2017 FCA 201, 2017 FCA 201

A-78-16 2017 FCA 201 Apotex Inc. ( Appellant ) v. Pfizer Inc., Pharmacia Aktiebolag and Pfizer Canada Inc. ( Respondents ) Indexed as: Apotex Inc. v. Pfizer Inc. Federal Court of Appeal, Gauthier, Stratas and Boivin JJ.A.—Toronto, February 22; Ottawa, October 2, 2017. Patents — Infringement — Appeal from Federal Court decision dismissing appellant’s motion for partial

summary judgment — Appellant contending that respondents’ failure to pay proper application fee for issuance of Canadian Patent No. 1339132 ( ʹ 132 patent) invalidating ʹ 132 patent but Federal Court disagreeing — When application that resulted in issuance of ʹ 132 patent filed, patent applicant not claiming small entity status — Applicable fee payable as large entity for $300 submitted — All fees paid on basis applicant large entity — However, final fee payable was $700 for applications filed by large entities before October 1, 1989 — In present case, additional $50 paid to Patent Office on incorrect assumption that payment corrected previous payment error — Thereafter, ʹ 132 patent issued — Payment errors never corrected within deadline after Patent Act, s. 78.6(1) coming into force — Ultimately, proper application fee never paid; Federal Court so finding — Motion for

summary judgment arising in related proceeding appellant instituting to claim damages resulting from delay in obtaining notice of compliance for product allegedly infringing ʹ 132 patent — Whether Federal Court erring when it found that failure to pay proper application fee not invalidating ʹ 132 patent; whether appellant could rely on 1989 Act, s. 73(1) as fact or default thereunder that rendered ʹ 132 patent void pursuant to 1989 Act, s. 59 — Federal Court adopting incorrect approach in interpreting 1989 Act, s. 73 but error not meaning judgment wrong in law — 1989 Act, s. 73(1) not expressly dealing with impact on patent issued — Object of 1989 Act, s. 73(1) to provide tool for Commissioner of Patents to collect fees — Appellant arguing that 1989 Act, s. 59 rendering ʹ 132 patent void — Appellant’s simple, literal approach to s. 59 in particular would lead to absurd results, disregarded scheme, object of Act — Defects in pre-patent issuance process not coming within ambit of provisions dealing expressly with voidance of patent, like 1989 Act, s. 53, cannot be relied upon by alleged infringer to render patent void — Since 1869, Parliament using precise wording when intending to deal with matters that could void patent — Defences to actions for infringement not based on administrative law principles but on patent law — This is law to which s. 59 referring to — Fact alleged infringer can raise certain defences not changing nature of proceeding — Federal Court properly concluding that appellant could not rely on 1989 Act, s. 73 to void ʹ 132 patent — Act in question not act or default that came within ambit of 1989 Act, s. 59 — Appeal dismissed.

This was an appeal from a Federal Court decision dismissing the appellant’s motion for partial

summary judgment. The appellant contended that the respondents’ failure to pay the proper application fee for the issuance of Canadian Patent No. 1339132 (the ʹ132 patent) invalidated the ʹ132 patent. The Federal Court disagreed. The main issue was the

interpretation of various provisions of the Patent Act as it existed on September 30, 1989 (the 1989 Act), which applied given the time of the application for the patent and its issuance. On September 12, 1989, the application that ultimately resulted in the issuance of the ʹ132 patent was filed. At the time, the applicant did not claim small entity status. The then applicable fee payable as a large entity in the amount of $300 was submitted.

Except for the final fee to be paid once the notice of allowance was issued, all the prescribed fees relating to the ʹ132 patent were paid on the basis that the applicant was a large entity as per the relevant Patent Rules . After receiving the notice of allowance in November 1996, a fee of $300 was paid, which was an error. The final fee payable was $700 for applications filed by large entities prior to October 1, 1989. Then, in 1997, an additional $50 was paid to the Patent Office on the erroneous belief that this payment corrected the previous payment error.

The Patent Office accepted the $350 fee as full payment and the ʹ132 patent was issued on July 29, 1997. After subsection 78.6(1) of the Patent Act came into force on February 1, 2006, patentees had 12 months to correct past payment errors but these errors were not corrected by the deadline. The Patent Office acknowledged receipt of payment from the patent agent as a large entity and the record was amended to indicate this status. In the end result, the proper application fee payable back in 1997 was never paid and the Federal Court so found. The motion for partial

summary judgment before the Federal Court arose in the context of a proceeding under

section 8 of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations instituted by the appellant to claim damages resulting from the delay in obtaining its notice of compliance for a product which allegedly infringed the ʹ132 patent. In response to the said

section 8 proceedings, the respondents alleged, among other things, that the appellant had been infringing the ʹ132 patent. The appellant contended, inter alia , that since the proper application fee had not been paid in full, as a matter of law under subsection 73(1) of the 1989 Act, the application was forfeited as of May 19, 1997. The issues were whether or not the Federal Court erred when it found that the failure to pay the proper application fee did not invalidate the ʹ132 patent and whether the appellant could rely on subsection 73(1) in the 1989 Act as a fact or default thereunder that rendered the patent void pursuant to

section 59 in the 1989 Act. Held , the appeal should be dismissed. The Federal Court adopted an incorrect approach in its

interpretation of

section 73 of the 1989 Act. It referred to a later version of

section 73 of the Patent Act and to the Patent Rules . However, this error did not mean that its judgment was wrong in law. Subsection 73(1) of the 1989 Act does not expressly deal with its impact on a patent issued, especially when it results from inadvertent mutual mistakes. The object of subsection 73(1) of the 1989 Act was to provide a tool for the Commissioner of Patents to collect fees. The appellant argued in particular that in this case there was a fact or default as stated in

section 59 of the 1989 Act that rendered the ʹ132 patent void. The appellant’s simple and literal approach to

section 59 in particular would lead to absurd results and disregarded the

scheme and object of the Act. As determined by previous case law, defects in the pre-patent issuance process that do not come within theambit of provisions dealing expressly with the voidance of a patent, like

section 53 of the 1989 Act, cannot be relied upon by an allegedinfringer to render a patent void. There was no need to determine whether the word “forfeited” (in French “périmée”) in subsection 73(1) has the same meaning as theword “abandoned” (in French “abandonnée”) used in the various provisions of the 1989 Act. The events referred to in those provisionsoccur in the pre-patent issuance period and the legislator provided for an opportunity to reinstate or restore the application after its status(abandoned or forfeited) was changed by the operation of the law.

Since 1869, Parliament has used precise wording when it intended todeal with matters that could void a patent. Defences to actions for infringement are not based on administrative law principles but arebased on patent law. This is the law to which

section 59 refers to. An action for infringement is a statutory right. The fact that the allegedinfringer can raise certain defences does not change the nature of the proceeding. It is not a judicial review. It would be absurd in theoverall context of the 1989 Act to construe

section 59 as enabling an alleged infringer to void a patent say ten years later or even after itsexpiration, on the basis that the petitioner was a few pennies short. This is all the more so considering that the proposed

interpretation ofsection 73 would have inconsistent and unfair consequences. Courts will apply the law, even if it leads to absurd results, but only if it isimpossible to interpret it another way, which was not the case here. The Federal Court properly concluded that the appellant could notrely on

section 73 of the 1989 Act to void the patent. It was not

an act or default that came within the ambit of

section 59 of the 1989 Act. A final comment was made that, considering the importance of patents nowadays and the importance given to intellectual property lawin trade treaties, courts should obviously be careful before adopting an

interpretation that would put Canada at odds with its tradingpartners. The purposive

interpretation of the 1989 Act provided did not require the addition or the recognition of the new grounds ofinvalidity that the appellant’s view respecting sections 27 and 59 of the 1989 Act would entail and that could be in direct conflict withthose generally recognized in England, Europe and the United States. STATUTES AND REGULATIONS CITED

An Act respecting Patents of Invention, S.C. 1869, c. 11, ss. 6, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29.

An Act to amend the Patent Act, S.C. 2005, c. 18, s. 2. Economic Action Plan 2014 Act, No. 2, S.C. 2014, c. 39, s. 138. Intellectual Property Law Improvement Act, S.C. 1993, c. 15, s. 52.

Interpretation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21, s. 45. Patent Act, R.S.C. 1906, c. 69, ss. 17, 34, 47. Patent Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-4, s. 63(2). Patent Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4, s. 12(2), 27, 29, 30, 36(2),(3), 40, 46, 53, 54, 59, 61(1),(2), 73, 78.6. Patent Act (The), S.C. 1923, c. 23, ss. 19, 43. Patent Act, 1935 (The), S.C. 1935, c. 32, s. 41. Patent Act, 1949 (U.K.), 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 87, s. 32. Patent Rules, C.R.C., c. 1250, Sch. I, Form 1, Sch. II, Form 30. Patent Rules, SOR/96-423, Sch. I, Form 1, Sch. II. Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93-133, s. 8.

CASES CITED FOLLOWED: Fada Radio Ltd. v. Canadian General Electric Co., (SCC), [1927] S.C.R. 520, [1927] 3 D.L.R. 922 affg (CA EXC), [1927] Ex. C.R. 107, [1927] 1 D.L.R. 1184. APPLIED: Corlac Inc. v. Weatherford Canada Ltd., 2011 FCA 228, 422 N.R. 49, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2012] 2 S.C.R. vii; Rizzo &Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, (1998), 154 D.L.R. (4th) 193. DISTINGUISHED: Dutch Industries Ltd. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 2003 FCA 121, [2003] 4 F.C. 67, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2003] 3S.C.R. vi; Corlac Inc. v.

Weatherford Canada Ltd., 2011 FCA 228, 422 N.R. 49, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2012] 2 S.C.R. vii(as to applicable version of statute). CONSIDERED: Procter & Gamble Co. v. Beecham Canada Ltd. (1982), 40 N.R. 313, 61 C.P.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused,[1982] 1 S.C.R. v; Miller v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 FCA 370, 220 D.L.R. (4th) 149, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2003]

1 S.C.R. xiv. REFERRED TO: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235; Lovell Manufacturing Co. and Maxwell Ltd. v. Beatty Bros. Ltd. (1962), 41C.P.R. 18 (Ex. Ct.); Flexi-Coil Ltd. v. Bourgault Industries Ltd. (1999), (FCA), 237 N.R. 74, 86 C.P.R. (3d) 221(F.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2000] 1 S.C.R. xi; Merck & Co., Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2006 FCA 323, [2007] 3 F.C.R. 588,leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2007] 1 S.C.R. v; Dutch Industries Ltd. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 2001 FCT 879, [2002]1 F.C. 325; ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v.

Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board), 2006 SCC 4, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 140; 2747-3174 Québec Inc.v. Quebec (Régie des permis d’alcool), (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919, (1996), 140 D.L.R. (4th) 577; Eli Lilly and Co. v.Apotex Inc., 2009 FC 991, 80 C.P.R. (4th) 1, affd 2010 FCA 240, 90 C.P.R. (4th) 327, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2011] 2 S.C.R.v; Bristol-Myers Co. (Johnson’

s) Application, [1975] R.P.C. 127 (H.L.). AUTHORS CITED Sullivan, Ruth. Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed., Markham, Ont.: Lexis Nexis, 2014. APPEAL from a Federal Court decision (2016 FC 136, [2017] 1 F.C.R. 3) dismissing the appellant’s motion for partial

summaryjudgment within a proceeding under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations instituted by the appellant to claimdamages resulting from the delay in obtaining its notice of compliance for a product that allegedly infringed the respondents’ patent.Appeal dismissed. APPEARANCES Harry Radomski and Nando De Luca for appellant. Orestes Pasparakis, Jordana Sanft and David Yi for respondents. SOLICITORS OF RECORD Goodmans LLP, Toronto, for appellant. Norton Rose Fulbright Canada LLP, Toronto, for respondents.

The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by [1] Gauthier J.A.: This is an appeal of the decision of Diner J. of the Federal Court dismissing Apotex Inc.’s (Apotex) motion forpartial

summary judgment. Apotex contended that the respondents’ failure to pay the proper application fee for the issuance of CanadianPatent No. 1339132 (the ʹ132 patent) invalidated the patent. The Federal Court disagreed: 2016 FC 136, [2017] 1 F.C.R. 3 [Federal Courtreasons]. Apotex appeals. [2] The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. The main issue before us is the

interpretation of various provisions of thePatent Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4, as it existed on September 30, 1989 (the 1989 Act). This version of the Patent Act applies given the timeof the application for the patent and its issuance. The parties have agreed that the issue can be properly determined by way of

summaryjudgment. [3] The version of the Patent Act at issue is important because both parties relied on case law that involved a later version of thePatent Act and the applicable Patent Rules, C.R.C., c. 1250 (as of June 1989) (the 1989 Rules) (see book of authorities, Vol. 1, tab 7).They also refer to amendments adopted since 1989. This even includes the latest amendment (not yet in force) in the Economic ActionPlan 2014 Act, No. 2, S.C. 2014, c. 39 (Economic Action Plan Act), which makes it clear that non-payment of fees payable before theissuance of a patent will not invalidate the said patent (Economic Action Plan Act,

section 138). [4] This is the first and most likely the last case involving

section 73 of the 1989 Act. It is always dangerous and often inappropriateto consider amendments post-dating the version of the statute under review (Interpretation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21,

section 45). In fact,I believe that this resulted in the Federal Court adopting an incorrect approach in its

interpretation of

section 73 of the 1989 Act. Itreferred to a later version of

section 73 of the Patent Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4,

section 73, as am. by Intellectual Property LawImprovement Act, S.C. 1993, c. 15,

section 52) and to the Patent Rules, SOR/96-423 enacted in 1996. However, as will be seen, this errordoes not mean that its judgment was wrong in law. [5] For the reasons that follow, I am of the view that the appeal should be dismissed. I. Factual Background [6] On September 12, 1989, the application that ultimately resulted in the issuance of the ʹ132 patent was filed. At the time, theapplicant did not claim small entity status (see 1989 Rules,

Schedule I, Form 1 and the petition filed (appeal book, Vol. 3, pageAB0494)). The then applicable fee payable as a large entity in the amount of $300 was submitted at the same time as the $100 payable tofile an assignment (see 1989 Rules,

Schedule II and the cover letter of the petition (appeal book, Vol. 3, page AB0493)). [7] There is no evidence that the status of the applicant was changed at any time before the issuance of the patent by filing a Form 30(see 1989 Rules,

Schedule I). In fact, it appears, and this is not disputed, that except for the final fee to be paid once the notice ofallowance was issued, all the prescribed fees in respect of the application and the maintenance of the ʹ132 patent until its expiration in2014 were paid on the basis that the applicant (this includes its successors in title) was a large entity as per the relevant Patent Rules. [8] One will never know exactly how the errors occurred, but after receiving the notice of allowance in November 1996, the patentagent paid a fee of $300. This was an error. The final fee payable was $700 for applications filed by large entities prior to October 1,

Then, on April 18, 1997, the patent agent wrote to the Patent Office to say that due to a clerical error only $300 had been paid andan additional $50 (at the time the applicable final fee for a small entity on an application filed before October 1, 1989, was $350) wasincluded. [9] Despite the expert evidence and the witnesses examined, and given the status of the applicant that should have been recorded inthe Patent Office at the relevant time (i.e. large entity), it is not clear why the Patent Office accepted the $350 fee as full payment.Whatever the reason, the Commissioner of Patents (the Commissioner) issued the ʹ132 patent on July 29, 1997. [10] After subsection 78.6(1) of the Patent Act (see Appendix) came into force on February 1, 2006, patentees had 12 months tocorrect past payment errors.

The applicant did not correct these errors by the end of the 12-month period. After receiving from the PatentOffice a list of all patents which may require a top-up payment under

section 78.6, the patent agent was instructed by the patentee toensure that any additional fees due as a large entity should be paid forthwith. Rather than forwarding an additional payment, the patentagent wrote to the Patent Office stating: “Pursuant to 78.6 of the Patent Act, be advised that the entity status of this patent is large.Confirmation of this fact would be appreciated”.

Although it may be that the agent thought that the prescribed fee had been paid in fullgiven that the status of the applicant since the filing of the petition was that of a large entity, there is no real explanation as to why thesaid agent did not discover that he had not paid the correct amount of the final fee due on receipt of the notice of allowance. Whenexamined in 2014, he had no recollection of this file and most of his file had been destroyed sometime in 2002.

Rather than clarifyingwhy the ʹ132 patent was on the list of patents sent to the patent agent given that it was always a large entity, the Patent Officeacknowledged receipt of payment as a large entity and that their record had been amended to indicate this status. Again two mistakes. [11] In the end result, the proper application fee payable back in 1997 was never paid and the Federal Court so found (Federal Courtreasons, at paragraph 37). [12] The motion for partial

summary judgment before the Federal Court arose in the context of a proceeding under

section 8 of thePatented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93-133, instituted by Apotex on June 14, 2013, to claim damagesresulting from the delay in obtaining its notice of compliance for a product which allegedly infringed the ʹ132 patent. In their statementof defence and counterclaim filed in response to the said

section 8 proceedings, the respondents allege, among other things, that Apotexhad been infringing the ʹ132 patent. Apotex defended the counterclaim, alleging that the ʹ132 patent is invalid for various reasons. Onereason it asserted was the failure to pay the proper application fee. II. Issue [13] As mentioned, there is only one question before us: whether or not the Federal Court erred when it found that the failure to paythe proper application fee does not invalidate the ʹ132 patent. [14] This is a question of law reviewable on the standard of correctness (Housen v.

Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, atparagraph 8). III. Positions of the Parties [15] Apotex says that the Commissioner of Patents did not have the power to issue the ʹ132 patent. The Commissioner could onlyissue the patent when all the requirements for issuing a patent under the 1989 Act had been met (section 27). Apotex contends that as theproper application fee had not been paid in full, as a matter of law under subsection 73(1) of the 1989 Act, the application was forfeitedas of May 19, 1997.

This is a fact or default on which Apotex can rely as a defence against allegations of infringement within themeaning of

section 59 of the 1989 Act because it renders the ʹ132 patent void. In support of this contention, Apotex relies heavily on thereasoning of this Court in Dutch Industries Ltd. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 2003 FCA 121, [2003] 4 F.C. 67 (Dutch) (leave toappeal to S.C.C. refused, [[2003] 3 S.C.R. vi], 29738 (December 11, 2003)). [16] The respondents urge us to be guided by the reasoning of this Court in Corlac Inc. v. Weatherford Canada Ltd., 2011 FCA 228,422 N.R. 49 (Weatherford) (leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 34459 (March 29, 2012) [[2012] 2 S.C.R. vii]). Weatherford concernedwhether an applicant’s error in fulfilling a requirement for a patent application under

section 73 (as it stood in 1996) (see Appendix) canbe considered a “fact or default” (section 59) an alleged infringer could rely upon as a defence to infringement after a patent has issued.Interpreting

section 73 (as it stood in 1996) purposively, the Court found that the legislator did not intend such fact or default to void apatent. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on what it considered a long line of cases which refused to consider various acts ordefaults during the prosecution of the application, i.e., the pre-patent issuance period, as acts or defaults that can be relied upon in aninfringement action or a counterclaim seeking to invalidate a patent (Lovell Manufacturing Co. and Maxwell Ltd. v. Beatty Bros. Ltd.(1962), 41 C.P.R. 18 (Ex. Ct.), at page 40; Flexi-Coil Ltd. v.

Bourgault Industries Ltd. (1999), (FCA), 237 N.R. 74, 86C.P.R. (3d) 221 (F.C.A.), at paragraph 31, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 27273 (March 23, 2000) [[2000] 1 S.C.R. xi]; Procter &Gamble Co. v. Beecham Canada Ltd. (1982), 40 N.R. 313, 61 C.P.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.A.) (Procter & Gamble), at paragraphs 68 and 69 [of1982 CarswellNat 604 (WestlawNext Can)], leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 16993 (May 10, 1982) [[1982] 1 S.C.R. v]; Merck & Co.,Inc. v.

Apotex Inc., 2006 FCA 323, [2007] 3 F.C.R. 588, at paragraph 47, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 31754 (May 10, 2007)[[2007] 1 S.C.R. v]). [17] Apotex points out that Weatherford was based on a different pre-patent issuance error, i.e., a different branch of

section 73. Thus,it should be distinguished. Alternatively, at paragraph 90 in its memorandum, Apotex submits that this Court should overruleWeatherford based on Miller v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 FCA 370, 220 D.L.R. (4th) 149 (Miller) (leave to appeal to S.C.C.refused, 29501 (April 17, 2003) [[2003] 1 S.C.R. xiv]). Apotex did not pursue this submission in oral argument at the hearing. In anyevent, I can summarily reject this submission.

Apotex did not meet its burden of establishing that Weatherford was “manifestly wrong, inthe sense that the Court overlooked a relevant statutory provision, or a case that ought to have been followed” (Miller, at paragraph 10). [18] In oral argument at the hearing, neither party asked this Court to overrule any other cases. Rather, faced with authorities againsttheir positions, they submitted that they be distinguished on their facts. It is worth noting that none of the cases, particularly Dutch andWeatherford, dealt with subsection 73(1) of the 1989 Act.

Where the parties differ is on the relevance to the case before us of thereasoning adopted in each of those decisions. Assessing this is the task of the Court in this appeal.

[ 19 ] We have before us a question of law and so correctness is the standard of review. I will proceed with my own analysis of the relevant provisions of the 1989 Act and the most salient authorities relied upon by the parties. IV. Legislative Provisions [ 20 ] The most relevant provisions of the 1989 Act read as follows: APPLICATION FOR PATENTS Who may obtain patents 27.

(1) Subject to this section, any inventor or legal representative of an inventor of an invention that was (

a) not known or used by any other person before he invented it, (

b) not described in any patent or in any publication printed in Canada or in any other country more than two years before presentation of the petition hereunder mentioned, and (

c) not in public use or on sale in Canada for more than two years prior to his application in Canada, may, on presentation to the Commissioner of a petition setting out the facts, in this Act termed the filing of the application and, on compliance with all other requirements of this Act, obtain a patent granting to him an exclusive property in the invention. Applications for patents out of Canada

(2) Any inventor or legal representative of an inventor who applies in Canada for a patent for an invention for which application for patent has been made in any other country by that inventor or his legal representative before the filing of the application in Canada is not entitled to obtain in Canada a patent for that invention unless his application in Canada is filed, either (

a) before issue of any patent to that inventor or his legal representative for the same invention in any other country, or (

b) if a patent has issued in any other country, within twelve months after the filing of the first application by that inventor or his legal representative for patent for that invention in any other country. What may not be patented

(3) No patent shall issue for an invention that has an illicit object in view, or for any mere scientific principle or abstract theorem. … LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN RESPECT OF PATENTS Void in certain cases, or valid only for parts 53.

(1) A patent is void if any material allegation in the petition of the applicant in respect of the patent is untrue, or if the specification and drawings contain more or less than is necessary for obtaining the end for which they purport to be made, and the omission or addition is wilfully made for the purpose of misleading. Exception

(2) Where it appears to a court that the omission or addition referred to in subsection (1) was an involuntary error and it is proved that the patentee is entitled to the remainder of his patent, the court shall render a judgment in accordance with the facts, and shall determine the costs, and the patent shall be held valid for that part of the invention described to which the patentee is so found to be entitled. Copies of judgment

(3) Two office copies of the judgment rendered under subsection (1) shall be furnished to the Patent Office by the patentee, one of which shall be registered and remain of record in the Office and the other attached to the patent and made a part of it by a reference thereto. … INFRINGEMENT … Defence 59. The defendant, in any action for infringement of a patent may plead as matter of defence any fact or default which by this Act or by law renders the patent void, and the court shall take cognizance of that pleading and of the relevant facts and decide accordingly. … FORFEITURE AND RESTORATION OF APPLICATIONS Forfeiture of applications

(1) Where the prescribed fees stated to be payable in a notice of allowance of patent are not paid within six months from the date of the notice, the application for patent is thereupon forfeited. Restoration

(2) A forfeited application may be restored and a patent granted thereon on application to the Commissioner within six months from the incurrence of the forfeiture, on payment with the application for restoration, in addition to the fees payable on the grant of the patent, of a further prescribed fee. Idem

(3) A restored application is subject to amendment and re-examination. V. Analysis [ 21 ] At the outset, I wish to say more about the decisions of this Court in Dutch and Weatherford . A. Dutch [ 22 ] In Dutch , when the patent application No. 2146904 (the ʹ904 application) was filed in April 1995, the applicant paid the application filing fees on the basis that it was a small entity.

This was in error: all the parties acknowledged that the applicant could not claim it had a small entity status as of November 25, 1994 ( Dutch , at paragraph 18). [ 23 ] Dutch arose on an application for judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner to accept a top-up payment and effectively reinstate the application ( Dutch , at paragraph 20). [ 24 ] The appeal also involved a second issue regarding Patent No. 2121388 (the ʹ388 patent), in respect of which, the application was filed in April 1994 claiming a small entity status ( Dutch , at paragraphs 10 and 12).

With respect to the ʹ388 patent, it was admitted that, at the time, the applicant did meet the definition of “small entity”. [ 25 ] Considering the prescribed form for the petition (hereinafter called the application) to be filed at the relevant times (see Patent Rules ,

Schedule I, Form 1), the applicant in respect of both patent applications would have had to make a declaration in respect of its status as a small entity in the application. [ 26 ] Despite the change in status as of November 25, 1994, all fees applicable to the ʹ388 patent both before and after its issuance were all paid at the rate applicable to a small entity ( Dutch , at paragraphs 12 and 47).

The Patent Office was not advised of any change in status until March 29, 2000 ( Dutch , at paragraph 18). [ 27 ] It was argued that the Commissioner could not amend the Patent Office records upon receipt of a top-up payment made in 2000 because by that time, the application for the ʹ388 patent had become abandoned by the operation of law due to partial payment of the maintenance fees in 1995 ( Dutch Industries Ltd. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) , 2001 FCT 879 , [2002] 1 F.C. 325 , at paragraph 13 ).

It was further argued that, in any event, the patent had expired in accordance with subsection 46(2) of the Patent Act (see Appendix), which provides that when fees for the maintenance of a patent are not paid within the time prescribed, the term of the patent shall be deemed to have expired at the end of that time. [ 28 ] Thus, with respect to the failure to pay the proper maintenance fees applicable to both the ʹ904 application and the application for the ʹ388 patent, the Court had to construe paragraph 73(1)(

c) as it appeared in the newer version of the Patent Act (see Appendix). It differs from

section 73 of the 1989 Act. [ 29 ] This Court had no difficulty concluding that paragraph 73(1)(

c) applied to the ʹ904 application. The said application was deemed abandoned and had not been reinstated within the time provided for in the Patent Act . Thus, the Commissioner had no authority to amend its record and accept the top-up payment as a corrective payment ( Dutch , at paragraphs 48 and 49). [ 30 ] With respect to the application for the ʹ388 patent and the patent itself, the Court construed the Patent Rules purposively and concluded that once an applicant properly filed its application as a small entity, it retained that status throughout the prosecution and thereafter ( Dutch , at paragraph 46).

Thus, the application for the ʹ388 patent was never deemed abandoned, nor did the ʹ388 patent lapse, for the prescribed maintenance fees had been paid in full at all relevant times ( Dutch , at paragraph 47). [ 31 ] Thus, the Court did not have to determine what would have been the effect of the failure to pay the maintenance fee of the application for the ʹ388 patent on the validity of the ʹ388 patent. Sharlow J.A. for this Court wrote in obiter that a failure to pay a maintenance fee could have catastrophic consequences ( Dutch , at paragraph 43).

Parliament took notice: in 2005, it quickly adopted subsection 78.6(1) of the Patent Act ( An Act to amend the Patent Act , S.C. 2005, c. 18,

section 2). This provision deals with the failure to pay large-entity fees for applications and patents (see Appendix: Patent Act ,

section 46). Since then, further amendments have been adopted but are not in force yet (Economic Action Plan Act,

section 138). [ 32 ] Be that as it may, this obiter does not change the fact this Court in Dutch did not have to deal with the validity of the ʹ388 patent, having found that the proper fee had been paid prior to its issuance. This Court effectively reversed the Federal Court’s findings in respect of the ʹ388 patent. [ 33 ] Finally, I ought to note that in Dutch , the Commissioner argued that it was entitled to rely on an applicant’s declaration that it was a “small entity” ( Dutch , at paragraph 16). As mentioned, an applicant must claim a small entity status in the application ( Patent Rules ,

Schedule I, Form 1). Thus, the Commissioner’s reliance on such a statement makes sense when one considers that an untrue statement in the petition (i.e., application) is subject to the application of

section 53 of the Patent Act (same as

section 53 of the 1989 Act).

[34] In the present case, the applicant made no untrue statement in its application for the ʹ132 patent. Its status as a large entity wasnot misrepresented and it never changed. [35] Also,

section 59 of the 1989 Act was not in play in Dutch, considering the type of proceeding involved—a judicial reviewinstituted shortly after the decision under review was made. B. Weatherford [36] In Weatherford, our Court was dealing with an appeal of a decision of the Federal Court in respect of an infringement action anda counterclaim challenging the validity of the Patent No. 2095937 (the ʹ937 patent). [37] As in Dutch, the patent application for the ʹ937 patent was filed after October 1, 1989 (Weatherford, at paragraph 14). The ʹ937patent issued in December 1998 (Weatherford, at paragraph 1). Thus, the relevant provisions of the Patent Act, particularly

section 73,were not the same as those that apply in the present appeal. [38] However, paragraphs 130 to 151 of our Court’s reasons in Weatherford are relevant here. In these paragraphs, the Courtaddresses the issue whether the alleged infringer could rely on paragraph 73(1)(

a) of the Patent Act, as it then read, to invalidate the ʹ937patent. [39] Although many paragraphs of this version of

section 73 deal with the failure to pay various fees prior to the issuance of a patent,the paragraph of

section 73 at issue in Weatherford provides that the application will be deemed abandoned if the applicant does notreply in good faith to any requisition by an examiner within the prescribed time period. [40] Layden-Stevenson J.A., writing for our Court, applied the modern principles of statutory

interpretation (Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd.(Re), (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, (1998), 154 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Rizzo)). In particular, she examined the scheme of theAct and its objects, and read

section 73 in its context among the other provisions of the Act, particularly

section

Section 53 deals withuntrue statements in an application and misrepresentations in a specification and their impact on the validity of issued patents. Shereviewed case law where our Court has consistently distinguished between applications for patents and issued patents (Weatherford, atparagraph 145). She considered the issuance of a patent as a significant moment such that paragraph 73(1)(

a) spoke only during theprosecution of the application, not afterward. In her view, once the patent issues, paragraph 73(1)(

a) no longer operates to affect theissued patent (Weatherford, at paragraph 150). She considered the decision of our Court in Dutch and distinguished it, finding that it wasnot dealing with the validity of a patent. Thus, in her view, Dutch did not support the position that paragraph 73(1)(

a) could be reliedupon to invalidate the patent (Weatherford, at paragraph 151). [41] I agree with Layden-Stevenson J.A.’s treatment of Dutch and of the other authorities referred to in paragraph 151 of her reasons.As I do not find any other cases relied upon by Apotex to be of assistance, I will not discuss them in these reasons. C.

Can Apotex rely on subsection 73(1) in the 1989 Act as a fact or default under this Act that renders the patent void pursuant tosection 59 in the 1989 Act? [42] Our task is to construe the relevant words of the 1989 Act “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary senseharmoniously with the scheme of the [statute]”, its objects and the intention of the legislator (Rizzo, at paragraph 21). [43] The ordinary meaning of the words in subsection 73(1) would normally cover situations where the prescribed fees for the patentapplication were not paid at all or were not paid in full, voluntarily or through an inadvertent error.

However, the provision does notexpressly deal with its impact on a patent issued, especially when it results from inadvertent mutual mistakes (i.e., mistakes on the part ofthe applicant as well as the Patent Office). [44] I note that on such literal

interpretation of this provision, if the payment in respect of the ʹ132 patent application had been made,let’s say within a month or two of the receipt of the notice of allowance, and the patent issued prior to the expiration of the six monthsprovided for in subsection 73(1), the application would not have become forfeited before such issuance even if the payment was notmade in full. Thus, to include mutual mistakes that result in the issuance of a patent could result in inconsistent consequences dependingon whether the patent issues before the end of the six months or not.

This appears unfair. [45] Having considered the legislative evolution of subsection 73(1) of the 1989 Act, it becomes clearer that the object of thisprovision was to provide a tool for the Commissioner to collect fees. It first appeared as a note in the Tariff of Fees, then included in thestatute, when Parliament decided in 1923 to lessen the financial burden required when filing an application for a patent (see Appendix:The Patent Act, S.C. 1923, c. 23, the relevant portion of

section 43) (the 1923 Act). Until then, upon filing the application, the applicanthad to pay upfront the fees for the duration of the patent he was seeking (see Appendix: Patent Act, R.S.C. 1906, c. 69,

section 47) (the1906 Act). Like maintenance fees for patent applications and for patents, it was also a means for getting rid of “deadwood”. [46] When the Tariff of Fees was transferred to the Patent Rules later on, the note became subsection 73(1). This legislative evolutionalso explains why one finds this provision at the end of the 1989 Act just before the sections dealing with offences and punishment. [47] Reading subsection 73(1) in the context of subsection 73(2), I first note that the words “may be restored and a patent granted” insubsection 73(2) suggest that the legislator did not envisage that

section 73 would be relevant where a patent already issued. Second, it isclear that the legislator wanted to give a real opportunity to an applicant to rectify a failure to pay the prescribed fees within six monthsafter the forfeiture. If a patent issues because of inadvertent mutual mistakes before the end of the period set out to restore theapplication, there is no realistic opportunity to discover that the fees were not properly paid. It is difficult to see how voiding the patentissued will help achieve the legislator’s intent to provide a cure in the pre-patent issuance period.

The object of this provision is notparticularly helpful to support the view put forth by Apotex. [48] Now, considering the broader context, did the legislator intend that an alleged infringer be able to raise a default like the onebefore us, which occurred prior to the issuance of the patent and does not come within the ambit of

section 53? Are we in the presence of

a “fact or default which by this Act or by law renders the patent void” under

section 59? [49] Apotex’s answer to these questions is simple. It cites subsection 27(1) of the 1989 Act. That subsection provides that an“inventor … may, on presentation to the Commissioner of a petition setting out the facts … and, on compliance with all otherrequirements of this Act, obtain a patent granting to him an exclusive property in the invention” (my emphasis).

Section 59 of the 1989Act provides that when defending an infringement action, a defendant “may plead … any fact or default which by this Act or by lawrenders the patent void”. Thus, on Apotex’s view of the matter, any failure to meet any requirement of the Act, including the PatentRules pursuant to subsection 12(2) of the 1989 Act (see Appendix) will render a patent void. [50] In my view, the wording of

section 59 is not as clear as Apotex suggests. One must go beyond the text of a legislative provisionand consider the context of the legislative provision and the legislative purpose (Rizzo). This is so even if the words of the legislativeprovision seem clear (ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board), 2006 SCC 4, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 140 (ATCO), atparagraph 48).

Once context and purpose are considered, subsection 27(1) of the 1989 Act does not mean that any failure to meet anyrequirement of the Act renders the patent void. [51] The simple and literal approach advocated by Apotex to sections 27 and 59 is attractive, but in my view, it leads to an absurdresult and disregards the scheme and object of the Act, and the true purpose of those provisions. This Court, in Weatherford (atparagraph 150) and Dutch (at paragraphs 41 and 42), made it clear that an

interpretation leading to absurd results should be avoided if atall possible, considering the importance of patents and the catastrophic consequences that a purely literal

interpretation would lead to. InDutch, this led our Court to greatly restrict the type of cases in which the version of

section 73 of the Patent Act at issue could apply (nochange in the status of an entity after the filing). [52] As noted in Weatherford (at paragraph 142), this Court has consistently construed the facts and defaults that can be raised by analleged infringer as those relating to the patentability of the invention by the person seeking the patent and those set out in

section 53 ofthe 1989 Act, or in similar provisions in previous versions of the patent legislation dealing expressly with the nullity or voidance ofpatents. [53] Here, I ought to mention that the wording of

section 59 of the 1989 Act has been in every version of the patent legislation since1869, when the first Canadian statute was adopted after the Confederation to deal with patents for invention (see Appendix: An Actrespecting Patents of Invention, S.C. 1869, c. 11,

section 26 (the 1869 Act); 1906 Act,

section 34). [54] In substance,

section 59 has been on the books since 1869. Parliament has also included, since 1869, a provision dealing withwho may seek a patent which, like

section 27 of the 1989 Act, included the words relied upon by Apotex: “may, on a petition …presented to the Commissioner and on compliance with the other requirements of this Act, obtain a Patent” (see Appendix: 1869 Act,section 6) (my emphasis).

Thus, in all the precedents referred to above, it was open to the courts to adopt Apotex’s view. [55] Thus, it is telling that as early as 1927, the Supreme Court of Canada, on an appeal involving a decision of the Exchequer Courtin an infringement action where the defendant alleged as a ground of invalidity the absence of any affidavit in support of the applicationfor a reissued patent (a requirement for the issuance of such patent), stated: ….we are satisfied that any insufficiency in the material on which the Commissioner acts, the entire absence of an affidavit or any defectin the form and substance of that which is put forward as an affidavit in support of the claim, cannot, in the absence of fraud, which inthis instance has not been suggested, avail an alleged infringer as a ground of attack on a new patent issued under s. 24.

It is not a “fact ordefault, which, by this Act, or by law, renders the patent void” (Patent Act, s. 34). (Fada Radio Ltd. v.

Canadian General Electric Co., (SCC), [1927] S.C.R. 520 (Fada), at pages 523 and 524.) [56] When it wrote its reasons, the Supreme Court of Canada in Fada was fully aware that, as the court below put it, “[t]he legal effectof a failure to strictly comply with certain formalities of the statutes and rules regarding applications for patents has not apparently beenthe subject of discussion in reported cases in Canada or England, but it has been the subject of discussion in many American cases” (TheCanadian General Electric Co., Ltd. v. Fada Radio, Ltd., (CA EXC), [1927] Ex.

C.R. 107, at page 111). [57] Thus, I consider ourselves bound by the essential concept in Fada, that pre-patent issuance defects in the administrative processfor applying for a patent cannot be relied upon by an alleged infringer to render a patent void. [58] The Patent Act and the practice of the Patent Office have evolved since Fada. But in a number of cases since, our Court hasagreed with the essential holding in Fada. It has ruled that defects in the pre-patent issuance process that do not come within the ambit ofprovisions dealing expressly with the voidance of a patent, like

section 53 of the 1989 Act, cannot be relied upon by an alleged infringerto render a patent void. [59] For example, in Procter & Gamble, again in the context of an action for infringement and a defence of invalidity, the Court hadto determine whether a failure to meet the requirement set out in subsection 63(2) of the then applicable version of the Patent Act [R.S.C.1970, c.

P-4] (see Appendix: 1989 Act, subsection 61(2)) was a fact or default which could be raised by an alleged infringer to void thepatent. [60] Subsection 63(2) addressed circumstances in which a patent application was made for an invention that was already covered byan existing patent. It provided that the patent application would be “deemed to have been abandoned unless the applicant” moved to set apre-existing patent aside, which the applicant in that case had not done.

The Court agreed with the trial Judge “that the subsection ‘hasnothing to do with an issued patent’ [as it] is not a provision to be applied after the issuance of the second patent to provide a basis foralleging the invalidity thereof” (Procter & Gamble, at paragraph 69 [of 1982 CarswellNat 604 (WestlawNext Can)]). [61] There is no need to determine whether the word “forfeited” (in French “périmée”) in subsection 73(1) has the same meaning asthe word “abandoned” (in French “abandonnée”) used in the various provisions of the 1989 Act (see Appendix for examples: 1989 Act,section 30, subsections 36(3), 61(2)).

In all cases, the events referred to in those provisions occur in the pre-patent issuance period and

the legislator provided for an opportunity to reinstate or restore the application after its status (abandoned or forfeited) was changed bythe operation of the law, even if the time in which to do so and what needs to be established to do so may differ. [62] The legislator is presumed to know the law and how it has been applied, especially where, as here, the case law of appellatecourts has been consistent for such a long period of time (2747-3174 Québec Inc. v.

Quebec (Régie des permis d’alcool), (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919, at paragraphs 237 and 238; ATCO, at paragraph 59). [63] The legislator was well aware of the distinction between an application and a patent. Since 1869, Parliament has used precisewording when it intended to deal with matters that could void a patent.

Section 53 of the 1989 Act is evidence of the fact that thelegislator turned its mind to facts and defaults that could void a patent. [64] Prior versions of the Patent Act contained more provisions, like

section 53, dealing expressly with the nullity and voidance ofpatents. These reflect what the legislator considered to be so fundamental as to justify this harsh consequence. For example, for severaldecades, a patent would become null if the invention was not manufactured in Canada within a prescribed period. This was in line withone of the objects of the patent legislation which was to promote inventions that would be practised in Canada, i.e., to promote economicand technological development in Canada. [65]

Section 53 first deals with untruth in the application (petition). Thus, it is significant that the prescribed form for the applicationin the 1989 Rules requires the applicant to state that he or she made the invention and verily believes to be entitled to a patent havingregard to the provisions of the Patent Act. This obviously does not speak to any matter arising during the prosecution of the application.It is directed only to matters that are at the heart of the patent bargain between an inventor and the public, not technical matters such aswhether the prescribed fee has been paid. [66] The second portion of

section 53 addresses omissions or unwarranted additions in the specification—that is, misrepresentationsin what is actually disclosed to the public. One would normally expect this to be more important than an inadvertent mistake that resultsin payment of a few dollars less than what was due. Still, Parliament made it clear that the patent will only be void if themisrepresentation was made with an intent to deceive.

An involuntary error will not affect the validity of the patent for the part of theinvention to which the patentee is found to be entitled. [67] When one looks at the overall scheme of the 1989 Act, it speaks to different actors (petitioners, co-inventors, co-owners, theCommissioner, third parties such as an alleged infringer), different stages of the process (pre-and post-patent issuance) and differenttypes of proceedings and remedies available to each such actor. [68] This is why for example,

section 59 was not in play in Dutch (a judicial review), and would not be in play in the various types ofappeals provided for in the 1989 Act. [69] There is nothing unusual or offensive about the fact that certain actors can raise issues that others cannot in other types ofproceedings. The choices made by Parliament are consistent with the fact that most matters occurring during the administrativeprosecution of a patent application should be dealt with within a relatively short period of time, through appeals and judicial reviews asthis ensures finality and certainty.

In the context of such proceedings, one can reasonably expect administrative law principles to apply.This is particularly important where, as in this case, a timely review of the Commissioner’s decision to issue the ʹ132 patent would havelikely enabled the applicant to restore the application pursuant to subsection 73(2) of the 1989 Act. [70] However, defences to actions for infringement are not based on administrative law principles; they are based on patent law. Thisis the law to which

section 59 refers to, in the same manner that it is the law to which

section 40 of the 1989 Act (see Appendix) refers towhen it says that the Commissioner can refuse the application when he “is satisfied that an applicant is not by law entitled to be granted apatent”. The legislative evolution of

section 40 indicates that the legislator had initially listed the substantive grounds for patentability tobe met by a person to obtain a patent (see Appendix: 1906 Act,

section 17). But patent law evolved through the

interpretation of thePatent Act by the courts. For example, it included matters such as double patenting and obviousness. Hence, Parliament then choseinstead to mention more generally that the applicant must be entitled by law (see Appendix: 1923 Act,

section 19; The Patent Act, 1935,S.C. 1935, c. 32,

section 41); that is now part of the wording of

section 40 of the 1989 Act. [71] An action for infringement is a statutory right. It was included in 1869 in the first Canadian statute on patents for invention (seeAppendix: 1869 Act, sections 23, 24). The fact that the alleged infringer can raise certain defences does not change the nature of theproceeding. It is not a judicial review. The matter is not decided on the basis of what was before the Commissioner. It has never been sofor more than a hundred years (see Eli Lilly and Co. v.

Apotex Inc., 2009 FC 991, 80 C.P.R. (4th) 1, at paragraphs 353–354, 359 and 362,affd 2010 FCA 240, 90 C.P.R. (4th) 327, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 33946 (May 5, 2011) [[2011] 2 S.C.R. v]). [72] It would be absurd in the overall context of the 1989 Act to construe

section 59 as enabling an alleged infringer to void a patent(here a successful pharmaceutical patent worth millions if not billions of dollars) say ten years later or even after its expiration, on thebasis that the petitioner was a few pennies short. This is all the more so considering that, as mentioned, the proposed

interpretation ofsection 73 would have inconsistent and unfair consequences (see paragraph 44, above). [73] To be certain, courts will apply the law, even if it leads to absurd results, but only if it is impossible to interpret it another way(Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes (6th ed.), [Markham, Ont.: Lexis Nexis] 2014 at §10.4). This is not the casehere. [74] The Federal Court properly concluded that Apotex could not rely on

section 73 of the 1989 Act to void the patent. It is not an actor default that comes within the ambit of

section 59 of the 1989 Act. [75] Finally, I ought to mention that historically, the grounds for invalidating a patent were originally those for which a writ of scirefacias could be obtained (see Appendix: 1869 Act,

section 29). This was also the case in England. As noted by Lord Diplock in Bristol-Myers Co. (Johnson’

s) Application, [1975] R.P.C. 127 (H.L.), at page 156, the grounds to repeal a patent by scire facias before 1884were essentially codified in

section 32 of the Patents Act, 1949 (U.K.), 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 87 (the U.K. 1949 Act), in England (see

Appendix). The grounds on which one could impeach a patent were the same as those that could be raised as a defence to an action for infringement (see Appendix: U.K. 1949 Act, subsection 32(4)). [ 76 ] The patent legislation applicable in the European Union and in the United States since then adopted a similar approach and the grounds on which one can impeach a patent or raise invalidity as a defence to an infringement action are expressly listed. [ 77 ] Considering the importance of patents nowadays, and the importance given to intellectual property law in trade treaties, courts should obviously be careful before adopting an

interpretation that would put Canada at odds with its trading partners. Thus, I am comforted by the fact that my purposive

interpretation of the 1989 Act does not require the addition or the recognition of the new grounds of invalidity that Apotex’s view in respect of sections 27 and 59 would entail and that could be in direct conflict with those generally recognized in England, Europe and the United States. [ 78 ] To conclude, I propose to dismiss the appeal with costs fixed at an all-inclusive amount of $5000. Stratas J.A. : I agree. Boivin J.A. : I agree. Appendix

An Act respecting Patents of Invention , S.C. 1869, c. 11 WHO MAY OBTAIN PATENTS. Residents of Canada during one year, may obtain Patents for their own discoveries and inventions. Form of Patent. Proviso. 6.

Any person having been a resident of Canada for at least one year next before his application, and having invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or used by others before his invention or discovery thereof, or not being a the time of his application for a patent in public use or on sale in any of the Provinces of the Dominion with the consent or allowance of the inventor or discoverer thereof, may, on a petition to that effect presented to the Commissioner and on compliance with the other requirements of this Act, obtain a Patent granting to such person an exclusive property therein; and the said Patent shall be under the seal of the Patent Office and the signature of the Commissioner, or the signature of another member of the Privy Council, and shall be good and avail to the grantee, his heirs, assigns or other legal representatives, for the period mentioned in such Patent ; but no Patent shall issue for an invention or discovery having an illicit object in view, nor for any mere scientific principle or abstract theorem. … ASSIGNMENT AND INFRINGMENT OF PATENTS. … Remedy for infringement of patent. 23.

Every person who, without the consent in writing of the Patentee, makes, constructs or puts in practice any invention or discovery for which a Patent has been obtained under this Act, or procures such invention or discovery from any person not authorised to make or use it by the Patentee, and uses it, shall be liable to the Patentee in an action of damages for so doing;—and the judgment shall be enforced, and the damages, and costs as may be adjudged, shall be recovered in like manner as in other cases in the Court in which the action is brought. Action for infringement of patent. Injunction may issue.

Appeal allowed. 24.

An action for the infringement of a Patent may be brought before any Court of Record having jurisdiction to the amount of damages asked for and having its sittings within the Province in which the infringement is said to have taken place, and being at the same time, of the Courts of such jurisdiction within such Province, the one of which the place of holding is nearest to the place of residence or of business of the defendant; and such Court shall decide the case and determine as to costs; in any action for the infringement of a Patent, the Court, if sitting, or any judge thereof in Chambers if the Court be not sitting may, on the application of the plaintiff or defendant respectively, make such order for an injunction, restraining the opposite party from further use, manufacture or sale of the subject matter of the patent, and for his punishment in the event of the disobedience to such order, or for inspection or account, and respecting the same and the proceedings in the action, as the Court or Judge may see fit;—but from such order an appeal shall lie under the same circumstances and to the same Court, as from other judgments or orders of the Court in which the order was made. … Defence in actions for infringement. 26.

The defendant in any such action may specially plead as matter of defence any fact or default which by this Act or by law would

render the Patent void; and the Court shall take congnizance [sic] of that special pleading and of the facts connected therewith, and shall decide the case accordingly. NULLITY, IMPEACHMENT AND VOIDANCE OF PATENT. Patent to be void in certain cases or only valid for part. 27.

A Patent shall be void, if any material allegation in the petition or declaration of the applicant be untrue, or if the specification and drawings contain more or less than is necessary for obtaining the end for which they purport to be made, such omission or addition being wilfully made for the purpose of misleading; but if it shall appear to the Court that such omission or addition is simply an involuntary error, and it is proved that the Patentee is entitled to the remainder of his Patent pro tanto , the Court shall render a judgment in accordance with the facts, and determine as to costs, and the Patent shall be held valid for such part of the invention described, and two office copies of such judgment shall be furnished to the Patent Office by the Patentee, one to be registered and to remain of record in the office, and the other to be attached to the Patent and made a part of it by a reference. … Proceedings for impeachment of patent.

Scire facias may issue. 29.

Any person desiring to impeach any Patent issued under this Act, may obtain a sealed and certified copy of the Patent and of the petition, declaration, drawings and specification thereunto relating, and may have the same filed in the Office of the Prothonotary or Clerk of the Superior Court for the Province of Quebec, or of the Court of Queen’s Bench or Common Pleas for the Province of Ontario, or of the Supreme Court in the Province of Nova Scotia, or of the Court of Queen’s Bench in the Province of New Brunswick, according to the domicile elected by the Patentee as aforesaid, which Court shall adjudicate on the matter and decide as to costs; the Patent and documents aforesaid shall then be held as of record in such Court, so that a Writ of Scire Facias under the Seal of the Court grounded upon such record may issue for the repeal of the Patent, for legal cause as aforesaid, if upon proceedings had upon the Writ in accordance with the meaning of this Act the Patent be adjudged to be void.

Patent Act , R.S.C. 1906, c. 69 REFUSAL TO GRANT PATENTS. Commissioner may object to grant a patent in certain cases. 17. The Commissioner may object to grant a patent in any of the following cases:— (

a) When he is of opinion that the alleged invention is not patentable in law; (

b) When it appears to him that the invention is already in the possession of the public, with the consent or allowance of the inventor; (

c) When it appears to him that there is no novelty in the invention; (

d) When it appears to him that the invention has been described in a book or other printed publication before the date of the application, or is otherwise in the possession of the public; (

e) When it appears to him that the invention has already been patented in Canada, unless the Commissioner has doubts as to whether the patentee or the applicant is the first inventor; (

f) When it appears to him that the invention has already been patented in a foreign country, and the year has not expired within which the foreign patentee may apply for a patent in Canada, unless the Commissioner has doubts as to whether the foreign patentee or the applicant is the first inventor. … IMPEACHMENT AND OTHER LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN RESPECT OF PATENTS. … Defence in action for infringement. 34.

The defendant, in any such action, may plead as matter of defence, any fact or default which, by this Act, or by law, renders the patent void; and the court shall take cognizance of such pleading and of the facts connected therewith, and shall decide the case accordingly. … PATENT FEES. Tariff of fees. 47. The following fees shall be payable before an application for any of the purposes herein mentioned shall be received by the Commissioner, that is to say:—

Full fee for 18 years…………..$60.00 Partial fee for 12 years…………40.00 Partial fee for 6 years…………..20.00 Fee for further term of 12 years..40.00 Fee for further term of 6 years…20.00 The Patent Act , S.C. 1923, c. 23 REFUSAL TO GRANT PATENTS. Power of Commissioner to refuse grant. 19. The Commissioner may object to grant a patent whenever he is satisfied that the applicant is not by law entitled thereto, and when it appears to him that the invention has already been patented, unless the Commissioner has doubts as to whether the patentee or the applicant is the first inventor and the application was filed within two years from the date of the patent. … PATENT FEES. Tariff of fees. 43.

(1) The following fees shall be payable before an application for any of the purposes herein mentioned shall be received by the Commissioner, that is to say:— On filing an application for patent…………………………. $15.00 On grant of patent …………... 20.00 (Payable on pain of forfeiture within six months from the date of notice of the allowance of patent.) The Patent Act, 1935 , S.C. 1935, c. 32 REFUSAL OF PATENTS. Refusal by Commissioner. 41.

Whenever the Commissioner is satisfied that the applicant is not by law entitled to be granted a patent he shall refuse the application and, by registered letter addressed to the applicant or his registered agent, notify such applicant of such refusal and of the ground or reason therefor. … Patents Act, 1949 (U.K.), 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 87 … Revocation and surrender of patents Revocation of patent by court. 32.

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a patent may, on the petition of any person interested, be revoked by the court on any of the following grounds, that is to say,- (

a) that the invention, so far as claimed in any claim of the complete specification, was claimed in a valid claim of earlier priority date contained in the complete specification of another patent granted in the United Kingdom; (

b) that the patent was granted on the application of a person not entitled under the provisions of this Act to apply therefor; (

c) that the patent was obtained in contravention of the rights of the petitioner or any person under or through whom he claims; (

d) that the subject of any claim of the complete specification is not an invention within the meaning of this Act; (

e) that the invention, so far as claimed in any claim of the complete specification, is not new having regard to what was known or used, before the priority date of the claim, in the United Kingdom; (

f) that the invention, so far as claimed in any claim of the complete specification, is obvious and does not involve any inventive step having regard to what was known or used, before the priority date of the claim, in the United Kingdom; (

g) that the invention, so far as claimed in any claim of the complete specification, is not useful; (

h) that the complete specification does not sufficiently and fairly describe the invention and the method by which it is to be performed,

or does not disclose the best method of performing it which was known to the applicant for the patent and for which he was entitled to claim protection; (

i) that the scope of any claim of the complete specification is not sufficiently and clearly defined or that any claim of the complete specification is not fairly based on the matter disclosed in the specification; (

j) that the patent was obtained on a false suggestion or representation; (

k) that the primary or intended use or exercise of the invention is contrary to law; (

l) that the invention, so far as claimed in any claim of the complete specification, was secretly used in the United Kingdom, otherwise than as mentioned in subsection (2) of this section, before the priority date of that claim. …

(4) Every ground on which a patent may be revoked shall be available as a ground of defence in any proceeding for the infringement of the patent. Patent Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4 (as it appeared on September 30, 1989) RULES AND REGULATIONS 12. … Effect

(2) Any rule or regulation made by the Governor in Council has the same force and effect as if it had been enacted herein. … APPLICATION FOR PATENTS … When applications to be completed 30.

(1) Each application for a patent shall be completed within twelve months after the filing of the application, and in default thereof, or on failure of the applicant to prosecute the application within six months after any examiner, appointed pursuant to

section 6, has taken action thereon of which notice has been given to the applicant, the application shall be deemed to have been abandoned. Abandoned application reinstated

(2) An abandoned application may be reinstated on petition presented to the Commissioner within twelve months after the date on which it was deemed to have been abandoned, and on payment of the prescribed fee, if the petitioner satisfies the Commissioner that the failure to complete or prosecute the application within the time specified was not reasonably avoidable. Idem

(3) An application reinstated under subsection (2) shall retain its original filing date. … DIVISIONAL APPLICATIONS 36. … Divisional applications

(2) Where an application describes and claims more than one invention, the applicant may, and on the direction of the Commissioner to that effect shall, limit his claims to one invention only, and the invention or inventions defined in the other claims may be made the subject of one or more divisional applications, if those divisional applications are filed before the issue of a patent on the original application. Idem

(3) If the original application becomes abandoned or forfeited, the time for filing divisional applications terminates with the expiration of the time for reinstating and reviving the original application under this Act or the rules made thereunder. … REFUSAL OF PATENTS Refusal by Commissioner 40. Whenever the Commissioner is satisfied that an applicant is not by law entitled to be granted a patent, he shall refuse the application and, by registered letter addressed to the applicant or his registered agent, notify the applicant of the refusal and of the ground or reason

therefor. … PRIORITY OF INVENTIONS Establishing Priority 61.

(1) No patent or claim in a patent shall be declared invalid or void on the ground that, before the invention therein defined was made by the inventor by whom the patent was applied for, it had already been known or used by some other person, unless it is established that (

a) that other person had, before the date of the application for the patent, disclosed or used the invention in such manner that it had become available to the public; (

b) that other person had, before the issue of the patent, made an application for patent in Canada on which conflict proceedings should have been directed; or (

c) that other person had at any time made an application in Canada which, by virtue of

section 28, had the same force and effect as if it had been filed in Canada before the issue of the patent and on which conflict proceedings should properly have been directed had it been so filed. A second patent

(2) Notwithstanding

section 41, an application for a patent for an invention for which a patent has already issued under this Act shall be rejected unless the applicant, within a time to be fixed by the Commissioner, commences an action to set aside the prior patent, so far as it covers the invention in question, but if that action is commenced and diligently prosecuted, the application shall not be deemed to have been abandoned unless the applicant fails to proceed on it within a reasonable time after the action has been finally disposed of. Patent Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4 (as it appeared in Weatherford ) 46. … Lapse of term if maintenance fees not paid

(2) Where the fees payable under subsection (1) are not paid within the time provided by the regulations, the term limited for the duration of the patent shall be deemed to have expired at the end of that time. … ABANDONMENT AND REINSTATEMENT OF APPLICATIONS Deemed abandonment of applications 73.

(1) An application for a patent in Canada shall be deemed to be abandoned if the applicant does not (

a) reply in good faith to any requisition made by an examiner in connection with an examination, within six months after the requisition is made or within any shorter period established by the Commissioner; (

b) comply with a notice given pursuant to subsection 27(6); (

c) pay the fees payable under

section 27.1, within the time provided by the regulations; (

d) make a request for examination or pay the prescribed fee under subsection 35(1) within the time provided by the regulations; (

e) comply with a notice given under subsection 35(2); or (

f) pay the prescribed fees stated to be payable in a notice of allowance of patent within six months after the date of the notice. … Payment of prescribed fees 78.6

(1) If, before the day on which this

section comes into force, a person has paid a prescribed fee applicable to a small entity, within the meaning of the Patent Rules as they read at the time of payment, but should have paid the prescribed fee applicable to an entity other than a small entity and a payment equivalent to the difference between the two amounts is submitted to the Commissioner in accordance with subsection (2) either before or no later than twelve months after that day, the payment is deemed to have been paid on the day on which the prescribed fee was paid, regardless of whether an action or other proceeding relating to the patent or patent application in respect of which the fee was payable has been commenced or decided.