R. v. Stampp, 2021 BCPC 264
Opinion
Citation: R. v. Stampp 2021 BCPC 264 Date: 20210825 File No: 103480-1 Registry: Port Coquitlam IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGINA v. SEAN DELANO STAMPP ORAL REASONS FOR SENTENCE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE R. McQUILLAN Counsel for the Crown: P. Bachra Counsel for the Defendant: L. Pippard Place of Hearing: Port Coquitlam , B.C. Date of Hearing: August 4, 2021 Date of Judgment: August 25, 2021 A Corrigendum was released by the Court on November 9, 2021.
The corrections have been made to the text and the Corrigendum is appended to this document. [ 1 ] Sean Delano Stampp has pleaded guilty to one count of trafficking in fentanyl on April 17, 2019, contrary to s. 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (“ CDSA ”). He is now before the court to be sentenced. [ 2 ] The Crown is seeking a 22-month jail sentence, to be served in a correctional facility, along with a 10-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order. The Defence seeks either a suspended sentence with probation, or a Conditional Sentence Order of something less than 24 months duration.
Circumstances of the Offence [ 3 ] Between December 2018 and April 2019 Coquitlam RCMP were engaged in a drug investigation regarding a dial-a-dope drug line involving the sale of fentanyl. During the course of that investigation undercover officers made 15 purchases from that drug line, one of which was from Mr. Stampp. [ 4 ] On April 17, 2019, officers were conducting surveillance connected to a cell phone involved in the drug line, for which they had obtained a tracking warrant.
That surveillance brought them to Walton Park in Coquitlam where at approximately 9:30 AM they observed a white Nissan Altima vehicle parked with a male in the driver’s seat. Officers followed the vehicle as it pulled into a Petro- Canada station and drove up next to a vehicle familiar to police, which they believed was involved in the re-loading of street-level drug traffickers. A male exited that vehicle and approached the driver of the Altima, who was later determined to be Mr. Stampp. The male placed a small bag in the back of the Altima and removed a black bag.
This was believed by the officers to be a re-loading event, meaning retrieval of money from drug sales and replacing the drugs that had been sold. Both vehicles then drove away. [ 5 ] Fifteen minutes later, an undercover officer called the dial-a-dope phone number being investigated. The officer asked the male answering the phone if he could buy a “ball of D”, which is a reference to “down”, or specifically heroin or fentanyl. He also asked if the drugs could be in one package. The call ended, and shortly thereafter the male phoned the undercover officer back and said the cost for 1/8 of an ounce would be $500.
The officer said that was not a good deal. The male said that he would see what he could do and would call him back. When he called back again the price remained at $500 but he ultimately agreed to a price of $480. They then made arrangements to meet at a Shell gas station in Port Coquitlam. [ 6 ] The undercover officer went to the Shell station and was met by the white Altima, driven by Mr. Stampp. The officer got into the Altima and they drove around the parking lot while Mr. Stampp handed the officer two bags of fentanyl in return for $480.
The undercover officer then left. [ 7 ] Police continued surveillance of Mr. Stampp for the next 2 ½ hours, during which time he was seen to conduct three further short duration meets, which appeared consistent with further drug sales. Mr. Stampp was then arrested and charged with trafficking in controlled substances. [ 8 ] The drugs sold by Mr. Stampp to the undercover officer were subsequently tested and confirmed to be fentanyl, with a total weight of 3.32 grams. Circumstances of the Offender [ 9 ] I have had the benefit of reviewing a Pre-Sentence Report dated May 4, 2021. That report reveals that Mr.
Stampp is 23 years old, and was just 21 at the date of the offence. He was born in Jamaica and immigrated to Canada with his family in 2009. He described being raised in poverty but otherwise having a positive childhood. [ 10 ] He has a five-year-old son from a former relationship. That child primarily resides with his mother but Mr. Stampp remains involved with him. [ 11 ] Mr. Stampp has recently moved out of his family home with his fiancé and their 4-month old son. His fiancé is now pregnant with their second child together. Mr. Stampp is currently the sole income earner for the family. [ 12 ] Mr.
Stampp completed grade eleven in high school. He did not have any learning or behavioural issues, although he was disinterested in school and was frequently absent. He has been employed full-time as a material handler building wood pallets since January 2021, currently working a graveyard shift. No further information was provided in the Pre-Sentence Report as to any previous employment. [ 13 ] Mr. Stampp suffers from some mental health challenges. He experienced bouts of paranoia and auditory hallucinations during his teenage years.
This included a history of self-harm, whereby he would use a knife to cut his legs and wrists. In 2017 he was assessed and it was determined that his symptoms were consistent with a major depressive disorder and substance-induced psychosis. He had brief hospitalizations at psychiatric units, with the last one occurring in October 2019, which was several months after the index offence. Since then he has been connected with the Early Psychosis Intervention Clinic, where he is followed by a case worker and psychiatrist.
He is currently taking a mood stabilizer medication which he believes helps him manage well in the community. [ 14 ] Mr. Stampp reports an earlier history of substance misuse including marijuana, cocaine and methamphetamines, although he said that has not been an issue since 2017 when he was assessed as having substance-induced psychosis. [ 15 ] Mr. Stampp does not have a record of criminal convictions. He does however, have previous involvement in the criminal justice system.
On November 15, 2018, he received a conditional discharge with 12 months of probation for charges of possessing stolen property and fraud under $5000. On January 14, 2020, he received a second conditional discharge and two years of probation for three counts, being: wilfully resisting a peace officer, assault with a weapon, and possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose. While it is not clear when those latter offences occurred, the sentencing date post-dates the offence for which Mr. Stampp is now being sentenced. [ 16 ] Mr.
Stampp has expressed an understanding of the impact his actions have had on the community. He believes that the underlying issue which contributed to him committing the offence was a deterioration in his mental health, resulting in a state of psychosis, although he acknowledged that his associating with known criminals at the time was also a factor. Impact of Fentanyl on Individuals and the Community [ 17 ] As it frequently does in sentencing cases involving the trafficking of fentanyl, the Crown relies on an expert report dated July 25, 2016, from Dr.
James Kennedy, a physician with specialties in internal medicine, clinical pharmacology and toxicology. In his report, Dr. Kennedy describes the effects of fentanyl on the human body and the ways in which fentanyl is particularly insidious and dangerous. It
is 100 times more potent than morphine. [ 18 ] A lethal dose of fentanyl is highly variable and often unpredictable. Even the smallest dose, or change in dose of fentanyl is difficult to measure outside of a regulated pharmaceutical laboratory such that a small dose may be greater than thought, with potentially lethal consequences. The mixing of fentanyl with other drugs, whether intentionally or accidentally, increases this risk. [ 19 ] The Crown also refers to Coroners Service Reports detailing illicit drug toxicity deaths and fentanyl detected deaths in BC between 2011 and 2021.
The statistics in those reports show a sharp increase in overdose deaths beginning in 2016. The statistics clearly show that this increase is due to the proliferation of fentanyl. The year this offence occurred, 2019, there were 984 illicit drug toxicity deaths, of which 84% involved fentanyl. There were 83 deaths in April alone, the month when this offence occurred. There is no question that the fentanyl epidemic has wreaked tremendous damage on families and communities in recent years and continues to do so. Relevant Sentencing Provisions in the Criminal Code and CDSA [ 20 ] Fentanyl is a
Schedule I substance, and as such, is subject to a maximum term of imprisonment for life. There is no applicable minimum sentence. [ 21 ] The Criminal Code sets out a number of principles that a court must consider in sentencing offenders. [ 22 ]
Section 718 sets out the purpose and objectives of sentencing as follows: 718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (
a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; (
b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (
c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (
d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (
e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (
f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community. [ 23 ]
Section 718.1 sets out the fundamental principle that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. [ 24 ]
Section 718.2 requires a sentencing judge to consider any mitigating or aggravating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender. It also requires sentencing judges to impose sentences similar to what has previously been imposed on similar offenders for similar offences in similar circumstances. The same
section also cautions sentencing judges to exercise restraint in sentencing, and to give due consideration to sanctions less restrictive than imprisonment if appropriate. [ 25 ] For drug related offences,
section 10 of the CDSA further provides that an additional sentencing purpose is to encourage rehabilitation and treatment of offenders in appropriate circumstances. Case Law [ 26 ] The Crown relies on four cases in support of its sentencing position. The first is the leading fentanyl sentencing case from our Court of Appeal – R. v. Smith, 2017 BCCA 112 . In that case, the Court of Appeal endorsed a higher sentencing range for trafficking offences involving fentanyl as compared to other hard drugs, given the dangerousness of the drug, and the impact of it on the broader community.
The court concluded that the range should begin at 18 months and increase to 36 months or higher, depending on the particular facts of the case. At paragraph 49, Mr. Justice Harris stated: [49] In my opinion, these facts warrant recognizing a sentencing range for street-level dealing in fentanyl which is materially higher than the sentencing range applicable to other dangerous drugs such as heroin. The range for street-level dealing in those drugs seems to start in British Columbia at six-months’ imprisonment.
As matters stand today, other dangerous drugs do not kill as frequently, accidentally, or as unpredictably as fentanyl, but the risks posed by those drugs should not be minimized even by comparison with fentanyl. Heroin, crystal meth and cocaine can have devastating consequences. They may not kill as often as fentanyl, but very large numbers of accidental deaths are associated with their consumption (indeed the majority of accidental overdose fatalities involve a mixture of illicit drugs) and they destroy lives and wreak social havoc.
The existing sentencing range for them is intended to reflect, amongst others, the sentencing principles of deterrence and denunciation.
Recognizing a different and markedly higher sentencing range for street-level dealing in fentanyl turns on the enhanced risks associated with that activity and the individual responsibility of dealers given those risks and public knowledge of them. [ 27 ] The Court of Appeal also noted that sentencing ranges are merely guidelines and not straitjackets, and do not create hard and fast categories, or preclude lesser or greater sentences if the circumstances or applicable principles warrant: para. 35. [ 28 ] The Crown and Defence both rely on the case of R. v. Voong, 2015 BCCA 285 .
In that case, the Court of Appeal considered four Crown appeals of suspended sentences granted for dial-a-dope drug dealers. Voong pre-dates Smith and the higher sentencing range endorsed therein. In Voong , the Court reiterated that the normal range in place then for a first offence dial-a-dope trafficker was between six to nine months and upwards to 18 months in some cases, absent exceptional circumstances. Much of the analysis in Voong related to what might constitute exceptional circumstances such as to justify imposing a sentence lower than the otherwise normal sentencing
range.
The Court stated that, generally speaking, the exceptional circumstances must engage principles of sentencing to a degree sufficient to overcome the application of the main principles of deterrence and denunciation by way of a prison sentence. [ 29 ] At paragraph 59 of Voong , Madam Justice Bennett stated, [59] …Exceptional circumstances may include a combination of no criminal record, significant and objectively identifiable steps towards rehabilitation for the drug addict, gainful employment, remorse and acknowledgement of the harm done to society as a result of the offences, as opposed to harm done to the offender as a result of being caught.
This is a non-exhaustive list, but at the end of the day, there must be circumstances that are above and beyond the norm to justify a noncustodial sentence. There must be something that would lead a sentencing judge to conclude that the offender had truly turned his or her life around, and that the protection of the public was subsequently better served by a non-custodial sentence. However, Parliament, while not removing a non-custodial sentence for this type of offence, has concluded that CSO sentences are not available.
Thus, it will be the rare case where the standard of exceptional circumstances is met. [ 30 ] In Voong , the Court also affirmed that in some cases a suspended sentence with a period of probation, while primarily rehabilitative, may give sufficient effect to the principles of denunciation and deterrence. At paragraph 61: [61] A suspended sentence can achieve a deterrent effect, as noted above, as well as a denunciatory effect. And, as Esson J.A. stated in Chang, the fact of being arrested, tried and convicted, can also address these principles.
In other words, the stigma of being a convicted drug trafficker and the consequences of that conviction—for example, restricted ability to travel outside of Canada and exclusion from many forms of employment—may also play a deterrent effect. [ 31 ] Of the four offenders who were the subject of the sentence appeals in Voong , three were found to have demonstrated exceptional circumstances and were given suspended sentences with lengthy probation.
Some of the circumstances that placed those three offenders in the category of exceptional circumstances were: guilty pleas, demonstrations of remorse, minimal or no prior criminal record, meaningful and verifiable steps taken to address addiction issues, youthfulness, and engagement in employment. The fourth offender did not meet the test of exceptional circumstances as he had tested positive for drug use several months after the offence date and his efforts at rehabilitation were largely unverifiable. [ 32 ] The third case relied on by the Crown is the case of R. v. Rutter, 2017 BCCA 193 .
In that case, the Court of Appeal overturned suspended sentences which were imposed on two first-time dial-a-dope offenders who had pleaded guilty to trafficking in fentanyl and cocaine. Both of the offenders were quite youthful, at 22 and 24. One had a history of addiction but had taken steps to address his addiction after the offence, albeit with some setbacks. The other offender was not an addict but had been engaged in trafficking to support his educational endeavours.
The Court of Appeal concluded that in both cases a suspended sentence was demonstrably unfit and substituted sentences of six months, together with probation. I note that the offences in the case pre-date the higher sentencing range set out in Smith . [ 33 ] Finally, the Crown relies on the case of R. v. Ruiz, 2019 BCCA 323 . In that case, the Court of Appeal considered “exceptional circumstances” in the context of an offender’s sentence appeal following a guilty plea to trafficking in methamphetamine. His role had been to provide a ride to an acquaintance who was conducting drug sales.
He was aware of the trafficking activity but did not stand to profit from it. The offender was 40 years old, and had three children, one of whom had autism. He had no criminal record. The sentencing judge concluded that exceptional circumstances were not present and ordered that the offender serve a 90-day sentence, to be served intermittently, along with 18 months of probation. The Court of Appeal concluded that the sentencing judge had not erred, and upheld the sentence. In doing so Mr.
Justice Groberman stated, at paragraphs 18-19: [18] It is important to recognize that “exceptional circumstances” is not a term of art, but rather a generalized description intended to encompass circumstances of the offender and of the offence that call out for a sentence that is well below the generally accepted range. [19] There is, in short, no litmus test for “exceptional circumstances”. Further, as Bennett J.A. recognized in Voong , at para. 102 , there are degrees of “exceptional circumstances”.
A sentencing judge, recognizing that suspended sentences may be imposed even for trafficking of drugs, must evaluate the circumstances of the offence and of the offender and decide whether the situation is such as to call for a sentence that is lighter than those usually imposed for trafficking offences. [ 34 ] In addition to Voong , the Defence relies on three further cases, that he says support the imposition of a suspended sentence in this case. In R. v. Joon, 2017 BCPC 301 , the offender had pled guilty to one count of trafficking in heroin and fentanyl in the context of a dial-a-dope operation.
The offender was 19 at the time of the offence. He had no criminal history and was not a drug user but rather became involved in trafficking solely for the purposes of financial gain. He was otherwise of good character and was employed, and at the time of sentencing was in his second year of training to become an electrician. His father’s vehicle was seized as a result of the offence. He was remorseful. Exceptional circumstances were found to exist in his case such as to justify departing from the normal sentencing range and to impose a non-custodial sentence.
He received a suspended sentence with probation for three years, which included a curfew and 80 hours of community work service. [ 35 ] In R. v. McClain, 2018 BCPC 369 , an offender had pleaded guilty to trafficking in fentanyl. He was 22 years old and had no criminal record. He was a drug addict. The offence occurred in the context of a dial-a-dope operation. Following his arrest and release he sold drugs to an undercover officer again. Subsequently, he participated in and successfully completed residential drug treatment and had become a leader to other recovering addicts.
He had become employed, separated himself from previous criminal associates and had complied with strict bail conditions for a year and a half. The sentencing judge imposed a suspended sentence with two years of probation. [ 36 ] In R. v. Dewat, 2019 BCPC 183 , an offender was sentenced after pleading guilty to trafficking in heroin and fentanyl. He was 18 years old at the time of the offence but had been on bail as a youth for a charge of trafficking in cocaine at the time of the offence.
Exceptional circumstances were found to exist in his case, which included his youthfulness, his guilty plea, expressions of remorse, and sustained and significant efforts to rehabilitate himself. He was given a suspended sentence with probation for three years. The first 18 months of the probation order included house arrest conditions. He was also ordered to complete 30 hours of community work service.
[ 37 ] Finally, while not referred to by the Defence, the Court of Appeal addressed the issue of exceptional circumstances in sentencing cases involving the sale of fentanyl in R. v. Schneider, 2019 BCCA 310 . In that case, the offender had pleaded guilty to trafficking in heroin and fentanyl when he sold a small amount of the substance to an undercover police officer after being approached by the officer who asked to purchase drugs from him. This was not in the context of a dial-a-dope operation. At the time, the offender was homeless, living on the streets and addicted to heroin.
He was 36 years old and had a lengthy criminal record mostly related to drug issues. He had been repeatedly sexually abused as a child by a person in a position of trust which had led to his drug abuse. By the time of sentencing he had not used illicit drugs for 23 months and was enrolled in a methadone program. He had completed 86 hours of group counselling since the offence, considerably more than had been expected of him.
The sentencing judge expressed admiration for his considerable efforts at rehabilitation but held that a significant jail sentence was nonetheless necessary for an offence involving fentanyl and imposed a 20 month sentence. [ 38 ] On appeal, the Court found that it was an error for the sentencing judge to conclude that a lengthy jail sentence is necessary in fentanyl cases, despite the existence of exceptional circumstances. The Court reiterated that sentencing ranges are guidelines only and not intended to set out a baseline minimum sentence in all cases, regardless of the circumstances.
At paragraph 24 the court stated: [24] While trafficking in fentanyl will normally result in a custodial sentence in the range identified in Smith , that decision does not prohibit a judge’s exercise of discretion in favour of a suspended sentence whenever fentanyl is involved, no matter how small the amount of the drug sold, or how exceptional the rehabilitation efforts of the offender. The rare exception identified in Voong , of a suspended sentence under strict conditions, can still be appropriate in exceptional circumstances.
A suspended sentence will in some cases provide a longer period of supervision than an appropriate term of imprisonment and will still provide a significant imposition on a person’s liberty, and it will thus have a specific and general deterrent and a denunciatory effect. [ 39 ] On the facts before it, the Court found that Mr. Schneider’s efforts at rehabilitation were truly exceptional and justified a three- year suspended sentence with strict probation conditions, which included a curfew for the entire probation period. [ 40 ] Mr.
Stampp’s alternative sentencing submission is that a Conditional Sentence Order (“CSO”) may be a fit sentence. Prior to the recent BC Supreme Court decision on April 7, 2021 in R. v. Chen, 2021 BCSC 697 , in which Mr. Justice Schultes declared s. 742.1 (
c) and (e)(ii) of the Criminal Code to be of no force and effect, a CSO was not an option available for the offence of trafficking. Persons convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance could expect to receive a real jail sentence, unless they were able to establish the existence of “exceptional circumstances” to justify a non-custodial sentence, or one that departed from the sentencing ranges set out by the BC Court of Appeal.
Before Chen however, a non-custodial sentence could only be served by way of a suspended sentence, and not a CSO. [ 41 ] A statutory pre-condition for a sentence to be served in the community under s. 742.1, is that the sentence must be for a period of less than two years.
Further, the court must be satisfied that service of the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community, and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code . [ 42 ] The conditional sentence regime was enacted by Parliament to reflect its concerns over the high rates of incarceration in Canada: R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 at para. 17 . A properly crafted conditional sentence can still provide adequate denunciation and deterrence. ( Proulx at para. 67 ) [ 43 ] In the post- Chen case of R. v.
Howard, 2021 BCPC 167 , Judge Jetté of this court sentenced an offender, following a guilty plea to one count of possessing heroin, fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. The Crown sought a sentence of 36 months. The Defence submitted that exceptional circumstances were present to justify a non-custodial sentence. In the alternative, the Defence submitted that a CSO was appropriate in the wake of the Chen decision. [ 44 ] The offender had been arrested in the context of a dial-a-dope drug operation.
Upon arrest, she was found to be in possession of over $14,000 worth of drugs packaged for sale, including fentanyl, heroin and cocaine. She was a drug addict who was selling drugs to fuel her addiction. She was 38 years old and had a criminal record, which included a 2012 conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance, for which she received an eight-month CSO, which was subsequently breached and terminated.
Since her arrest for the current offence, 4 ½ years before the sentencing hearing, she had made a number of positive changes which had brought about significant improvements in her life and the lives of her children. She had not used illicit drugs in the past three years and was on the methadone program. She had been working during the day and attending night classes at BCIT and had obtained employment in a marketing position with a construction company. The court concluded that a suspended sentence would not be a fit sentence given her high level of blameworthiness for the offence.
However, the court concluded that the pre-conditions of a CSO were met and that a fit sentence was a CSO of 22 months in duration. I observe that the circumstances of the offending behaviour in that case were significantly more aggravating than those in the present case, but the rehabilitative steps taken by the offender were also significantly more mitigating than in this case. [ 45 ] In R. v. Flintroy, 2021 BCSC 1187 , the BCSC sentenced an offender following a guilty plea to possessing cocaine and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.
The offender was involved in the trafficking operation at a mid-level. She had been physically and sexually abused as a child, worked in the sex industry and had longstanding addiction issues. She had also been in a series of abusive relationships. After the offence, she had begun addiction treatment and found employment caring for the victims of drug overdoses. The sentencing judge found that she had made uniquely positive strides in her rehabilitation and had been seriously compromised by addiction during the period of her offending activity. However, a suspended sentence was not appropriate.
A period of imprisonment was found to be required, but outside of the usual range and the sentence could be served in the community by way of a CSO. Accordingly, she received a 20 month CSO, followed by 12 months of probation. [ 46 ] As in Howard , both the aggravating and mitigating circumstances were more substantial than in the present case. However, that case again demonstrates that such sentences may be appropriate in certain circumstances. Analysis
[ 47 ] In the present case, I find the following to be mitigating circumstances: • Mr. Stampp has entered into a guilty plea. While it was not a particularly early guilty plea, I understand that the delay is a result of defence considering but ultimately abandoning a defence of entrapment. • Mr. Stampp’s rehabilitative success. While he has not had to address substance abuse issues as some offenders have, Mr.
Stampp appears to have placed his life on a more positive trajectory by disassociating himself from criminal associates, obtaining regular employment and having the support of his young family, for whom he is currently the sole financial support. • Mr. Stampp’s youthfulness, being 21 at the age of committing the offence. • Mr. Stampp’s mental health challenges are mitigating.
While I am unable to conclude that he was suffering from symptoms of psychosis at the time of the offence, as suggested by counsel, the fact that he was hospitalized several months after this offence suggests that his mental health may have been compromised at the time of the offence, thus diminishing his moral blameworthiness. [ 48 ] I find the following to be aggravating circumstances: • The existence of fentanyl, with its attendant lethality. • The sale occurred in the context of a dial-a-dope operation.
As noted in Voong , this type of trafficking is particularly insidious, and permits the drug trade to infiltrate communities to a greater degree (para. 16). • Mr. Stampp’s trafficking activity was profit motivated, rather than being driven by a drug addiction. [ 49 ] In my view, the circumstances of this case are clearly not so exceptional such as to justify a suspended sentence. Such a sentence would not adequately address the primary sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence.
This case is distinguishable from McClain , Dewat and Schneider where the offending was driven by addiction which the offenders were able to address before sentencing. In Joon , the offender had a more complete and enduring picture of turning his life around than in the case of Mr. Stampp, and had no previous involvement in the criminal justice system. While Mr.
Stampp appears to have moved away from a criminal lifestyle, that combined with the other mitigating circumstances are not sufficient to justify a non-custodial sentence. [ 50 ] I turn next to a consideration of whether a CSO would be a fit sentence in the circumstances of this case. One of the statutory pre-conditions for such a sentence is met, as a fit jail sentence would be less than two years. I am also satisfied that service of the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community.
However, I must also be satisfied that serving the sentence in the community would be consistent with the purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2 . Upon a consideration of those purposes and principles, I find that a sentence served in the community would not adequately address them, and in particular, the principles of denunciation and deterrence. [ 51 ] As noted at paragraph 1 of Voong , those who embark in drug trafficking engage in serious criminal conduct and, absent exceptional circumstances, should expect to be sentenced to prison.
However, there are “degrees of exceptional circumstances” ( Ruiz ). In my view the circumstances of the present case, and in particular Mr. Stampp’s reduced blameworthiness due to his mental health issues justify a departure from the sentencing range that is usually imposed for fentanyl trafficking offences. In my view, a fit sentence would be one of 12 months in jail, followed by 18 months of probation. [ 52 ] Mr. Stampp you are sentenced to 12 months in prison. Following completion of that sentence, you will be on probation for 18 months.
The conditions of your probation will be as follows: 2001 – You must keep the peace and be of good behaviour. You must appear before the court when required to do so by the court.
You must notify the court or the probation officer in advance of any change of name or address, and promptly notify the court or the officer of any change of employment or occupation 2104 - You must report in person to a probation officer at 2610 Mary Hill Road, Port Coquitlam, B.C. within two business days after your release from custody unless you have obtained, before your release from custody, written permission from the probation officer to report elsewhere or within a different time frame.
After that, you must report as directed by your officer. 2212 - When first reporting to your probation officer, you must provide them with the address where you live and your phone number. You must not change your address or phone number without notifying your officer in writing in advance of any change. 2501 - You must attend, participate in and complete any intake, assessment, counselling, or education program as directed by your probation officer. [ 53 ] Pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code , you are prohibited from possessing: a.
Any firearm, other than a prohibited firearm or restricted firearm, and any cross-bow, restricted weapon, ammunition and explosive substance for a period of 10 years following your release from prison, and b. Any prohibited firearm or restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device and prohibited ammunition for life. [ 54 ] This is a secondary designated offence. After considering the factors set out in
section 487.051(3) of the Criminal Code , I am satisfied that it is in the best interest of the administration of justice to authorize the taking of samples of bodily substances from you. The samples will be taken from you while you are in custody and you must submit to the taking of the samples.
_____________________________ The Honourable Judge R.
McQuillan Provincial Court of British Columbia CORRIGENDUM – Released on November 9 , 2021 In the Oral Reasons for Sentence dated August 25, 2021 , the following changes have been made: [1] Throughout the reasons the name of the Defendant should read “Sean Delano Stampp” instead of ““Sean Delano Stammp”. [2] Throughout the ruling, “Controlled Drugs and Substances Act”, (“CDSA”), should be formatted as “ Controlled Drugs and Substances Act ”, (“ CDSA ”) and “ Criminal Code ” as “ Criminal Code ”. [3] At para. 26, the citation at the second line should read “ R. v. Smith , 2017 BCCA 112 ” instead of “ R. v.
Smith 2017 BCCA 112”. [4] At para. 28 the citation at the second line should read “ R. v. Voong , 2015 BCCA 285 ” instead of “ R. v. Voong 2015 BCCA 285”. [5] At para. 32 the citation at the first line should read “ R. v. Rutter , 2017 BCCA 193 ” instead of “ R. v. Rutter 2017 BCCA 193”. [6] At para. 33 the citation at the first line should read “ R. v. Ruiz , 2019 BCCA 323 ” instead of “ R. v. Ruiz 2019 BCCA 323”. [7] At para. 34 the citation at the second line should read “ R. v. Joon , 2017 BCPC 301 ” instead of “ R. v. Joon 2017 BCPC 301”. [8] At para. 35 the citation at the first line should read “ R. v.
McClain , 2018 BCPC 369 ” instead of “ R. v. McClain 2018 BCPC 369”. [9] Paragraph [35] is listed twice, one after the other. All paragraphs after the first paragraph [35] will be correctly numbered chronologically, starting from [36] accordingly. [10] At para. 36 the citation at the first line should read “ R. v. Dewat , 2019 BCPC 183 ” instead of “ R. v. Dewat 2019 BCPC 183”. [11] At para. 37 the citation at the third line should read “ R. v. Schneider , 2019 BCCA 310 ” instead of “ R. v. Schneider 2019 BCCA 310”. [12] At para. 40 the citation at the third line should read “ R. v.
Chen , 2021 BCSC 697 ” instead of “ R. v. Chen 2021 BCSC 697”. [13] At para. 42 the citation at the second line should read “ R. v. Proulx , 2000 SCC 5 ” instead of “ R. v. Proulx 2000 SCC 5”. [14] At para. 43 the citation at the first line should read “ R. v. Howard , 2021 BCPC 167 ” instead of “ R. v. Howard 2021 BCPC 167”. [15] At para. 45 the citation at the first line should read “ R. v. Flintroy , 2021 BCSC 1187 ” instead of “ R. v. Flintroy 2021 BCSC 1187”. _____________________________ The Honourable Judge R. McQuillan Provincial Court of British Columbia
Loading document…