2012 QCCQ 4204, 2012 QCCQ 4204

R. c. Pardi 2012 QCCQ 4204 JM1267 COURT OF QUÉBEC Canada PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC DISTRICT OF BEAUHARNOIS LOCALITY OF SALABERRY-DE-VALLEYFIELD « Criminal Court » N° : 760-01-041747-079 DATE : June 5, 2012 ______________________________________________________________________ IN THE PRESENCE OF THE HONOURABLE MICHEL MERCIER ______________________________________________________________________ HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Plaintiff c.

BRANDON PARDI Accused ______________________________________________________________________ S E N T E N C E ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] Brandon Pardi, you are awaiting your sentence for having driven dangerously on October 31, 2007 and caused the death of the young Bianca Leduc. [ 2 ] Everyone can understand that you did not plan or want her death, but did cause it.

You have committed this crime and now you must face the consequences. [ 3 ] Everyone can understand that you only had 12 hours of experience as an adult when you took the very wrong decision of driving a standard car without having the ability to do so, causing the death of Bianca Leduc. [ 4 ] You found it hard to be judged as an adult instead of as minor, like your friend X. [ 5 ] I do understand the suffering of the victim's mother and relatives. It is unfair to loose a child under such circumstances, I know they are not asking for revenge but their suffering will last forever.

I also believe that you, your family and relatives are also suffering. [ 6 ] The sentence you deserve is based on several principles that are well-known to both attorneys. [ 7 ] I told you the last time you were in front of me that my duty was not to render a severe or lenient sentence but a sentence fit to who you are and to what you have done. Exemplarity is not synonymous of publicity. The sentence does not have to be different because it was largely publicized in the media. The sentence has nothing to do with the media like the radio, television, newspaper or Web.

You don't have to fear having a different sentence because of that, this is not exemplarity.

[ 8 ] To decide what sentence you deserve, I have to take into account the facts: - you have no previous record; - you come from a good family; - there were no alcohol or drugs involved; [ 9 ] This Court has said on a number of occasions that sentencing is an individualized process, in which the trial judge has considerable discretion in imposing a fit sentence. The rationale behind this approach stems from the principle of proportionality, the fundamental principle of sentencing, which provides that a sentence must be proportional to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

Proportionality requires an examination of the specific circumstances of both the offender and the offence so that the "punishment fits the crime". As a by-product of such an individualized approach, there will be inevitable variation in sentences imposed for particular crimes. [ 10 ] It has been repeatedly stressed that there is no such thing as a uniform sentence for a particular crime… [ 11 ] Sentencing is an inherently individualized process, and the search for a single appropriate sentence for a similar offender and a similar crime will frequently be a fruitless exercise of academic abstraction.

As well, sentences for a particular offence should be expected to vary to some degree across various communities and regions in this country, as the "just and appropriate" mix of accepted sentencing goals will depend on the needs and current conditions of and in the particular community where the crime occurred. [ 12 ] Society is interested in deterrence, exemplarity and also in rehabilitation. [ 13 ] I have the duty to seek every other sentence before imprisonment if it is reasonable and also because you have the right, under to the Charter of Rights , to benefit from a lesser punishment following an amendment to the law. [ 14 ] The Crown asked for four (4) years of imprisonment in a penitentiary for your crime.

This does not take into account

section 11) 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights which states that any person charged with an offence has the right, if found guilty of the offense and if the punishment for the offence has been varied between the time of its commission and the time of sentencing, to the benefit from the lesser punishment. In your case, on December 1st, 2007, the conditional sentence of imprisonment was no longer available under

section 742.1 of the Criminal Code . Consequently, it's my duty to ask myself if it is a fit sentence in your case. According to the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Proulx ( [1] ): "There is four criteria that a court must consider before deciding to impose a conditional sentence. (1) the offender must be convicted of an offence that is not punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment; (2) the court must impose a term of imprisonment of less than two years; (3) the safety of the community would not be endangered by the offender serving the sentence in the community; and (4) a conditional sentence would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in

section 718 to 718.2." [ 15 ] In a decision dated June 28, 2010 and rendered by my colleague, the Honourable Hélène Fabi in Q. v. Nicolas Brault( [2] ), the facts were very similar. And in reviewing the relevant jurisprudence found in her decision, we can conclude that in light of all the decisions, particularly those of the Court of Appeal in Blouin( [3] ), Kelly( [4] ), Olivier( [5] ), Paré( [6] ), Scraire( [7] ) and Hakim( [8] ), we are taught that the sentences imposed for dangerous driving causing death are of one to three years of incarceration, the "standard" being of two.

And as my colleague said, what stems from studying all the decisions is that the Courts have always considered that the general deterring denunciation factors are very important. Also, to individualize the sentence, the Court must, before thinking of deprivation of liberty, examine the possibility of less restrictive sanctions when the circumstances and the law allow it. [ 16 ] The presentence report reveals that Brandon Pardi comes from a family with conventional values and little misconduct. He has had, generally speaking, relationships with prosocial individuals.

Into sports, he has not had ties with marginal people or people who had trouble with the law. He is not known for any alcohol or drug problem. [ 17 ] He took

part in meetings with a psychotherapist to help him find ways to deal with all the emotion he was experiencing. He showed significant suffering as well as painful guilt following the events. [ 18 ] He has no prior convictions and acknowledged having driven at high speeds and does not contest being blamed for it. His perceptions, we are told, are filled with more ambiguity with regards to the incriminating nature of the consequences of his conduct. [ 19 ] The accused claims having no desire to cause any harm or the intention of destruction.

We can note, in his discourse and attitude, the weight of the infamous accusation. Social stigma and disapproval associated with the gravity of the offence are all consequences he is measuring the scope of . His sadness following the victim's death seems also sincere. [ 20 ] The risk of reoffending is low. [ 21 ] Mr. Pardi does not have the traits associated with those of an offender. He is able to learn from his mistakes, is not indifferent emotionally and not particularly self-centered.

To all this can be added the above-mentioned social abilities such as having a social network that promotes good behavior. [ 22 ] I strongly believe that Brandon Pardi would not endanger the safety of the community by serving a conditional sentence of two years less one day in the community, under the following conditions: (

a) keep the peace and be of good behavior;

(

b) appear before the court when required to do so by the court; (

c) report to a supervisor within the next three (3) days; (

d) thereafter, when required by the supervisor and in the manner directed by the supervisor; (

e) remain within the jurisdiction of the court unless written permission to go outside that jurisdiction is obtained from the supervisor; and (

f) notify the supervisor in advance of any change of name or address, and promptly notify the supervisor of any change of employment or occupation. For the first year of this order, you shall be confined to your residence under house arrest for 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. The only times you may be absent from your residence are as follows: For the following year less one day, respect a curfew from 11:00 pm. to 7.00 am. with the same following exceptions: (

g) being at work; (

h) attending scheduled medical appointments or dealing with a medical emergency; (

i) court attendances, meeting with counsel on outstanding legal proceedings, and reporting to your supervisor; (

j) attending for counselling or treatment directed by the supervisor; (

k) attending to shopping for essentials and banking on Saturdays between 11 a.m. and 7:30 p.m.; (

l) travel directly to or from any of these activities; and (

m) at any other time with the prior written permission of the supervisor. abstain from (

n) the consumption of alcohol or other intoxicating substances, or (

o) the consumption of drugs except in accordance with a medical prescription; (

p) abstain from owning, possessing or carrying a weapon; Prohibition to drive a motor vehicle in Canada for a period of three (3) years;

No costs, no surcharge. _________________________ MICHEL MERCIER, J.C.Q. (JM1267)Me Joey DuboisAttorney for the Crown Me Pierre JoyalAttorney for the defense QUOTED JURISPRUDENCE Busque c. R. , 2009 CQ et 2009 CA, par 173 CQ et 3 CA Michaud c. R., 2010 CA, par 12 R. c. Marcoux, 2008 CQ, par 42 et 45 à 47 R. c. Garneau, 2007 CQ, par 53 et 56 R. c. Bouchard, 2006 CQ, par 52 à 54 Brutus c. R., 2009 CA, par 18 R. c. Leblanc, 2010 CQ, par 57 et 77 Ferland c. R., 2009 CA, par 29 à 31 R. c. Pelletier, 2009 CQ, par 26 à 28 R. c. Maher-Ménard, 2009 CQ, par 43 à 45 Hakim c.

R., 2009 CA, par 24 Legault, 2009 CQ, par 53-54 et 77 R. c. Rabolt, 2009 OSC, par 39-41 R. c. St-Onge, 2002 OSC, par 28 R. c. G. B., 2010 QCCQ 8243 Latimer c. R., 2001, 1 R.C.S., 3, 2001 CSC 1 R. c. Brault, 2010 QCCQ 7329 R. c. Jonathan Bernier, 2011 QCCA 228 R. c. Marie-Josée Lortie, 17 mars 2010, 760-01-035827-069 R. c. Beatty, (2008) 2008 SCC 5 , 1 R.C.S., 49 R. c. Proulx, (2000) 1 R.C.S.