Smith v. McIsaac, 2016 NSSC 24

SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia FAMILY DIVISION Citation: Smith v. McIsaac , 2016 NSSC 24 Date: 20160115 Docket: 1201-065919 Registry: Halifax Between: Kevin Peter Smith Applicant v. Linda Marie McIsaac Respondent Judge: The Honourable Justice C. LouAnn Chiasson Heard: November 5 and 6, 2015, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Counsel: Kevin Smith, self-represented Judith Schoen counsel for Linda McIssac By the Court: BACKGROUND [ 1 ] Mr. Smith and Ms. McIsaac were married on October 19, 1991, separated on April 1, 2011, and divorced on February 4, 2014.

A Divorce Order and Corollary Relief Order were issued by this Court on February 4, 2014. On September 15, 2014, Mr. Smith applied to vary the terms of the Corollary Relief Order as they relate to child support. The parties have two children: Spencer and Madison. [ 2 ] At the time of the Corollary Relief Order Mr. Smith’s income was noted to be $106,887. Ms. McIsaac’s income (from disability benefits) amounted to $20,844 per annum. Spencer was in his second year of university and had earned approximately $13,000 in 2012.

At the time of the Corollary Relief Order, Spencer was living independently of both parties. [ 3 ] The relevant paragraphs of the Corollary Relief Order are: “For the purpose of calculating the contribution of the parties and the child, Spencer Sinclair Smith to Spencer Sinclair Smith’s s. 7 university education expenses, this Honourable Court finds that the agreement of the parties with respect to the sharing of these expenses is reasonable.” 4. The Respondent (Mr. Smith) shall pay child support in the amount of $550.00 per month directly to Spencer Sinclair Smith. 5.

The Respondent shall pay child support to the Petitioner for Madison Linda Marie Smith in the amount of $893.00 per month effective January 1, 2013 and continuing on the first day of each month until further order of this Honourable Court. 6. University expenses for Spencer Sinclair Smith shall be shared as follows: Spencer Sinclair Smith- 50% The Petitioner – 10% The Respondent – 40%. 7. Any contributions to Spencer Sinclair Smith’s student line of credit shall be at the discretion of the Respondent.

8. The parties shall each contribute to reasonable

section 7 expenses as set out in the Child Support Guidelines as and when they occur. 11. The Petitioner will advise the Respondent in writing by Mary 31, 2014 of:

a) the universities Madison had applied to;

b) any acceptance from universities and scholarships offered and received (on an on-going basis after this date);

c) Madison’s 2013 income, 2014 income and prospects for income;

d) Madison’s choices (options) for post-secondary education.” [ 4 ] It is noteworthy that the Corollary Relief Order indicates that counsel for the parties endorsed the order indicating “Consent as to Form”. This would appear to indicate that the parties consented to the form of order but that the content of the order was directed by the decision of the court at the conclusion of a contested hearing. A review of the written decision of Justice Williams, however, (reference Smith v. Smith, 2013 NSSC 409 ) at paragraph 4 provides that: “Mr. Smith shall pay child support for Spencer of $750.00 per monthly.

This will be paid directly to Spencer.” (emphasis added) [ 5 ] I am uncertain as to why there is a $200 reduction in the monthly support paid as between the decision and the Corollary Relief Order. I am uncertain as to whether this is a typographical error or if the parties reached an agreement subsequent to the contested hearing before Justice Williams to reduce the amount payable. Nevertheless, the issue was not raised at the variation hearing and the parties have not objected to the form of the Corollary Relief Order mandating payment by Mr.

Smith to Spencer in the amount of $550 per month (as well as contributing to Spencer’s university expenses at a rate of 40% of those costs). CHANGES IN CIRCUMSTANCES [ 6 ] Mr. Smith asserts the following changes in circumstances since the granting of the Corollary Relief Order: (

a) Spencer’s income has increased . (

b) Spencer moved back into Ms. McIsaac’s residence in the fall of 2014. (

c) Spencer is in his 5th year of his Bachelor of Arts Program (with a double major in psychology and criminology). (

d) Madison graduated from high school and began attending St.F.X. in the fall of 2014 (

e) Madison reached the age of majority in January 2015. [ 7 ] Ms. McIsaac was of the view that any changes in circumstances were not significant enough to warrant a variation. Counsel on behalf of Ms. McIsaac stated that all the changes could reasonably have been anticipated by the parties at the time of the Corollary Relief Order. Further, counsel for Ms. McIsaac notes that Mr. Smith’s income has increased (to $119,480) and that he has remarried. Mr. Smith’s partner had a T4 income in 2014 of $85,665 (the household income in 2014 was therefore $205,145). POSITION OF THE PARTIES [ 8 ] Mr.

Smith requested that the court terminate any support obligation he owed in relation to Spencer. He acknowledged that he had not paid his portion of Spencer’s tuition from September of 2015. Mr. Smith stated that Spencer was not a child of the marriage and that any contribution of the parties should be voluntary. [ 9 ] Ms. McIsaac indicated that she was seeking continued support for Spencer pursuant to the current Corollary Relief Order for his final year of study.

She was not seeking any increase to the table amount of support, nor was she seeking to have it paid to her, despite the fact that Spencer was residing with her and not independently. [ 10 ] In relation to Madison, Ms. McIsaac was not seeking any contribution in relation to Madison’s residence or meal plan at St. F.X. She was, however, seeking to have the amount payable pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Corollary Relief Order continue to be paid by Mr. Smith (i.e. $893 per month). She was also seeking contribution from Mr. Smith in relation to Madison’s tuition, books, and laptop. ISSUES 1.

Has there been a material change in circumstance sufficient to warrant a variation of the Corollary Relief Order issued February 4, 2014? 2. If so, how should the Corollary Relief Order be varied? LEGAL ANALYSIS [ 11 ] The first stage in an application to vary is to determine whether or not there is a material change in circumstance.

Section 17 of the Divorce Act sets out the statutory framework for the consideration of any variation: “

(1) A Court of competent jurisdiction may make an order varying, rescinding or suspending, prospectively or retroactively, (

a) a support order or any provision thereof on application by either or both former spouses;…

(4) Before the court makes a variation order in respect of a child support order, court shall satisfy itself that a change of circumstances asprovided for in the applicable guidelines has occurred since the making of the child support order or the last variation order made inrespect of that order.” [12] The Supreme Court of Canada has stated in the cases of Willick v. Willick, (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 670 (S.C.C.)that a material change must be substantial, unforeseen and permanent. It cannot be trifling or time limited. [13] Subsection 2(1)(

b) of The Divorce Act, R.S. , 1985 provides the statutory definition for "child of the marriage" where the childis over the age of majority: 2(1) "child of the marriage" means a child of two spouses or former spouses who, at the material time… (

b) is the age of majority or over and under their charge but unable, by reason of illness, disability or other cause, to withdraw from theircharge or to obtain the necessities of life." [14] Reference was made to the case of Erickson v. Erickson, 2007 NSSC 333. Justice Legere-Sers stated at paragraphs 154 of thedecision: 154 It must be shown that the child is unable to withdraw himself or herself from parental charge. The party claiming support (overthe age of majority) has the burden of establishing entitlement (See MacLennan v. MacLennan, (2003), 2003 NSCA 9 , 212N.S.R. (2d) 116, at para. 39).

Further, in MacLennan, supra, the Court of Appeal reiterated the direction in Yaschuk v. Logan (1992), (NS CA), 110 N.S.R. (2d) 278 (S.C.A.D.) at para. 40 as follows: … each case be examined carefully in light of its own facts. The weighing of these facts and exercising judgment in relation to them is,as he said, particularly in the province of the trial judge … [15] The fact driven nature of these considerations was highlighted in the case of Galbraith v. Galbraith, 2014 NSSC 337 ,2014NSSC 337. Justice Jollimore reinforces the need to look at the specific facts in each case.

She states at paragraph 63 of thedecision: "…In MacLennan, 2003 NSCA 9 at paragraph 41, Justice Cromwell explicitly says lists such as that in Farden, 'mustnot be used in place of the language of the statute or be invoked to impose a burden on parties to call evidence about the obvious or onjudges to address non-issues in their reasons for judgement.'" [16] In Harnish v. Harnish, 2015 NSFC 5, Judge Dewolfe stated at paragraphs 8 and 9: 8 Post-Secondary education may result in a child over the age of majority continuing to be a dependent child.

Various courtdecisions have developed lists of factors relevant to determining whether a child enrolled in post-secondary education is a "child of themarriage" pursuant to the Divorce Act, for example, Farden v. Farden (1993), (BC SC), 48 R.F.L. (3d) 60 (B.C.Master), Martell v. Height (1994), 1994 NSCA 65 , 130 N.S.R. (2d) 318 (N.S. C.A.) and Kusnir v. Kusnir (2001), (ON CJ), 21 R.F.L. (5th) 90 (Ont. C.J.).

This analysis is transferable to a large extent to the definition of "dependent child" underthe Maintenance and Custody Act. 9 Relevant factors include age, ability to secure employment at the end of a course, eligibility for student loans, ability to contributethrough part time employment, whether the child could have reasonably expected assistance if her parents were cohabiting, and whethershe is expeditiously pursuing her education. There is no rule which says a child is disentitled to maintenance if she is enrolled in asubsequent academic program, see: Lee v. Lee, 2009 NSSC 121 (N.S. S.C.) at paragraph 23.

There is no longer an age cap on thedefinition of "dependent child". Spencer’s circumstances [17] What has changed in relation to Spencer? He was enrolled full time in an undergraduate program at the time of the Order andcontinues to be enrolled. Mr. Smith takes issue with the fact that Spencer has declared a double major resulting in an additional year ofstudy (i.e. a 5th year for his Bachelor of Arts with a double major in criminology and psychology).

This declaration of a double majorand the addition of one further year onto Spencer’s course of studies does not amount to a change in circumstance sufficient to warrant avariation. [18] Spencer had been living independently of both parties at the time of the Corollary Relief Order. Subsequently Spencer hasmoved in with his mother. Ms. McIsaac’s claim for child support to cover living expenses for Spencer is strengthened by this change ofcircumstances. [19] Mr.

Smith stated at paragraph 78 of his pre-hearing submissions (filed October 26, 2015) that: “I do not find unreasonable the amount of $550.00 per month for ‘room and board’ regardless of who Spencer pays it to, however, Isubmit that it is not reasonable to expect support for an adult child who operates and maintains a motor vehicle, secures and uses creditcards, travels and makes ample discretionary purchases in addition to providing for his necessary expenses.” [20] This statement appears to indicate that Mr.

Smith feels that it is Spencer’s increased income which should disentitle him toqualify as a “child of the marriage”. [21] Spencer’s income has increased from approximately $12,000 at the time of the Order to $15,766 in employment income in2014. Spencer earns minimum wage at his job at Kent’s. Spencer also received $7,309.52 in dependent disability payments in 2014

(approximately $4,000 of the $7,309.52 received in relation to retroactive disability benefits). His employment income increased by$3,766 from the time of the Corollary Relief Order. Further, Spencer is now in receipt of dependent disability payments in theapproximate amount of $3,300 per annum. [22] Spencer worked a considerable number of hours at a minimum wage job in order to be able to earn that level of income.

Although he is to be lauded for his efforts, should the court expect that Spencer should be forced to continue to work such a significantamount thereby alleviating any responsibility of his father to contribute to his expenses? I do not find that assertion to be reasonable inthe circumstances of this case. Spencer had to work the hours he did to be able to contribute to his expenses as he has done. [23] Although Mr.

Smith indicates that the motor vehicle expenses of Spencer are a luxury, I was provided with no evidence toconfirm that Spencer could work the hours he did (all the while maintaining good grades at university) if he were to rely on publictransportation. Ms. McIsaac is disabled and the ability of Spencer to rely on his mother for transportation is not self-evident. [24] Mr. Smith also took issue with Spencer’s travel expenses. Ms. McIsaac testified that Spencer has taken three trips with hisdodge ball team since 2014. In the summer of 2014, Spencer participated in two dodge ball tournaments in Ontario and PEI.

In order toreduce costs he contributed to a rental vehicle with his teammates. In the spring of 2015 he and approximately six of his dodge ballteammates rented a vehicle and drove to a dodge ball tournament in Quebec. He did take a one week trip to Cuba with friends in 2014. Presumably this trip was possible as a result of his receipt of retroactive disability payments. These trips and their associated expensesare reasonable in the circumstances of such a hard working young man. [25] Spencer’s additional income has enabled him to pay for all expenses related to a motor vehicle he purchased.

It has also meantthat Spencer is paying 50% of his university expenses. This significant contribution by him is mandated, in part, by his earnings. Mr.Smith’s position is that Spencer’s increase in income is a change sufficient to warrant a variation to the Corollary Relief Order. [26] Spencer’s income can be presumed to be less than $19,000 on a go forward basis. Both parents acknowledge that Spencer is ahard working dedicated student. Despite his significant work hours, he has been able to maintain a B average in university. Spencer is tobe commended for his dedication and hard work.

I find that Spencer remains a “child of the marriage” as defined in the Divorce Act. Spencer is diligently pursuing his undergraduate degree at the present time. [27] Given the changes in income of all parties (including Spencer, Mr. Smith and Ms.

McIsaac) I find that there has been a changein circumstances which meets the threshold established in s. 17 of the Divorce Act. [28] Having found Spencer to continue to qualify as a child of the marriage, I then look to s. 3(2) of the Federal Child SupportGuidelines which state: “Unless otherwise provided under these Guidelines, where a child to whom a child support order relates is the age of majority or over,the amount of the child support order is (

a) the amount determined by applying these Guidelines as if the child were under the age of majority; or (

b) if the court considers that approach to be inappropriate, the amount that it considers appropriate, having regard to the condition,means, needs and other circumstances of the child and the financial ability of each spouse to contribute to the support of the child.” [29] In MacLennan v. MacLennan, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal noted at paragraph 48: “The judge noted that she had heard little about Allan’s needs. She therefore applied the Guideline amount as addressed in s. 3(2) of theGuidelines.

While it is argued that the judge had no basis for doing so, I would find, on the contrary, that there was no evidence beforeher that would have permitted her to find that the Guideline amount would be inappropriate if Allan were in full time attendance atuniversity. (Q.L.)(S.C.) The onus of showing that the Guideline amount is inappropriate is on the party so claiming: James C.MacDonald and Ann C. Wilson, Child Support Guidelines Law and Practice (looseleaf, updated to release 2, 2002) at 9.15.5; Wesemannv. Wesemann (1999). (BC SC), 49 R.F.L. (4th) 435; B.C.J. No 1387 (Q.L.)(S.C.).

I would, however, direct that Mr.MacLennan be provided with all financial information pertinent to Allan’s schooling, if he has returned to school, including student loanamounts, tuition and book costs, academic results, his place of residence and living costs and income from employment.” (emphasisadded) [30] In examining the interrelationship between s. 3(2) of the Guidelines and s. 7, reference may be had to the case of Lewi v. Lewi (ON CA), 2006 CarswellOnt 2892 (Ont. C.A.).

The Ontario Court of Appeal stated at paragraphs 96 and 97: “96 Section 3(2) of the Guidelines dictates that the amount of child support for an adult child of the marriage is to be the amountdetermined as if the child were under the age of majority, unless that "approach" is inappropriate, in which case the court is to set theamount it considers appropriate. Based on the structure and wording of s. 3, in my view, the presumptive amount of child support for anadult child of the marriage is the same as that for a child under the age of majority. As Heeney J. wrote in Merritt v.

Merritt, supra, atpara. 55: As written, the Guidelines do not say that the amount of child support should be different just because a child is 18 years old. Quite thereverse. The presumptive order is the table amount. It is only where the payor, who has the onus of proof, convinces the court that thetable amount is inappropriate, that a different amount may be ordered [emphasis in the original]. 97 Section 3(2)(

b) provides that the court may order a different amount for an adult child of the marriage only if the "approach" isinappropriate. What does the word "approach" mean in s. 3(2)(b)? In my view, it refers to the approach set out in s. 3(1), namely, settingchild support for living expenses based on the table and setting child support for special expenses based on s. 7. Thus, the court is tofollow the table approach to setting child support for living expenses of an adult child of the marriage unless that approach isinappropriate.

If it is, the court may order the amount it considers appropriate based on a consideration of the "condition, means, needsand other circumstances of the child" and the financial ability of each parent to contribute to the child's support. Similarly, the court is to

follow the approach to special or extraordinary expenses provided by s. 7 unless that approach is inappropriate. Only if the approach mandated by s. 7 is inappropriate is the court to set an appropriate amount for such expenses, for an adult child of the marriage, based on s. 3(2)(b).” [ 31 ] Lewi, supra , mandates that the court look first to an analysis of the circumstances of the parties and the adult child and to examine the amount, if any payable pursuant to s. 7. I do find that Spencer’s income is such that he is able to pay for some of the expenses typically covered by the table amount.

For example, Spencer’s earnings have meant that he is able to cover all his car expenses, his cell phone, hair and grooming, and other sundry expenses related to entertainment, fitness, etc.. [ 32 ] I find that the table amount payable in relation to Spencer would not be appropriate in the circumstances. It would, however, be completely unreasonable to expect that Spencer contribute all of his earnings to his expenses.

Even if he were to contribute 100% of his earnings, he would still have a deficit. [ 33 ] If one accepts Spencer’s expenses (as filed with the court on December 2, 2014), then Spencer’s expenses exclusive of his post- secondary expenses (tuition and books) are $12,972. His post-secondary expenses in 2015/ 2016 were $7,099.45 in tuition and books which cost $754.01 (for a total of $7,853.46. This amounts to $20,825.46 with no allowance for accommodation costs (i.e. food, shelter). Spencer has financial need for which Mr.

Smith will be partially responsible. [ 34 ] In determining the appropriate amount, I am directed to take into account the condition means and circumstances of the child as well as of the parties themselves. I am mindful of the relatively minor income of Ms. McIsaac in comparison to the dual income of Mr. Smith’s household (in excess of $200,000). I am mindful of the deficit declared by Ms. McIsaac which is in part due to Mr. Smith’s unwillingness to cover any residence expenses for Madison.

I am also mindful of the fact that the amount paid in relation to Spencer’s living expenses of $550 per month is well below what Mr. Smith spends on his entertainment for one month ($750). For Spencer, Mr. Smith will continue to pay the sum of $400 per month in relation to s 3(2) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines. [ 35 ] Mr. Smith acknowledges that he has not made his contribution to Spencer’s tuition by the deadline for the payment as mandated by Spencer’s university. Tab 12 of the Respondent’s Exhibit Book confirms that the payment for fall tuition was due on September 18, 2015. Mr.

Smith had not made any contribution to Spencer’s tuition for 2015 by the time of the hearing. [ 36 ] Total tuition for 2015/ 2016 for Spencer is $7,099.45. Further, Spencer purchased books for his fall semester of 2015 in the amount of $498.96. Spencer also purchased books for the second semester of 2014/2015 in the amount of $255.05. It does not appear as though Mr. Smith has made any contribution in relation to these expenses. In accordance with the Corollary Relief Order, Mr. Smith would owe 40% of these costs amounting to $3,141.38. I direct that Mr. Smith pay to Ms.

McIsaac the sum of $3,141.38 in relation to these expenses forthwith. Madison’s circumstances [ 37 ] Since the granting of the Corollary Relief Order Madison has reached the age of majority and is attending university. Both of these circumstances were reasonably contemplated when the Corollary Relief Order was issued. Mr. Smith, however, asserts that Madison no longer qualifies as a “child of the marriage”. He is unwilling to contribute to either table amount or

section 7 expenses in relation to Madison. [ 38 ] The Corollary Relief Order does provide for the payment of

section 7 expenses (should Madison meet the definition of a child of the marriage). The difficulty is that the formulation regarding the parties’ contributions to Madison’s s. 7 expenses is not clearly defined in the Order. Paragraph 8 provides: “8. The parties shall each contribute to reasonable

section 7 expenses as set out in the Child Support Guidelines as and when they occur.” [ 39 ] Mr. Smith does not want to financially assist Madison in any way. He asserts that she is not a “child of the marriage” and therefore is not entitled to support, either table amount or

section 7 expenses. He bases this in part on what he has described his “alienation” from her. He indicated that he has done everything possible to maintain a relationship with Madison but that she has terminated this relationship. In support of his position he provided a number of texts between himself and Madison. [ 40 ] Far from showing that Madison has unilaterally terminated the relationship with Mr. Smith, the texts show a different context. The texts do show a strained relationship between the parties but the difficulties are not as one sided as Mr. Smith indicated. For example, Mr.

Smith confirmed that he did not try to communicate with Madison on her last two birthdays. This despite the fact that Madison contacted him on his birthday. [ 41 ] Mr. Smith also indicated that Madison refused to see him. This is contrary to the evidence. When Madison asked if her friend could accompany her because she had not seen her father for a period of time, it was Mr. Smith that refused to see Madison. It would appear as though the relationship with Madison needs to be on Mr. Smith’s terms. If there is estrangement, it cannot be said to be unilateral on Madison’s part.

The nature of the relationship between Madison and Mr. Smith does not disentitle her to receipt of child support. [ 42 ] I find that Madison remains a “child of the marriage” entitled to support. [ 43 ] Is the presumptive payment of table amount of child support “inappropriate” in relation to Madison? I do not find that the table amount of support payable in relation to Madison is inappropriate for the following reasons: 1. Ms. MacIsaac is not seeking any contribution to the residency costs of Madison throughout the school year at St.F.X.

2. There are clearly accommodation costs associated with Madison (shelter, food, etc.) 3. Madison’s income is insufficient to be able to contribute significantly to her accommodation costs throughout the year. 4. Madison’s income is taken into account below in an analysis of her contribution to university expenses. [ 44 ] Mr. Smith shall pay the table amount of child support for Madison in the amount of $990 per month based on his income of $119,480. It should be noted that this payment, coupled with the payment in relation to Spencer is still less than Mr.

Smith would pay if he were called upon to pay the table amount for two children. [ 45 ] Mr. Smith refuses to contribute to Madison’s university expenses (tuition, books and laptop) in part based upon the fact that he wanted her to attend a different university (Dalhousie). The reasons for Madison attending St. F.X. were explained by Ms. McIsaac which included the following: 1. Madison did not get into the nursing program at Dalhousie; 2. The cost of tuition and books is less at St. F. X. than Dalhousie; 3. St.

F.X. did not require advanced math as a pre-requisite (which Madison did not have); [ 46 ] Further, even if there was disagreement about the university Madison was to attend, this does not alleviate Mr. Smith’s obligation to contribute. As set out in the decision of Woodford v. Horne , 2015 NSSC 280 , Justice Lynch stated at paragraph 57: “The father says he did not agree to the older child attending the particular university. The CRO and the variation order require consent to incur s. 7 expenses.

The father is not exempted from sharing the older child's university expenses because he did not consent to the specific university. The older child chose where she wanted to go after considering several universities. The father attended the open house at the university she attended and he knew that the older child was considering this university. The same can be said for the choice of private school for the younger child. The school was recommended by the mental health professionals working with the younger child.

The father cannot be exempted from contributing to these expenses because he did not explicitly agree to the choice of schools. He agrees that the younger child needs to be in private school. He implicitly agreed to the private school and the university and cannot be exempted from sharing these expenses.” [ 47 ] In analyzing Madison’s conditions, means and needs, I find that Madison is able to contribute to her university expenses. Ms. McIsaac has agreed that, despite Madison’s income being significantly lower than Spencer’s (i.e. approximately $6,300 in employment income), Ms.

McIsaac asserts that Madison should pay 50% of her university expenses (tuition, books and fees). Ms. McIsaac is requesting that Mr. Smith contribute 40% towards Madison’s

section 7 expenses (excluding her residence costs). [ 48 ] I find this request to be more than reasonable in the circumstances. In particular, I note that Madison qualified and could have received a bursary as a result of Mr. Smith’s employment. Because of the pre-conditions Mr. Smith set on Madison obtaining the bursary money, Madison did not attend the event in order to receive the money. In addition to the 40% contribution of Mr. Smith, I would mandate that he also pay the amount of the bursary of $600. [ 49 ] The total amount payable in relation to

section 7 expenses for Madison is 40% of the following expenses: (a) $752.77 expenses related to 2014/2015 school year (reference Tab 5 of Respondent’s Exhibit Book- less $1,207.49 in relation to the computer); (b) $575.66 expenses related to 2015/2016 school year (reference tab 6 of Respondent’s Exhibit Book); (c) $5,912 for 2014/ 2015 tuition (reference tab 6 of Respondent’s Exhibit Book); and (d) $5,912 for 2015/2016 tuition (reference tab 6 of Respondent’s Exhibit Book). [ 50 ] These amounts total $13,152.43 of which 40% (or $5,260.97) is payable forthwith by Mr. Smith.

Adding the payment of $600 in relation to the bursary which Madison did not receive mandates a payment of $5,860.97 by Mr. Smith to Mr. McIsaac.

SUMMARY [ 51 ] Both Spencer and Madison continue to qualify as “children of the marriage”. Pursuant to section 3(2) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, Mr. Smith shall pay the sum of $400 per month in relation to Spencer’s living expenses. Mr. Smith shall pay the sum of $990 per month in relation to s. 3(1) of the Divorce Act for Madison’s living expenses. He shall continue to pay 40% of the university costs of tuition, books and fees for both Spencer and Madison for so long as they qualify as “children of the marriage”. Chiasson, J.