pen l i q uor and sea r ching t he v ehicle w as a l so an i m porta n t p o li c e d u t y as it rel a ted to the pr e ser v ation o f e v idenc e . But the in v e s tig a ti n g o f f i cer did not ph y si c ally in v o l v e hi m self i n the re m o v al of a l cohol or t he sea r ch of t he v ehicl e . T here w as ano t her off i cer deali n g w ith that m a t te r .

So gi v en t h ere w as a s e c ond o ff i cer it w as not nec e s sary f or the in v estig a ting o f f i cer to addr e s s i t pe r sonally (li k e it m ig h t i f he w ere alon e ). [ 3 3 ] I a c cept the o f fi c er ’ s co n cern t h at a s s o cia t es of the appl i c ant m ig h t co m e o u t of the r e s idence and in v o l v e the m sel v es in the in v estigatio n . T h i s had happ e ned to h i m befo r e.

B ut o n ce agai n , I find th a t not w ith s t a nding th e se co n si d eratio n s the o ff i cer had t i m e to co mm unic a te rig h ts to cou n sel. [ 3 4 ] W hile t he cou r t sh o uld n o t e n do r se a g eneral p ra c t i ce o f w aiting a m inute o r t w o to p r o v ide rights to cou n sel, the rati o nale e x pre s sed by the o f fi c er in v ol v ed a c o nce r n th a t the detainee a ctu a lly under s tand their rig h t s . I b e lie v ed t h is e v idence fr o m the o f f i ce r .

H e w as si n cere in d e sc r ibing his w ish to let the h eat o f the arr e s t su b side slig h tly before pro v iding ri g hts to cou n se l . [ 3 5 ] F inall y , although t h e o f f i cer agreed w ith a sugg e s tion th a t his approach w as a kin to “ as s oon a s pr a c tic a ble” pro v ision o f rig h ts t o cou n sel rath e r than i mm ediat e , his o v erarching e x planati o n f o r h i s delay related to t h e m a t te r s th a t I h a v e anal y zed. I am r e quired to anal y ze the c ond u c t a s a w hole r a ther than draw co n cl u s i ons bas e d on a sin g le a n s w er.

It i s a l so i m po r tant th a t the o ff i cer f u r t her e m phas i zed th a t h i s p o li c e training re q uired him to m a ke s ure that the “en v iron m ent w as s afe” the r eby ass e rt i ng a general i zed p olice s a f e ty co n sider a tion th a t I found to be j u st i fia b le. [ 3 6 ] On this r e cor d , the applica n t has n o t s ati s fied m e th a t t h e Suberu breach i s a gene r al pr a ct i ce or probl e m in the D urh a m r e gion. I am thi n king of S chr e ck P. A . J. ’ s pe r su a si v e d e cis i on in R . v. Sandhu 2017 ON C J 226 ( C .

J .) at para g rap h s 9- 1 1 w herein he l i s t s nu m ero u s ca s es w here C our t s h a d ad d re s sed t h e Suber u i s s ue in t he R egion of Pee l en r oute to a f i nding that there w as a s y ste m ic probl e m . T here i s no s uch r e cord in t his c a s e . [ 3 7 ] I found t h e o f f icer i n th i s c a se t o be a credible w itne ss . H e w as prof e ss i onal, d e tai l ed, a nd d i re c tly re s ponsi v e to qu e sti on s i n h i s te s ti m on y .

H e sin c erely h e ld the v ie w s he e x pre s sed a b o ut h i s prioriti e s . [ 3 8 ] I a c kno w ledge t h a t the o f fi c er’s e v idence a nd the e v iden c e of the ci v ilian w itness d i f f ered w ith r e sp e c t to the p o s i tion of the applica n t ’ s v ehicle at the ti m e of the in v estig a tion ( i. e ., w hether the c ar w as on the road w a y or on t he dri v e w a y at the t i m e of f ir s t int e ra c t i on w ith t he off i cer ) . I could n o t r e sol v e this d i f f er e nce b et w een the t w o w itness e s.

But in t he en d , the p o siti on ing o f the v ehicle w as n ot v e r y i m porta n t in this p r oceeding nor w as i t i m por t ant t o the r e sol u tion of C harter i s su e s .

[ 3 9 ] T he fail u re to pro v ide rig h ts to cou n sel w as s e rio u s, b u t o n th i s r e cord it w as u nde r sta n d a ble or e x plainabl e . It w as dri v en by the ci r cu ms ta n ce s . I d i d not find the in v es t igating o f f i cer to be ca v alier or re c kle ss . H e w as t hough t ful and l ogi c al. [ 4 0 ] N ot w ithsta n ding th i s char a c ter i zat i on o f the o f f i cer ’ s cond u c t , the Supre m e C ou r t of C anada’s guida n ce in Suberu is clear and una m biguou s . [ 4 1 ] T his an a l y sis o f th i s f a c tor supp o r t s e x clusio n . C.

Im p a c t o n C h art e r -p rot e ct e d I n t e rests [ 4 2 ] I ha v e no e v idence from the appl i ca n t c oncerni n g w hat e f f e ct t he se v en m inute delay had on h i s rig h t s . [ 4 3 ] T he in v estig a ting o f fic e r f a cili t a ted a c c ess to cou n sel of c hoice b a ck at the s t a tion. H e l eft se v eral m e s sa g es for c oun s el o f c h oice but gi v en the ti m e o f n i ght the appl i ca n t di d not spe a k to co un sel. H e ref u sed to s p eak to duty c o unse l .

H e o nly w anted to spe a k to a sp e cif i c la w y er. [ 4 4 ] In s u ch ci r cu m sta n ces i t i s un c lear to m e th a t pro v iding r i ghts to cou n sel se v en m i n utes ear l ier w ould h a v e m ade much of a diff e ren c e. T he i n f or m ational c o m po n ent o f rig h ts to co u nsel w as addre s sed at the sc ene. T he ASD de m and w as co mm uni c ated “fo r th w ith ” . A c ce s s to cou n sel w ould h a v e been f a cil i tat e d at t he st a tion in eit h er s c e nario. [ 4 5 ] Se c tion 10(

b) of t he C hart e r i s pri m arily f o c u sed on se l f -i n c ri m inatio n . N o inc r i m inati n g e v idence w as g a theri n g by the poli c e d u r i ng t h e dela y . T he a ppl i c a nt w as n ot p l a ced i n a p os i tion w here self- incri m in a tion c o nc e rns ar o se. [ 4 6 ] In m y v i e w the i m p act o f the bre a ch w as fle e tin g . T he i n f or m ational co m pone n t o f the r i ghts to cou n sel w as d e la y ed but not d enied. [ 4 7 ] T his f a ctor fa v ours ad m is s ion o f the e v idenc e . D. So c i e t y ’ s I n t e r e st in an A d j u d icat i o n o f t h e Ca s e

[ 4 8 ] Adjudic a tion o f th i s ca s e on i ts m er i ts i s w arrante d . [ 4 9 ] T he e v idence sou g ht to be e x cluded in th i s c a se is hig h ly reliable. [ 5 0 ] T his f a ctor fa v ours i ncl u sion of t h e e v idenc e . E. Ba l anc i ng [ 5 1 ] T he o f f i cer i n th i s c ase fail e d to co m p l y w ith a clear s t a t e m ent o f law from the Supre m e C ourt o f C anada in Suber u . O v erall, I f ound that he w as n o t i g nora n t of t his stan d ard.

H e inappr o pri a tel y , b ut under s tandabl y , p r i orit i zed oth e r m a tt e rs o v er his res p ons i bili t y to co mm unic a te t h e r i ghts to cou n se l . [ 5 2 ] T here i s no re a son for the C ou r t to d i st ance i t se l f from th i s beha v ior.

I am not con v inced that the g ood repu t e of the a d m ini s tr a t i on of jus t ice and t h e lo n g -term co n fide n ce of the publ i c in the j u st i ce s y stem w ould be i m pacted by the c o n duct in t his ca s e . [ 5 3 ] A n i n for m ed re a so n able pe r son w ould be c onc e rned abo u t the fai l ure to p ro v ide righ t s to cou n sel i mm ediate l y but s u pport the a pproach o f the o f fi c er in this c a se. [ 5 4 ] T he appl i cant h a s n ot e s tabl i shed the b as i s for the 24( 2 ) r e m ed y . [ 5 5 ] T he e v idence i s a d m issib l e. IV.

Disp o sit i on o f the T rial [ 5 6 ] Both D efe nc e C ou n sel and the C ro w n Att o rney agreed t h at there w ere no tria l -rel a t e d argu m e n ts in t h is ca s e. [ 5 7 ] T he bre a th r eadin g s a re ad m i s sible

[ 5 8 ] T he def e ndant i s f o und gui l t y . Released Ju l y 4 , 2017 “Just i ce S. Felix”