Coast Staging & Events Ltd. v. Brand.Live Date:, 2011 BCPC 133

Citation: Coast Staging & Events Ltd. v. Brand.Live Date: 20110517 2011 BCPC 0133 File No: 1134407 Registry: Vancouver IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA BETWEEN: COAST STAGING & EVENTS LTD. CLAIMANT AND: BRAND.LIVE MANAGEMENT GROUP INC. DEFENDANT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF HIS WORSHIP JUDGE L.A. KAHN Appearing for the Claimant: S. Fanning Counsel for the Claimant: G. Sham Appearing for the Defendant: P. Runnals Place of Hearing: Vancouver , B.C.

Date of Hearing: April 20, 2011 Date of Judgment: May 17, 2011 [ 1 ] This matter came before me on April 20, 2011 pursuant to the Simplified Trial Rules under the Small Claims Act . [ 2 ] The dispute between the parties concerns the invoicing, debits and credits owing by brand.LIVE Management Group Inc. (“brand.LIVE”) to Coast Staging & Events Ltd. (“Coast Staging”) arising from contracts between the parties for staging, equipment and materials supplied during the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics. [ 3 ] The contracts between the parties concerned two locations, one at Heineken House in Richmond, B.C., and the other at Vancouver House in downtown Vancouver. [ 4 ] Stephen Fanning (“Mr.

Fanning”) testified on behalf of the Claimant. Paul Runnals, Catherine Runnals and Chelsea Bedford testified on behalf of the Defendants. [ 5 ] Neither Trial Statements attached the contracts between the parties. It turned out that there was no contract, but rather, the

parties relied on estimates or quote sheets that were supplied by Coast Staging to brand.LIVE. [ 6 ] As I understood the evidence, brand.LIVE acted as the agent for the City of Vancouver with respect to Vancouver House. Apparently, all of the monies paid to Coast Staging by brand.LIVE for Vancouver House required precise invoicing which was scrutinized by the City of Vancouver before payments were made to Coast Staging. [ 7 ] With an event as significant as the Olympics, there were problems that arose with respect to materials and equipment supplied, their repair and suitability in some aspects.

However, the essence of this dispute was insignificant in relation to, what I understood to be, contracts that amounted to over $300,000 between the parties. [ 8 ] Mr. Fanning was very candid about his claim. He explained that there were three specific issues between the parties as follows: (

a) A deduction of $1,036 charged back by the Defendant for Vancouver House; (

b) A deduction of $96.57 charged back by the Defendant for Vancouver House; and (c) $351 that was not paid with respect to Heineken House. These totalled $1,483.57. [ 9 ] As well, Mr. Fanning claimed interest on the outstanding amount noted above at 15%. [ 10 ] The above claims were the specific claims about which the parties testified and gave evidence. [ 11 ] However, the actual claim in the Notice of Claim was for $4,425.12, which Mr. Fanning explained was the total that had not been paid pursuant to all of the invoices, including charge backs and adjustments that were agreed between the parties.

Apparently, this amount was calculated by the Claimant’s bookkeepers in or about September 2010, as this dispute festered between the parties. Additionally, the Claimant sought $807.03 interest, which I understood to be 2% per month on the outstanding amount. [ 12 ] The dispute is fraught with difficulties because there was no written contract. For example, the deduction of $1,036 noted above concerned an invoice for water proofing to the tenting at Vancouver House.

The witnesses on behalf of the Defendants, particularly, Paul and Catherine Runnals, testified that there was some water penetration, and they had requested that the Claimant attend to repairing same, but the Claimant refused to do so. This deduction represented work carried out on behalf of the Defendants to correct the water proofing problem, which was completed by a company known as Scenic Oasis.

There is no invoice included in the Defendants’ Trial Statement with respect to this work, although Catherine Runnals testified that she could produce the invoice. [ 13 ] The $96.57 related to certain items described as hangers, which the Defendants said were not supplied. However, the Claimant said the hangers were supplied. [ 14 ] The other outstanding item, namely $351, related to Heineken House, as I noted above. It apparently related to a discrepancy in the invoicing between the parties which is described in the email dated April 21, 2010 exchanged between the parties.

There was no satisfactory evidence on behalf of either party as to how the discrepancy arose. Frankly, I could not determine from the invoicing in the Trial Statements, nor from the evidence of the parties as to who was correct about this issue. [ 15 ] What is clear from the evidence is that the parties met in late March 2010 and attempted to resolve these disputes. According to Mr. Fanning, he expected to receive a cheque in the amount that was agreed upon between the parties.

That evidence was not contradicted to any great extent by the evidence of the Defendants, other than Paul and Catherine Runnals believed they had hedged their bets at the meeting, which left it open for them to make any deductions they wished. [ 16 ] I am unable to determine from the evidence of the parties which of their stories is correct. However, I am prepared to draw an inference from the meeting in late March that I have described above. It seems to me that Paul and Catherine Runnals would not have raised these issues with Mr.

Fanning as they attempted to settle a very modest dispute, given the size of the contract between them. [ 17 ] Where the evidence between the parties is at odds, I prefer the evidence of the Claimant. In my opinion, it was clear to the Defendants when they met with Mr. Fanning which items were in dispute between them. When they settled upon an amount to resolve the dispute, I am satisfied that there was an agreement reached between the parties.

Therefore, it was not open to the Defendants to make further deductions as they did following that meeting. [ 18 ] However, I am not prepared to accede to the evidence of Mr. Fanning that he was entitled, after the fact, to disregard the agreement that was reached between the parties in late March 2010, which would permit him to send an invoice or demand for the amount set out in the Notice of Claim.

In my opinion, he is limited to claim $1,483.57 as set out in Exhibit 1 to these proceedings. [ 19 ] Furthermore, the Claimant is not entitled to interest at 2% per month as noted above, nor at 15% per annum as claimed. There is no contract between the parties which sets out the contractual interest. Rather, the Claimant is only entitled to interest permitted under the Court Order Interest Act . [ 20 ] Accordingly, there will be judgment in favour of the Claimant, as follows: (a) $1,483.57 for monies owing pursuant to the settlement between the parties; (

b) Pre-judgment interest from April 1, 2010 until April 20, 2011 pursuant to the Court Order Interest Act ; (

c) Court fees - $156; and (

d) Cost of Service - $80.

[ 21 ] The Court Registry may determine the pre-judgment interest as I have directed above. [ 22 ] As well, the Claimant is entitled to post judgment interest following April 20, 2011 pursuant to the Court Order Interest Act . ____________________ Lawrence A. Kahn