) Mr. H. Crawley ) for the Crown HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN ) ) Mr. K. Sneesby - v. -, 2015 MBPC 10

2015 MBPC 10 THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF MANITOBA BETWEEN: ) Mr. H. Crawley ) for the Crown HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN ) ) Mr. K. Sneesby - and - ) for the Accused ) JODY RONALD MCDONALD, ) ) Sentence delivered Accused. ) January 27, 2015 _____ WIEBE, P.J. (Orally) Mr. McDonald has pled guilty to possession for the purpose of trafficking times two and in one case the substance was crack cocaine and in the other it was cocaine. In addition, he has pled guilty to possession of a restricted firearm with ammunition. The circumstances of the offence is as follows. On December the 2nd of 2012, the police stopped Mr.

McDonald because he was driving a vehicle and he thought that he did not meet the description of the person who was the registered owner. When the police stopped him he did not immediately produce his registration and while he was looking for it the police saw two dime bags. They felt they had reasonable and probable grounds for a search and the search revealed crack cocaine in a Kinder Egg as well as two sandwich bags. They also found two rocks of cocaine in Mr. McDonald's pocket and found two additional cell phones. He was charged and released on a promise to appear.

On March 30th, 2014, the police saw him driving again and thought he looked panicked. Mr. McDonald hit a curb while he was driving. He then parked and exited his vehicle before the police got to his vehicle. When they did catch up to him they noted he had a pouch on his person and he appeared to be nervous. He did not have a driver's licence with him. He started whispering to his three passengers which concerned the officers so the officers handcuffed him and searched the car. They found a loaded handgun in the front seat and they found cocaine and benzocaine. In a statement Mr.

McDonald admitted that the drugs and the gun were his. Mr. McDonald was arrested and he had his bail revoked on April 19th, 2014 and he did not apply for bail thereafter. The issues before me are: What is a reasonable sentence in these circumstances? And is Mr. McDonald entitled to 1.5 to one credit for the time he has spent in custody? With respect to the sentence. Counsel has presented a joint recommendation for the substantive offences. They recommend as follows: For the December 2nd, 2012 offence of possession for the purpose of trafficking, an 18 month sentence.

For the March 30th, 2014 offence of possession for the purpose of trafficking, a three year consecutive sentence. For the March 30th, 2014 possession of the restricted handgun and ammunition, a three year sentence concurrent to the three years for the possession for the purpose of trafficking. In addition, they agree that a

Section 109 weapons prohibition and a DNA order are appropriate and forfeiture of the drugs, the weapons and the cell phones. The reasons behind the joint recommendation are: Mr. McDonald's record, it is very limited. He was sentenced for a break and enter and theft as well as mischief and a fail to appear in March of 2009. He received a 21 month custodial sentence, three years probation and a

Section 109 weapons prohibition for those matters. There were contingencies with the Crown's cases including issues regarding statements made by Mr. McDonald on March 30th of

2014. The sentence is within the appropriate range for similar offences and it is a considerable sentence in a federal penitentiary. His guilty pleas and his acceptance of responsibility. With respect to sentencing, I am guided by the principles and objectives set out in the Criminal Code .

Section 718 indicates that, "The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: • (

a) to denounce unlawful conduct; • (

b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; • (

c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; • (

d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; • (

e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and • (

f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community."

Section 718.1 indicates that, "A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender." The foremost sentencing principle here is denunciation and deterrence. This sentence sends a strong message to Mr. McDonald and to the public that drugs and guns are not acceptable in our society. With respect to the degree of Mr. McDonald's responsibility, it is high. Possession of a loaded firearm, a prohibited weapon, in a vehicle in a public place is exceptionally dangerous. Guns are used to shoot people. They are used to kill people.

Carrying a concealed loaded weapon shows how dangerous Mr. McDonald is. He is a danger to the public, he is a danger to the police and his actions show a complete disregard for a safe society and for what is acceptable conduct in our society. Couple that with the fact that Mr. McDonald had drugs for the purpose of trafficking and you have a lethal combination of circumstances that can only lead to harm and tragedy. These are the activities Mr. McDonald is engaged in and this is the lifestyle he has chosen to live. In the process he had completely ignored the principles of a peaceful and law-abiding society.

He contributes to the underbelly of society by selling drugs, promoting crime and dragging buyers of drugs and their families into a horrible downward spiral from which many never return. Counsel agree that deterrence and denunciation are the foremost guiding principles in this case. I agree. Mr. McDonald's conduct must be strongly and clearly denounced, both to him and to all others who live this lifestyle and engage in the same conduct. The joint recommendation in this case achieves these sentencing objectives and reflects the gravity of Mr. McDonald's offences and his degree of responsibility.

Accordingly, I agree with the joint recommendation and impose the sentence as set out above. Calculation of the time in custody. The issue here is whether Mr. McDonald is entitled to 1.5 to one credit for the time spent in custody. Initially defence argued yes and the Crown argued no. Subsequently the Crown changed its mind and now indicates that in this case 1.5 to one credit should be applied, although they have stated in their agreement a caveat that the Crown does not agree with the reasoning in R. v. Cummer and they reserve the right to appeal the decision in R. v. Cummer .

This is the case where Justice Edmond had granted 1.5 to one for pre-trial custody. Both counsel rely on the principles of stare decisis and judicial comity in their arguments. The question before me is whether the provincial court is bound by a decision of the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench, namely R. v. Cummer , where the justice is acting in a trial and not an appellate or supervisory capacity and if so, to what extent. In this case the offences committed are indictable and therefore the provincial court has coordinate jurisdiction with the Court of Queen's Bench.

Both counsel are aware that I have previously issued a decision in R. v. Cook which is currently under appeal to the Court of Appeal and I am advised it is set to be heard on March 23rd of 2015. Mr. Crawley, is that not correct? The date was taken from your brief. Am I misstating? MR. CRAWLEY: I think that's correct, yeah, Your Honour. I took that off of the appeal registry. THE COURT: All right. MR. CRAWLEY: I had it in my mind that it was a -- I mixed the names up. I was thinking there were two Crown appeals, it must be defence appeal in that case though, I think.

THE COURT: All right. I will restate that because I am not sure that it makes much difference. I will restate it as that both counselare aware that there are decisions on appeal to the Court of Appeal with respect to the issue of 1.5 to one pre-trial custody. On November 19th, 2014, Justice Edmond of the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench released the unreported decision of R. v.Cummer. Justice Edmond was sitting as a trial judge on this matter, not sitting as an appellant court and not on any of the provincialcourt decisions.

He considered the issue of 1.5 to one for time in custody in a circumstance where revocation had issued but noapplication for judicial interim release had been made. He concluded that 1.5 to one was available. Both counsel are essentially arguing that the provincial court is bound by Justice Edmond's decision and if it is not bound they say itshould be followed based on the principle of judicial comity. Counsel filed a joint casebook to support their position. I do not intend torefer to all of the cases but I will address the central argument. In Holmes v.

Jarrett, , a decision of the Ontario Supreme Court, Justice Granger set out the following helpful andinstructive description of the rule of stare decisis and the views and approaches to its application. He said: "The employment of the rule of stare decisis has been necessary to ensure uniformity in the development of the law, and therebyultimately encourage the predictability of decisions in a meaningful understanding of the law. As a result, it has been said that theprimary reasons for the development of the doctrine can be stated as follows:

(1) To provide for certainty and predictability in the law;

(2) To provide for continuity and stability in the law;

(3) To provide for consistency in the law." He then went on to distinguish the different views which have been applied as follows: The authoritative view ... judges of the same court are required to apply the law as previously stated by their court. ... these decisions are authoritative. The persuasive view According to the persuasive view, such a rule (i.e. the persuasive view) does not exist, and therefore the phrase stare decisis is merely aconvenient way of expressing the tradition which has developed within our judicial system that certain courts will follow decisions ofother courts.

Compliance with this custom, it is said, may be viewed more as judicial comity than forced adherence. And three, The conformity view ... judges ought to follow previous decisions of their colleagues unless certain specific situations exist. Namely, "(

a) Subsequent decisions have affected the validity of the impugned judgment; (

b) It is demonstrated that some binding authority in case law or some relevant statute was not considered; (

c) The judgment was unconsidered, a nisi prius judgment given in circumstances familiar with all trial judges, where the exigencies ofthe trial require an immediate decision without opportunity to fully consult authority." Justice Granger then quoted R. v. Northern Electric Co. Ltd. (ON SC), [1955], O.R. 431, where Chief JusticeMcRuer stated at page 448, as follows: "Having regard to all the rights of appeal that now exist in Ontario, I think Hogg J. stated the right common law principle to be applied in

his judgment in R. ex rel. McWilliam v. Morris, [1942] O.W.N. 447 ... where he said: “The doctrine of stare decisis is one longrecognized as a principle of our law.

Sir Frederick Pollock says, in his First Book of Jurisprudence, 6th ed., p. 321: The decisions of anordinary superior court are binding on all courts of inferior rank within the same jurisdiction, and, though not absolutely binding oncourts of co-ordinate authority nor on that court itself will be followed in the absence of strong reasons to the contrary ...." He continues in quotes to say: "I think that “strong reason to the contrary” does not mean a strong argumentative reason appealing to the particular judge, but somethingthat may indicate that the prior decision was given without consideration of a statute or some authority that ought to have been followed.I do not think “strong reason to the contrary” is to be construed according to the flexibility of the mind of the particular judge.

According to Chief Justice McRuer and Justice Wilson, the decisions of judges of coordinate courts are persuasive and should be givenconsiderable weight unless there are very cogent reasons to depart from such decision." The authoritative view has been applied in Manitoba. See Sedziak v. Polish Workers Association (MB KB), [1937],4 D.L.R. 672 which was reversed on other grounds. More recently, Judge Smith considered the issue with stare decisis in R. v. Kehler,

(2009) MBPC 2009. Judge Smith explained theidea of judicial comity is to ensure that law is applied consistently and predictably. She went on to say: "On the application of stare decisis to the hierarchy of courts, it may not be accurate to conclude that every decision of a higher courtbinds the lower court. It appears that an exception exists where the decision of the higher court is in an instance where that court is actingin a co-ordinate capacity, as opposed to an appellate or reviewing capacity. Another way of looking at that situation is that the doctrine issimply inapplicable in that context: see R. v.

Unnah, [2007] O.J. No. 101 (Ont. C. J.). In Unnah, Justice Stone declined to considerhimself bound to follow a judgment of the Ontario Supreme Court where that court was a trial court exercising concurrent jurisdiction." Judge Smith went on to adopt this reasoning and it would appear adopt a conformity view as she followed the decisions of JudgeSandhu and Judge Harapiak who had decided the same issue as the one which faced her. Of note, there were no decisions to the contraryin the provincial court when Judge Smith made her decision.

Other decisions appear to have taken a similar approach, following a court of concurrent jurisdiction where the matter has beenthoroughly canvassed and all the applicable law had been given to the court. For example, R. v. Wiebe, 2012 MBPC 27 and R. v. Allen,2014 NWTTC 7. In R. v. Weik, 2012 MBQB 138, Chief Justice Joyal appears to have applied the conformity view and indicated that he was not boundby a decision of a brother judge because that judge did not have the relevant appellate and Supreme Court of Canada cases before himwhen making his decision.

In other cases it has been stated that in the criminal law forum a judge has more latitude in determiningwhether to follow the decision of a court of coordinate jurisdiction. See R. v. Letourneau, 2008 ABPC 192. In the R. v. Cummer case it is agreed by counsel that Justice Edmond had relevant case law before him. This includes Judge Devine'sdecision in R. v. McDougall, 2014 MBPC 35, as well as the B.C. Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Chambers, 2013 YKTC 77. Judge Devine, in the course of her reasons in R. v. McDougall considered a number of reasons why 1.5 to one credit should begranted.

The three reasons were: it was consistent with the spirit of R. v. Summers, the 2014 decision by the Supreme Court of Canada;it is a constitutional

interpretation; and thirdly, it leads to consistency in that all accused who do not apply for bail would be treatedconsistently. With respect to her reason of constitutional

interpretation, Judge Devine relied, in part, on Chief Judge Ruddy's trial decision of theYukon Provincial Court. She said the following, this is Judge Devine: "It is trite law that legislation must be given a constitutional meaning. An accused person's right to bail is constitutionally protected ins. 11(

e) of the Charter. In my view, an

interpretation of s. 524(8) that would have the effect of circumscribing the breadth of the right tobail without an explicit limitation stated in the statute, cannot stand. The wording of the revocation portion of s. 524(8) is again, asfollows: ..." And she quotes it (s.524(8)). She continues with her quotation to say:

"The

section does not state what 'a reasonable opportunity to do so' means. If Parliament had intended that the accused must show causewithin a particular period of time, Parliament would have included a time limit in the amendment. I expect that Parliament did not,because such a statutory provision would not meet constitutional muster. In this regard, I find the decision of Judge Ruddy in Chambersmost persuasive as it deals in a purposive manner not only with the amendments to sentencing in s. 719(3.1), but also with the bail provisions in the Criminal Code." She then quotes Justice Ruddy who said: "It must be remembered that the right to bail as enshrined in s. 11(

e) of the Charter is the right of the accused. The notion of affording the accused a 'reasonable opportunity' to show cause must beunderstood within this constitutional framework. Recent decisions out of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice have considered thequestion of whether an accused can be forced on to a bail hearing. "In R. v. Hudson, 2011 ONSC 5176 , Trotter J. stated the following: '[18] ...

Part XVI was never designed to force an accused person into a hearing on such an important issue at an ill-advised orinopportune time.

Section 516 places strict constitutionally guarded limitations on how long the Crown may seek to delay or postpone abail hearing. But there is no corresponding limitation on how long an accused person may delay exercising his or her right to apply forbail. ...'" Judge Ruddy then said -- oh pardon me, I think this is still part of Justice Trotter's quote: "After canvassing some of the legitimate reasons an accused may wish to postpone his or her bail hearing, he went on to conclude: '[19] ... For various reasons, an accused person may not wish to seek bail immediately, or even in the near future.

And there is nothingwrong with this. There is no competing constitutional principle that requires the accused to seek release within a time frame set by theCrown. Similarly, and stemming from this, there is no justification for requiring an accused person to waive his or her rights under s.11(

e) of the Charter in order to suit the scheduling exigencies of the trial court. The same goals can be achieved in a different manner,one that better respects the right to bail.'" Chief Justice Ruddy's decision with respect to the applicability of 1.5 to one was overturned by the Yukon Court of Appeal. Accordingly, it is arguable that part of the reasons Judge Devine relied upon are now questionable law. I understand Justice Edmond hadthe Yukon Court of Appeal decision before him when he made his decision.

He does not, however, mention this decision and he doesnot mention its impact on Judge Devine's decision in R. v. McDougall. As mentioned earlier, Judge Devine relied on Chief JusticeRuddy's decision for only one rationale in granting 1.5 to one, but it is unclear from Justice Edmond's decision in R. v. Cummer if herelied on that part of the decision or on all of Judge Devine's reasons. Both counsel have urged me to follow Justice Edmond's decision in R. v. Cummer.

They argue that following it will lead toconsistency and predictability that the provincial court needs to ensure similarly situated sentenced people are treated equally, at leastand until the Court of Appeal gives the much needed direction to the courts on what the proper

interpretation of the applicable provisionsare. Counsel have supported their positions with case law where concurrent courts have followed their own courts as an example ofapplying stare decisis in the way it was intended and for the purpose the principle was created. In R. v. Guay, the Manitoba County Court declined to revisit a constitutional question afresh as it stated a brother judge had dealt fullyand extensively with the issue. In some of the cases filed the provincial court followed the decision of the Queen's Bench which had also been filed by anotherprovincial court judge. See R. v.

Pilkington, 2012 MBPC 35. In reflecting on all of the above issues and principles, including stare decisis and judicial comity, I consider the following: Stare decisis applies in cases where there is appellate jurisdiction and the court is a court of superior jurisdiction. This is consideredto be vertical stare decisis. That is not the case here. In this case there is horizontal stare decisis or coordinate jurisdiction. How staredecisis applies in this context has been canvassed in Manitoba but not thoroughly.

Manitoba courts, if they can be said to follow aparticular "view" on stare decisis, appear to prefer the conformity view where judges ought to follow previous decisions of theircolleagues unless certain specific situations exist as stated earlier, including, "(

a) Subsequent decisions have affected the validity of the impugned judgment; (

b) It is demonstrated that some binding authority in case law or some relevant statue was not considered;

(

c) The judgment was unconsidered, a nisi prius judgment given in circumstances familiar to all trial judges, where the exigencies of the trial require an immediate decision without opportunity to fully consult authority." Or, as put another way by courts, unless there is compelling and not personal reasons not to do so. The principle of stare decisis developed: (1) to provide certainty and predictability in the law; (2) to provide for continuity and stability of the law; and (3) to provide for consistency in the law.

Given all of the above and with the greatest respect to Justice Edmond and the Cummer decision, and equally with the greatest respect to Judge Devine's decision, I find I cannot apply the principle of stare decisis or judicial comity in this case. What I consider to be "strong reasons to the contrary" for not following the Cummer decision is as follows: In Manitoba at this time on this issue we do not have certainty, predictability and consistency in this state of the law. This is unlike many of the cases provided where there were not competing decisions on the same point in the same court.

As such, the objective of the principle of stare decisis in its horizontal form does not currently exist. Secondly, the doctrine of stare decisis depends largely on not disturbing "settled matters". This area of the law is not settled in Manitoba and is unlikely to be settled until the Court of Appeal rules on the issue. Third, applying the conformity view to my decision, while the decision in R. v. Cummer is persuasive and should be given considerable weight, it is not a decision of an appellate or supervisory court. This specific issue is to be heard by the Manitoba Court of Appeal in March of 2015.

And fourth, again considering the conformity approach, the decision in R. v. Cummer did not explicitly address the Yukon Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Chambers and it did not explicitly consider the effect of that decision on the reasoning in R. v. McDougall , which the Manitoba Court of Queen's bench followed. While the decision of the Yukon Court of Appeal is not strictly binding on the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench and while the Cummer decision is not "an impugned decision", it is arguable the Yukon Court of Appeal decision has brought into doubt, at least in part, the reasoning in R. v.

McDougall which was relied upon in R. v. Cummer . Accordingly, the first exceptions stated by Holmes v. Jarrett , namely that (

a) subsequent decisions have affected the validity of the impugned judgment, is arguably applicable. For these reasons I find that the decision in R. v. Cummer is not binding upon me and in the result I find that 1.5 to one credit is not available to Mr. McDonald and I therefore decline to award 1.5 to one credit. Therefore the time served in custody will be at a one to one ratio for the time served. I did want to clarify one point on the

Section 109 weapons prohibition. Is that a lifetime -- MR. CRAWLEY: No, I think -- THE COURT: -- prohibition or what was the Crown seeking? MR. CRAWLEY: I went back and reviewed our position letter, Your Honour, and I don't think notice was ever served with respect to a notice of intention to seek greater punishment by reason of previous offence. Therefore, the Crown is only seeking a 10-year weapons prohibition with respect to this matter. THE COURT: All right. There will be a 10-year weapons prohibition with respect to that. MR.

CRAWLEY: There's one thing -- Your Honour, I was able to check and I'm quite certain that it is your decision that was under, that is being appealed. It's a situation where it's an accused is the appellant in the Court of Appeal. That's the provincial, it's a provincial Crown decision, so I'm not quite as familiar with it, but I'm fairly certain that is in fact your decision which is under appeal and they are to be heard together on that March 23rd date.

The only thing I was going to clarify is that, and perhaps I wasn't clear in my letter, it's probably moot from our perspective now, but I was actually reserving the right to appeal this decision if the Court of Appeal returns substantive reasoning in Cummer , if you had decided -- THE COURT: Oh, okay. MR. CRAWLEY: -- in favour, if you decided on the basis of the comity issue here. The Crown position was that we would -- if the substantive issue changed then we might appeal. THE COURT: All right.

Thank you for that clarification because I definitely read your letter to say that you reserve the right, that you did not agree with the reasoning in Cummer and reserved the right -- MR. CRAWLEY: It's a provincial decision. THE COURT: That's a provincial decision. MR. CRAWLEY: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Yes, thank you. That makes sense. MR. CRAWLEY: Okay. THE COURT: All right. MR. CRAWLEY: I apologize if I was not clear. THE COURT: All right. Anything further? MR. SNEESBY: No, I think it's clear. THE COURT: All right. You understand all that, Mr. McDonald? MR. SNEESBY: Can I have 20 seconds with him? I'll just ask Mr. Sheriff after you leave. THE COURT: Yes. MR. SNEESBY: Thank you. I just want to make sure it's crystal. THE COURT: Yes. THE CLERK: Your Honour, what is the time served then? MR. SNEESBY: One to one. THE COURT: Oh, the time served -- THE CLERK: The actual -- MR.

CRAWLEY: Two hundred and ninety-six days, I think. THE COURT: Thank you very much. MR. SNEESBY: It was 296 last time. MR. CRAWLEY: Yeah, the 296 was at one to one. MR. SNEESBY: Yeah, it was 296 last time. MR. CRAWLEY: Oh no, there's a couple more now, I suppose, right? MR. SNEESBY: Yes, witness and the last date. I'm trying to remember what the last date was. THE COURT: This matter, I believe, appeared before me on Friday, January 16th and at that time it was 292 days plus another four days was 296 is what my note says. MR. SNEESBY: Right.

THE COURT: So then from then to today, which is another, is that another 11 days? MR. CRAWLEY: Yes. MR. SNEESBY: Yes. MR. CRAWLEY: So 307. THE COURT: Yes, 307 days. So the 307 days will be subtracted from the 18 months on the first offence. MR. SNEESBY: Thank you. MR. CRAWLEY: Thank you, Your Honour. THE COURT: And so that is, just to be clear, so it is 365 minus 307. Oh sorry, no, 18 months ... MR. CRAWLEY: It's four and a half years minus 307. THE COURT: Well we assign it to a particular ... MR. CRAWLEY: Or you're to assign it to the 18 month one I suppose. THE COURT: Yes. MR. SNEESBY: That makes sense.

THE COURT: So but they are going to want a number of days going forward so I would like us all to agree.

THE CLERK: Is it 540 days is the 18 months, is that (inaudible)? THE COURT: Five hundred and forty-nine point five days would be -- I don't want to slice hairs here though, so if counsel want to say it is five hundred and ... MR. CRAWLEY: Forty-nine is fine with me. THE COURT: Five hundred and forty-nine less 307 is 242 days going forward. Counsel, are we all in agreement on that? MR. CRAWLEY: Yes. MR. SNEESBY: Yes. THE COURT: So that will be on the first possession charge. THE CLERK: Plus with the three years on the other? THE COURT: Plus three years concurrent on each of the other.

THE CLERK: And the DNA order, is it a primary or secondary? MR. CRAWLEY: Secondary designated offence. THE CLERK: Thank you. Court is taking a recess? THE COURT: Yes, we're going to take a recess. THE CLERK: Order, all rise. Court is now in recess. (BRIEF RECESS) THE CLERK: Court is now re-opened. You may be seated. THE COURT: Apologies, gentlemen, we did not deal with costs and surcharges, I understand. MR. CRAWLEY: Yes. MR. SNEESBY: Right. THE COURT: Costs and surcharges are mandatory on the matters at March 30th, 2014. I see Mr. McDonald has left us. MR. SNEESBY: Right. I'll advise him. THE COURT: All right.

So the costs and surcharges, we don't know though, Mr. Sneesby, how long he may need to pay. MR. SNEESBY: Well he's going to be in jail for a little bit and it depends on what federal corrections say in the sense that when you have a weapon, we've talked about this, like a gun, it changes their release calculation. So I'm not sure how they're going to work that. So he'll be in custody for -- THE COURT: All right. Would five years? MR. SNEESBY: I think that's good because that gives him a year and a bit when he gets out, so yeah, that should be good. THE COURT: All right.

So the costs and surcharges are imposed on that in the amount of? THE CLERK: Four hundred and four dollars. THE COURT: All right. And so there will be five years to pay that and given the lengthy sentence that he will be serving, I am going to waive the costs and surcharges with respect to the December 2nd, 2012. MR. SNEESBY: Thank you. THE COURT: And I think we dealt with forfeiture so I think I have dealt with all of the matters, correct? MR. CRAWLEY: It was forfeiture of all items, is that ...

THE COURT: Well I think I specifically said, because this was all I was aware of, is the gun, I don't know if I said the ammunition, but that would include the ammunition, the drugs and I believe there was two cell phones. MR. CRAWLEY: I think there might be --

THE COURT: There was at least two cell phones, so cell phones. MR. CRAWLEY: And there was -- I think when I'm looking back, there might have been like a small amount of cash, like $100 cash that was seized of one of these -- THE COURT: Mr. Sneesby -- MR. CRAWLEY: -- there were proceeds of crime charges. THE COURT: All right. THE CLERK: Do you want it specified or just list all items? THE COURT: All items. MR. CRAWLEY: Thank you, Your Honour. THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel.