Animal Control Officer for the City of Port Coquitlam v. Bennett, 2023 BCPC 16

Citation: Animal Control Officer for the City of Port Coquitlam v. Bennett 2023 BCPC 0016 Date: 20230127 File No: 106687-1 Registry: Port Coquitlam IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA In the Matter of

Section 49 of the Community Charter, SBC 2003 c. 26 and

Section 321 of the Local Government Act, RSBC 2015 c. 1 AND In the Matter of an Application to Destroy "Kujo" a Male Pit Bull Type Dog BETWEEN: THE ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICER FOR THE CITY OF PORT COQUITLAM APPLICANT AND: SHARON BENNETT AND TODD LEDUC RESPONDENTS REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE W. LEE Counsel for the Applicant: J. Tikhonova Counsel for S. Bennett: R. Larmer (S. Bennett not appearing) Not Appearing: T. Leduc ( Self-represented) Place of Hearing: Port Coquitlam, B.C. Date of Hearing: January 5, 2023 Date of Judgment: January 27, 2023 Introduction [ 1 ] The Animal Control Officer for the City of Port Coquitlam is applying for the following:

a) a finding that a pit bull-type dog known as “Kujo” is a “dangerous dog” as defined in s. 49(1) of the Community Charter , S.B.C. 2003, c. 26 , and

b) that Kujo be destroyed. [ 2 ] Sharon Bennett is the owner of Kujo. She did not attend the hearing although her counsel, Mr. Larmer, was present. Mr. Larmer advised that he has not had any recent contact with his client but was prepared to proceed in her absence. This matter was previously set for trial and was adjourned to this date. Despite the absence of Ms. Bennett, I held that the trial would still proceed. I note that the dog Kujo has been impounded by the City of Port Coquitlam (the “City”) since approximately September 15, 2021.

Further delay in the trial would be unfair to the City, which is incurring boarding fees, and to Kujo who remains impounded. [ 3 ] The co-respondent, Todd Leduc, has never appeared in these proceedings. I will discuss his involvement in this matter later in my Reasons. The Law [ 4 ] In Port Coquitlam, dangerous dogs are governed by the provisions of the Community Charter , the relevant portions of which are as follows: Special powers in relation to dangerous dogs 49

(1) In this section: "dangerous dog" means a dog that (

a) has killed or seriously injured a person, (

b) has killed or seriously injured a domestic animal, while in a public place or while on private property, other than property owned or occupied by the person responsible for the dog, or (

c) an animal control officer has reasonable grounds to believe is likely to kill or seriously injure a person.

(2) In addition to the authority under

section 48 but subject to this section, an animal control officer may seize a dog if the officer believes on reasonable grounds that the animal is a dangerous dog.

(3) Before exercising a power under subsection (2), in the case of a dog that has acted as described in paragraph (

a) or (

b) of the definition of "dangerous dog", the animal control officer must consider whether the dog was acting while in the course of (

a) attempting to prevent a person from committing an unlawful act, or (

b) performing law enforcement work. …..

(10) In addition to any other authority, if an animal control officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a dog is a dangerous dog, the officer may apply to the Provincial Court for an order that the dog be destroyed in the manner specified in the order. [ 5 ] The wording used at s. 49 of the Community Charter is the same as is used in s. 324.1 of the Vancouver Charter , S.B.C. 1953, c. 55 , which was discussed in the leading case of Santics v. Vancouver (City) Animal Control Office r, 2019 BCCA 294 . [ 6 ] In the Santics decision, the court held at paras. 65 and 66 that:

a) If the dog meets the statutory definition of a “dangerous dog,” the animal control officer has grounds to seize the dog, and

b) If the dog is also likely to kill or injure in future, then the court has no option other than a destruction order. [ 7 ] As set out at para. 67 of Santics , in determining whether a dog is likely to kill or injure in future, the court must perform a contextual and prospective analysis of the danger posed by the dog to the public, taking into consideration whether the dog was attempting to prevent a person from committing an unlawful act, or was performing law enforcement work.

These two factors are set out at s. 49(3) of the Community Charter and s. 324.1(3) of the Vancouver Charter , but are not applicable in this case. [ 8 ] The court is also able to receive evidence of other factors that “bear upon a dog’s prospective dangerousness [including] its past and present temperament and any extenuating circumstances that would make a future attack unlikely”: see Santics v. Vancouver (City) Animal Control Office r at para. 68 . [ 9 ] As stated in New Westminster (City) v.

Ash , 2006 BCPC 635 at para. 19 : The future safety of the public is paramount -- whether people or domestic animals -- and the Community Charter should be liberally construed with this end in mind, in my view. [ 10 ] The standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities: see Santics v. Vancouver (City) Animal Control Office r at para. 69 ; Animal Control Officer for Fraser Valley Regional District v. Carlson , 2022 BCPC 225 at para. 8 . [ 11 ] There is no traditional burden of proof and the court must consider the totality of the available evidence regardless of which party adduced it: Santics v.

Vancouver (City) Animal Control Office r at para. 69 .

[ 12 ] The court lacks the jurisdiction to make a conditional order that would allow for the return of the dog to the owner on certain terms. An example of a conditional order would be a requirement for an owner to keep a dog muzzled when in public. [ 13 ] An animal control officer and an owner may still agree to an order for the control of the dog which, if complied with, would remove or minimize the risk to the public and avoid the need for a destruction order. Such terms are often incorporated into a consent order.

These types of protective orders can only be made with the agreement of the parties and the court has no authority to impose terms: Santics v. Vancouver (City) Animal Control Office r at para. 70 . [ 14 ] I must also consider the Port Coquitlam Animal Control Bylaw No. 3990 (the “ Bylaw ”), described as “A Bylaw to regulate and prohibit the keeping of Animals and to provide for the licencing, seizure, and impoundment of animals.” [ 15 ]

Section 2 of the Bylaw provides as follows:

a) An “aggressive dog” is defined as a dog: i. that has, without provocation, bitten, inflicted a minor injury or assaulted, pursued or harassed a person or another animal or has demonstrated a propensity, tendency or disposition to do so; or ii. that the Animal Control officer has reasonable grounds to believe it is likely to cause injury to a human or another animal.

b) The definition of “dangerous dog” is the same as that found in the Community Charter .

c) The term “At Large” means: i. an animal that is not on the premises of its Owner and is not under the care and control of its Owner; or ii. in the case of a Dog, a Dog that is not on the premises of its Owner and is either not secured on a Leash to its Owner or is not under the care and control of its Owner while in an Off Leash Area. [ 16 ] Section 8(1) of the Bylaw requires every owner of a dog to prevent the dog from being or running “At Large.” [ 17 ] Among other things, s. 10 of the Bylaw allows an animal control officer to require an owner of an “aggressive dog” to keep that dog securely confined either indoors or outdoors in a locked enclosure.

The dog may be out of the secured enclosure and allowed on any highway, in any public place or in any other place that is not owned or controlled by the owner if the dog is secured to a responsible adult with a non-retractable leash. [ 18 ]

Section 11 of the Bylaw deals with “dangerous dogs.” If an animal control officer determines that a dog is a “dangerous dog,” the owner is required to post a sign at all points of entry to their premises stating that a dangerous dog is present. The dog must be kept securely confined indoors or outdoors in a locked enclosure. The dog is not permitted to be on any highway, in any public place or in any other place that is not owned or controlled by the owner unless the dog is muzzled and secured to a responsible adult on a non-retractable leash. [ 19 ]

Section 14 of the Bylaw permits an animal control officer to seize any dog found at large and deliver the dog to the poundkeeper for impoundment. The powers of a poundkeeper are set out at s. 5 of the Bylaw . Agreed Statement Of Facts [ 20 ] An Agreed Statement of Facts has been put into evidence. I summarize the agreed facts as follows: • Sharon Bennett is the owner of Kujo, a male pitbull-type dog. • On August 19, 2021, Kujo was running at large near Castle Park Elementary School in Port Coquitlam. A passerby, Nicole Smith, placed Kujo onto a spare leash.

Kujo became startled by a passing man and took off, dragging Ms. Smith along a gravel road. Ms. Smith suffered injuries including severe bruising and scratches. Photographs of the injuries were attached to the Agreed Statement. • On September 15, 2021, while impounded at Countryside Kennels, Kujo barked at and attempted to leap toward Cathy Isherwood, an employee of the kennel. A 7-second video of Kujo was taken and put into evidence.

The video only showed Kujo for some 3 seconds, and he was barking and leaping onto the chain link door of the kennel. • On September 16, 2021, Alia Stachoski, an employee of Countryside Kennels, was attending to impounded dogs. She stood outside Kujo’s kennel for a couple of minutes to ensure he was not exhibiting aggressive behaviour. Ms. Stachoski entered the kennel with a leash to walk Kujo. When Ms. Stachoski turned her back to close the kennel gate, Kujo lunged at her, biting the thumb of her left hand, and breaking through the nail. Kujo then bit Ms.

Stachoski’s right arm, gripping her right arm for several seconds. Ms. Stachoski attempted to push Kujo away and he lunged at her, tearing through her shirt. Ms. Stachoski again attempted to push Kujo away, and Kujo bit her foot and bruised her shin. Ms. Stachoski was able to exit the kennel and close the door. Kujo continued to aggressively lunge and jump at her through the gate, trying to bite her fingers. Ms. Stachoski was treated at Eagle Ridge Hospital. She received stitches to her arm, her other wounds were treated and she received a tetanus shot Photographs of Mr.

Stachoski’s injuries were put into evidence. They show puncture wounds on her right arm, left thumb and one leg. Ms. Stachoski testified at trial and I will set out her evidence later in my Reasons. • On August 12, 2022, Ms. Darraugh Evans, a shelter attendant, took Kujo out to the shelter courtyard. She petted Kujo for some time. Kujo’s head turned quickly. Ms. Evans said she no longer felt safe and got up to leave. Kujo bit her hand. Ms. Evans backed away and left the courtyard. Ms. Evans sustained three puncture wounds to her arm, soft tissue damage and a swollen wrist.

She went to the hospital and was treated with antibiotics. Pictures of the injuries were put into evidence, which shows puncture wounds on the hand and

arm. The Evidence Of Alia Stachoski [ 21 ] Alia Stachoski testified about the effects of Kujo’s attack upon her. She had numbness in her wrist for some 1.5 months after the attack. She had bruising for several months. She still has scars on her right wrist. [ 22 ] Ms. Stachoski said she has become more anxious around dogs, even dogs that she knew. [ 23 ] Other than the scars, she no longer has any physical issues. [ 24 ] Despite her anxiety around dogs, she remained working at Countryside Kennels after the attack, although she no longer works for dogs at this time.

The Evidence Of Officer Stephanie Finn [ 25 ] Officer Finn has been employed as a Bylaw Enforcement – Animal Control Officer for the City of Port Coquitlam since January 2019. Her duties include investigating allegations of dangerous dogs, including dog bites. [ 26 ] Officer Finn identified Kujo from a photograph of the dog that was put into evidence. She first met Kujo in May 2020, when Kujo’s owner, Ms. Bennett, was hospitalized and Kujo was impounded. Ms. Bennett informed Officer Finn that Todd Leduc was entitled to pick up Kujo.

Officer Finn said this was a common occurrence. [ 27 ] Officer Finn said there have been multiple complaints about Kujo, that he has been caught running at large 22 times and bitten people four times. [ 28 ] Officer Finn referred to an incident on September 15, 2021, where she met with Brad Hertslet at his home. [ 29 ] There were two dogs in Mr. Hertslet’s yard. One was Kujo; the second dog was named “Wuppy.” Officer Finn observed that Mr. Hertslet had blood on his hand. [ 30 ] Officer Finn took both dogs to the animal shelter. [ 31 ] Mr.

Hertslet did not testify at trial and his statement to Officer Finn would be hearsay evidence if adduced for the truth of its content. I will discuss the nature of hearsay evidence later in my decision. [ 32 ] There is no evidence that Mr. Hertslet was bitten by Kujo. [ 33 ] Officer Finn also investigated the September 16, 2021 incident involving Kujo and Alia Stachoski. [ 34 ] Officer Finn created a chart based on records of calls received by the Coquitlam Animal Shelter.

Copies of the actual records were not put into evidence and I will discuss this omission later in my decision. [ 35 ] Officer Finn referred to this chart to show that Kujo was at large on 22 occasions. However, the chart only referred to Kujo by name once, an incident on January 23, 2021, regarding a report of a dog at large at Gates Park. [ 36 ] The May 24, 2020 note referred to a “Brindle Terrier” although I understand that breed of dog can be similar in appearance to a pit bull type dog such as Kujo. [ 37 ] The August 6, 2021 note refers to a dog being returned to “Marcia” and I presume this is not Ms.

Bennett or Mr. Leduc. [ 38 ] All other entries did not provide any information that would allow me to link a report to Kujo. [ 39 ] Officer Finn testified that anytime Kujo was impounded, she would phone or attend at the home of Ms. Bennet or Mr. Leduc. I accept that this occurred on several occasions although I do not accept Officer Finn’s chart as evidence that Kujo has been at large 22 times. [ 40 ] Officer Finn said that both Ms. Bennett and Mr. Leduc are homeless. Ms. Bennett resides in a camp at Gates Park in Port Coquitlam. Mr.

Leduc resides in a camp near Mary Hill and Argue Street, also in Port Coquitlam. [ 41 ] Officer Finn spoke to Ms. Bennett on September 17, 2021, about Kujo. Ms. Bennett would not agree to the voluntary surrender of Kujo. [ 42 ] Officer Finn also discussed whether Kujo could be kept on a leash. Ms. Bennet said this was not possible as she was homeless. Officer Finn felt that Ms. Bennett was unwilling to control Kujo. [ 43 ] Officer Finn gave Ms.

Bennett a letter dated September 25, 2021, advising her that Kujo was considered a “dangerous dog” as defined in the Community Charter and that the City would now pursue a destruction order. [ 44 ] Officer Finn was also asked about her conversations with Todd Leduc. An issue arose as to whether Mr. Leduc was properly a respondent in these proceedings, such that his statements to Officer Finn would be considered an exception to the hearsay evidence rule. A voir dire was conducted on this question. [ 45 ] I held that Mr. Leduc fell within the definition of “owner” as found in the Bylaw.

The definition of “owner” included “any person allowing a Domestic Animal to remain about his or her house or premises.” I found that Mr. Leduc’s camp was a “premise” within the

meaning of the Bylaw and that the evidence was clear Mr. Leduc often had Kujo at or about his premises. [46] As a result, Mr. Leduc is properly a respondent in these proceedings. His statements to Officer Finn would be an admission andan exception to the hearsay rule. [47] Officer Finn testified about a discussion she had with Mr. Leduc. Mr. Leduc had a muzzle for Kujo, a photo of which was putinto evidence. Mr. Leduc told Officer Finn that a shelter he was staying at required Kujo to wear a muzzle due to the type of dog Kujowas. Officer Finn said she understood that this referred to Kujo’s behaviour.

She agreed though that this comment may have been areference to the breed of dog. [48] Officer Finn also gave Mr. Leduc a letter dated September 25, 2021, advising him that Kujo was considered a “dangerous dog”as defined in the Community Charter and that the City would now pursue a destruction order. [49] Officer Finn summarized her position, stating that she believed Kujo was a public safety risk as he was frequently at large, he hasbitten people and there are no attempts by the owners to control Kujo.

Summary Of Records [50] Earlier on, I referred to Officer Finn’s use of a chart summarizing records of calls received by the Coquitlam Animal Shelter. Theactual records themselves may have been admissible into evidence under the BC Evidence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 124 but they were notput into evidence. I refer to the decision Animal Control Officer for Fraser Valley Regional District v. Carlson, 2022 BCPC 225 at para.10 for an example where animal control files were admitted into evidence under s. 42 of the Evidence Act. They may also have beenadmissible under s. 28 of the Act. [51] A

summary of records may be of assistance to the court but they need to be supported by the actual records themselves so thatboth the opposing party and the court can ensure the accuracy of the

summary. I refer to the decision of Coor Nuclear Services Inc. v.Mendes, 2016 NBQB 66 at para. 21 which stated: [21] In R. v. Scheel, (ON CA), [1978] O.J. No. 888, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in admitting summaries ofbusiness records, relied on the American case of McDaniel v. United States where the court stated: The rule is that a

summary of books and records is admissible, provided cross-examination is allowed and the original records areavailable. Here, the records of which the exhibits are summaries were in evidence and the man who prepared them was available forcross-examination. [52] Although Officer Finn’s chart was entered into evidence, the chart carries little weight because the actual records of callsreceived by the Coquitlam Animal Shelter were not put into evidence. As I have also noted, there is only one reference to Kujo in thatchart and it only said Kujo was running loose.

Hearsay Evidence [53] Hearsay evidence is an out-of-court statement tendered for the proof of its contents. The intended use of the statement determinesif the evidence is hearsay. In general, hearsay evidence is not permitted at trial given concerns over its reliability. There are manycategorical exceptions to the hearsay rule, but even if the evidence falls within a listed exception, the evidence must still be necessaryand reliable: R v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40 , [2000] 2 SCR 144. [54] During the trial, the City sought to rely upon an out-of-court statement made to Officer Finn by Brad Hertslet. Mr.

Hertslet wasnot called as a witness at trial, and there was no suggestion that he was not available. Whatever statement he may have made to OfficerFinn was not admissible. [55] The statements made by the respondents to Officer Finn were admissible as admissions, a categorical exception to the hearsayrule. Findings [56] As discussed, Officer Finn had a

summary chart suggesting Kujo has been at large 22 times. I did not accept this as evidence ofthe number of times Kujo has been at large given the original reports to the Coquitlam Animal Shelter were never put into evidence.Nevertheless, I am satisfied that Kujo is frequently found running at large based on Officer Finn’s personal experience retrieving Kujo. [57] In the August 19, 2021 incident, Kujo dragged Nicole Smith causing her injuries. From my own experience, it is not uncommonfor dogs to become excited and run away.

There is no indication though that during this incident Kujo attacked anyone or actedaggressively. I do not consider this incident as evidence that Kujo is a dangerous dog. [58] The video taken September 15, 2021, does show that for a brief instance, Kujo acted aggressively in jumping against the kenneldoor toward Ms.

Isherwood. [59] The September 16, 2021 incident involving Alia Stachoski caused several puncture wounds, with residual physical symptomslasting a few months and ongoing anxiety about dogs. [60] The August 12, 2022 incident involving Darraugh Evans also involved Kujo biting and causing three puncture wounds to Ms.Evans, along with soft tissue damage and a swollen wrist. [61] The evidence presented by the City does not show any other incidents of Kujo attacking or biting anyone. [62] The owner of Kujo, Ms. Bennett, has stated she cannot restrain Kujo as she is homeless.

[ 63 ] Mr. Leduc is the frequent caretaker of Kujo and he is also homeless. He did show Officer Finn a muzzle he had for Kujo and this suggests he has some ability to control Kujo. Availability Of Measures Under The Port Coquitlam Animal Control Bylaw No. 3990 [ 64 ] Given that both Ms. Bennett and Mr. Leduc are homeless and lack premises that can secure Kujo, I am satisfied that the options for control of an aggressive or dangerous dog according to the Bylaw were not available. The only recourse would be an application for a destruction order under the Community Charter .

Is Kujo A “Dangerous Dog” Under The Community Charter ? [ 65 ] The Community Charter defines a “dangerous dog” to include one that has killed or seriously injured a person. [ 66 ] There are two instances where Kujo has bitten a person. In both cases, the victims suffered puncture wounds along with other injuries. [ 67 ] The BCCA decision in Santics originated from a trial decision before me, which was reported as City of Vancouver v. Santics , 2018 BCPC 381 . In that decision, I considered whether the victim was seriously injured by a dog.

Starting at para. 77, I stated as follows: [77] As I described earlier in my Reasons, the definition of a “dangerous dog” is found at

section 324.1 (

a) of the Vancouver Charter to mean a dog that has killed or seriously injured a person. Where there exists a dangerous dog,

section 324.1(10) of the Vancouver Charter permits an application to be made for the destruction of that dog. [78] The first question then is whether Punky is a “dangerous dog” and to decide this, I have to determine if Punky seriously injured Alyssa Prattas. [79] In the decision Community Charter v Whittle , 2005 BCPC 610 , Crown Counsel argued that the injuries suffered by a dog attack victim were such that it fell within the definition of “bodily injury” as found in the Criminal Code of Canada .

Crown also submitted that the injuries fell within the definition of an “aggravated assault” set out in s. 268 of the Criminal Code of Canada , which referred to an assault that “wounds, maims, disfigures or endangers the life of the complainant.” [80] Judge Rodgers found that the victim suffered puncture wounds to his stomach. The wounds oozed for approximately three days. Judge Rodgers concluded that the injuries would have fallen within the definition “of assault causing bodily harm and aggravated assault in the Criminal Code ” and that the victim did suffer a serious injury.

Judge Rodgers added that this was not a trifling or transient injury. [81] The decision Corporation of the City of New Westminster v. Ash , 2006 BCPC 635 involved a dog attacking another dog. The Honourable Judge Dyer found that the victim dog suffered puncture marks on his muzzle and a large gash on the interior of his right upper lip. The veterinary repair bill was $788.96. Judge Dyer found that the victim dog was seriously injured. [82] In the decision R v. Kang & Shin , 2010 BCPC 121 , the Honourable Judge Meyers referred to the R. v. Whittle decision.

Judge Meyers considered the meaning of “serious injury” and rejected the

definitions of injury used in the Criminal Code for assault causing bodily harm or aggravated assault as being far too extreme: see paragraph 75. [83] Referring to an incident that occurred July 10, 2009, Judge Meyers found that there was no evidence to show that the injuries suffered by the victim Ms. Kang were any more than transient or trifling in nature. Judge Meyers said he was not satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to show that Ms. Kang suffered a puncture wound: paragraph 82 to 85. [84] Judge Meyers did find though that two other persons, Ms. Cashman and Mr.

Farriss, were bitten by the dog in question and each did suffer puncture wounds. Judge Meyers found that these injuries were serious: see paragraph 104. [85] It is my conclusion that if a dog causes puncture wounds of the nature and extent suffered by Ms. Prattas, a serious injury has occurred as that term is used in the definition of “dangerous dog” found in

section 324.1 of the Vancouver Charter . [86] This is not to say that a serious injury cannot occur without any puncture wound or that all puncture wounds must be considered a serious injury. Whether a “serious injury” occurs will remain dependent on the facts of each case. [ 68 ] In the decision The City of Prince George v. McLeod , 2004 BCPC 8 , Judge Skilnick dealt with an application for a destruction order under the Local Government Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 33 , which has since been amended.

Judge Skilnick found that although the dog had never killed or seriously injured anything, human or animal, it ran unchecked in public and acted aggressively.

Judge Skilnick held that based on the dog’s behaviour, the animal control officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the dog was likely to kill or seriously injure a person, and was therefore a dangerous dog. [ 69 ] In this case, there is no evidence that Kujo was acting aggressively while at large. [ 70 ] On the facts before me, I am satisfied that the injuries caused by Kujo fell within the meaning of a “serious injury” as found in s. 49 of the Community Charter . Both attacks involved puncture wounds. The attack on Ms. Stachoski was more significant as its physical repercussions lasted for several months.

The pictures of her injuries were especially disturbing. [ 71 ] Having found that Kujo did cause a serious injury, I conclude that Kujo was a dangerous dog within the meaning of s. 49(2) and the animal control officer did have the statutory grounds to seize Kujo. Is Kujo Likely To Kill Or Injure In Future? [ 72 ] Section 49(10) of the Community Charter states:

In addition to any other authority, if an animal control officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a dog is a dangerous dog, the officer may apply to the Provincial Court for an order that the dog be destroyed in the manner specified in the order. [ 73 ] As set out in the Santics decision at para. 66, if I find that Kujo is likely to kill or injure in future, then I have no option other than an order for destruction. [ 74 ] Officer Finn has testified that in her view, there should be a destruction order.

She believes Kujo to be a public safety risk as he is frequently at large, he has bitten people and there are no attempts by the owners to control Kujo. [ 75 ] The evidence is clear that Kujo is frequently at large without any attempt by the respondents to control him. [ 76 ] There are two instances where Kujo caused serious injury. In both instances where Kujo has attacked someone, he was in the kennel. Counsel for Ms.

Bennett asked me to infer that Kujo only bites when he is in the kennel. [ 77 ] The City has not provided any evidence to show that Kujo bites when running at large. [ 78 ] Neither party has tendered any expert evidence to show what Kujo’s tendencies are, as was the case in the decisions Fraser Valley Regional District v. Carlson, referred to earlier, and R. v. Kucera, 2001 BCPC 360 . However, expert evidence is not always a necessity, as shown in the Santics decision. [ 79 ] I refer again to the decision The City of Prince George v.

McLeod , at para. 33, where the court said: The past actions of the dog, along with the other evidence, are used as a means to predict the likelihood that the dog will kill or seriously injure a person in future. [ 80 ] What is clear is that Kujo has bitten two persons almost a year apart. In both cases, Kujo had been locked in a kennel. However, without further evidence, I am not prepared to infer that Kujo will only bite when he is caged. [ 81 ] Ms. Bennett is unwilling or unable to control the Kujo. Mr.

Leduc may have some ability to control the dog as he has used a muzzle on Kujo before but he is not the primary owner. An owner’s capacity to control the dog is relevant to the likelihood of the dog killing or causing injury in the future. [ 82 ] The past actions of Kujo are that he has bitten two different people, causing serious injuries. I find that this is a strong indicator of the likelihood of his future actions. [ 83 ] In cases such as this, the safety of the public is of primary importance.

This extends to the need to protect animal control officers, who are authorized to seize a dog found at large, and to the poundkeeper and its employees, who are mandated by the Bylaw to impound a seized dog. [ 84 ] Given the evidence before me, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Kujo is likely to kill or injure in future. This is especially the case because Kujo is frequently found at large requiring him to be seized and impounded. [ 85 ] In light of this finding, I have no choice but to make an order for the destruction of Kujo.

This order will be carried out by a qualified veterinarian but is not to occur until at least 31 days after the date of this order in case of any appeal. Order [ 86 ] I order as follows:

a) The pit bull-type dog known as “Kujo” is a “dangerous dog” as defined in s. 49(1) of the Community Charter , S.B.C. 2003, c. 26

b) The euthanasia of “Kujo” is to be carried out by a qualified veterinarian but this is not to occur until at least 31 days from the date of this order. [ 87 ] I ask Ms. Tikhonova to draft and file the order after obtaining Mr. Larmer’s approval of the form of the order. _____________________________ The Honourable Judge W. Lee Provincial Court of British Columbia