Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v. S.L., 2011 ONCJ 847

WARNING The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file: This is a case under

Part III of the Child and Family Services Act and is subject to subsections 48(7) , 45(8) and 45(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 85(3) of the Child and Family Services Act , which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows: 45.—

(7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication. — The court may make an order, . . . (

c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing, where the court is of the opinion that . . . the publication of the report, . . ., would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.

(8) Prohibition: identifying child.— No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child's parent or foster parent or a member of the child's family.

(9) Idem: order re adult. — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part. . . . 85. —

(3) Idem. — A person who contravenes subsection 45(8) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 45(7)(

c) or subsection 45(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both. Sault Ste. Marie Registry No. 68/2009 DATE: 2011·XI·21 CITATION: Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v. S.L. , 2011 ONCJ 847 ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: ) ) CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY OF ALGOMA ) ) Jennifer A.

Mealey, for the applicant society ) ) — AND — ) ) ) S.L. and M.R. ) ) ) ) David Stone, for the respondent mother, S.L. Eric McCooeye, for the respondent father, M.R. ) ) HEARD: 27 September 2011 [ 1 ] JUSTICE J. KUKURIN:— This is a ruling on a request by the applicant society for a finding that a witness, Ms. Sharon Chayka, be qualified as an expert in this child protection case in the areas of: (

a) child attachment; (

b) dealing with developmentally challenged persons; (

c) assessing parental capacity. It wishes her opinion evidence, as it relates to these areas, to be admissible and admitted in the trial being held in this case.

[ 2 ] This case is a child protection case involving two children, V., age four, and J., age three. They were apprehended from their parents in March 2009, some two and one-half years ago, and have been in the same foster home throughout all the intervening time. The society’s claim in this case is for an order of Crown wardship with no access. Should it be successful, it plans to find an adoptive home for these children. [ 3 ] Crown wardship with no access is the most intrusive of the protection orders possible in a child protection case. It results in a permanent separation of a child from its birth family.

Before a society can obtain this kind of an order, or, in fact, any lesser child protection order, it must satisfy the court that the child in question is a child in need of protection. [ 4 ] A child can be found judicially to be in need of protection on certain specified grounds. These are set out in the Child and Family Services Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. C-11, as amended (“the Act”), the statute that governs child protection proceedings in Ontario. In this case, the society relies for such a finding on the grounds set out in subclause 37(2)( b )(

i) and subclause 37(2)( b )(ii) of this statute. [1] [ 5 ] The onus is on the children’s aid society, the applicant in this case, to satisfy the court of three things: (

a) that the children are in need of protection; (

b) that they should be made wards of the Crown; (

c) that there should be no right of access to these children in favour of anyone. [ 6 ] Courts are typically satisfied only with evidence. Evidence can take many forms. There are rules of evidence that have evolved over centuries. Some are so fundamental to our system of law that it is presumed that everyone is aware of them. Others of them are codified, that is, they are enshrined in a statute. [2] Some have developed in our jurisprudence through decisions of judges.

These evidentiary principles [3] are sometimes neatly arranged, indexed and annotated in textbooks. [4] Some have even made their way into our constitution. [5] [ 7 ] In family matters, there are no juries. The judge presiding in a family law case is the trier of fact. And facts are what form the framework of the family law case. Since the judge was not there when certain factual events occurred, he or she must rely on the evidence of others who can convey, almost invariably in words, what happened in the past. Sometimes what happened is in dispute between the parties in the case.

The judge then has to decide between contradictory evidence and make findings of fact that he or she accepts to be true. [ 8 ] Unfortunately, this is a very simplistic description of the evidentiary aspects of a child protection case. In making factual findings, judges also rely on their own general knowledge as well as on knowledge acquired from judicial education programs. However, and despite some judicial opinions to the contrary, judges do not know everything about everything that it may be necessary to know in a particular case.

In general, having expert witnesses testify is the best way to have appropriate, current, relevant social science knowledge brought before the court and applied to a specific case. [ 9 ] In family law cases, in particular, it may be helpful for the court to have an assessment done by a professional or a team of professionals. Some assessments include recommendations of the assessor; some do not.

In this case, there was an assessment done pursuant to an order of this court dated 21 April 2010. [ 10 ] This assessment was to be a parenting capacity assessment (PCA) of the mother and the father of the children in this case, as well as of their maternal grandmother and her husband. The order was made on motion brought by the applicant society. It was brought pursuant to subsection 54(1) of the Act . [6] The only evidence filed in support of this motion was the affidavit of the primary child protection worker, in this case, sworn on 23 March 2010. The assessor appointed by the court in its order was Dr.

Jeffrey Phillips, a practising psychologist with a practice in North Bay, Ontario. He had, according to the evidence, consented to do the assessment. The order appointing Dr. Phillips required him to consider (and presumably to address) a list of nine questions. [7] [ 11 ] Assessments are invariably in written form. Those ordered pursuant to

section 54 of the Act are statutorily declared to be evidence [8] and to form part of the court’s record in the case in which they were ordered. [ 12 ] Although an assessment report stands by itself as an independent piece of evidence in the case, the author of the report is often called as a witness for a trial held in the case. Why this is so varies from case to case. The most obvious reason is the desire of any (or all) [9] of the parties to cross-examine him or her, to test the contents of the report in some way.

Generally, which persons are proposed to be witnesses at trial is fleshed out at a trial management conference held in the case before any trial dates are even assigned. [10] [ 13 ] In this case, the assessment report was ordered on 21 April 2010. The report was dated 23 and 24 September 2010. However, this particular report had some unusual features. [ 14 ] There is no statutorily specified format for a parenting capacity assessment [11] . In this case, the actual report was 163 pages in total. It was essentially in two parts.

Part 2 was 55 pages in length. It consisted of four reports each entitled “Psychological Assessment”. These assessment reports were of four individuals: (

a) the mother (15 pages); (

b) the father’s new partner (12 pages); (

c) the father (15 pages); (

d) the mother’s new partner (13 pages). There was no assessment done by Dr. Phillips of the maternal grandmother, or of her spouse, as ordered in the

section 54 assessment order of 21 April 2010. This deviation from what was formally ordered is understandable with the benefit of hindsight. At the time that the assessment was ordered, the mother’s plan was to reside, with the children, in the home of her mother and her mother’s spouse. The father’s plan was to parent on his own. By the time of the assessment, these plans had both changed. The mother planned to parent with

her new partner. The father planned to parent with his new partner. Somehow, without any judicial amendment to the

section 54 order, Dr. Phillips assessed the new partners of the parents instead of the maternal grandmother and her spouse. The grandmother and her spouse had declined by that time to be assessed. [ 15 ]

Part 1 of the assessment report was 108 pages long. It was not authored by Dr. Phillips. There was some uncertainty as to who actually wrote ( i.e. , created) this part of the report. It was signed by Sharon Chayka and by Michael O’Neil. The former is the director of Perspectives Inc. which I gather is a corporation whose business involves, among other things, conducting assessments related to families, including parenting capacity assessments. Ms. Chayka has academic credentials of undergraduate degrees — B.A. Psychology (1982) and Honours B.A. Psychology (1986) — and a Masters Degree, M.Ed. Counselling (1991).

Mr. O’Neil signed the report as “clinical assessor”. His academic qualifications are a B.S.W. and a R.S.W.

Part 1 is entitled “Section 54 Assessment”. [ 16 ] At the trial, Dr. Phillips attended as a witness. He was sought, by the society, to be qualified as an expert witness. I accepted Dr. Phillips as an expert in the field of psychology, and in particular for the purposes of this case, in the area of assessment of parenting capacity. [12] [ 17 ] Ms. Chayka also attended as a witness at trial. She was tendered as an expert witness in the three areas mentioned in paragraph 1 of this ruling. I deferred my ruling on whether she was accepted as such expert.

Because she was from another city and had travelled to attend at trial and because I wished to hear what she had to say about her areas of expertise, I permitted her to be sworn and give viva voce testimony. This testimony was not restricted to the issue of whether she qualified as an expert. It also involved questions on

Part 1 of the assessment report, which she had authored, or co-authored. [ 18 ] How and why the report was created in two parts is of some relevance. In the interests of avoiding redundancy, I include verbatim that

section of

Part 1 of the report that is entitled “Assessment Procedures”. This explains the why. It partially explains the how. [13] [ 19 ] The balance of the “how” was elicited from viva voce testimony given by Dr. Phillips and Ms. Chayka at the trial. Their answers to questions by counsel, and by me, led to the following inferences: 1. Dr. Phillips and Perspectives Inc. do their work contemporaneously. 2. Dr. Phillips and Perspective Inc. do not collaborate in the course of their work. 3. Dr. Phillips works with a qualified psychometrist but it is he who interprets psychometric test results. 4. Dr.

Phillips’ assessment also includes his personal clinical observations of the persons he assesses. 5. Dr. Phillips prepares his report and provides a copy to Perspectives Inc. 6. Perspectives Inc. reviews Dr. Phillips’ report before it prepares its formal report. 7. Dr Phillips does not read the report prepared by Perspectives Inc. (not even at the point he was testifying at this trial). 8. Dr. Phillips has no idea what recommendations, if any, were made in the Perspectives Inc. report. 9. The Perspectives Inc. team consists of Ms. Chayka and generally several other persons.

In this case (for situational reasons), the only other member of the Perspectives Inc. team was Mr. O’Neil. 10. Mr. O’Neil interviewed all of the individuals he identified as having been interviewed for purposes of this report. 11. Ms. Chayka did not personally interview any of the persons identified as having been interviewed. 12. Ms. Chayka consulted with Mr. O’Neil to obtain information he had accumulated through his investigations and interviews. 13. Ms. Chayka “created” the majority (if not all) of

Part 1 of the report in the sense that the words, and meanings inherent in those words, were assembled by her. [ 20 ] This is, admittedly, a rather lengthy introduction to the issue that is before this court for its ruling, namely, whether Ms. Chayka is to be accepted by this court as an expert witness on the three areas previously identified. For the sake of clarity, this ruling is not about the admissibility of the report (or any part of it) that was filed with this court pursuant to the

section 54 order of 21 April 2010. That may be an issue for another day. [ 21 ] Perhaps the most often cited authority that deals with the testimony of an expert witness is The Queen v. Mohan . [14] This was a criminal case decided by the Supreme Court of Canada. Justice John Sopinka set out four criteria in that case to be applied to the determination of whether evidence was to be admitted as expert evidence: (

a) relevance; (

b) necessity in assisting the trier of fact; (

c) the absence of any exclusionary rule; and (

d) a properly qualified expert. [ 22 ] Relevance is not merely logical relevance — that is, does the evidence relate logically to a fact in issue? The expert opinion evidence may be excluded, even if logically relevant, on a costs-benefits analysis. Is it worth what it costs? Is its probative value overborne by its prejudicial effect?

Will its effect be so out of proportion to its reliability as to be misleading? [15] [ 23 ] To be “necessary”, the expert evidence has to provide information likely to be outside of the experience of the trier of fact. [16] It must be more than just helpful. [17] [ 24 ] If the expert evidence had to do with the ultimate issue to be decided in the case, the court should apply the requirements of relevance and necessity more strictly. [18] [ 25 ] My judicial colleague, Justice Stanley B. Sherr, summarized very nicely and concisely the rule regarding expert testimony: [19]

If specialized knowledge will assist the judge to understand the evidence or a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience or training may testify by way of opinion. The expert must possess special knowledge and experience going beyond that of the judge.

It is only admissible if it is needed to allow the judge to make sense of the evidence. [ 26 ] In appellate case law, there is more than a passing reference to the role of the judge as a “gatekeeper” with respect to what evidence is admitted in a particular case. [20] Opinion evidence from a witness is, and should be, a rare exception to the general rule of evidence. Simply because a person is a professional does not make that person an “expert” for evidentiary purposes. Neither does the fact that a professional may have done an assessment, even one ordered pursuant to the provisions of a statute.

Although, in some cases, the opinion of an expert may superficially be desirable, judges must remain vigilant at the gates to ensure that only the evidence that meets the criteria established in our jurisprudence for admission of expert opinion evidence comes in. There is a vast different between ruling evidence “not admissible”, and admitting evidence to which varying degrees of weight may later be judicially assigned.

This distinction is critical to the gate-keeping function. [ 27 ] In fairness, there is some degree of controversy with respect to whether the criteria for admitting expert evidence applies equally to family law as to criminal law where many of these criteria had their genesis. There is some judicial opinion that the lesser standard of proof in civil and family law cases impacts on admissibility of expert opinion evidence. [21] So too does the fact that court- appointed experts are seen as more neutral than partisan experts; ergo, their opinion evidence is less objectionable. [ 28 ] I am unable to accept Ms.

Chayka as an expert in this proceeding in any of the three areas sought by the society to have her qualified as an expert for purposes of giving opinion evidence. I come to this ruling by applying the law, as summarized above, for the following reasons. [ 29 ] From an academic point of view, Ms. Chayka does not have the academic qualifications that I consider sufficient to enable her to provide opinion evidence on any of the areas of attachment, developmentally handicapped persons, or capacity to parent.

She has both a general and an honours undergraduate degree in psychology. [22] Although she has a Masters degree, it is a Masters in Education (Adult Education Counselling). She also has some academic standing (but with specific qualifications not provided) in addictions and relapse prevention, mediation and French. I can appreciate the connection between her training in psychology and the nature of her opinion evidence, but I do not think that she is at a sufficient academic level for her opinion to be of much value. Moreover, this court has the opinion of Dr.

Phillips who is eminently more qualified in the area of psychology than is Ms. Chayka. As for her other academic areas, in absence of some more detailed evidence, I do not see how her education in these areas has any connection with the opinion evidence sought from her. [ 30 ] Ms. Chayka has been in the work force for 45 years. According to her personal résumé filed at trial, she has been moderately eclectic in her vocational history. She started as a teacher in the 1960s and 1970s, returning to academia in the early 1980s while continuing to teach part-time.

She changed her direction and became involved in family-related therapy, counselling and support work, in particular, for special needs people. She claims to have been a psychotherapist from 1986, the year she received her Honours B.A degree, to date. However, a closer look at what she has done since the mid 1980s discloses that her positions became increasing administrative, managerial and supervisory in nature.

In the 1990s, she was a member of a number of committees, usually as chairperson. [ 31 ] The closest her experience comes to the areas of attachment and assessing parenting capacity is her work as a (psycho) therapist. Unfortunately, I am not entirely sure how that particularly vocation translates into a qualification for giving an expert opinion on a developmental theory (attachment), or on assessing capacity to parent. I note from her voir dire testimony [23] that the minimum qualification for a psychotherapist is a Masters degree. She received this degree only in 1991.

Yet she claimed to be a psychotherapist from 1986. She describes what she does as a psychotherapist as “therapy in counselling”. Although some degree of assessing the needs for which counselling therapy is warranted is inherent in the work of a psychotherapist, I am sceptical that it is qualitatively the same kind of assessment that is involved in an assessment of parenting capacity. [ 32 ] As for experience working with the developmentally challenged, what she has done does not, in my view, qualify her as an expert.

She had a ten-week course in 1986 designed for professionals working with the profoundly retarded. She was a family support worker in 1985-86 developing support systems for families with developmentally delayed children . In 1990-91, she chaired two committees, one a district committee to deal with the developmentally challenged population and the other to examine and develop emergency procedures for developmentally disabled adults. In 1994-95, she chaired another committee that was tasked with the co- ordination of community resources for the developmentally challenged.

None of these involvements could, in my view, make her opinion with respect to the mother, father, grandmother or any other potential caregiver in this case, one that would be admissible as expert opinion evidence. [ 33 ] A considerable amount of evidence in this case revolves around whether there is, to what extent there may be, and the nature of the attachment of the children V. and J. to their parents and other adults. Ms. Chayka attended a three-day session through the Office of the Children’s Lawyer dealing with attachment. She also went to Dr. Bowlby, an acknowledged pioneer in attachment theory.

I take this to mean that she has read what he may have written in his lifetime. She also discussed attachment with Dr. Phillips. She made a presentation on attachment to another children’s aid society, as well as to a First Nations group. None of these, individually or cumulatively, elevate her to the level of expert in the area of attachment. Most significant is Ms. Chayka’s acknowledgement that she is a “generalist”. She is not a specialist. [ 34 ] Ms. Chayka has done many “assessments”, in excess of 300, according to her own testimony. Some were done pursuant to

section 30 of the Children’s Law Reform Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. C-12, as amended. [24] Some have been done pursuant to

section 112 of the Courts of Justice Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43, as amended. [25] I am not sure how many “parenting capacity assessment” reports she has done. These are qualitatively different from reports under

section 30 of the Children’s Law Reform Act and

section 112 of the Courts of Justice Act . If she has done parenting capacity assessment reports, there is no evidence of how many she has done. More importantly, there is no evidence whether any were done pursuant to an order under

section 54 of the Child and Family Services Act and, if any were, whether she was personally named in the order as the assessor. Although this kind of information is more useful at the stage where an

assessment order under

section 54 of the Child and Family Services Act is being considered, this information does have some relevance to the issue of whether Ms. Chayka is an expert for purposes of assessing capacity to parent. With the lack of detail presented in her experience and involvement with these various types of reports, I cannot conclude that she is an expert in this area. [ 35 ] There is another aspect of this case that ties into the issue of the expertise of Ms. Chayka. The opinion sought to be introduced through her is not restricted to what she may say in her viva voce testimony. The fact is that the vast majority of the first 108 pages of the report made under

section 54 of the Child and Family Services Act and filed in this case represents the assessment of Ms. Chayka. Imbedded in those 108 pages are her opinions , some quite overt, others more subtle. If she is not qualified as an expert to provide viva voce opinion evidence, how does that effect any of her opinion evidence contained in the report filed with the court? [ 36 ] Although the issue of the assessment report is not the primary focus of this ruling, any opinion evidence that can be ascribed to Ms.

Chayka that is contained in that report necessarily will be impacted by the ruling on her qualification as an expert. [ 37 ] In addition to the question of whether Ms. Chayka is an expert in a general sense, there is a corollary question of whether she could be an expert and give expert opinions in this particular case. Ms. Chayka did not personally interact with or observe any of the persons assessed, or either of the children, or their foster mother. Whatever opinions she might have formed were as a result of information she received from Dr. Phillips, or Mr.

O’Neil, or from the documentary review referred to in the report, or from the society. Any “clinical observations” were not made by her personally. [ 38 ] This ruling is not intended to disparage Ms. Chayka in any way. In fact, I am I mpressed with all that she has accomplished as set out in her personal résumé. [26] She has been very busy in her professional life and has held some impressive positions. That she has an organized mind is reflected in the portion of the report that she authored in this case. This also came through in her testimony.

She has good reason to be proud of her accomplishments. [ 39 ] All of these things may make her a professional. She may also be an assessor. She may well be an expert — but not, on the basis of the evidence before me, in those three areas where the society seeks to have her qualified as an expert. I appreciate that she may have been qualified as an expert by other courts in other proceedings. I am aware of at least one case where she was not. [27] These rulings are not binding on me in any event. [ 40 ] In

summary, two of the criteria in The Queen v. Mohan , supra , are not met in the considering all of the evidence as it relates to Ms. Chayka. One is the requirement of a properly qualified expert. The other is the necessity in assisting the trier of fact. [28] In a case where Crown wardship without access is a possibility, I prefer to err on the side of caution in what I rule to be admissible expert evidence. [ 41 ] Accordingly, my ruling in this voir dire is that Ms.

Sharon Chayka is not accepted as an expert in this case for the purposes of giving opinion evidence in the areas of attachment, developmentally challenged persons and assessing parenting capacity. Released: 21 November 2011 Justice John Kukurin (

b) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s, (

i) failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, or (ii) pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child;

(7) Evidence on adjournments. — For the purpose of this section, the court may admit and act on evidence that the court considers credible and trustworthy in the circumstances. 54. Order for assessment.—

(1) In the course of a proceeding under this Part, the court may order that one or more of the following persons undergo an assessment within a specified time by a person appointed in accordance with subsections (1.1) and (1.2): 1. The child; or 2. A parent of the child. 3. Any other person, other than a foster parent, who is putting forward or would participate in a plan for the care and custody of or access to the child.

(1.2) Appointment by court. — The court shall appoint the person selected by the parties to perform the assessment if the court is satisfied that the person meets the following criteria:

1. The person is qualified to perform medical, emotional, developmental, psychological, educational or social assessments. 2. The person has consented to perform the assessment.

(6) Assessment is evidence. — The report of an assessment ordered under subsection (1) is evidence and is part of the court record of the proceeding.

(6) Purposes of trial management conference.— The purposes of a trial management conference include, (

a) exploring the chances of settling the case; (

b) arranging to receive evidence by a written report, an agreed statement of facts, an affidavit or another method, if appropriate; (

c) deciding how the trial will proceed; (

d) ensuring that the parties know what witnesses will testify and what other evidence will be presented at trial; (

e) estimating the time needed for trial; and (

f) setting the trial date, if this has not already been done. 5. Form of assessment report.— Without limiting the generality of the contents of an assessment report, every assessment report shall include the following : 1. A resume of the assessor outlining, (

i) the assessor’s academic and professional qualifications and credentials, including any publications relevant to the questions being addressed, and (ii) information regarding the type and number of assessments previously conducted by the assessor. 2. A

schedule setting out, (

i) a

summary of the instructions received, whether written or oral, (ii) a list of the questions upon which an opinion is sought, and (iii) a list of the materials provided and considered. 3. A

schedule setting out the methodology used in carrying out the assessment, including the interviews, observations, measurements, examinations and tests, and whether or not they were conducted or carried out under the assessor’s supervision. 4. The reasons and factual basis for any conclusions drawn by the assessor. 5. A direct response to the questions presented to the assessor in the assessment order, or an explanation of why these questions could not be addressed. 6.

Recommendations where these were required of the assessor, or an explanation of why recommendations could not be made. [1] This is a ruling on a qualification sought by the applicant society of its witness, Dr. Jeffrey Phillips, as an expert in the field of psychology, in particular, in the conducting parenting capacity assessments. [2] The mother has no objection to this judicial qualification of Dr Phillips as such expert in this case.

The respondent father does not object. [3] However, a simple lack of objections by opposing parties does not make Dr Phillips the expert that the society wishes the court to accept. His expertise derives from his academic and experiential qualifications. In this regard, the curriculum vitae of Dr Phillips has been filed as an exhibit (ex. 3) in this case. It attests to his academic qualifications in undergraduate and at graduate levels including his doctorate in clinical psychology.

I am satisfied that this academic background gives him the essential tools required of expert witnesses before the court. [4] In addition, he has experience in his field of psychology that is very comprehensive. It covers a variety of areas in a number of different venues that includes, as well, a role as a teacher and university level professor. He has done over three-hundred parenting capacity assessments, and this, by itself, argues for expertise in this particular area.

He is a registered psychologist and a member of the Ontario Psychological Association. [5] The essential aspect of an expert giving testimony in our court is to provide evidence by way of expert opinion that the finder of fact may not be able to determine or appreciate without such assistance. In this case, Dr Phillips has prepared a report and is tendered as a viva voce witness to be examined and cross examined mainly on the contents of his report but also on other matters within the areas of his expertise.

He has the advantage of having examined the mother and father (as well as certain collaterals) in this case in the context of a parenting capacity assessment. [6] In short, I accept Dr Phillips as an expert witness in this case as an expert in the field of psychology, and in particular, for purposes of this case, in the area of assessment of parenting capacity. [7] This ruling is limited to qualification of the person of Dr Phillips as an expert as sought by the applicant society.

The current assessment was conducted by two teams of assessors. The first team was led by Ms. Sharon Chayka, M.Ed. of Perspectives Inc., and this team focused upon psychosocial elements to the current

section 54 matters. The second team was led by Dr.Jeffrey R. Phillips. This independent team focused upon the formal psychological assessment of individuals involved in the current

section 54 matter. Both teams were made aware of

section 54 issues before conducting their respective components of the assessment process. Otherwise, the two assessment teams conducted themselves in independent fashion. The psychological assessment was designed so as to provide psychologically oriented information related to the issues at hand, with comments being made by Dr. Phillips in regard to the impact that psychological functioning of various individuals involved in the current

section 54 assessment matter, would have upon issues of importance. These findings were then integrated into the psychosocial component of the

section 54 assessment, and recommendations in regard to

section 54 matters, were then put forth by the Perspectives team. It is noted that the current assessment process involved both male and female assessors in order to minimize gender bias. The independent assessment procedures of the two assessment teams were utilized in order to, again, maximize the objectivity and comprehensiveness of the assessment at hand. It is further noted that the assessment process reflects data being collected in a building block style.

That is, initial data impressions of the psychological team were formed with interview data, followed by the addition of observation data, data from affidavits and reports, and data from collateral interviews. The assessment process was reviewed in this final interview with

section 54 assessment parties, and their satisfaction with the assessment process and the manner in which they were treated, was achieved prior to reviewing finding of the current assessment process. In reviewing findings of the current assessment process, the assessment parties were encouraged to provide feedback and their reaction was then recorded as part of the assessment report. The above procedures were described to assessment participants, and a verbal indication of understanding and acceptance of the above procedures was provided at the commencement of the assessment process. 1.

Will the evidence allow the court to appreciate the technicalities? 2. Will the information provided likely be beyond the judge’s experience? 3. Is the judge unlikely to form a correct inference if not assisted by the evidence? 4. Is the evidence complex — will it confuse or is it easily understood? 5. Is there other evidence available that will enable the court to determine the issue? 6. Is the need for the evidence greater than will be its prejudicial effect? 30. Assessment of needs of child.—

(1) The court before which an application is brought in respect of custody of or access to a child, by order, may appoint a person who has technical or professional skill to assess and report to the court on the needs of the child and the ability and willingness of the parties or any of them to satisfy the needs of the child. 112. Investigation and report of Children’s Lawyer.—

(1) In a proceeding under the Divorce Act (Canada) or the Children’s Law Reform Act in which a question concerning custody of or access to a child is before the court, the Children’s Lawyer may cause an investigation to be made and may report and make recommendations to the court on all matters concerning custody of or access to the child and the child’s support and education.