2018 NBCA 84, 2018 NBCA 84

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK SOUTHERN NEW BRUNSWICK FOREST PRODUCTS MARKETING BOARD APPELLANT 139-17-CA OFFICE DE COMMERCIALISATION DES PRODUITS FORESTIERS DU SUD DU NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK APPELANT - and - - et - J.D. IRVING, LIMITED, A.V. NACKAWIC INC., D. MURRAY HARVESTERS LTD. et al., W. & R. GILLESPIE LTD. and J.D. TIMBER HOLDINGS LTD. RESPONDENTS J.D. IRVING, LIMITED, A.V. NACKAWIC INC., D. MURRAY HARVESTERS LTD. et autre, W. & R. GILLESPIE LTD. et J.D. TIMBER HOLDINGS LTD. INTIMÉES Southern New Brunswick Forest Products Marketing Board v. J.D.

Irving, Limited, et al., 2018 NBCA 84 Office de commercialisation des produits forestiers du Sud du Nouveau-Brunswick c. J.D.

Irving, Limited, et autres, 2018 NBCA 84 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice Baird The Honourable Justice French CORAM : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge Baird l’honorable juge French Appeal from a decision of the New Brunswick Forest Products Commission: November 18, 2015 Appel d’une décision de la Commission des produits forestiers du Nouveau-Brunswick : le 18 novembre 2015 History of case: Decision under appeal: N/A Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Historique de la cause : Décision frappée d’appel : s.o. Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: April 26, 2018 Judgment rendered: December 6, 2018 Appel entendu : le 26 avril 2018 Jugement rendu : le 6 décembre 2018 Reasons for judgment: The Honourable Justice Baird Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice French Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: David Duncan Young For the respondent, J.D. Irving, Limited: Paul R. Steep and Bryn E. Gray For the respondent, A.V. Nackawic Inc.: Douglas A.M. Evans, Q.C. and David J. Shore For the respondent, D. Murray Harvesters Ltd. et al.: No one appeared For the respondents, W&R Gillespie Ltd. and J.D.

Timber Holdings Ltd.: David R. Ames, Q.C. Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Baird Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge French Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelant : David Duncan Young Pour l’intimée, J.D. Irving, Limited : Paul R. Steep et Bryn E. Gray Pour l’intimée, A.V. Nackawic Inc. : Douglas A.M. Evans, c.r. et David J. Shore Pour l’intimée, D. Murray Harvesters Ltd. et autres : personne n’a comparu Pour les intimées, W&R Gillespie Ltd. et J.D. Timber Holdings Ltd. : David R. Ames, c.r.

THE COURT The appeal is dismissed with costs of $2,500 payable to J.D. Irving, Limited, $2,500 to A.V. Nackawic Inc., $1,500 to W. & R. Gillespie Ltd. and J.D. Timber Holdings Ltd. LA COUR L’appel est rejeté avec dépens de 2 500$ payables à J.D. Irving, Limited, de 2 500 $ payables à A.V. Nackawic Inc., et de 1 500 $ payables à W. & R. Gillespie Ltd. et à J.D. Timber Holdings Ltd. The judgment of the Court was delivered by BAIRD, J.A. I.

Introduction and Background [ 1 ] The New Brunswick Forest Products Commission, in a Panel decision dated December 11, 2017, set aside Marketing Order No. 2015-604, made by the Southern New Brunswick Forest Products Marketing Board (SNB Board). The order would have established the SNB Board as the single “desk seller” for all primary forest products produced on privately owned woodlots in the area it regulates. The SNB Board appeals the decision asserting the Commission made errors of law and mixed fact and law.

It also seeks a declaration the order is intra vires , costs and such further relief as would be granted by the Court. [ 2 ] This is not the first time the Court has been asked to review a Panel decision concerning the validity of a marketing order made pursuant to the Natural Products Act ( Act ), S.N.B. 1999 c. N-1.2. In J.D. Irving, Limited v.

North Shore Forest Products Marketing Board et al , 2014 NBCA 42 , 422 NBR (2d) 233 , the Court concluded that marketing boards possess the legislative authority to regulate contracts for the sale of wood from private woodlot owners; however, the Court held that a “marketing order” that does not establish the criteria upon which Boards would grant approval will be invalid (para. 34). I will come back to this issue.

In this case, the SNB Board intended that it be the designated body through which forest products would be marketed, and that all producers would offer to sell and would sell wood exclusively to and through the SNB Board. [ 3 ] The SNB Board was established pursuant to s. 18(1) of the Act and is governed by the New Brunswick Forest Products Marketing Plan Regulation – Natural Products Act , N.B. Reg. 2014-1 ( Regulation 2014-1), and the Southern New Brunswick Forest Products Marketing Board Regulation – Natural Products Act , N.B. Reg. 2005-146 ( Regulation 2005-146).

Section 3 of Regulation 2014-1 allows for the creation of separate marketing plans for each of the forest products boards in New Brunswick, of which the appellant is one. [ 4 ] All persons engaged in the marketing of, or in the production and marketing of, the regulated product in a regulated area are governed by a plan (s. 4 of Regulation 2014-1). The regulated product is defined as a primary forest product produced on a private woodlot within a regulated area (s. 5 of Regulation 2014-1). The regulated area for the SNB Board is Albert County, Kings County, Queens County, Saint John County and the Parish of Salisbury in Westmorland County (s. 6(6) of Regulation 2014-1). [ 5 ]

Section 7 of Regulation 2014-1, sets out the powers granted to a Board:

Purposes for the establishment of a Board 7 The purposes for which a Board is established are: (

a) the promotion, control and regulation within its regulated area of the marketing of the regulated product; (

b) the promotion within its regulated area of the production of the regulated product; (

c) the development, conservation and management of forestry resources on private woodlots in its regulated area; and (

d) the promotion of the consumption and use of the regulated product. Objets de l’établissement d’un Office 7 Les objets pour lesquels un Office est établi sont les suivants :

a) la promotion, le contrôle et la réglementation dans la zone réglementée de la commercialisation du produit réglementé;

b) la promotion dans la zone réglementée de la production du produit réglementé;

c) le développement, la conservation et la gestion des ressources forestières sur les terrains boisés privés dans la zone réglementée;

d) la promotion de la consommation et de l’usage du produit réglementé. [ 6 ] The SNB Board has the power to make orders to fulfill its mandate, and to exercise any purpose vested in it pursuant to s. 11 of the Act and by Regulation 2014-1: Powers of a Board 9 The following powers are vested in a Board: […] (

g) to require any person who produces the regulated product to offer to sell and to sell the regulated product to or through the Board; (

h) to prohibit any person from processing, packing or packaging any of the regulated product that has not been sold to, by or through the Board[.] Pouvoirs d’un Office 9 Un Office est investi des pouvoirs suivants : [ …]

g) imposer à toute personne qui produit le produit réglementé l’obligation d’offrir en vente et de vendre ce produit à l’Office ou par l’intermédiaire de l’Office;

h) interdire à toute personne de transformer, d’emballer ou d’empaqueter le produit réglementé qui n’a pas été vendu à l’Office, par lui ou par son intermédiaire[.] [ 7 ] The SNB Board acts as an intermediary for the purchase and sale of wood from private woodlot producers and wood processors and by Regulation 2005-146, it has the following authority:

Powers of Board 9 The following powers are vested in the Board: (

a) to exempt from any order of the Board any person or class of persons engaged in the marketing or the production and marketing of the regulated product or any class, variety or grade of the regulated product[.] Pouvoirs de l’Office 9 L’Office est investi des pouvoirs suivants :

a) soustraire à l’application d’un arrêté de l’Office toute personne ou catégorie de personnes s’occupant de la commercialisation ou de la production et de la commercialisation du produit réglementé ou de toute catégorie, variété ou classe quelconque de ce produit réglementé[.] [ 8 ] The SNB Board is overseen by the Commission. It regulates marketing relationships between private woodlot owners and producers, as represented by the forest products marketing boards, and the Province of New Brunswick.

The Commission membership consists of an independent Chairperson, two representatives of the processors, two members representing the woodlot owners and producers, and two members who represent the Government of New Brunswick. The Commission has the authority to establish a Panel of industry experts empowered by the Act to hear and determine appeals of orders issued by a forest products marketing board. On August 9, 2017, a Panel was established to hear an appeal respecting SNB Board Order No. 2015-604.

On December 11, 2017, the Panel rendered its decision, which binds the Commission. [ 9 ] A predecessor order, No. 2014-604, came into effect on January 14, 2015, pursuant to Regulation 2014-1, and was made retroactive to December 31, 2014. That order required that all “persons […] shall” register with the SNB Board before commencing or continuing in the marketing of the regulated product, and all producers of the regulated product “shall sell” the product to the Board (s. 2-6).

The order prohibited any “person” from buying the regulated product other than from the SNB Board, and “all persons” were prohibited from processing any regulated product that had not been sold to or through the SNB Board. There was a difference of opinion between the producers and the processors concerning the effect of the order. A.V.

Nackawic Inc., in particular, was of the belief it could continue to deal directly with private woodlot owners on the condition it remitted delivery slips and levy fees to the SNB Board. [ 10 ] The practice of processors simply bypassing the SNB Board and contracting directly with the producers continued, despite the passage of the predecessor order. In July 2015, the SNB Board formed a negotiating group with the goal of finding common ground concerning the purchase and sale of wood products. On September 23, 2015, the negotiating group met with J.D.

Irving, Limited and proposed a wood purchasing contract which was rejected. Several days later, on September 28, 2015, the SNB Board executive met and formulated the terms of the marketing order under challenge. On November 2, 2015, the draft order was passed at a meeting of the Board of Directors and came into effect on January 1, 2016, thereby repealing the predecessor Order No. 2014-604. Marketing Order No. 2015-604 reads: 2. All persons shall register with the Board before commencing or continuing in the marketing of the regulated product. 3.

All persons producing the regulated product shall sell the regulated product to the Board. 4. All persons are prohibited from buying the regulated product other than from the Board. 5. All persons are prohibited from processing any regulated product that has not been sold by the Board. 6.

Order No. 2014-604 of the Board is hereby repealed upon the coming into force of this order. [ 11 ] The SNB Board intended that Order No. 2015-604 would eliminate the possibility of any processor or producer entering into direct contracts by requiring all purchases and sales of wood produced on private woodlots in the regulated area to be contracted to and through the SNB Board. SNB Board Chairperson Sabine confirmed the order was drafted by the same members who unsuccessfully negotiated with J.D. Irving, Limited.

Certain SNB Board members testified they were not provided with a copy of the draft order in advance of the meeting in November 2015, and they were not certain what effect the order would have on their day-to-day

dealings with the SNB Board or with the processors. Other members expressed uncertainty concerning the implementation of the order. The Panel was advised during the hearing that the Board planned to delegate the administrative responsibility for the implementation of the order to the SNB Wood Co-op on a fee-for-service basis; however, by the date of proclamation, there were no guidelines or criteria in place. [ 12 ] On November 18, 2015, Commission Chairperson Fox requested the SNB Board provide a policy statement “as soon as possible” concerning the “implementation and/or enforcement” of the order.

Whether, or not, the SNB Board understood the intent of this request is in dispute. Chairperson Sabine testified he did not consider it necessary to draft a policy statement. The following excerpt from the transcript of the Panel hearing illustrates this point: Question : “Reflecting on it today, Mr. Sabine, do you think maybe what Mr. Fox was referring to are exactly the things you and I have been discussing? How are you going to implement this in an environment where shortages could arise, surpluses could arise, conflicting interest of who gets to sell, who gets to buy arise?

What rules are going to apply to this regime? Do you not think that’s what they were interested in?” Answer : “I think he is requesting that when we do that [that] be forwarded to the commission as per the order, yes.” [Respondents’ Joint Book of Essential References, p. 41] II. The Relief Sought and the Panel Decision [ 13 ] Before the Panel, processors J.D. Irving, Limited, A.V. Nackawic Inc., D. Murray Harvesters Ltd., and W&R Gillespie Ltd. / J.D. Timber Holdings Ltd. sought:

i) an order setting aside Order No. 2015-604; ii) an order that the SNB Board “shall” not require parties to register with the Board before they may market any of the regulated product; iii) an order that the SNB Board “shall” not prohibit persons from buying the regulated product other than from the Board; iv) an order that the SNB Board “shall” not prohibit persons from processing any regulated product other than from the Board;

v) an order exempting the processors from the application of the order; vi) costs of the Appeal; and vii) such other relief as deemed appropriate. [ 14 ] In a lengthy decision dated December 11, 2017, the Panel found Order No. 2015-604 to be invalid, concluding it: 1) converted legislative authority to an arbitrary administrative function, held by the Supreme Court to be an invalid exercise of power;

2) lacked detail and specificity which could lead to assumptions and speculations concerning its implementation and intent; 3) was improperly worded and did not reflect the intent of the Act ; 4) delegated some of the SNB Wood Board’s powers to the SNB Wood Co-op for the sale of primary forest products, thereby exceeding its legislative authority, and there was a reasonable apprehension of bias due to the fact SNB Wood Co-op employees would be involved in the negotiations for the price of primary forest products. [ 15 ] In a “nutshell”, the Panel’s reasons for decision can be distilled to four issues, those being: arbitrariness (paras.44-48); statutory

interpretation (paras. 82-86); unlawful delegation of powers (para. 87); and finally, the issue of bias and conflict of interest which are interconnected with the delegation of powers (para. 87). III. Grounds of Appeal [ 16 ] The SNB Board argues the Panel made numerous errors in law or, alternatively, it erred in mixed fact and law.

It asserts the Panel: i. erred when it concluded the absence of directives concerning the implementation of the order was an arbitrary exercise of power; ii. erred when it found there was an apprehension of bias associated with the employment of SNB Co-op personnel for the implementation of the order and the reasons were insufficient to support its conclusions; iii. erred when it concluded the order was made as an attempt to force negotiations with “any company” and was therefore made for an improper purpose; iv. erred when it concluded there was a breach of procedural fairness and the reasons were insufficient to support this conclusion; v. erred in law when the Panel determined the order violated the principles of statutory

interpretation and was improperly constructed; vi. erred in both fact and in law, when the Panel concluded the order was inconsistent with the wording of the Act ; in particular, the failure to include the words “or through” or “by, or through” in the wording of the Order, and the reasons were insufficient to support this conclusion; vii. exceeded its jurisdiction when it concluded that SNB Co-op employees should not have been employed to conduct the day to day operations of the SNB Board. IV.

Standard of Review [ 17 ] In this case there is a right of appeal granted by statute with no prescribed standard of review; therefore, the Court must determine the applicable standard of review. This requires a contextual analysis. ( Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick , 2008 SCC 9 , [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 , at paras. 57 and 62-64 ). [ 18 ] The SNB Board argues there are two standards of review applicable ( see Dunsmuir at paras. 47-49 ). In Canada ( Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 SCC 31 , [2018] S.C.J.

No. 31 (QL) , Gascon J. reaffirms that when an administrative tribunal interprets its home statute, the reasonableness standard presumptively applies. The SNB Board submits further the correctness standard will be applicable with respect to other issues it has identified in its submission.

[19] As Robertson J.A. stated in North Shore (para.12), in a post-Dunsmuir era, “the correctness standard applies toall questions of law that are of central importance to the legal system and outside the relative expertise of the tribunal, not just thosequestions involving civil or common law principles: Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011SCC 53, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 471.” It is apodictic the correctness standard will apply to tribunal decisions that involve a “true jurisdiction[al]question” (Dunsmuir at para. 59).

The correctness standard of review concerns questions of true jurisdiction, or vires, constitutionalquestions, issues of central importance to the legal system, and competing jurisdictions. As Robertson J.A. notes in North Shore, added tothis list are those cases alleging a breach of the fairness duty, or bias; however, if the Legislature has delegated to the tribunal the right toestablish policy or guidelines concerning adjudicative matters, the deference standard is restored (para. 15). Robertson J.A. concluded inNorth Shore that deference is owed to a Commission decision (para. 22).

The issue of the improper delegation of powers in this case willbe reviewed on the reasonableness standard. [20] Findings with respect to bias will be reviewed on the correctness standard (see Committee for Justice andLiberty et al. v. National Energy Board et al., (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, [1976] S.C.J. No. 118 (QL), at p. 394). Thecorrectness standard will be applied if one of the categories in Dunsmuir is established or, exceptionally, where a contextual inquiryshows a clear legislative intent that the correctness standard should be applied. See Workplace Health, Safety and CompensationCommission v.

St.-Onge, 2018 NBCA 53, [2018] N.B.J. No. 198 (QL), per Richard J.A., at para 13. See also Groia v. Law Society ofUpper Canada, 2018 SCC 27, [2018] S.C.J. No. 27 (QL), per Moldaver J. [21] The above remain the guiding principles until the Supreme Court decides otherwise. For the reasons thatfollow, I conclude the Panel decision falls within the range of reasonable outcomes and I do not discern an error in law that wouldwarrant appellate intervention. I would dismiss the appeal. V.

Analysis [22] The Panel poignantly observed the backdrop to this dispute when it wrote the following: In its simplest form, this case is seen by the Panel to be a focus on two different disputes; one between a party who is empowered and isdesperately trying to exercise its legislated powers and parties who desire that the exercise of those powers be done fairly, consistentlyand within the intent of the Natural Products Act; the other between a party who is empowered to regulate and parties who do not wishto be regulated in any way at all.

With respect to the latter, the Panel is of the opinion that if the legislature did not intend for regulationof the marketing or production and marketing of primary forest products in New Brunswick, it would not be contemplated at all in theNatural Products Act. [para. 81] [23] As observed in North Shore, the Court concluded that forest products marketing boards possess the statutoryauthority to regulate, provided each Board “adopts a marketing order which sets out the criteria upon which stumpage agreements are tobe assessed for approval purposes” (para. 34).

In this case, whether the SNB Board had the authority to pass a marketing order is notdisputed; however, as observed, at the heart of the Panel decision are issues concerning arbitrariness, failure to provide directives orcriteria concerning the implementation of the order, the delegation of powers, the relationship the SNB Board has with its Co-op, and thewording of the order. Although the appellant cites improper purpose and lack of procedural fairness as errors in the Panel reasons, as willbe seen further, the Panel did not make discrete findings with respect to these grounds. A.

Arbitrariness [24] The Panel found that Order No. 2015-604 was an attempt by the SNB Board to re-state its statutory powers in aregulatory order which granted it unlimited discretion. At para. 44 of its reasons, the Panel refers to Brant Dairy Co. v. Ontario (MilkCommission), (SCC), [1973] S.C.R. 131, and writes: “[…] the Order essentially repeats the powers they have been giventhus converting such power from a legislative power to an arbitrary administrative function which was held by the Supreme Court ofCanada in Brant Dairy Co. v.

Ontario (Milk Commission), to be an invalid exercise of power.” [25] In Brant Dairy, Laskin J. concludes “[a] statutory body which is empowered to do something by regulationdoes not act within its authority by simply repeating the power in a regulation in the words in which it was conferred […]” (pp. 132-133).Robertson J.A. adopted this principle in North Shore at para. 3.

In this case, the Panel correctly found the SNB Board has the power tomake orders it considers to be advisable, or necessary, to effectively regulate the marketing of wood products; however, it concludedOrder No. 2015-604 was an impermissible attempt by the SNB Board to exercise “limitless and arbitrary power,” as there were no

criteria or guidelines to indicate how the discretion would be exercised. [26] In Brant Dairy, the Ontario Milk Commission was granted statutory power to regulate the marketing of milkproducts, and to make regulations for that purpose. The legislation permitted some limited delegation of those powers to the MilkMarketing Board. [27] In that case, the Board made a regulation which, in essence, repeated the wording of the enabling provision inthe Act.

The regulation was so broadly worded that it granted arbitrary powers to the Board to “fix and allot” quotas of milk on suchterms as the Board deemed fit. [28] Laskin J., writing for the majority, struck the regulation writing that the fact the powers conferred were to becarried out on the basis the Board “deem[s] proper” did not allow it to “keep its standards” out of the regulation, and it could not escapeits obligations to establish criteria and policies in it.

Laskin J. confirms that a statutory body which is empowered to do something byregulation does not act within its authority by simply repeating those powers in a regulation. [29] The Supreme Court reaffirmed the above in Air Canada v. City of Dorval, (SCC), [1985] 1S.C.R. 861, [1985] S.C.J. No. 42 (QL). Powers granted by legislation cannot be re-delegated without having content. This ensuresaccountability.

At para. 36, quoting Laskin J. from Brant Dairy, the Court writes: A statutory body which is empowered to do something by regulation does not act within its authority by simply repeating the power in aregulation in the words in which it was conferred. That evades exercise of the power and, indeed, turns a legislative power into anadministrative one. It amounts to a re-delegation by the Board to itself in a form different from that originally authorized; and that this isillegal is evident from the judgment of this Court in Attorney General of Canada v.

Brent, (SCC), [1956] S.C.R. 318. [30] It is clear this principle applies to the SNB Board. The Board could not evade its responsibilities to flesh outthe manner in which Order No. 2015-604 would be implemented, thus avoiding the pitfall of unlimited discretionary authority and,perhaps, the inequality of treatment of those affected. [31] This same issue was addressed by Robertson J.A. in North Shore where he concluded that marketing orderswhich, in effect, merely repeat the legislative powers granted to Boards will have no effect.

Both Brant Dairy and North Shore hold thatmarketing orders that do not include guidelines concerning their implementation or criteria as to how discretionary power will beexercised will be considered arbitrary. [32] The appellant argues the “mischief” which was addressed in Brant Dairy and North Shore does not exist in thiscase, as the order does not grant discretionary power for which criteria would be necessary.

On this point, the Panel writes: The Panel considers it is essential that persons regulated by Board orders have access to information by reference to any MarketingBoard Orders clearly setting out the standards or limits within which those persons will be regulated. In the Panel’s opinion, the Order # 2015-604 as written is an attempt by the SNB Board to exercise limitless and arbitrary power. ThePanel is left with questions similar to those asked in Roncarelli above.

Given the broad definition of marketing included in the order, isthe SNB Board’s intent to have any person engaged in any of the activities listed in the definition register with the Board, or only thosewho buy or sell? What happens if someone does not register? How does this affect the producer who is selling firewood to his neighbor,must he sell it to the Board first?

These are but a few examples of the questions that could arise from the Order as it has been established. [paras. 47-48] [33] The Panel concluded the order, as worded, gave the SNB Board complete discretion to decide how muchwood each producer could sell to the SNB Board, how much each processor could buy, and at what price. In addition, it observed theorder did not include a dispute resolution process. The Panel acknowledged the “generous” amount of discretion vested in the SNBBoard; however, it concluded that discretionary authority has limits. As stated by the Supreme Court in Roncarelli v.

Duplessis, (SCC), [1959] S.C.R. 121:

In public regulation of this sort there is no such thing as absolute and untrammelled “discretion”, that is that action can be taken on anyground or for any reason that can be suggested to the mind of the administrator; no legislative Act can, without express language, betaken to contemplate an unlimited arbitrary power exercisable for any purpose, however capricious or irrelevant, regardless of the natureor purpose of the statute. [p. 140] See New Brunswick Telephone Company, Limited v. John Maryon International Limited and John Maryon And Partners Limited;Maryon v.

New Brunswick Telephone Company, Limited, (NB CA), 43 N.B.R. (2d) 469, [1982] N.B.J. No. 387 (QL). [34] The respondents assert the SNB Board did precisely what the Supreme Court said they could not do. Thewording of the impugned order mirrors the language in the Regulation, but it is silent as to how the licencing regime would beimplemented. This problem was confirmed through the evidence of producer Scott McMillan, on behalf of D. Murray Harvesters,(Record on Appeal, at Tab C).

The respondents submit that Order No. 2015-604 creates a new regulatory regime of general applicationand constitutes an overreach of its statutory authority. The Panel concluded the order was “scant on detail” as to how it would beimplemented and it was this lack of detail that could lead to speculation and assumptions concerning the extent of its power (PanelReasons at para. 64). I agree, and it is my view the Panel was correct. B. Statutory

Interpretation [35] The Panel concluded Order No. 2015-604 was improperly constructed, it violated principles of statutoryinterpretation, and was not in keeping with the intent of the Act. A.V. Nackawic argues the order is invalid for “grammatical reasons.”The success or failure of this submission hinges on whether the SNB Board’s decision to omit certain words from the order runs contraryto the spirit and intent of the Act, more specifically, s. 9 of Regulation 2014-1, as noted.

The appellant argues that read in its “ordinaryand grammatical sense,” the provision allows the SNB Board to require any person to sell the regulated product through the Board.

Atpara. 67 of their submission they write: “The provision contemplates two separate courses of action for the Board, not one course ofaction that requires the Board to give a choice to any party affected.” In addition, the SNB Board submits the Panel decision is internallyinconsistent, arguing, on the one hand, the Panel determined the order was intra vires, and it then concluded the order exceeded thepowers granted to the SNB Board by regulation. [36]

Section 9(

d) of Regulation 2014-1 empowers the SNB Board to require “any and all persons” to register withand obtain licences from it prior to marketing the regulated product. As noted, s. 9(

g) and (

h) empower it “to require any person whoproduces the regulated product to offer to sell and to sell the regulated product to or through the Board;” and “to prohibit any personfrom processing, packing or packaging any of the regulated product that has not been sold to, by or through the Board” other thanthrough the SNB Board. The Panel accepted the order was improperly constructed, finding that words should not be added, or omitted,nor should the reader be required to fill in the gaps, as a matter of statutory

interpretation. The omissions of the words “to or through”,and “by, or through”, in Order No. 2015-604, are significant. The Panel determined the SNB Board’s failure to include the language ofthe Act in its Order was both improper and violated fundamental principles of statutory

interpretation. [37] The SNB Board argues the provision should be read disjunctively. It submits the Panel erroneously took“tools” that were meant as aids to statutory

interpretation and “elevated” them to rules with respect to the drafting of an order. The Panelwrites otherwise at paras. 84-85. [38] The Court in Small v. New Brunswick Liquor Corporation, 2012 NBCA 53, 390 N.B.R. (2d) 203, emphasizedthe importance of deference when reviewing a tribunal’s

interpretation of its home statute. Robertson J.A. states: The law has imposed a methodology, or legal framework, for addressing interpretative issues and it matters not whether the issue arisesin the civil as opposed to administrative law context. In both instances, the reviewing court will be examining the methodology used toreach an interpretative result, including the question of whether the wording gives rise to “ambiguity”. As a general proposition, wheredeference is owed and there is ambiguity giving rise to two plausible

interpretations, the one chosen by the adjudicative tribunal must beaccorded deference. However, when it comes to the task of statutory

interpretation, it is settled law that the words of an enactment mustbe read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme of the enactment, its object andthe intention of the legislature or Parliament. Alternatively stated, the

interpretation of an enactment must be made according to a textual,contextual and purposive analysis in order to find a meaning which is harmonious with the enactment as a whole. But if the words areclear they must generally prevail. If they are not clear, the words must yield to an

interpretation that best meets the overriding purpose ofthe statute (see Celgene Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 1, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 21). For purposes of deciding thisappeal, it is easy to maintain that the same approach is equally applicable, with appropriate modifications, to the

interpretation of acontract such as the By-law in question. In other words, I am taking the same approach that I would have taken if the interpretative issue

involved a provision of a collective agreement. [para. 31] See also E.A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes , 2 nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at p. 87.

The Court in Small added that these principles apply equally to enactments of provincial legislatures (see Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re) ). [ 39 ] As Dreidger writes: “Not only must the whole Act be read, but every provision of the Act should, if possible, be given meaning; hence, if there are rival constructions the general principle is that the construction that gives effect to the whole of the statute, or to the provision under consideration, should be adopted in preference to one that renders part thereof meaningless” (pp. 91-92). [ 40 ] The above principle was applied by Drapeau C.J.N.B. in LeBlanc v.

Doucet and the New Brunswick Power Corporation , 2012 NBCA 88 , 394 N.B.R. (2d) 228 , as follows: In that oft-cited case, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the following principle of

interpretation: Today, there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of

an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. [para. 21] As for s. 17 of the

Interpretation Act , it states that every provision of a regulation shall be deemed remedial and shall “receive such fair, large and liberal construction and

interpretation as best ensures the attainment” of its object. The Legislature has identified, in terms that could not be any more pellucid, the purpose of the rules and its intent regarding their

interpretation. Indeed, Rule 1.03(2) provides that “[t]hese rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just , least expensive and most expeditious determination of every proceeding on its merits” (emphasis added). The clerk and the Court of Queen's Bench judge were required to give a liberal

interpretation to sub-para. 2 (14), one designed to secure a just determination of the proceeding on its merits. With respect, the

interpretation that found favour with them does not comply with that obligation. [para. 25] [ 41 ] This same principle was reiterated by Brown J. in British Columbia v. Philip Morris International, Inc. , 2018 SCC 36 , [2018] S.C.J. No. 36 , at para. 17 . [ 42 ] In this case, the Panel considered not only ss. 9(

g) and (

h) of the marketing regulation, but it also considered ss. 3(

a) and (

g) of

Part II of the Act , as well as s. 7 of the Regulation , thus demonstrating it was alive to the legislative purpose behind the Act and Regulations . [ 43 ] The Panel found the SNB Board failed to consider the context of the whole Act when it omitted key words from the order. It found the omission of the words “and obtain licences from” removed a significant statutory power and changed the intent of the Act .

It determined the powers vested in the Board by Regulation 2014-1 refer to the collection of a licence fee and the word “and” in “register with and obtain licences from” is conjunctive (Panel Decision at paras. 74 and 84). The Panel concluded the omission of the words “or through” and “by or through” as noted, improperly changed the authority granted to the SNB Board by s. 9(

g) and 9(

h) of the Regulation . As a result, the Panel found SNB Order No. 2015-604 was improperly constructed (Panel Reasons at para. 80). [ 44 ] As stated, there is a rebuttable presumption that deference applies to a Panel’s

interpretation of its home statute. In my opinion, the Panel’s analysis was contextual, and thorough. The appellant has failed to persuade me the Panel erred on this issue. See also Robichaud v. Worksafe NB , 2018 NBCA 44 , [ 2018] N.B.J. No. 160 (QL) , at para. 8 . C. Unlawful Delegation and Bias [ 45 ] The Panel found the relationship between the SNB Board and the SNB Wood Co-op (SNB Co-op) constituted an improper delegation of powers and it gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant has merged these two conclusions into a singular ground of appeal; however, they will be treated separately, as there is a different standard of review applicable to each. The SNB Board has historically permitted its day-to-day business to be carried out by members of the SNB Co-op, a for-profit

association, the membership of which includes approximately 25 percent of the private woodlot owners who are regulated by the SNB Board. The Vice Chairman of the SNB Board testified that the Manager of its Board is also employed by the SNB Co-op as its General Manager, but reports to the Boards of Directors separately.

As the SNB Co-op harvests wood in the regulated area, the respondents argue the effect of the Order No. 2015-604 is to grant the SNB Co-op full control over the marketing of wood produced by private woodlot owners, thus placing them in a position of competitive advantage and conflict. [ 46 ] On the other side, the SNB Board argues the relationship between it and its Co-op is one of “contracting out of services.” The Chairperson of the SNB Board characterized the role of the Co-op as being its “hands and feet.” The Panel found there was evidence the SNB Board shares office space in the same building as its Co-op, it uses Co-op employees to assist with its day-to-day operations, it shares an office manager, and levies and remittances are collected by the Co-op and deposited into its account before being remitted to the SNB Board.

On this point, the Panel concluded: Further, the Panel is of the opinion that provisions do not exist within the NPA that authorize a Board to delegate the powers that have been vested in them to another person. It is the Panel’s opinion that the fact that the SNB Board relies on people solely and legally employed by the SNB Co-op to carry out the functions of an order of the SNB Board exercising its statutory powers dissolves the line between a simple “[principal]/agent” relationship and delegation of the SNB Board’s powers.

While the evidence presented at this hearing might not be sufficient to pass the legal test for apprehension of bias, the Panel agrees with the appellants there is reasonable apprehension of bias involved with the SNB Co-op employees involved in the exercise of the functions of the SNB Board. However, the Panel also recognizes that strict

interpretation of the SNB Order #2015-604 as written would in effect exclude the SNB Co-op from the ability to participate in any way other than to register with the Board before commencing or continuing in the marketing of the regulated product and sell any regulated product to the Board.

The Panel is of the opinion that if the Order was upheld as written, the issue of conflict or bias could become moot because it would be contra to the provisions in the Order for the SNB Co-op to have any involvement in the exercise of the powers under the Order. [Panel Reasons at paras. 55-56] [ 47 ] The nub of the respondents’ allegation of unlawful delegation is demonstrable in the testimony of Chairperson Sabine: Question : “There is going to have to be some negotiation like that with your producers?” Answer : “I wouldn’t call it negotiation, but okay, that set of circumstances. Yes.” Question : “Yes.

Well you agree that something like that has to take place in order for the board to secure a supply that it can deliver to the mill.” Answer : “We would have to have a contract that’s acceptable to get the volume required from the private woodlot owners and producers to fulfil the contractual needs, yes.” Question : “Okay. And the only employees available to engage in those discussions and carry this out at a practical level are the employees of the Co-op?” Answer : “Okay.” Question : “Will you agree with that? There are no other employees to do this?” Answer : “Exactly.”

Question: “Okay. Now the co-op itself is a seller of wood to the board, correct?” Answer: “Yes.” Question: “So then you have one party who is going to want to sell its wood negotiating contract terms with other regulated entities thatwant to sell their wood, correct?” Answer: “There could be employees on the negotiating committee, but as you can see like in the last one it’s the manager.

The onlyperson from the co-op that’s on our negotiating team, the last one you pointed out is the manager.” Question: “So the manager of the negotiating team–.” Answer: “Well she wouldn’t be the manager of the negotiating team but part of the team, yes.” Question: “Right. Is also going to be the manager of the Co-op which is going to want to sell product to the board?” Answer: “Yes.” Question: “So do you not see that you have set up one regulated entity, the Co-op, over which you have regulatory authority, as thenegotiating agent with other regulated entities like Mr.

Gillespie?” Answer: “No.” [Joint Book of References at pp. 33-35] [48] On this ground, J.D. Irving, Limited submits: The evidence demonstrates the day-to-day business of the Board is actually run by Co-op employees who wear “two hats.” On the onehand, they are charged with carrying out the day to day business and duties of a regulator. On the other hand, they are employed by anorganization regulated by that same Board. The Co-op earns significant revenue in acting for the Board as it discharges its duties.

TheCo-op’s members comprise a minority of the private woodlot owners and are in competition with the remaining private woodlot ownerswho are regulated by the Board, including owners who have contracts with JDI. This creates a reasonable apprehension of bias that theemployees of the Co-op, in conducting the business of the Board, will advantage the Co-op’s members and interests over otherstakeholders. [J.D. Irving, Limited Submission at para. 62] [49] It is a well-known principle that the delegation of statutory powers is not permitted in the absence ofstatutory authority.

The Panel referred to Therrien (Re), 2001 SCC 35, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 93, as authority on this issue. Theconclusions of the Panel at paras. 55 and 56 of the decision are set out above. The appellant contends there was no derogation from thisprinciple, on the basis the role of the SNB Co-op is administrative in nature. It relies on a number of authorities, including Forget v.Quebec (Attorney General), (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 90, [1988] S.C.J.

No. 68 (QL), at p.108, where the Supreme Courtconcludes: “The delegatus non potest delegare rule prevents the holder of a power which entails the exercise of a discretion fromconferring the exercise of that power on some other person or agency.” They argue because the functions of the SNB Co-op are notdiscretionary, legislative, or judicial/ semi-judicial there can be no violation of the rule. In my opinion, the conclusion reached by thePanel on this issue is defensible on both the reasonableness and the correctness standards.

There is no provision in the Act, nor inRegulation 2014-1, which allows the SNB Board to delegate its powers as it did. Although the use of agents is contemplated in 13(

c) ofthe Act, these appointments must be authorized by the Commission in advance. No such order was made which would have permitted theSNB Board to enter an agency relationship with its Co-op.

[50] On the issue of bias, the Panel writes: “While the evidence presented at this hearing might not be sufficient tosatisfy a legal test for apprehension of bias, the Panel agrees […] that there is reasonable apprehension of bias involved with the Co-opemployees involved in the exercise of the functions of the SNB Board” (Panel Reasons at para. 56). The appellant submits this statementby the Panel proves there was insufficient evidence to support its conclusion on this point.

The Panel accepted the role of the SNB Co-opwas more than just an administrative one, and was therefore non-discretionary in nature, rejecting the assertion otherwise by theappellant (Panel Reasons, para. 87). There was an abundance of evidence to support the Panel’s conclusion on this point. The SNB Boardhad not passed an order authorizing it to utilize the SNB Co-op as its agent. Despite having the power to do so, the SNB Board had notappointed its own employees to conduct the day-to-day business of the Board. In fact, Chairperson Sabine testified that the Manager ofthe SNB Board is paid by the SNB Co-op.

Details concerning who would be responsible for deciding how much wood would bepurchased from each producer and at what price were left to the discretion of the SNB Co-op. The Panel concluded this practice is notacceptable within the “application” of the Act, and would not prevent a reasonable apprehension of bias or conflict of interest (AppealBook at p. 25, paras. 87-88). I agree.

The Panel concluded, as the SNB Co-op had a vested interest as both a buyer and a seller, it wouldreceive a competitive advantage. [51] The test for reasonable apprehension of bias was articulated by de Grandpré J. in Committee for Justice andLiberty v.

National Energy Board, where he writes: […] the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to thequestion and obtaining thereon the required information […][t]hat test is “what would an informed person, viewing the matterrealistically and practically – and having thought the matter through –conclude.

Would he think that it is more likely than not that [thedecision maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly”. [para. 394] [52] Although these were dissenting reasons, his conclusions have been followed and applied with approval by theSupreme Court and by this Court since. See R. v. S. (R.D.), (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R.484, [1997] S.C.J. No. 84 (QL);Lambert v. Lacey-House, 2013 NBCA 48, 406 N.B.R. (2d) 346; Rothesay Residents Association Inc. v. Rothesay Heritage Preservation& Review Board et al., 2006 NBCA 61, 299 N.B.R. (2d) 369; and Brooks v.

The Law Society of New Brunswick et al., 2015 NBCA 18,433 N.B.R. (2d) 371. [53] The Panel did not discuss bias as a stand-alone reason; however, this issue formed part of its analysisconcerning the delegation of powers, as noted. The Panel discussed bias to illuminate the close relationship that exists between the SNBBoard and the SNB Co-op. The Panel concluded that SNB Co-op employees would “wear two hats” and would have conflicting dutiesshould the order be found valid.

I conclude it was both correct and reasonable for the Panel to find the delegation of powers to the SNBCo-op employees was improper for the reasons expressed and I discern no error on this point. D. Improper Purpose [54] The appellant contends the Panel erred when it concluded the motivating factor behind the passage of OrderNo. 2015-604 was to “force” negotiations with J.D. Irving, Limited. This assertion is wrong, in my opinion, as there was no discretefinding on this issue.

In fact, the Panel writes the following “Based on the evidence, the Panel is of the opinion that the SNB Board’sintention was to negotiate a blanket agreement that would cover all producers in the SNB Region but was ill-prepared to attemptnegotiations with JDI that were in accordance with the Commission Order No. 2005-189” (Panel Reasons at para. 58). [55] Respondent, J.D. Irving, Limited submits that this proves there was an improper purpose which motivated theSNB Board to proceed in the fashion it did.

In point of fact, the Panel concluded the intent of the Act is to ensure that “organized”negotiations take place in an effort to settle, by agreement, issues such as the price, quantity, grade of wood, delivery schedules, etc.,between the producers and processors.

It stated that this approach ensures fairness, and does not “force” negotiations with any company;however, the Panel did not explicitly find there was an improper purpose which motivated the SNB Board to pass Order No. 2015-604on the heels of the failed negotiations (Panel Reasons at para. 61). [56] With due respect to the appellant, it is my view this ground lacks merit as the Panel made no such finding. E. Procedural Fairness [57] I start by observing that the Panel did not set aside the Order for this reason. The appellant’s complaint is

largely focused on the Panel’s reasons with respect to the process employed by the SNB Board in the lead up to the passage of Order No.2015-604. During the meeting of the full SNB Board on November 2, 2015, certain members expressed concerns about the process. Twomembers, in particular, described the meeting as confusing, with no clear explanation of the effect of the order on the stakeholders. Onthis point, the Panel writes: “In any event, the evidence presented before the Panel revealed the inadequacies in the communication ofthe establishment and implementation of SNB Order No. 2015-604.

The only semblance of a plan was for the SNB Board to deal withthe issues with the Order as they were presented to the Board after the Order was established and brought into force, which in the view ofthe Panel is also inadequate” (Panel Reasons at para. 70).

In fact, four days following the effective date of the Order, the SNB Boardcirculated a communiqué to the membership in an effort to clarify its effect (Joint Book of Essential References at Tab K). [58] The Panel stated the following in para. 66 of the reasons: “The Appellants all hold the position that theestablishment and implementation of SNB Order # 2015-604 violated their rights to ‘procedural fairness’, while the Respondent believesthat because the establishment of the Order by the SNB Board was neither adjudicative nor quasi-judicial, [and] therefore does not attractthe kinds of ‘rights’ that the Appellants suggest.” [59] The appellant submits that procedural fairness does not apply, arguing the decision to pass Order No. 2015-604was “policy” driven.

It submits the Panel misapplied the law to the facts when it concluded the respondents were entitled to proceduralfairness; as the decision to pass Order No. 2015-604 was neither adjudicative, nor quasi-judicial, it does not attract the rights suggestedby the respondents. The appellant relies on the following decisions as its authority: Bedesky et al. and Farm Products Marketing Boardof Ontario et al. (1975), (ON SC), 8 O.R. (2d) 516 (H.C.J.) (QL); Pelissero v. Ontario Egg Producers MarketingBoard, [1982] O.J. No. 1373 (H.C.J.) (QL); Martineau v.

Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board, (SCC), [1980] 1S.C.R. 602, where Dickson J. (as he then was) states: A purely ministerial decision, on broad grounds of public policy, will typically afford the individual no procedural protection […]. [p.628] [60] With respect, it is my opinion the above decisions are not helpful, and are advisory only.

The Panel did notmake a discrete finding on this question and did not find the order invalid for that reason. [61] The Panel concluded there were inadequacies in the “establishment and implementation” of the order, and theonly “semblance of a plan” was to deal with issues as they were presented to the SNB Board after the order was brought into force (PanelReasons at para. 70). I agree. The Panel decision did not turn on this ground. F. Jurisdiction [62] Applying Dunsmuir, a question concerning jurisdiction is reviewed on the standard of correctness (see Alberta(Information and Privacy Commissioner) v.

Alberta Teachers' Association, 2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 S.C.R 654, per Rothstein J. at para.34). The appellant contends the Panel exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared: […] if the SNB Board wishes to properly exercise powers vested in them through the NPA and its regulations, the Board should do sothrough the appointment of employees who are employed exclusively by the Board. [Panel Reasons at para. 87] [63] It argues this excess of jurisdiction is evident in the draft substituted Order the Panel attached to its decision,contending it is, in reality, a licencing order.

The substituted order would require buyers and sellers dealing with private woodlot ownersto be licenced through the SNB Board and they would be required to provide it with information concerning the harvesting of wood inthe regulated area, as well as information concerning the types of trees being harvested. [64] The Panel made “no Order against the Board dismantling its contractual relationship with the Co-op” (J.D.Irving, Limited Submission at p. 34). In fact, it stated the following:

[…] if the SNB Board wishes to properly exercise the powers vested in them through the NPA and its regulations, the Board should do so through the appointment of employees who are employed by the[b]oard. [ 65 ] Section 68(2) of the Act grants the following authority to a Panel: 68

(2) On an appeal under

section 65, a panel may (

a) dismiss the appeal, or (

b) allow the appeal and (

i) set aside the order, decision, direction or determination of the agency or board, (ii) substitute its order, decision, direction or determination for that of the agency or board, or (iii) exempt the person who made the appeal from application of the order, decision, direction or determination of the agency or board. 68

(2) Lors d’un appel prévu à l’article 65, un comité peut

a) rejeter l’appel, ou

b) accueillir l’appel et (

i) annuler l’arrêté, la décision, la directive ou la détermination de l’agence ou de l’office, (ii) substituer à son ordonnance, sa décision, sa directive ou sa détermination celle de l’agence ou de l’office, ou (iii) exempter la personne qui interjette appel de l’application de l’arrêté, de la décision, de la directive ou de la détermination de l’agence ou de l’office. [ 66 ] Section 68(1) of the Act grants broad discretion to a Panel.

It may consider fairness, undue hardship and the effect of an order or decision, direction or determination of an agency or board on the person appealing, and it may make a decision on the appeal which it considers fair and equitable in the circumstances (s. 68(2)(b)(ii)). The appellant characterizes the substituted order as a “declaration.” In my view, the Act granted the Panel the discretion to make the draft substituted order. The principle of deference which attaches to a tribunal when it interprets its home statute was reaffirmed in Nolan v.

Kerry (Canada) Inc. , 2009 SCC 39 , [2009] 2 S.C.R. 678 at para. 33-34 . [ 67 ] Finally, the appellant submits the various grounds of appeal are “intertwined” and “indivisible”, and should the Court allow one ground of appeal, the Panel decision would be tainted in its entirety. The appellant gratuitously inserted sufficiency of reasons in several of its grounds of appeal; however, this ground was not really fleshed out in its submission.

Without going much further, I would conclude two things: if I had to consider the sufficiency of reasons as a standalone ground of appeal, I would have concluded the reasons were comprehensive, they meet the standards set by the Supreme Court as well as by this Court, and that ground would have failed. [ 68 ] Firstly, reasons, including the inadequacy thereof, are a component of the reasonableness standard to be met by a tribunal. If reasons pass the Dunsmuir standard of justification, transparency and intelligibility, they are considered adequate.

If the entirety of the reasons, taken together with the evidence, explain the result, provide public accountability and permit meaningful appellate review, they are sufficient. See Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board ), 2011 SCC 62 , [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708 at para. 14 ; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ).

In Nurses’ Union , Abella J. states: Read as a whole, I do not see Dunsmuir as standing for the proposition that the “adequacy” of reasons is a stand-alone basis for quashing a decision, or as advocating that a reviewing court undertake two discrete analyses -- one for the reasons and a separate one for the result (Donald J. M. Brown and John M. Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada (loose-leaf), at s. 12:5330 and 12:5510).

It is a more organic exercise -- the reasons must be read together with the outcome and serve the purpose of showing whether the result falls within a range of possible outcomes. This, it seems to me, is what the Court was saying in Dunsmuir when it told reviewing courts to look at “the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes” (para.

47). [para. 14] [69] In keeping with the above, it is my opinion, the Panel reasons comply with the above test. See R. v. R.E.M.,2008 SCC 51 , [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, [2008] S.C.J. No. 52 (QL) per McLaughlin C.J.C.; P.R.H. v. M.E.L., 2009 NBCA 18, 343N.B.R. (2d) 100, per Larlee J.A. at paras. 10-14; N.J.P. v. The Minister of Social Development, 2012 NBCA 3, 382 N.B.R. (2d) 245, perQuigg J.A. [70] Secondly, the argument of indivisibility was not developed by the appellant. Relying on Rule 62.21(1), theappellant asserts this Court has the authority to make such an order.

Had I been asked to make the determination, as a separate ground ofappeal, I would have dismissed this ground. [71] The Panel in this case concluded that Order No. 2015-604 was invalid for the reasons which have beendiscussed. I would not interfere with its decision and I would dismiss the appeal. VI. Disposition [72] The appeal is dismissed with costs in the amount of $2,500 payable to J.D. Irving, Limited, and A.V. NackawicInc., and combined costs in the amount of $1,500 to W. & R. Gillespie Ltd. and J.D. Timber Holdings Ltd. Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par La juge Baird I.

Introduction et contexte [1] La Commission des produits forestiers du Nouveau-Brunswick, dans une décision rendue par un comité et datée du 11 décembre 2017, a annulé l’arrêté de commercialisation no 2015-604, pris par l’Office de commercialisation desproduits forestiers du Sud du Nouveau-Brunswick (l’Office). En vertu de l’arrêté, l’Office serait devenu le « guichet unique » pour lavente de tous les produits forestiers de base provenant de terrains boisés privés dans la zone réglementée.

L’Office interjette appel decette décision en invoquant des erreurs de droit et des erreurs mixtes de droit et de fait qu’aurait commises la Commission. Il solliciteégalement un jugement déclaratoire portant que l’arrêté est intra vires, des dépens et toute autre mesure réparatoire que la Cour pourraitlui accorder. [2] Ce n’est pas la première fois que l’on demande à la Cour de contrôler une décision rendue parun comité concernant la validité d’un arrêté de commercialisation pris en vertu de la

Loi sur les produits naturels, L.N.-B. 1999, ch. N-1.2 (la Loi). Dans l’arrêt J.D. Irving, Limited c. Office de commercialisation des produits forestiers du Nord et autres, 2014 NBCA 42, 422 R.N.-B. (2e) 233, la Cour a conclu que la loi confère aux offices de commercialisation la compétence de réglementer les contratsprévoyant la vente de bois par des propriétaires de terrains boisés privés; toutefois, la Cour a conclu qu’un « arrêté decommercialisation » qui n’énonce pas les critères sur lesquels les offices s’appuieront pour accorder une approbation sera invalide(par. 34). J’y reviendrai plus loin.

En l’espèce, l’Office avait l’intention de devenir l’organisme désigné par l’intermédiaire duquel lesproduits forestiers seraient commercialisés et d’imposer à tous les producteurs l’obligation d’offrir en vente et de vendre leur boisexclusivement à l’Office ou par l’intermédiaire de l’Office. [3] L’Office a été établi en vertu du par. 18(1) de la Loi et il est régi par le Règlement établissantle Plan de commercialisation des produits forestiers du Nouveau- Brunswick –

Loi sur les produits naturels, Règl. du N.-B. 2014-1

( Règlement 2014-1 ), et le Règlement concernant l’Office de commercialisation des produits forestiers du Sud du Nouveau-Brunswick –

Loi sur les produits naturels , Règl. du N.-B. 2005-146 ( Règlement 2005-146 ). L’article 3 du Règlement 2014-1 pourvoit à l’établissement de plans de commercialisation distincts pour chacun des offices de commercialisation de produits forestiers du Nouveau-Brunswick, au nombre desquels figure l’appelant. [4] Toutes les personnes s’occupant de la commercialisation, ou de la production et de la commercialisation, du produit réglementé dans une zone réglementée sont régies par un plan (art. 4 du Règlement 2014-1 ).

Selon la définition qui en est donnée, le produit réglementé est un produit forestier de base provenant d’un terrain boisé privé situé dans une zone réglementée (art. 5 du Règlement 2014-1 ). La zone réglementée qui relève de l’Office comprend les comtés d’Albert, de Kings, de Queens et de Saint John et la paroisse de Salisbury dans le comté de Westmorland (par. 6(6) du Règlement 2014-1 ). [5] L’article 7 du Règlement 2014-1 énonce les pouvoirs qui sont conférés aux offices : Purposes for the establishment of a Board 7 The purposes for which a Board is established are: (

a) the promotion, control and regulation within its regulated area of the marketing of the regulated product; (

b) the promotion within its regulated area of the production of the regulated product; (

c) the development, conservation and management of forestry resources on private woodlots in its regulated area; and (

d) the promotion of the consumption and use of the regulated product. Objets de l’établissement d’un Office 7 Les objets pour lesquels un Office est établi sont les suivants :

a) la promotion, le contrôle et la réglementation dans la zone réglementée de la commercialisation du produit réglementé;

b) la promotion dans la zone réglementée de la production du produit réglementé;

c) le développement, la conservation et la gestion des ressources forestières sur les terrains boisés privés dans la zone réglementée;

d) la promotion de la consommation et de l’usage du produit réglementé. [6] L’Office a le pouvoir de prendre des arrêtés afin de s’acquitter de son mandat et il peut exercer les pouvoirs qui lui sont conférés à l’art. 11 de la Loi et par le Règlement 2014-1 :

Powers of a Board 9 The following powers are vested in a Board: […] (

g) to require any person who produces the regulated product to offer to sell and to sell the regulated product to or through the Board; (

h) to prohibit any person from processing, packing or packaging any of the regulated product that has not been sold to, by or through the Board[.] Pouvoirs d’un Office 9 Un Office est investi des pouvoirs suivants : […]

g) imposer à toute personne qui produit le produit réglementé l’obligation d’offrir en vente et de vendre ce produit à l’Office ou par l’intermédiaire de l’Office;

h) interdire à toute personne de transformer, d’emballer ou d’empaqueter le produit réglementé qui n’a pas été vendu à l’Office, par lui ou par son intermédiaire[.] [7] L’Office agit comme intermédiaire pour l’achat et la vente de bois par les propriétaires de terrains boisés privés et les transformateurs et, aux termes du Règlement 2005-146 , il a les pouvoirs suivants : Powers of Board 9 The following powers are vested in the Board: (

a) to exempt from any order of the Board any person or class of persons engaged in the marketing or the production and marketing of the regulated product or any class, variety or grade of the regulated product[.] Pouvoirs de l’Office 9 L’Office est investi des pouvoirs suivants :

a) soustraire à l’application d’un arrêté de l’Office toute personne ou catégorie de personnes s’occupant de la commercialisation ou de la production et de la commercialisation du produit réglementé ou de toute catégorie, variété ou classe quelconque de ce produit réglementé[.] [8] L’Office est supervisé par la Commission. Celle-ci réglemente, s’agissant de la commercialisation, les relations entre les propriétaires de terrains boisés privés et les producteurs, d’une part, représentés par les offices de commercialisation des produits forestiers, et la Province du Nouveau-Brunswick, d’autre part.

La Commission est composée d’un président indépendant, de deux représentants des transformateurs, de deux membres représentant les propriétaires de terrains boisés et les producteurs et de deux membres qui représentent le gouvernement du Nouveau-Brunswick. La Commission a le pouvoir d’établir un comité formé d’experts de l’industrie auquel la Loi confère le pouvoir d’entendre et de trancher les appels interjetés à l’encontre d’arrêtés pris par un office de commercialisation des produits forestiers. Le 9 août 2017, un comité a été établi afin d’entendre un appel concernant l’arrêté n o 2015-604 pris par l’Office.

Le 11 décembre 2017, le comité a rendu sa décision, laquelle oblige la Commission. [9] L’arrêté en question est venu remplacer l’arrêté n o 2014-604 pris en vertu du Règlement 2014- 1, qui était entré en vigueur le 14 janvier 2015 avec effet rétroactif au 31 décembre 2014. L’arrêté prescrivait que toutes « les personnes [devaient] » s’inscrire auprès de l’Office avant de commencer ou de poursuivre la commercialisation du produit réglementé et que tous les producteurs du produit réglementé « [devaient] vendre » celui-ci à l’Office (art. 2 à 6).

L’arrêté interdisait à toutes « les personnes » de faire l’achat du produit réglementé de sources autres que l’Office et il était interdit à « [t]outes les personnes » de transformer tout produit réglementé qui n’avait pas été vendu par l’Office ou par l’intermédiaire de l’Office . Les producteurs et les transformateurs différaient à propos de l’incidence de l’arrêté. A.V.

Nackawic Inc., plus précisément, croyait qu’elle pouvait continuer à traiter directement avec les propriétaires de terrains boisés privés à condition de remettre les bons de livraison et les droits perçus à l’Office. [10] Les transformateurs ont conservé l’habitude qu’ils avaient de tout simplement contourner

l’Office et de passer des contrats directement avec les producteurs malgré l’adoption de l’arrêté n o 2014-604. En juillet 2015, l’Office a établi un groupe de négociation dans le but de trouver un terrain d’entente en ce qui concernait l’achat et la vente des produits du bois. Le 23 septembre 2015, le groupe de négociation s’est réuni avec des représentants de J.D. Irving, Limited et a proposé un contrat d’achat de bois qui a été rejeté.

Plusieurs jours plus tard, le 28 septembre 2015, le personnel de direction de l’Office s’est réuni et a formulé les dispositions de l’arrêté de commercialisation qui est contesté. Le 2 novembre 2015, le projet d’arrêté a été adopté lors d’une réunion du conseil d’administration et il est entré en vigueur le 1 er janvier 2016, l’arrêté n o 2014-604 ayant alors été abrogé. L’arrêté de commercialisation n o 2015-604 est ainsi rédigé : 2. Toutes les personnes doivent s’enregistrer auprès de l’Office avant de commencer ou de poursuivre la commercialisation du produit réglementé. 3.

Toutes les personnes qui produisent le produit réglementé doivent vendre celui-ci à l’Office. 4. Il est interdit à toutes les personnes de faire l’achat du produit réglementé de sources autres que l’Office. 5. Il est interdit à toutes les personnes de transformer tout produit réglementé qui n’a pas été vendu par l’Office. 6.

L’arrêté no 2014-604 de l’Office est par la présente abrogé au moment de l’entrée en vigueur du présent arrêté. [11] L’Office voulait que l’arrêté n o 2015-604 élimine la possibilité qu’un transformateur ou un producteur passe des contrats directs en exigeant que tous les achats et les ventes de bois produit sur des terrains boisés privés dans la zone réglementée fassent l’objet de contrats passés avec l’Office et par son intermédiaire. Le président de l’Office, M. Sabine, a confirmé que l’arrêté a été rédigé par les mêmes membres qui avaient négocié, en vain, avec J.D. Irving, Limited.

Certains membres de l’Office ont témoigné qu’on ne leur avait pas fourni de copie du projet d’arrêté avant la réunion de novembre 2015 et qu’ils ne savaient pas très bien quelle serait l’incidence de l’arrêté sur leurs opérations quotidiennes avec l’Office ou avec les transformateurs. D’autres membres ont fait part de leur incertitude quant à la mise en œuvre de l’arrêté. Pendant l’audience, le comité a été informé que l’Office avait l’intention de déléguer la responsabilité administrative de la mise en œuvre de l’arrêté à la S.N.B.

Wood Cooperative Limited (la « coopérative ») et de lui verser des honoraires à l’acte; toutefois, à la date de la proclamation, aucune ligne directrice ni aucun critère n’avaient été adoptés. [12] Le 18 novembre 2015, le président de la Commission, M. Fox, a demandé à l’Office de déposer [TRADUCTION] « le plus tôt possible » un énoncé de principes concernant [TRADUCTION] « la mise en œuvre ou l’application » de l’arrêté. La question de savoir si l’Office a ou non compris le but de cette demande ne fait pas l’unanimité.

Le président Sabine a témoigné qu’il n’a pas estimé nécessaire de rédiger un énoncé de principes. L’extrait suivant de la transcription de l’audience tenue devant le comité permet de mieux saisir ce point : [TRADUCTION] Question : À bien y penser, aujourd’hui, M. Sabine, croyez-vous que ce à quoi M. Fox faisait allusion, c’était exactement les choses dont vous et moi avons discuté?

De quelle façon allez-vous mettre cela en œuvre dans un environnement où il pourrait y avoir des pénuries, où il pourrait y avoir des surplus, où des conflits d’intérêts sur la question de savoir qui a le droit de vendre et qui a le droit d’acheter se font jour? Quelles règles vont s’appliquer à ce régime? Ne pensez-vous pas que c’est là ce qui les intéressait? Réponse : Je pense qu’il demande que lorsque nous le ferons, cela soit transmis à la Commission conformément à l’arrêté, oui. [Recueil commun des principales références des intimées, p. 41] II.

La mesure réparatoire sollicitée et la décision du comité [13] Devant le comité, les transformatrices J.D. Irving, Limited, A.V. Nackawic Inc., D. Murray Harvesters Ltd., W&R Gillespie Ltd. et J.D. Timber Holdings Ltd. ont sollicité les mesures suivantes :

1. une ordonnance annulant l’arrêté n o 2015-604; 2. une ordonnance portant que l’Office ne [TRADUCTION] « doit » pas obliger les parties à s’inscrire auprès de l’Office avant de pouvoir commercialiser un produit réglementé quelconque; 3. une ordonnance portant que l’Office ne [TRADUCTION] « doit » pas interdire à toutes les personnes de faire l’achat du produit réglementé de sources autres que l’Office; 4. une ordonnance portant que l’Office ne [TRADUCTION] « doit » pas interdire à toutes les personnes de transformer tout produit réglementé qui n’a pas été vendu par l’Office ; 5. une ordonnance soustrayant les transformateurs à l’application de l’arrêté; 6. les dépens afférents à l’appel; 7. les autres mesures réparatoires qui seront jugées indiquées. [14] Dans une longue décision datée du 11 décembre 2017, le comité a conclu que l’arrêté n o 2015- 604 était invalide pour le motif qu’il : [TRADUCTION] a. faisait d’une compétence conférée par la loi une fonction administrative arbitraire, ce dont la Cour suprême du Canada a conclu qu’il s’agissait d’un exercice illégitime de pouvoir; b. n’était pas suffisamment précis et explicite, ce qui pouvait donner lieu à des suppositions et à des conjectures pour ce qui concernait sa mise en œuvre et son objet; c. était mal rédigé et ne reflétait pas l’objet de la Loi ; d. déléguait certains des pouvoirs de l’Office à la SNB Wood Co-op pour la vente des produits forestiers de base, de sorte qu’il outrepassait la compétence légale de l’Office, et il existait une crainte raisonnable de partialité en raison du fait que les employés de la SNB Wood Co-op prendraient part aux négociations en vue de fixer le prix des produits forestiers de base. [15] En somme, les motifs de décision du comité se résument essentiellement à quatre questions, savoir l’arbitraire (par. 44 à 48); l’interprétation des lois (par. 82 à 86); la délégation illégale de pouvoirs (par. 87); et finalement, la question de la partialité et celle du conflit d’intérêts qui sont étroitement liées à celle de la délégation de pouvoirs (par. 87).

III. Moyens d’appel [16] L’Office prétend que le comité a commis de nombreuses erreurs de droit ou, subsidiairement, qu’il a commis des erreurs mixtes de fait et de droit. Il fait valoir que le comité : i. a commis une erreur lorsqu’il a conclu que l’absence de directives concernant la mise en œuvre de l’arrêté constituait un exercice arbitraire de pouvoir;

ii. a commis une erreur lorsqu’il a conclu qu’il existait une crainte de partialité du fait de l’embauche du personnel de lacoopérative pour la mise en œuvre de l’arrêté et ses motifs étaient insuffisants pour appuyer ses conclusions; iii. a commis une erreur lorsqu’il a conclu que l’arrêté constituait une tentative en vue d’imposer la tenue de négociations avec[TRADUCTION] « une compagnie quelle qu’elle soit » et avait donc été pris dans un but illégitime; iv. a commis une erreur lorsqu’il a conclu qu’il y a eu manquement à l’équité procédurale et ses motifs étaient insuffisants pourappuyer cette conclusion; v. a commis une erreur de droit lorsqu’il a conclu que l’arrêté violait les principes d’interprétation des lois et avait été malconstruit; vi. a commis une erreur de fait et de droit lorsqu’il a conclu que l’arrêté était incompatible avec le libellé de la Loi; savoir plusprécisément, que les expressions « ou par l’intermédiaire de » ou « par lui ou par son intermédiaire » avaient été omises dans le libellé del’arrêté et ses motifs étaient insuffisants pour appuyer cette conclusion; vii. a outrepassé sa compétence lorsqu’il a conclu que les employés de la coopérative n’auraient pas dû être engagés pourexercer les activités quotidiennes de l’Office.

IV. Norme de contrôle [17] En l’espèce, il existe un droit d’appel conféré par la loi qui ne s’accompagne d’aucune norme decontrôle prescrite; la Cour doit donc déterminer quelle est la norme de contrôle applicable. Elle doit effectuer une analyse contextuelle.(Dunsmuir c. Nouveau-Brunswick, 2008 CSC 9, [2008] 1 R.C.S. 190, aux par. 57 et 62 à 64). [18] L’Office prétend qu’il y a deux normes de contrôle applicables (voir l’arrêt Dunsmuir, auxpar. 47 à 49). Dans l’arrêt Canada (Commission canadienne des droits de la personne) c.

Canada (Procureur général), 2018 CSC 31, [2018] A.C.S. no 31 (QL), le juge Gascon a réitéré qu’il existe une présomption selon laquelle la décision d’un tribunal administratif quiinterprète sa loi constitutive est assujettie à la norme de la décision raisonnable. L’Office fait en outre valoir que la norme de la décisioncorrecte s’applique pour ce qui concerne les autres questions qu’il a mentionnées dans son mémoire. [19] Comme l’a dit le juge d’appel Robertson au par. 12 de l’arrêt J.D. Irving, Limited c.

Office decommercialisation des produits forestiers du Nord et autres, à une époque postérieure à l’arrêt Dunsmuir, « la norme de la décisioncorrecte s’applique à toutes les questions de droit qui revêtent une importance capitale pour le système juridique et qui sont étrangères àl’expertise relative du tribunal administratif, et non pas aux seules questions qui font intervenir des principes de common law ou de droitcivil (Canada (Commission canadienne des droits de la personne) c.

Canada (Procureur général), 2011 CSC 53, [2011] 3 R.C.S. 471 ».Il est indiscutable que la norme de la décision correcte s’applique aux décisions des tribunaux administratifs qui font intervenir une« véritable question de compétence » (Dunsmuir, au par. 59). La norme de contrôle dite de la décision correcte concerne des questionstouchant véritablement à la compétence ou à la constitutionnalité, des questions constitutionnelles, des questions qui revêtent uneimportance capitale pour le système juridique et la délimitation des compétences respectives de tribunaux concurrents.

Comme l’asouligné le juge Robertson dans cette affaire, s’ajoutent à cette liste les recours où est invoquée la violation de l’équité procédurale, ou lapartialité; toutefois, si la législature a délégué au tribunal le droit d’adopter des lignes directrices ou une politique en matière demécanismes décisionnels, la norme de la déférence est rétablie (par. 15). Le juge Robertson y a conclu que les décisions de laCommission [des produits forestiers du Nouveau-Brunswick] appellent à la déférence (par. 22).

La question de la délégation illégale depouvoirs en l’espèce sera examinée à l’aune de la norme de la décision raisonnable. [20] Le contrôle des conclusions se rapportant à la partialité sera effectué d’après la norme de ladécision correcte (voir l’arrêt Committee for Justice and Liberty c. Office national de l’énergie, (SCC), [1978] 1 R.C.S. 369, [1976] A.C.S. no 118 (QL), à la p. 394.

La norme de la décision correcte sera appliquée si l’on établit la présence d’une descatégories mentionnées dans l’arrêt Dunsmuir ou, exceptionnellement, si une analyse contextuelle montre que l’intention claire dulégislateur était que la norme de la décision correcte s’applique. Voir l’arrêt Commission de la santé, de la sécurité et de l’indemnisation des accidents au travail c. St-Onge, 2018 NBCA 53, [2018] A.N.-B. no 198 (QL), le juge d’appel Richard, au par. 13. Voir aussi l’arrêt

Groia c. Barreau du Haut-Canada, 2018 CSC 27, [2018] A.C.S. no 27 (QL), le juge Moldaver. [21] Les principes susmentionnés demeurent les principes qui doivent nous orienter jusqu’à ce que laCour suprême en décide autrement. Pour les motifs qui suivent, je conclus que la décision du comité fait

partie des issues raisonnables etje ne constate aucune erreur de droit qui justifierait une intervention en appel. Je suis d’avis de rejeter l’appel. V. Analyse [22] Le comité a décrit avec perspicacité la toile de fond du litige qui nous occupe lorsqu’il a écritceci : [TRADUCTION]Le comité estime que, ramenée à sa forme la plus simple, la présente instance fait ressortir deux litiges différents; l’un opposant unepartie à laquelle la loi confère des pouvoirs qu’elle cherche désespérément à exercer et des parties qui désirent que l’exercice de cespouvoi

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