R. v. Cornish, 2023 BCPC 248

Citation: R. v. Cornish 2023 BCPC 248 Date: 20230926 File No: 112245 Registry: Kamloops IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REX v. ANGELA ELISE CORNISH ORAL REASONS FOR SENTENCE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE R.C. DICKEY Counsel for the Crown: N. Farinelli Counsel for the Defendant: L. Walker Place of Hearing: Kamloops , B.C. Date of Hearing: September 26, 2023 Date of Sentence: September 26, 2023

[ 1 ] THE COURT: Angela Cornish has entered a guilty plea to intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire to Crown land. The date of the offence is between May 8 and 11, 2022. Crown and defence have put before the court a joint submission of a six-month conditional sentence order with numerous conditions. I will review the circumstances of the offence, the offender, the law in this area, and conclude with my analysis and decision. Circumstances of the Offence [ 2 ] Ms. Cornish, on May 8, 2022, attended a store and purchased four containers of available activated charcoal powder.

Later, she was observed to attend the store and purchase two lighter Turbo Torches and two Duco mini butane containers. Ms. Cornish shortly thereafter was observed to go to the Lac Le Jeune Forest Service Road area and later on foot in the area of the Kilometre 13 Spur Road. She remained in this area for approximately one hour. British Columbia Wildlife Services, after Ms. Cornish left the area, inspected the surrounding area and found three burning trees including two trees deeper into the bush off the roadway. The trees appeared to have been lit by igniting the sap of the trees. [ 3 ] Ms.

Cornish, on May 11, 2022, was followed into the Connelly Lake area which is in a rural part of Kamloops. Two active fires were located in this area shortly after Ms. Cornish left. One of the burning trees was large with broken branch debris at its base. The tree had smoke and fire at its base and up its sides. The second burn site had a standing tree that was burning and smouldering at its base. [ 4 ] British Columbia Wildlife Services determined the probable cause of the fires was incendiary ignition. Ms. Cornish was arrested and held in custody for 20 days until bail was perfected. Upon the arrest of Ms.

Cornish, her vehicle was searched and the following was found: nine bottles of hand sanitizer and a lighter refill cannister, two lighters, a butane lighter refill canister, a folding shovel, a blanket covered in what was believed to be fire-starter material, three barbeque lighters, a butane torch, 11 packages of fire-starter, a bottle of hair spray, and half bottle of fire-starter. [ 5 ] Hand sanitizer can be used as a fire accelerant. Circumstances of the Offender [ 6 ] Ms. Cornish is 42 years of age. She is single, but lives with Edward Mahler, a long-time and supportive friend. Ms.

Cornish has an unrelated and dated criminal record. Ms. Cornish, since May 30, 2022, has been on a strict release order with protective conditions. She has been on a curfew between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. which has been electronically supervised. She has been limited in her ability to attend outside of the Kamloops area. [ 7 ] A presentence report has been filed. Ms. Cornish is a licenced practical nurse, although she is presently unemployed. Ms. Cornish says that she began taking Dexedrine over 10 years ago when she struggled with staying awake during nightshifts.

Dexedrine is an amphetamine-based stimulant and is generally prescribed for persons suffering from ADHD. Ms. Cornish denies either suffering from or being diagnosed with ADHD. There is no evidence that Ms. Cornish suffers from any mental health issues at this time. [ 8 ] Ms. Cornish says, in March of 2022, shortly before the offences occurred, she decided to stop using Dexedrine. She says she suffered withdrawal symptoms and was "not really herself" and was "seeking to find ways to ground herself and reconnect to what is normal." She says her memory of the spring of 2022 is cloudy.

Her mother reports observing that her daughter began to "shine" again after ceasing the medication. [ 9 ] The author of the presentence report spoke to Ms. Cornish about her intent in starting fires. She says Ms. Cornish told her she finds fire to be soothing, cleansing, and therapeutic. Ms. Cornish told her that she used fire to relax and reconnect with the Earth and nature. The presentence report says Ms. Cornish expressed regret and remorse and referred to her actions as reckless and dangerous. Ms. Cornish was unable to say why she went to an area that had previously been impacted by forest fires.

Law [ 10 ] The Crown has provided a book of authorities which includes the following cases: 1. R. v. Cootes , 2011 BCCA 398 ; 2. R. v. Clifford , 2015 BCSC 875 ; 3. R. v. Bogue , 2017 BCPC 58 ; 4. R. v. Sharun , 2017 BCPC 367 ; and 5. R. v. Stuart , 2023 ABCJ 99 . [ 11 ] The Crown and defence subsequently also provided the decision of R. v. Hidasi , unreported, July 8, 2020, File Number 52321-1, Vernon Registry, and R. v. Hidasi , 2019 BCSC 225 . [ 12 ] In Cootes , the offender pled guilty to three offences of arson.

One aspect of the appeal was whether the offender should have been sentenced to a conditional sentence order and, specifically, the legal principles to consider in determining whether the offender had satisfied the CSO requirement that the safety of the community would not be endangered if the offender served her custodial sentence in the community (see s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code ). [ 13 ] Mr. Justice Groberman referred to the decision of R. v. Proulx , 2000 SCC 5 , and found that if a court finds that an offender poses

some risk to reoffend, it must consider whether the risk can be reduced to a minimal one by the imposition of appropriate conditions(paragraph 78). Justice Groberman went on further to state the test is whether there is a, and this is underlined, "real risk" that theoffender may reoffend and, if so, whether appropriate conditions in a CSO could control that risk (paragraph 79). He found that a smallrisk to reoffend did not necessarily mean that there was a "real risk" to reoffend.

I note that courts have frequently commented that thereis always some risk that an offender will reoffend. [14] In Clifford, the court found the offender's motive in setting fire to the victim's fruit trees and garage was one of vengeance. Theoffender was sentenced to three years' custody for the arson. [15] In Bogue, the offender pled guilty to arson by setting fire to a house causing $315,000 damage. Mr. Bogue, at the time of theoffence, was in a drug-induced psychosis and had no prior criminal record. His risk to reoffend was found to be extremely low.

TheHonourable Judge Merrick, after a review of the caselaw, found that the range of sentence for arson was a custodial sentence of betweennine months and three years. The court found that there were exceptional circumstances taking it out of the range. [16] The court was satisfied that the mental health of Mr. Bogue played a central role in the offence. The court held that deterrenceand punishment play less of a role in cases of mentally ill offenders (paragraph 27). There was also a reduced moral blameworthiness ofa mentally ill offender.

Judge Merrick concluded for there to be a non-custodial sentence, the court must find the offender had trulyturned his life around and the protection of the public was better served by a non-custodial sentence. [17] A conditional sentence order was not available to Mr. Bogue at the time and Mr. Bogue was sentenced to an 18-monthsuspended sentence with the court finding that, due to his mental illness, the primary sentencing consideration should shift fromdeterrence to treatment (paragraph 37). [18] In Sharun, the offender pled guilty to arson.

He set a number of fires in a suite which was located in a 16-unit building. Mr.Sharun at the time was attempting to commit suicide. There was extensive damage to the suite of Mr. Sharun. He came before the courtwithout a criminal record. Mr. Sharun, at the time of the offence, was struggling with high levels of stress and depression leading to apsychotic break. The psychologist found that the risk to the community was manageable. [19] The Honourable Judge Brecknell found that there were exceptional circumstances and imposed a suspended sentence withprobation of three years with 100 community work service hours.

Judge Brecknell stated in Sharun that the primary objectives insentencing in arson cases is denunciation and deterrence (paragraph 37). He then referred to a quote in R. v. Day, 2013 BCCA 172(paragraph 6), in which the Court of Appeal quoted from the decision of R. v. K.H. (1994), (NB CA), 146 NBR (2d)372 (CA), with regard to the seriousness and unpredictability of fire. This quote is as follows: By any yardstick, arson is a serious offence. An adult is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. Fire, no matter how well-planned, is oftenerratic and unpredictable and gives rise to unforeseen consequences.

For sentencing purposes, arsonists are sometimes divided into fourtypes: pyromaniacs or persons who are mentally disturbed, those who burn for no special reason or grudge, vandals and those who burnfor financial gain. It is the latter category that generally is most serious and attracts the longest sentence. [20] In Stuart, the offender was sentenced for an arson to two years less a day to be served on a conditional sentence order followedby two years' probation. The arson caused more than $1 million in damages. The offence occurred when Mr. Stuart was in a psychoticstate. He had no criminal record.

He was found to have a low risk to reoffend. The court found that if an offender suffers from a mentaldisorder, although the seriousness of the offence is not reduced, the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence is lessened as aresult of the offender's diminished responsibility (paragraph 33). [21] In Hidasi, counsel provided the decision of the Supreme Court on the issue of committal as it provided more of the facts than didthe sentencing decision. I note, however, the Supreme Court decision only relates to one offence date, that being June 22, 2016. On thatdate Ms.

Hidasi appeared to have lit a small fire six to 10 inches in diameter in a wooded area. Ms. Hidasi left the area of the fire andwas then approached by two witnesses. Ms. Hidasi told the witnesses of the fire and took them to its location where the fire was put out. [22] Ms. Hidasi entered guilty pleas to four counts of mischief for which she received a conditional discharge. It is unclear to thiscourt from the written sentencing decision of the circumstances of the other three mischiefs. The court found that Ms. Hidasi at the timeof the offence suffered from a mental health breakdown from posttraumatic stress.

She was found to have a low risk to reoffend. Thejudge agreed with the joint submission for a conditional discharge. Analysis and Decision [23] The Crown and defence argue that the primary sentencing objective of deterrence and denunciation can be satisfied by aconditional sentence order of six months.

Crown argues that the following factors are aggravating: 1. there was planning involved; 2. there were multiple ignition sites; 3. the potential for harm was significant as it occurred during wildfire season; and 4. there was a cost of $15,000 to extinguish the fires. [24] I highlight that it was extremely fortunate that Ms. Cornish was under surveillance at the time and, as a result, the fires wereextinguished quickly. There is no evidence that Ms. Cornish was aware of the surveillance and, consequently, was unaware of the actualreduced risk. The actual harm caused by Ms. Cornish was minor, but the risk great.

On this latter point, it is the risk of harm created bythe setting of fires that is most aggravating. I do not need to stress to the community how great the risk is for extreme damage and life-

threatening and life-changing consequences. The risk of death and destruction extends beyond those persons who live in the area andthe natural environment. It also places firefighters and first responders at risk as they put their lives on the line to protect the community. [25] The Crown argues that the mitigating factors are as follows: 1. a guilty plea; 2. Ms.

Cornish has complied with highly restrictive bail conditions for 15 months; 3. she has the support of family and friends; 4. she faces collateral consequences with the potential of civil liability; 5. she was not motivated by revenge, malice, or greed; 6. the offence was not committed in a populated area; 7. she has shown progress in her rehabilitation; and 8. Ms. Cornish's mental health appears to have been a factor. [26] Crown and defence argue that the 20 days Ms.

Cornish spent in custody with an effective credit of 30 days should also be takeninto consideration, but is not mitigating nor should it be recorded as a custodial credit (see R. v. Fice, 2005 SCC 32). [27] On the issue of mitigating circumstances, I do not agree it is mitigating that she was not motivated by revenge, malice, or greed. At most, this is a neutral factor.

It distinguishes this matter, however, from any of the cases in which an offender is sentenced for arsonwhere one of the aggravating factors is present. [28] I also do not agree it is mitigating that the offence was not committed in a populated area. As noted before, fire, no matter howwell it is planned, is often erratic, unpredictable, and can quickly spread into populated areas. Fire can result in unforeseen andunintended consequences causing great damage to personal and Crown property. Many rural areas are used by the general public forrecreational activities.

Fire can destroy or devalue a rural area for years. [29] I am troubled by the joint submission. The Supreme Court of Canada set out the process for a court to follow when a sentencingjudge finds themselves in such a position (see R. v. Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43 ). The test that a court must consider indetermining whether to accept a joint submission is the public interest test.

Anthony-Cook says a court, in applying this test, should notdepart from a joint submission unless the proposed sentence would bring the "administration of justice into disrepute or is otherwisecontrary to the public interest," paragraph 32. [30] Justice Moldaver states that a joint submission should not be rejected lightly and the test is not whether the proposed sentence isfit.

Justice Moldaver says the test for when a joint submission should be rejected is whether the joint submission is: … so unhinged from the circumstances of the offence and the offender that its acceptance would lead reasonable and informed persons,aware of all the relevant circumstances, including the importance of promoting certainty in resolution discussions, to believe that theproper functioning of the justice system had broken down. (Paragraph 34). [31] Justice Moldaver points out the many policy reasons for the courts imposing such a high threshold for the rejection of a jointsubmission. [32] Anthony-Cook sets out the process to occur where the court is troubled with the joint submission.

This includes providingcounsel with an opportunity to provide the court with further submissions and insight into the circumstances considered in forming thejoint submission. This process was followed in this matter. In the follow-up hearing, Crown and defence provided further submissionsand caselaw. [33] Crown advised that Ms. Cornish has now been on electronic monitoring with strict conditions for 477 days. There have been nonew police files during this time. [34] The Crown provided two documents to the court which were marked for identification for my review. I have done that.

Crownadvises that their position on sentence was influenced by the information contained therein. The documents were covered by apublication ban in another matter before the courts. The defence agreed that the documents were relevant on the issue of whether thecourt should accede to the joint submission, but did not agree to their admissibility on the instructions of their client. [35] I have reviewed the documents and consider them relevant. They will be admitted as a numbered exhibit.

The informationcontained in these documents is relevant to the joint submission and to the determination of whether this sentence brings theadministration of justice into disrepute. The offender was the victim of a significant criminal offence. The trial of this earlier matteroccurred approximately two years before the offence date of the matter before me. I find that this matter provides greater context to thepersonal circumstances of Ms.

Cornish and the joint submission put before the court. [36] I was also advised that, if this matter proceeded to trial, it would have involved lengthy and complicated voir dires and takenapproximately two weeks. It is argued, therefore, that the guilty plea is significantly mitigating in that it saved court time. I agree withthe submission. [37] The defence also argues that it is mitigating that there was significant media coverage in this matter. Canadian courts have found

significant media coverage to be a collateral consequence to the offender and mitigating (see R. v. Lepine , 2010 ABPC 374 ). [ 38 ] Counsel for the defence provided the court with two further cases. In R. v. Smith , 2023 ONCJ 265 , the accused pled guilty to causing damage by fire. The circumstances of the offence were that the accused threw a Molotov cocktail at the house of the victim and a further Molotov cocktail at the victim when he exited his house. Mr. Smith had no criminal record, was a neighbour to the victim, but the two were strangers to one another. [ 39 ] Mr.

Smith, at the time of the offence, was suffering from substance misuse and had attempted to commit suicide on the night of the incident. The psychiatric report diagnosed Mr. Smith with depression, anxiety, and substance abuse. The Crown sought a sentence of six months' custody and the defence a conditional sentence order. The court imposed a 15-month conditional sentence and a three- year probation order. The defence referred to paragraph 12 in this decision in which Justice Fergus O'Donnell stated the following: I cannot quibble for a moment with Mr. Leach’s assertion that Mr.

Smith’s conduct was very serious and that it is largely out of luck and/or Mr. Williams’s agility that things did not turn out much worse than they did. At the same time, criminal sentencing determinations are driven not only by the general or specific riskfulness of the offender’s conduct but also by the actual and … serendipitous outcomes. [ 40 ] I accept that the actual outcome of Ms. Cornish's offending behaviour was minor even though this was more through good fortune than as a result of the actions of Ms. Cornish.

The actual consequences should be considered in determining if the joint submission is appropriate. [ 41 ] The second case referred to by the defence is R. v. Harasiuk , 2023 ONCA 594 . This was a case in which the sentencing judge rejected a time-served sentence and imposed one of 24 months' imprisonment. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and the sentence was reduced to a time-served sentence. This decision emphasizes that the test is not whether the sentencing judge finds the sentence to be unfit, but rather whether it meets the test referred to in Anthony-Cook .

The court emphasized the policy decisions for the high threshold and, as a result, the rarity in which courts should reject a joint submission. The court concluded with the following: Although the joint submission may have been lenient, perhaps even very lenient, this was not a permissible basis for rejecting it. (Paragraph 25) [ 42 ] I find that in the circumstances of this matter and based on the additional information provided that the joint submission should not be rejected.

The proposed sentence in this matter satisfies the public interest test in that it is not so "unhinged" from the circumstances of the offence and the offender that it would lead to a reasonable and informed person to believe that the proper functioning of the justice system had broken down. [ 43 ] I find that the joint submission satisfies the test because of the mitigating circumstances including the circumstances of the offender at the time the offence was committed. I emphasize that the further information provided by the Crown and defence assisted the court in reaching this determination. [ 44 ] In

summary, the proposed sentence does not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. I will note for the record, however, that the sentence proposed is at the low end of the range of sentences for this type of offence and offender. I say this because of the extreme risk of Ms. Cornish's actions and the need for deterrence and denunciation. This is a case which can only be described as an offence that put the whole community at risk of catastrophic consequences. On the other hand, the motivation given by Ms.

Cornish for lighting the fires, that being an attempt to heal, appears to be related to her trauma as a result of a significant criminal offence referred to above. [ 45 ] I accept that a conditional sentence order is appropriate. Ms. Cornish has shown over a lengthy period of time that she can comply with court orders. The terms proposed will continue to be highly restrictive of her freedoms. [ 46 ] I accept that, Ms.

Cornish, a six-month conditional sentence served in the community on strict terms would not create a "real risk" of endangering the community as that term was defined in Cootes . [ 47 ] In conclusion, there will be a six-month conditional sentence order. The terms of that order will be as follows. [ 48 ] These are the compulsory conditions, Madam Clerk, which I believe is 3001. [ 49 ] You must keep the peace and be of good behaviour. You must appear before the court when required to do so by the court.

You must notify the court or your conditional sentence supervisor in advance of any change of name or address and promptly notify the court or supervisor of any change in employment or occupation.

You must remain in British Columbia unless you have prior written permission from the court or your conditional supervisor to leave the province. [ 50 ] You must report in person to a conditional sentence supervisor at 102 - 455 Columbia Street, Kamloops, B.C., by 3:00 p.m. tomorrow, September 27th, 2023, and after that, you must report as directed by your conditional sentence supervisor. [ 51 ] Sorry, Madam Clerk, that is 3101, and then this is 3201, 3209, and 3213. [ 52 ] When first reporting to a conditional sentence supervisor, you must provide them with the address or location where you live and regularly sleep and your phone number if you have one.

You must not change your address or phone number without the prior written permission from your conditional sentence supervisor. [ 53 ] For the first three months of this order, you must remain within your residence under house arrest (24 hours per day) each day. The exceptions are: 3209-A, you have the prior written permission of your conditional sentence supervisor; such permission is to be given only for employment or other reasonable purposes; 3209-C, you are in the immediate presence of Edward Mahler, but only with

the prior written permission of your conditional sentence supervisor; dash-D, you are going directly to or returning directly from a healthcare facility because of a medical emergency. [ 54 ] I am not sure this has happened. Ms. Walker, does she consent to providing proof of her attendance at the healthcare facility, if requested? [ 55 ] CNSL L. WALKER: Oh, just one moment, please. [ 56 ] THE COURT: I mean it is a joint submission so I assume that has been canvassed with Ms. Cornish? [ 57 ] CNSL L. WALKER: Yes, that's -- that's on consent, sorry.

She consents. [ 58 ] THE COURT: So if you are going directly to or returning directly from a healthcare facility because of a medical emergency, you have consented in court to providing proof of your attendance at the healthcare facility if requested by your conditional sentence supervisor; F, you are on the lot, but within five metres of the front door. [ 59 ] For the last three months of this order, you must obey a curfew and remain within your residence where you live and regularly sleep between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. everyday. [ 60 ] You must present yourself immediately at the door to the place where you are living or answer the phone when any peace officer or conditional sentence supervisor attends or calls to check on you during the curfew or house arrest [ 61 ] That 3209-2, Madam Clerk. [ 62 ] If you are given permission by your conditional sentence supervisor, you must carry it with you in paper or electronic format at all times when you are away from the place where you live and regularly sleep. [ 63 ] That is dash-3, Madam Clerk.

I am also going to refer to dash-4 and dash-5. [ 64 ] If a peace officer finds you outside the place where you are living during the curfew or house arrest hours and requests to see the permission, you must show it to the officer. [ 65 ] Both the period of house arrest and the curfew will be supervised electronically. [ 66 ] Any issue with the court also imposing -- I understand she is already on electronic monitoring, but the terms which I was proposing, which I think is appropriate, is 3213 and that is, "You must comply with the electronic supervision agreement, including the wearing of and care for the electronic supervision equipment." Any issue with that being -- that is not part of the terms which the joint submission was based on.

There is reference to electronic monitoring, but that specific term is not included, which I think it should be, just for Ms. Cornish to realize that she needs to comply with the agreement and everything that is involved with that? [ 67 ] CNSL L. WALKER: Yes, that's agreeable. [ 68 ] THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Farinelli -- [ 69 ] CNSL N. FARINELLI: Yes, I'm -- [ 70 ] THE COURT: -- no issue with that? [ 71 ] CNSL N. FARINELLI: -- I'm just confirming this is in respect of Condition 13 in the conditions that have been provided? [ 72 ] THE COURT: Yes. [ 73 ] CNSL N.

FARINELLI: Okay, yes, thank you. [ 74 ] THE COURT: Okay. [ 75 ] Yes, so 3213, you must comply with the electronic supervision agreement, including the wearing of and care for the electronic supervision equipment. [ 76 ] You must not go to any location outside the zone of Kamloops, British Columbia that is highlighted on the map marked as Exhibit 4 of this proceeding, and marked by the boundaries of Lorne Street on the north, Hugh Allan and Summit intersection on the south, East 13th Avenue on the east, and Copperhead Drive on the west.

This condition will be supervised electronically. [ 77 ] You must not attend or go to any nature park, protected grassland, or access any forestry roads. This condition will be supervised electronically. [ 78 ] You must not travel to or be within five kilometres of Lac Le Jeune, Connolly Lake, Lake Pinantan, Monte Creek, and Monte Lake.

This condition will be supervised electronically. [ 79 ] 3401, you must not possess or consume alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating substances, except with a medical prescription. [ 80 ] 3501, you must attend, participate in, and complete any intake, assessment, counselling, or education program as directed by your conditional sentence supervisor. [ 81 ] 3503, you must attend for a psychiatric intake, assessment, or treatment program through Forensic Psychiatric Services as

directed by your conditional sentence supervisor. [ 82 ] 3610, you must not possess directly or indirectly any weapons defined by the Criminal Code . [ 83 ] 3629, you must not possess any incendiary devices, flammable products, or explosive substances, including but not limited to lighters, matches, jerry-cans, fire accelerants, or fireworks. [ 84 ] 3624, you must not occupy the driver's seat of any motor vehicle. [ 85 ] Those are the terms and conditions. Any further submissions from Crown or defence? [ 86 ] CNSL L. WALKER. None.

The Crown will be directing a stay on the remaining counts on the information. [ 87 ] THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Ms. Walker? [ 88 ] CNSL L. WALKER: Yes, just with respect to the victim surcharge, Your Honour, I am wondering if you'd consider waiving it in the circumstances? [ 89 ] THE COURT: She is still not working? [ 90 ] CNSL L. WALKER: She's still not working, that's correct. [ 91 ] THE COURT: Okay, the victim fine surcharge will be waived for financial reasons. [ 92 ] CNSL L. WALKER: Thank you. [ 93 ] THE COURT: Ms. Cornish, if you can just stand up, please. Ms.

Cornish, you understand the terms and conditions that I have placed you on on the conditional sentence order? [ 94 ] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [ 95 ] THE COURT: Yes? Okay. You understand that if you breach any of those terms, the Crown could seek that you be detained for the remainder of the custodial time? So if you have done -- let us say you breached for one month of the conditional sentence order, they could seek to have you detained in custody for the following five months. You understand that? Yes?

Okay, and you understand, also, that if you breach any of those terms, you could be charged with a new offence and, if found guilty, you could be facing additional jail time. You understand that? Yes? Okay, based on those responses, I am not going to require that you sign the conditional sentence order, but you will get a copy of that, Ms. Cornish. You can get that down at the registry or you can get it from your conditional sentence supervisor when you attend either, if you have time, later today and, if not, tomorrow. Okay, you understand? [ 96 ] Okay, thank you. (REASONS CONCLUDED)